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Abstract  
This thesis explores constructions of success and failure for women in mid-life in 
Britain in the early 21st century.  It takes a discursive approach to social 
psychology, understanding language as social action constituting subjects and 
subjectivity.  Data from 20 interviews, including 4 conducted with women in 
pairs, supported by loosely structured questionnaires and a collection of 
photographs of women including celebrities and unknown women, were used to 
generate talk of selves and others.   Key objects marked out as sites of success and 
failure included family; work-life balance; possession of psychological capitals of 
happiness, security, and decorum around material affluence; exercise of choice, 
evaluated as good or bad choice and implicated in responsible citizenship.  Such 
sites were seen to be issues of interactional negotiation as analysis attended to 
ideological dilemmas and contested positions, to rhetorical negotiations of 
troubled and untroubled positions, such as dilemmas of adequacy and sufficiency 
for the passing subject.  
 Engaging with sociological narratives of individualisation and 
neoliberalism, this psychological study provided an empirical illustration of how 
these grand narratives appear in mundane talk in the context of constructions of 
success and failure, with implications for making sense of selves and others. 
Analysis showed more nuanced deployment of discursive resources than much 
previous literature suggests:  talk was threaded with argumentation and contest.  
 The thesis also considered how discourse studies might take life history 
and personal order seriously.  It presents an empirical analysis of personal order, 
extending this to interpersonal orders and habits of engagement accruing for 
subjects in ongoing relationships.  It adds to debates on the nature of the 
psychosocial, with concepts from psychoanalytic psychosocial readings, such as 
imagination and projection, re-worked empirically as discursive productions 
embedded in shared resources for making sense of the world, deployments also 
rooted in sedimented personal history. 
x 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. The research aims 
This thesis explores contemporary constructions of success and failure for women 
in mid-life in Britain in the first decade of the 21st century, and the implications 
for subjects, subjectivity, and claims to identity.  The interest is in both 
negotiations of self and of others; in how subjects are worked up and marked out 
as successful or failing.  It examines ideological dilemmas, the rhetorical 
negotiation of troubled and untroubled positions, and the figurations of personal 
and interpersonal orders for ‘subjectifying’ the self, and for subjectifying the other 
as ‘successful’ or ‘failing’. 
This is an area encompassing some large debates in social psychology and 
social theory about the formations, maintenance and variability of contemporary 
subjects, and appropriate ways for investigating these.  It is an area dominated in 
social theory by grand narratives of individualisation and neoliberalism.  These 
debates have been active for fifteen years or more in sociology, but social 
psychology has been slow to engage with them.  This thesis makes a contribution 
to this gap. 
The thesis also contributes to contemporary dialogues between 
discursively led psychosocial psychologies favoured here and psychoanalytically 
inflected psychosocial psychologies.  It argues for an understanding of the 
psychosocial which leaves aside the posited internally directed hidden worlds of 
the psychoanalytic, where the psyche is an unconscious governing property of the 
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individual, and instead, promotes an understanding of the psyche as thoroughly 
relationally, intersubjectively, and discursively organised. 
The empirical foundations draw on interviews with a sample of 24 women 
aged between 33 and 59, conducted during the period October 2006 to September 
2007.  The epistemological foundations are that the language-in-use in these 
interviews is interested social action, not neutral representation.  Language is 
understood to constitute worlds, subjects and semiotic histories and orders.   
The analytic approach employed here synthesises an attention to the fine 
grained action that takes place in talk, and crucially also locates that talk within 
the broader ideological and historical environment, attentive to dilemmas, 
tensions and conflicts.  In the process it works up a multilayered account of social, 
personal and interpersonal orders of meaning in relation to notions of successful 
and failing subjects, and successful and failing identities of self and other.   
1.1.1. Individualisation and neoliberalism  
Contemporary social theories of the Western subject are dominated by the grand 
narratives of neoliberal individualisation developed by Giddens (1991) and Beck 
(1992; see also Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; 2001).  These ideas refer to the 
reflexive practices of the ‘life project’: making oneself into a particular kind of 
person, exercising particular choices, and building a personal capacity for self 
provision.  The negotiation of identities of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is argued to be a 
central task within the neoliberal, individualisation project (Clarke, 2005; Skeggs, 
1997; 2004; Walkerdine, 2003). 
These grand sociological narratives make up a debate to which social 
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psychology has been somewhat unresponsive.  When psychology has attended to 
concepts of success and failure it has typically done so through studies of 
attribution theories (Försterling, 2001; Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 1983; Kelley, 
1967; Ross, 1977; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and 
Rausenbaum, 1971); or as factors correlating with measures of ‘self-esteem’ 
(Brown and Dutton, 1995; Emler, 2001; McGregor and Elliott, 2005); or theorists’ 
ascriptions to fears – fear of failure and fear of success (Clance and Imes, 1978; 
Horner, 1969; Hyde and Kling, 2001; Jones and Berglas, 1978; Tresemer, 1976a; 
1976b; Wrye, 2006); and with an occasional view to how individuals might define 
success and failure (Dyke and Murphy, 2006; Smulyan, 2004; Sturges, 1999).  
Mostly, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ have been treated as self-evident, objectifiable 
outcomes, determined in advance by the operational interests of the researcher.  
The approach has often been over-simplified, taken for granted, and 
individualistic.   
However, both social psychology and social theory have rather overlooked 
the complex and nuanced social activity taking place when people take on 
constructs of success and failure.  A small body of work is beginning to address 
this (see for example Locke, 2004, on sporting success; Smulyan, 2004, and 
Wagner and Wodak, 2006, on career success).  Nevertheless the gap in the project 
remains vast. 
 The underpinning argument of the thesis is that while contemporary 
individualisation practices may coerce people into marking out particular 
accountable ways of being ‘successful subjects’, what passes as success is 
contested and shifting.  This means people have opportunity and call to be 
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creative and flexible in the way they recruit and navigate mobile discourses of 
success and failure; working up moment by moment passing kinds of identity 
capitals. 
For example, material possessions may be positioned as measures of 
success, and their absence as measures of (economic) failure; particular forms of 
employment may occupy hierarchical positions over others, and particular kinds 
of intimate relationships may be privileged over others, or indeed over none, and 
so on. However, these may also all be contested as to whether they are the right 
kinds of measures of success. And, whether their absence implies failing subjects. 
This space for contest makes alternative claims to success negotiable, such as 
claims to ‘psychological’ success via discourses of happiness for example, which 
can be used to outrank other constructions or re-fashion them.  The thesis will 
illustrate this taking place in discursive practices. 
But, these various claims to successes are not without severe constraints.  
For success to be claimed effectively, it must be done in such a way as to be 
persuasive, to be recognised, as success. What might be understood by these 
notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is of course integral to the empirical ambitions 
of the thesis.  However, within the social constructionist underpinnings for this 
thesis, positions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are imagined as provisional, shifting, 
relational states of interested stake, requiring ongoing management.  This 
management is understood to carry risk, as concepts of success and failure are 
marked out as ethical projects; loaded with moral dilemmas and threats to identity 
and subjectivity (Locke, 2004; Skeggs, 2004; 2005; Walkerdine, 2003; 
Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001).  Both failure and success must be 
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managed in talk with care. 
It is an aim of this thesis to explore the social action which takes place 
when speakers talk of success and failure.  It will consider what these grand 
narratives of neoliberal individualisation look like lived out in discursive practices 
of subjectivity and identity making.  The thesis examines some of the ideological 
dilemmas and trouble in relation to both failure and success, reproduced, re-
worked, and lived out in the moment.  The thesis also has something to say about 
how these social practices are taken up as if they are authentic, owned 
psychologies; and how they take on a character of personal, and interpersonal 
order in the patterns of use.   
1.1.2. Invisible women 
The ‘subjects’ in this thesis are women in mid-life.  In psychology, Mary Gergen 
(1990: 477) has argued that ‘the woman at midlife has largely been overlooked by 
existing psychological accounts’ (1990:477) and where she is made visible, it is 
‘highly circumscribed in focus’ – physical decline – and ‘disabling in its 
consequences’ (1990:480).  This is in large part, she argues, because of the way 
many psychological accounts support oppressive ideological constraints on 
women.  Where we do appear, we are often pathologised as beings in decay, as 
creatures of loss: loss of fecundity, opportunity, youth, beauty and so on (Banister, 
2000; Chung, 2002; Degges-White, 2001; Gergen and Gergen, 2003). 
 There is of course a long line of critical feminist work explicating the 
systematic Othering of women (de Beauvoir, 1953; Greer, 1970; Skeggs, 1997; 
2004; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989; and many others), where the practices of 
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gender and gendering are understood to produce a subject constructed as always 
already deficient, and deviant.  These significant bodies of feminist scholarship 
suggest that women start the contemporary task of fashioning themselves as 
successful subjects from a culturally already given position of inadequacy. 
Moreover, this subject ‘woman’ is not simply presented and represented as 
deficient and deviant, but as one who must strive constantly to atone for that.  Yet, 
as Skeggs citing Bartky (Skeggs, 1997:82) says, ‘the demands of femininity are 
such that…virtually every woman is bound to fail, adding shame to her 
deficiency’.   
What is more, the women in my study are women in mid-life, that is, 
women further tyrannised by a cultural drive to banish signs of that mid-life age 
(Gullette, 2004).  Youth, Gullette argues, is a form of capital:  if old age had 
similar capital, looking young at 40 would not be quite so well received.  To be an 
aging women, then, is to be deficient in a particularly buoyant form of social 
capital.  In this framework ‘the successful middle aged woman’ is a virtually 
impossible position to inhabit.  To be successful in mid-life means in effect to 
deny aspects of the embodied aging self and render these aspects of the self 
invisible (Bordo, 1993; Gullette, 2004).  In short, this suggests that increasingly to 
be received as successful in middle age means not to appear to be in middle age. 
 While these critical accounts are philosophically and politically 
persuasive, there is a shortage of empirical analysis of how they are taken up by 
women themselves in mundane talk.  So, one of the interests for this study lies in 
how language-in-use accounts from adult women, women in their 30s, 40s and 
50s, might inform these characterisations of deficiency and deviancy, and ‘failing’ 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
7 
subjects. 
A focus on accounts of success and failure, framed in this way, is clearly  
not a neutral project.  It carries a risk that simply by asking about these things, 
accounts of failing, of not being good-enough, the study may just be adding to the 
pathologisation of women already pointed to.  It could work to reinforce the 
negative and oppressive characterisations just mentioned, and this will be 
something to pay critical attention to in analysis.  It is not a reason, though, to 
avoid investigation.  This topic is rooted in everyday business of being in the 
world (Pahl, 1995; Skeggs, 1997; 2004; Walkerdine, 2003). These are recurrent 
concerns, both in identity performance and the subjectivity of everyday lived 
lives.  
A research aim framing the project then is to respond to the general 
invisibility in social psychology of women in mid-life, and to the routine 
pathologisation where we do appear (Gergen, 1990).  However, the thesis also 
recognises from developing debates in concepts of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 
1989; 1991; McCall, 2005; Wetherell, 2005a) that this is not a homogeneous 
group.  There are multiple identities and subjectivities of this subject ‘woman’.  
Therefore the specificity and constraints of the all white, all British sample of 
participants here needs to be flagged. 
So, for this study of this particular sample of women loosely framed as in 
mid-life, the thesis explores if, and how, the grand narratives of the successful 
neoliberal self are taken up in the everyday practices of talk and meaning-making.  
It aims to understand something more about the discursive resources available to 
this group of women for giving meaning to  ‘success’ and ‘failure’ for themselves 
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and other women; and indeed, what constitutes success and failure, and for whom.  
Combining all this, it considers the implications carried for inhabiting particular 
subject positions and performing particular identities of  successful and/or failing 
subjects. 
1.1.3. Conversations on the psychosocial 
The final priority for the thesis is to join in current conversations on the ontology 
and epistemology of the ‘psychosocial’ subject.  That is, debates on the nature of 
the psychosocial subject, and what can be known about that subject, and by what 
processes and methods.   The women of this study are understood as postmodern, 
poststructural subjects.  This is a Foucauldian reading of the subject: one 
constituted in practices and regimes of knowledge (Foucault, 1961; 1969; 1973; 
1975; 1976; 1984; Rose, 1996; 1999).  These are fragmented subjects immersed in 
reflexive consequential interactional discursive practices, where talk of success 
and failure are not neutral assessments of achievements and disappointments, but 
are conceived as practices which constitute people and in which people have a 
stake (Antaki, 1988; 1994; Billig, 1991; 1996; Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, 
Middleton and Radley, 1988; Davies and Harré, 1990; Gergen, 1994; 1999; 
Potter, 1996; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001a; 
2001b).   
Subjects understood in this way are not simply users of language, but are 
subjects produced in language, in the ongoing technologies and practices through 
which the subject is knowable, both to itself and to others.  This is a psychosocial 
subject – although this is a contested term (Andrews, Day Sclater, Squire and 
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Treacher, 2000; Frosh and Baraitser, 2008; Hollway, 2004; Hollway and 
Jefferson, 2000a; 2000b; 2005a; 2005b; Wetherell, 2005b).    
The starting point in this thesis for working with the concept of the 
psychosocial is a fairly loose definition:  that there is an inseparable relation 
between the subject, understanding, experience and the social realm.  However, 
over recent years, the notion of the psychosocial has been somewhat captured by a 
psychoanalytically inflected account of the subject (Hollway, 2004).  So, as part 
of this project I have a particular interest in exploring if this socially constructed 
subject needs to be understood in psychoanalytic terms (Henriques, Hollway, 
Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine, 1984; Hollway and Jefferson, 2000a; Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody, 2001) or whether intriguing concepts from psychoanalysis, 
such as unconscious dynamics, repression, projection, identification and fantasy, 
can be re-worked discursively as social actions occurring in language-in-use, not 
in privately owned inner psyches (Billig, 1999a).  This version of the subject is a 
thoroughly social, psycho-discursive subject (Wetherell, 2007; Wetherell and 
Edley, 1999), one which entirely elides any sense of Cartesian duality, of the split 
between an imagined thinking, feeling, experiencing ‘I’, and the social, material 
location of that ‘I’.  The thesis will point empirically to the ‘doing’ of discursively 
organised psychosocial subjectivities and identities and to methods for accessing 
that ‘doing’.   
1.2. Inside-outside the subject: (re)constructing the researcher 
A reflexive address to the interests and investments of the researcher is an 
expected component of contemporary qualitative methodologies in psychology.  
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This follows a recognition that the positions and subjectivities of the researcher 
are integral to the unavoidably partial and situated conducts and products of the 
research (Taylor, 2001a).  Thus, it has become the convention to present an 
account of the researcher’s relationship to the research: to the topic, questions, 
assumptions, priorities, analytic paths and so on (Finlay and Gough, 2003; Lynch, 
2000; Pels, 2000). On the face of it, this might be seen to be even more of a 
pressing requirement for this project given the similarities that might be drawn 
between my topic and my own situated concerns:  I am a woman in mid-life, 
embedded in my own precarious ‘life project’ of building a new career. Locating 
myself in relation to my research seems irresistibly pertinent.  However, I want to 
separate out a couple of issues: reflexivity as a profitable interrogatory tool to be 
used throughout the research process; and reflexive positioning as a versioned, 
public, autobiographical, invested, account.   
 On the first of these, I am committed to the principle and practice of 
reflexive interrogation of the trajectories of the research via questions about my 
own interests, investments, concerns, anxieties, assumptions and so on.  However, 
I am more cautious and pessimistic about the second; the function of my own 
‘autobiographical’ account.  There are a number of problems with the processes 
and claims of such a reconstructed account.  
Almack and Churchill (2007:37) point out that as researchers ‘we do not 
have the benefits of anonymity provided to research respondents, [and this] raises 
salient questions about what we might want to reveal or conceal’.  Self-
presentation carries issues of risk.  To expose oneself reflexively, and indeed 
those others who may people our autobiographical accounts either directly or by 
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implication, to critical public scrutiny is a risk.  To do so may be taken as 
evidence for a ‘well-balanced psyche’, or alternatively, simply ‘foolhardiness’ 
(Ribbens McCarthy, 2007:142).  To be too free with one’s narrative risks falling 
into a ‘vortex of narcissism, pretentiousness, or infinite regress’ (Finlay and 
Gough, 2003:xi). 
Demands of the academy and the genre mean that to tell oneself as a 
reflexive researcher needs to be a balanced, carefully managed identity project in 
its own right.  Whatever the intent, these reflexive autobiographical accounts are 
unavoidably their own acts of repression: any one account silences other possible 
accounts, ‘concealing more than they reveal’ (Billig 1999a:7).  As some features 
are included other possibilities are excluded – hence my pessimism about 
reflecting on my own position.  Nevertheless, the arguments for some form of self 
location are compelling and need to be treated with respect, albeit doubt.  
I am a woman in mid-life, studying the discourses of women in mid-life. I 
am exploring other women’s constructions of success and failure along with 
complex moral constructions of identities of the self and others; and I am doing 
this at the same time as I am undertaking my own life project. This is a project to 
reconfigure myself from a former position of mainly unfulfilling, tenuous, low 
paid, sometimes piecemeal, contract work in voluntary or not-for-profit 
organisations; to a successful academic ‘subject’ through the practices of doctoral 
candidacy and subsequent employment.  I am then a subject in immediate, 
intimate,  relations with notions of successes and failures; a subject ‘inside’ my 
subject of study.   
Undoubtedly though, I have a different agenda to the women who most 
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generously took part in this study.  Inevitably I appropriate their words to my 
service. Therefore I am not precisely ‘one of them’: my multiple positions and 
intersubjectivities flow differently throughout the project.  I am relationally 
distributed, being both a subject inside my subject; and simultaneously outside of 
my subjects. 
The inevitable personal indexicality of the topic was not my original, 
‘conscious’, motivation.  Rather, I was intrigued by the apparent skill some 
women are able to demonstrate in working up (very well) passing identities with 
one set of discursive resources; when other women, in apparently similar 
circumstances, appeared to struggle to recruit resources for equivalently passing 
accounts.  Not surprisingly though, despite my initial naivety, I am of course now 
both positioning my research and its outcomes, and positioned by them.   
As a white, British, working class woman, with a shifting career trajectory, 
now pursuing a career in higher education, I feel myself precariously positioned  
(Almack and Churchill, 2007:43). This positioning is not only by my own 
semiotic order, self-doubts and anxieties, or the remembered and imagined voices 
of the past, but also by the strenuous reminders from respected scholars (some 
also self-categorised as working class) that as a working class woman I will 
experience myself as not quite good enough (Skeggs, 1997; Walkerdine, Lucey 
and Melody, 2001), as always in range of failure. I confess this has resonance, no 
more so than now. 
Moreover, as I have immersed myself in the discourses and ideologies of 
my analysis many other facets of my life have been brought into relational relief.  
What have my different imaginings of success been, my imaginings of my failures 
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(past and future)?  In each relationship, in each job, in the conducts of my life, 
what have been my understandings of myself as a successful or failing subject?  
Have I, do I, will I pass?  These questions locate me directly within the topic of 
my subject.  I am acutely aware that such questions of success and failure, 
whether asked publicly or privately, can be painfully loaded.  This is precisely a 
reason why such notions matter as a subject of research scrutiny. 
Etherington (2004:16) suggests that transparency and reflexivity in 
research may be gendered in some way, a facet, she claims, of ‘women’s ways of 
knowing’.  This is not an argument I find persuasive, but nevertheless, it takes on 
something of a direct challenge.  If I am to locate myself as a ‘successful’ female 
researcher, I am doubly urged to open up my life to scrutiny wherever it may be 
connected in some way with my subject of study.  However, given my subject of 
study, success and failure, as it is worked up by women often much like me, but 
translated in whatever direction the participants in this study lead, it is hard to 
imagine what fears, anxieties, hopes and desires, materialities and practicalities I 
might conceive which are not connectable to my research in some way.  I have to 
draw the line somewhere.  I choose to draw it early, but flexibly: I will make 
reference to my own connected positions at different points in my analysis – but 
this will be with a light touch.  
1.3. An overview of the thesis 
Throughout the thesis I will be developing a social psychology account of 
constructions of success and failure for women in mid-life, embedded in larger 
discourses of individualisation and neoliberalism.  However, this is a thesis 
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attentive to the dialogic, to nuance, flexibility and variability.  The goal is to 
contribute substantive material from an often overlooked population to the 
neglected debates around these grand narratives of social theory and to understand 
something of the positions which may be inhabited, the contests which may be 
negotiated.  An additional goal rests on making an empirical contribution to 
discussions of the ontology and epistemology of the psychosocial subject.   
In Chapter 2 I review some of the traditions in psychology for examining 
notions of success and failure.  Given the vast scope of the field this is not a 
comprehensive review of all these literatures on success and failure. Instead, the 
focus is on outlining the different ways success and failure have been researched, 
and the different types of assumptions and epistemologies which underpin them.  
In particular, I consider attribution theories - how people account for success and 
failure, important because it has such a vast history in the psychology of success 
and failure; and also literatures on the emotional associations of success and 
failure, particularly supposed fearfulness and impacts on self esteem.  I summarise 
the things most commonly marked out as sites and objects of success and failure, 
most typical of which is career success and I examine some recent studies here.   
 Throughout, I present a critique which argues that following the turn to 
language in the 1980s a new way of approaching social psychology became a 
compelling paradigm shift for many scholars and presented a devastating critique 
for the available psychologies of success and failure.  In particular, I will be 
presenting the now familiar argument that conventional approaches to the 
psychology of success and failure overlook the social actions, functions, and 
accomplishments at stake for subjects as they negotiate particular situated 
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subjectivities and take up particular identities around constructs of success and 
failure. 
 In Chapter 3 I outline this paradigm shift by drawing on post-structuralist 
readings of the subject.  I gather together the central intellectual resources which 
underpin the thesis and explain why I favour this framework for thinking.  This 
combines Foucauldian theories of subjectification, power and technology, fleshed 
out with an account of the psy complex, and the grand sociological narratives of 
neoliberal meritocratic individualisation.  I also present an account of language as 
dialogic, elaborated through concepts of ideological (re)productions, positioning 
theories and psycho-discursive concepts of trouble, and imaginary positions 
worked up in discourse studies in social psychology.  This third chapter also 
considers the explanatory potential of a psychoanalytically informed psychosocial 
theory, particularly as it might contribute theories of emotion, repression, 
projection, investment, and so on.  However, I contest some of the crucial 
assumptions and methods of psychoanalysis and establish my own position firmly 
located within a dynamic dialogic and reflexive psycho-discursive psychosocial 
framework.  
 The argument flowing through the account so far is that to understand the 
practices and implications of  constructing identities of success and failure there is 
an inescapable need to understand the subject as complex,  multiple, situated, and 
contingent.  In the final block of this chapter I address some of the  specificities of 
these complications by exploring ideas of location and intersectionality through 
configurations of gender, age, and class.   
Chapter 4 explains the methods used.  These are underpinned by the 
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central notion of language as social action.  I consider different approaches within 
discourse studies in social psychology, and explain why I favour a synthesis of 
micro and macro analyses of interview data.  I discuss the rationale for using 
open-ended, loosely structured interviews to generate data.  Choosing this loose 
structure reflects my desire to examine those objects participants would mark out 
as successes or failures, rather than directing their actions around any a priori 
assumptions of success and failure I might make.  The interviews also offered a 
setting for working up accountable identities.  Here, sixteen of twenty interviews 
were conducted one to one, but four interviews were conducted in pairs.  The two 
formats presented participants with very different interactional, relational 
accounting tasks.  Interviews also utilised photographic images of other women, 
some celebrities, some unknown.  I explain my purpose in this as a means of 
encouraging and supporting a focus on ‘actual’ others in addition to accounts of 
the self.  I explain my sampling methods and my decision to amend my sampling 
plan part way through data collection as renewed ethical concerns arose for me. I 
also explain the transformation of interview material into data, and the recursive 
processes of transcription and analysis, and the contribution of field notes to 
analysis. 
In Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 I present my empirical findings.  In the first of 
these, Chapter 5, I begin by illustrating the kinds of talk the project has generated 
and indicate some of the interests to be pulled out as analysis proceeds, for 
example the particular kinds of discursive resources available, and dilemmas of 
positioning and accountability participants implement in the production of 
individualised, biographical, and psychologised subjects.  I caution against any 
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overly simplistic division of success and failure into uncomplicated binaries, 
suggesting something much more flexible and nuanced as participants translate 
success and failure into a range of alternative forms, such as ‘things that are 
important’, and ‘what makes me happy’.   The core of the chapter, though, attends 
to discourses of family.  This is one of the central sites worked up by speakers as a 
marker for successes and failures.  Children and relationships are routinely 
produced as primary components of claims to successful identities for the 
speakers here.   However, there are also conflicting demands generated around 
mothering and career.  All together, this generates a powerful normative order in 
prioritising family, but one that is also a precarious and diminished position for 
women inhabiting dialogic dilemmas.  I illustrate some of the discursive strategies 
available for navigating a route through these tensions, particularly the practice of 
calling up multiple, contrasting, subject positions. 
In chapter 6, I turn attention to the resources for constructing successful 
psychologised and agentic selves as participants negotiated the right kinds of 
psychological capitals.  This includes a decorum about displays of wealth, and a 
privileging of security, happiness, and exercising choice.  Material wealth is 
constructed and orientated to as a troubled component of claims to being a 
successful self.  It is a position which appears to be constrained by normative 
expectations of modesty.  This intersects in challenging ways for speakers invited 
to work up identities of success in a climate that emphasises so greatly the 
successful production of selves, but which requires modesty in self presentation. 
A particularly useful solution to the dilemma of negotiating warrantable, 
legitimate, and nuanced notions of success and failure appears in the working up 
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of two ‘psychologised’ sites of success - happiness and choice.  Both constitute 
particular claims to success; and both are strategic resources for rejecting 
implications of failure.  Choice however, is worked up by speakers in a highly 
versatile way.  Speakers are in critical, nuanced debate with concepts of choice, 
questioning the tensions and contests ‘choice’ brings; and the demands of being a 
‘choosing’ subject.  Moreover, talk of choices made invokes criteria for marking 
out good choice and bad choice, the responsible and irresponsible, and with it 
good subjects and bad subjects.   
In Chapter 7 I turn attention to the construction of imaginary others, using 
an exploration of the body as a site of moral tensions and imagined psychologies.  
Data for the chapter came from discussions of photographs of other women, some 
celebrities, some unknown.  This created a rich opportunity for a multi-layered 
analysis of social and personal orders in which speakers constructed other women.  
I examine the way the practice of imagining others, constructing particular kinds 
of psychological, emotional states, and so on, is a practice built into the shared 
discursive resources available for making sense of selves and others.  The way in 
which different women are constructed in terms of living out successful or failing 
lives suggests a telling process of classification according to moralised hierarchies 
of social capital; who is marked out as valued, and who is not.   
I also argue though that the particular organisation these discursive  
imaginings of others takes, is not simply a matter of socially shared discourses, 
but is also deeply rooted in personal history and personal order: particular 
discursive resources settle into particular habits of meaning-making drawing on a 
sediment of salient resources.  To illustrate, I weave an analysis of one 
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participant’s talk of beauty, family and sacrifice in relation to others, with an 
analysis of those concepts played out in relation to her talk of herself, and her own 
biography as a mother and business women in the beauty industry.  I use this 
analysis of personal order to address a critique from psychoanalytic psychosocial 
psychology that queries the potential for a discursively led social psychology to 
take biography and life history seriously.  I demonstrate empirically through the 
multilayered analyses of talk here that a discursively led psychology is indeed 
able to do precisely that.  
Chapter 8 adds to this debate with an illustration of both personal and 
interpersonal order through an examination of one interview between two sisters 
working up connected and contested accounts of successful and failing identities.  
I consider some of the literatures on sibling relationships which might inform 
analysis before demonstrating a recurring pattern both in the biographical events 
the sisters narrate and in unfolding sequences of that narration.  This is a routine 
and repeated ‘habit of engagement’, an interpersonal order by which the speakers 
construct and enact a particular pattern of taking up/taking over each other’s 
subject positions and narrative capitals.  I also work up the notion of recognition 
and misrecognition, both as it occupies the sisters’ talk, and as it offers 
explanatory possibilities as a quality of untroubled and troubled  positions.  
Finally, in Chapter 9 I summarise my thesis and present my conclusions, 
showing the contributions to knowledge this study makes and the potential areas 
for further research.   
Appendices follow the final chapter, including recruitment and sample 
details, copies of the photographic images used and details of transcription 
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notation. References are at the end. 
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Chapter 2. Reviewing psychologies of success and 
failure 
2.1. A rationale for selecting literatures 
There is no one simple ‘psychology of success and failure’.  Previous study has 
approached conceptualisations of success and failure in a variety of ways and this 
chapter explores some of those ways as potential resources for addressing the 
research questions outlined in chapter 1.  However, the breadth and depth of the 
literature is vast and a pragmatic way of rationalising the material of choice is 
needed. 
Broadly, literatures on success and failure might be roughly divided into 
four overlapping themes: how people account for it (attribution theory); how to 
achieve it (for example, motivation theories); what success and failure feels like 
(particularly its fearfulness and its impact on self esteem); and to a lesser extent, 
what it is to be a successful person (captured mainly by humanistic psychologies 
attending to personal growth, fulfilment and self-actualisation). As a consequence 
of both scale and focus it is not practical to take a detailed literature review of all 
of these empirical and theoretical sites, nor is it sensible to focus in close detail on 
just one leaving other relevant literatures untouched.  Instead, I will be outlining 
some key concepts, assumptions and epistemologies from these broad areas in 
order to set out interlocutors for the arguments which run through this thesis. 
 I will be suggesting the different fields have one particular point in 
common which is of direct importance for this project.  Typically, the literatures 
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covered here tend to converge around the idea that when people (participants and 
analysts) are talking about ‘success’ and ‘failure’, there is generally some trouble 
to be navigated. In this sense, the literatures make a valuable contribution to the 
study here, pointing to what might be troublesome about success and failure and 
suggesting some fruitful lines of exploration.  I will be illustrating this shortly.  
However, I will also be arguing that the approaches to the person, the 
methodologies and epistemologies of the psychologies in which these literatures 
are embedded, are problematic.  They generate resources which, while offering 
some valuable indicators of phenomena, are often only of limited use for the 
questions asked in this study about social actions constituted in discourses of 
success and failure, and implications for ideological tensions and discourses of 
identity.  Existing literature leaves much unanswered in this regard.  I will be 
arguing that to understand how notions of success and failure are material to 
participants’ lived-lives as situated meaning-makers, a different concept of the 
person is needed to those conventionally drawn on, and in particular, a different 
concept of language, and language-in-use, as constitutive social action.  
Section 2.2 is organised around attribution theory, important because it has 
such a vast history in psychology and relevant here for its attention to the kinds of 
causal accounts people draw on when they talk about success and failure.  In 2.3  I 
turn to literatures on the emotional associations of success and failure, with  
particular attention to fear and self-esteem.  In 2.4. I use the literatures outlined to 
summarise those things which most commonly get marked out as sites and objects 
of success and failure, with particular attention to the most common amongst 
these, career, and I present a critique of some recent studies.  In section 2.5 I 
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summarise my conclusions for the chapter.  
2.2. Attribution studies 
Attribution theory has a vast history in psychology (Antaki, 1994; Edwards, 1997; 
Edwards and Potter, 1992; Försterling, 2001; Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 1983; 
Kelley, 1967; Ross, 1977; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, et al., 1971).   
Attribution has typically been approached as the ‘scientific study of naïve 
theories and commonsense explanations’ (Försterling, 2001:xi).  It is primarily, 
although not exclusively, concerned with lay accounts for the causes of one’s own 
and other people’s behaviours, and for outcomes of those behaviours. In 
particular, explanations for the causes of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ have been part 
of the common stock in attribution theory.  Examination of accountings for 
success and failure extend across a wide range of topics, such as career 
achievements (Schlosser, 2001), academic success (Cortez-Suarez and Sandiford, 
2008), sporting success (Locke, 2004; Stoeber and Becker, 2007), health 
(Schoeneman and Curry, 1990), relationships (Bradbury and Fincham, 1990; 
Houts and Horne, 2008; Stander, Hsiung, and MacDermaid, 2001), and so on.   
Related to this is the study of attributional theory, that is, the study of the 
psychological outcomes from making attributions.  This asks questions about the 
implications of causal attributions, for example the relationships between 
attributions for failure and motivations to try again (Shields, Brawley and 
Lindover, 2005) or to adopt avoidant behaviours (Brown and Dutton, 1995); or 
the implications for attributing ‘success’ to ‘luck’ say, rather than to ability for 
example (Försterling, Preikschas, and Agthe, 2007).  
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Moreover, attribution has been one of the most vital sites where 
epistemologies have been fought out and was one of the first areas where 
discourse studies in social psychology established clear territory (Antaki, 1994; 
Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
 Attribution theory began with the conceptualisation of people as lay 
scientists, naturally engaged in private causal explanations of events (Heider, 
1958; Kelley, 1967).  A fundamental assumption has been that attribution operates 
as a rational, systematic and consistent underlying process: a process ‘behind’ the 
words used.  Investigation proceeds in order to arrive at a set of  ‘higher order 
relations of attributions’ (Weiner, 1985: 570), that is, the systematised cognitive 
framework by which people draw conclusions about causes of events.  This is an 
enormous field spanning more than five decades.  Försterling (2001) and 
Hewstone (1989) provide valuable introductions, and Antaki (1994), Edwards 
(1997) and Edwards and Potter (1992), invaluable critiques which go on to 
completely reframe ‘attributions’ as social practice rather than cognitive practice. 
These distinctions are discussed below but first some additional detail on 
attribution theory.   
The history of attribution research commonly begins with Heider (1958) 
although some limited attempts have been made to recognise the writings of 
Gustav Ichheiser from the late 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (Rudmin, Trimpop, Kryl, 
and Boski, 1987).  Both Heider and Ichheiser were working on processes of 
perception and attribution over a similar period of time but in independent 
developments: Heider working within a cognitive model; Ichheiser within a 
phenomenological and discursively inflected model attentive to talk as socially 
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situated action (Rudmin et al., 1987).  However, Ichheiser’s contribution to 
understanding the social nature of people’s expressions has been given scant 
attention.  Rudmin et al. suggest that while Heider is rightly regarded as the father 
of attributional psychology, Ichheiser ‘might be considered a long lost ‘rich uncle’ 
waiting to be discovered and welcomed home’ (Rudmin et al., 1987:175).  
Currently, it remains the case that little of Ichheiser’s work is available in English 
translation, he is still only rarely cited, and Heider’s cognitivist approach 
continues to be the common starting point for introductions to attribution theory.   
Heider’s proposition was that lay explanations are a cognitive process of 
categorisation where the underpinning judgement is whether ‘cause’ is internal to 
the person, or external, located in the environment or situation (Heider, 1958).  
Rotter (1966, cited in Weiner, 1985) subsequently termed this ‘the locus of  
control’.   
Then Weiner et al. (1971) argued an additional dimension was indicated, 
stability. For example, in their studies of student attributions for success and 
failure, Weiner et al. noted four dominant factors said to have an affect on 
outcomes:  ‘ability’, ‘effort’, ‘task difficulty’, and ‘luck’.  Ability and effort could 
be accounted for as internal attributes, task difficulty and luck as external.  
However, Weiner et al. argued some of these attributes might fluctuate, hence the 
need for stability as an organising dimension. Initial propositions suggested that 
ability was held to be internal and stable; effort was internal and unstable; task 
difficulty was categorised as external and stable; and luck was external and 
unstable. 
Weiner (1985) later suggested this two dimensional attributional matrix 
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still over-simplified processes in part because of the ambiguity of terms.  Effort, 
which had been classed as occasioned and therefore unstable, could instead be 
understood as a stable trait of an industrious person.  Ability could be interpreted 
as stable in terms of a person’s aptitude, but unstable in that learning and 
forgetting occur, and so on.  Ambiguity in constructs has been picked up 
elsewhere.  For example, Krantz and Rude (1984, cited in Antaki, 1994) showed 
low levels of agreement amongst participants on whether luck was an external or 
internal quality, or a stable or unstable quality, clearly indicating people use 
constructs in quite different ways. Attempts have been made to reconcile these 
observations by exploring interactions between these factors with additional 
dimensions such as controllability, intentionality and responsibility (Weiner, 
1985).  
Complexity was also recognised in other ways which also started to 
undermine the way attributions have been theorised.  Many studies have reported 
systematic ‘biases’ in the attributions people make.  The ‘fundamental attribution 
error’ (FAE) named by Ross (1977) is a classic study in the field.  It refers to a 
tendency speakers display for attributing others’ behaviours to internal 
dispositions rather than to external situational factors.   
Observing such systematic biases raises questions about the origins of 
attribution biases: whether they are cognitive in origin, in that they are a product 
of perceptual biases in information processing systems; or motivational, in that 
they arise out of the needs of the person doing the attributing, to preserve self-
esteem, perhaps; or whether they are an emergent product of some other 
circumstance.  For example, a bias related to the FAE is the actor-observer effect 
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(Jones and Nisbett, 1972) which also describes the tendency to attribute others’ 
behaviours to internal dispositions, but our own to situational factors.  But, further 
studies indicate the pattern is more complicated than this.  In attributions for 
success and failure, an allegedly self serving bias has been noted for attributing 
our successes to internal dispositions and our failures to external situational 
factors (Weary Bradley, 1978).  Stevens and Jones (1976, cited in Byford, 2002) 
suggest this might operate as a defensive measure to protect self esteem:  it allows 
the claim that our successes are due to the kinds of people we are; but that our 
failures are due to other factors outside of our own dispositions.   
Other studies have concentrated on those circumstances where participants 
do make internal attributions for failures but do so in a way that manages potential 
threats to self esteem.  For example, Schoeneman and Curry (1990) posit a 
‘personal changeability’ factor in people’s attributions.  This means participants 
manage the attributional threat of failure by utilising Weiner’s stability factor.  
People may attribute their failure to internal causes, but to internal causes that are 
not fixed dispositions, but are open to change.  Attribution to ‘effort’ is an 
example.  In this way, ‘people take credit for failure as well as success, but in a 
way that makes failure reversible and subject to personal control’ (Schoeneman 
and Curry, 1990:422-3). 
Shields et al. (2005) use similar logic to account for another paradox in 
their study of participants’ perceptions of success and failure in adherence to 
exercise programmes.  This was, quite typically, a questionnaire based study using 
rating scales.  Therefore, as with the other studies cited so far, it was not able to 
capture the diversity in talk as-it-happens but instead worked with coded 
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transformations of that talk. Questionnaires were administered in weeks one and 
seven of a twelve week exercise programme.  Participants were asked if they 
considered themselves (on previous experience) to be successful adherents of 
exercise programmes according to scales of efficacy, affect, perceived exertion, 
and attributions.  This retrospective data was compared with actual adherence and 
attributions in the current exercise programme.  Some participants who adhered to 
the programme indicated on scale measures that they did not think of themselves 
as successful adherents to exercise.  Some who dropped out said they did consider 
themselves to be successful adherents.  Those who dropped out but saw 
themselves as generally successful adherents were more likely to attribute locus of 
control for their current failure internally. In other words, those who failed to 
adhere to this programme but considered themselves to be successful adherents to 
exercise in general, saw their failures and their past and future successes as within 
their control.  Shields et al. (2005) interpret these qualities as self-enhancing, 
optimistic self-efficacy beliefs, albeit distorted, which are adaptive for 
encouraging perseverance.  Consequently they suggest these features are 
predictive socio-cognitive characteristics for participants’ likelihood of taking up 
future exercise programmes. 
The proposition that attributional styles are adaptive has been picked up by 
Försterling et al. (2007) from the perspective of evolutionary psychology.  
Försterling and colleagues were responding to earlier work which noted sex 
differences in attributions, particularly findings that women and men are more 
likely to attribute women’s successes to luck or effort; more likely to attribute 
men’s successes to ability; and women’s failures are more likely than men’s to be 
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attributed to lack of ability (for example, Deaux and Emswiller, 1974, cited in 
Försterling et al., 2007).  However, they also noted ‘there was nothing sexual in 
research on sex differences in causal attributions’ (2007:776), by which they mean 
no attention to potential reproductive advantages in evolutionary terms.  Their 
own study found same-sex attributions changed according to whether the stimulus 
person was considered attractive or unattractive.  Women attributed successes of 
attractive women and unattractive men to luck more than ability; and successes of 
attractive men and unattractive women to ability more than luck.  Men similarly 
made more luck attributions for attractive men and unattractive women; and more 
ability attributions for unattractive men and attractive women.  Försterling  et al. 
(2007) interpret this via an evolutionary adaptivity account suggesting women and 
men derogate attractive competitors for mates, and glorify desirable mates.  What 
is missing from their analysis however, is any assessment of what might be taken 
for granted in talk of ‘luck’ or ‘ability’ and what might be being constructed in the 
deployment of these particular terms in any particular ideological or material 
context. 
The complex and conflicting observations in attribution studies fuel a 
range of debates and critical commentary.  On the one hand, evidence of 
systematic biases argues against Heider’s (1958) underpinning notion of people as 
naïve scientists engaged in rational, logical, information-processing.  On the other, 
diversity and changeability in the causal factors nominated also raises questions 
about how generalisable ‘systematic’ biases might actually be when they operate 
so differently in different circumstances.  This is not to suggest there are no 
‘patterns’ in lay attribution talk.  What it does point to though, are questions about 
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the nature of those patterns and the contingent contexts in which they occur.   
These critical questions come from several routes.  One was the broad 
ranging call for greater ecological validity in psychological research in general 
(Gergen, 1973).  This developed momentum in the 1970s and saw increasing 
recommendations for moving studies of social psychology out of the laboratory 
and away from reductionist, individualist, positivist assumptions.  The argument 
gained further momentum from the development of social constructionist theories 
(Gergen, 1973) and  poststructuralism (Henriques et al., 1984). 
  A second critique comes from increasingly sophisticated understandings 
of the nature of language and the way speakers use language to accomplish 
situated social actions (Antaki, 1988; Austin, 1962; Billig, 1996; Billig et al. 
1988; Edwards, 1997; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 1998).  Austin’s 
(1962) speech act theory developed the notion of language as performative: 
stating, blaming, naming and so on are all actions constituting certain sorts of 
people, selves, relationships, events and other objects.  Also, those actions change 
according to the illocutionary force of a statement – the same three words, such as 
‘open the window’ may be many different actions – such as an order, a request, a 
question.  Moreover, these are actions in which people have a stake (Potter, 1996).  
In effect, when people do things with language, language does things with people.  
A pivotal moment in the discursive turn in psychology came with the publication 
of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) blueprint for a discursive social psychology.  
This was a transformational text which underpinned the development of discourse 
studies in contemporary psychology and paved the way for a rich and varied range 
of analytic approaches and epistemological and ontological arguments (Antaki, 
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1988; Billig, 1991, 1996; et al., 1988; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Hutchby and 
Wooffitt, 1998; Potter, 1996; Potter and Wetherell, 1992; van den Berg, 
Wetherell, and Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2003).   
Both the call for greater ecological validity, and the more sophisticated 
theory of language as social action, have contributed to a sustained critique of the 
methodologies and assumptions of much attribution research.  Classic 
experimental attribution research is intensely vulnerable to these critiques (Antaki, 
1988; 1994; Hewstone, 1989; Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983).  Firstly, 
experimental methods typically make use of vignettes, which are problematic for 
several reasons.  Vignettes have been shown to be susceptible to minor alterations 
in experimental variables.  This suggests findings are unlikely to hold in the more 
fluid conditions of life outside the experiment (Byford, 2002).  In addition, talk of 
cause is treated as a separate event to the description of the thing being accounted 
for.  Instead, attributions are in practice inherent in the descriptions given; so the 
way people talk about the world contains within it ‘causes’, be that luck, personal 
qualities, or some other ‘factor’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992).  These descriptions, 
including the attributions they contain are traditional, shared, ‘historically-situated 
explanatory discourse, rather than … an outcome of a universal cognitive process’ 
(Byford, 2002:64).   
As Byford notes, there are different ways of understanding these 
explanatory discourses.  In Moscovici’s terms they are ‘social representations’, 
the collection of ideas, beliefs, and values which pre-exist the moment of 
deployment and the object of reference, and which act as a shared communicative 
code people use to orientate themselves to, and master their social world 
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(Moscovici, 1976, cited in Moscovici, 2000). Social representations theory 
assumes shared understandings of pre-existing, already defined objects such as 
groups and categories of people, which speakers draw upon to conduct 
themselves.   
In contrast to social representations theory, Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
drew on work by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984, cited in Potter and Wetherell, 1987) 
to suggest a similar focus on socially shared meanings, but suggesting a much 
more mobile pattern of deployment.  They understand these explanatory 
discourses as ‘interpretative repertoires’:  groupings of terms, metaphors and 
tropes used to characterise and evaluate events.  For Wetherell and Potter (1992) 
the contents of interpretative repertoires are the building blocks by which 
language accomplishes social action.  They are more variably available to social 
actors across groups who construct and reconstruct groups, categories, and objects 
in the moments of interactional discursive deployments (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992).  The main point here though is that examining 
attribution out of its everyday site of use and placing it within the constraints of 
experimentally controlled variables pushes out of sight these ‘real life’ features of 
attribution as shared explanatory resources that ‘come with’ the description of the 
thing itself.  This is not to say that ‘talk’ in the laboratory is divested of its social 
nature and its shared communicative practices.  Talk is always social within this 
framework.  What it means is that the mundane, dialogic, interactional sociality 
of attribution talk is distorted and obscured by the practices of experimental 
design.  These practices presuppose attributions are cognitive ‘objects’ which can 
sensibly be decontextualised from everyday interactional sites, isolated, coded on 
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to matrices and statistically analysed for group differences, without losing the 
ontological nature of talk as situated social action.  Language is more mobile, 
variable, contingent and more reflexively invested, than reductionist examinations 
by ‘controlled variables’ allows for (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter 1996).  
Consequently, when people talk of successes and failures, their attributions do 
much more than attribute cause (Antaki, 1988; 1994). 
The recognition that language in its everyday use is much ‘messier’ than 
the ‘tidied up’ version of the laboratory allows, led to a range of calls to embed 
studies of attribution – along with other objects of study – in more ecologically 
valid methodologies.  Nevertheless, there continues to be a split between the 
desire for a universal model of attribution talk, a ‘top down’ approach to what 
people do, and a willingness to work ‘bottom up’, beginning with what people 
actually do when they do attribution in talk, in all its everyday variability.  The 
top down approach is exemplified by Hilton (1990) who rightly called for an 
understanding of attribution as an event situated in conversational exchange.  
However, as a model of attribution-in-use, Hilton’s version is essentially flawed.  
Hilton called specifically for a Gricean understanding of conversation. (Grice, 
1975, cited in Hilton, 1990). This invokes the presupposition that conversation is 
governed by the principle of co-operation, according to maxims of quality, 
quantity, relevance and manner.  In Gricean terms, this means communicative 
conversational exchanges must not include what is known to be false, or 
unsupported by evidence; utterances must carry sufficient information; utterances 
must pertain to the manifest topic; utterances must be delivered in a coherent and 
sensible way.   
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However, this formula clearly belies much conversation as it actually 
happens (Antaki, 1994; Edwards and Potter, 1992).  People are known to lie, to 
mislead, to lose track, to change the subject, to be obscure, to be mistaken.  The 
Gricean algorithmic way of framing what is happening when people do causal 
accounting for successes and failures takes conversation ‘as it happens’, which 
yes, is often cooperative, and replaces it with an abstract logic of an ‘idealized 
cognitive package’ (Antaki, 1994:31).  More than that, though, it does not take 
into account the range of social actions, blaming, excusing, justifying, claiming 
agency, and so on, which people engage in when they are doing ‘attributing’ 
(Antaki, 1988; 1994; Billig, 1991; 1996; Edwards and Potter, 1992; 1993; Locke, 
2004).   
The notion that language, and therefore attribution, is social action is 
grounded in constructionist arguments (Gergen, 1999).  Language constructs 
versioned worlds and accomplishes interested social action. Its use is situated, 
contingent, flexible, fluid and rhetorical (Antaki, 1988; Billig, 1991; 1996; Billig 
et al., 1988; Potter, 1996; Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001a; 2001b).  Within 
this framework, the question becomes not the somewhat strait-jacketed, to what 
do people attribute successes and failures? but rather, what social actions are 
performed when people account for successes and failures?  Locke’s (2004) 
discursive psychology study of attributions for success and failure in sports 
performances demonstrates this well.  She argues talk of success is ‘softened’ via 
performances of modesty.  Attributing success to ‘luck’, for example, works to 
dilute suggestions of personal agency and credit.  Failure may also be discursively 
mitigated, and blame avoided or reduced, by claiming limited agency over aspects 
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of the performance.  Locke provides a convincing micro-analytic reading of the 
social action taking place in the talk she analyses.  She makes the important point 
that what would traditionally be interpreted as attribution is shown to be a 
resource for managing accountability.  What is left unaddressed though, is an 
analysis as to why claims to success should be softened by modesty; why failures 
demand accountability management.  What is it about these particular constructs 
in this particular site that means success and failure may be taken for granted as 
self-evidently positive or negative, self-evidently consequential and reflecting 
back on speakers in particular ways?  What we get in Locke’s account are hints 
that success as well as failure are both sites of potential trouble.  But how 
widespread are these troubles?  What is the diversity and variability in trouble as 
it materialises in different deployments of success and failure, in different 
interactional contexts, working with different ideological dilemmas?  I discuss 
these concepts of trouble and dilemma in more detail in chapter 3; and address 
answers empirically in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
To summarise so far, attributions for success and failure make up a 
substantial part of a vast body of work which draws attention to important 
common, everyday, linguistic practices for making sense of the world and 
people’s behaviours in it.  I have presented samples of that work to give a flavour 
of the main themes and interests.  However, there are a range of damaging 
critiques.  Those aimed at the theory of the person as an information-processor, 
standing back from the world to observe and comment upon it; and those aimed at 
the theory of language as a neutral reflection of internal cognitions, both raise 
serious questions about how useful conventional approaches to attribution might 
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be for this study.  Neither adequately reflect the social nature of language in use. 
The theory of language which underpins these types of attribution studies means 
they offer little as either a descriptive or an explanatory resource for 
understanding what people are doing when they make attributions for success and 
failure.  In contrast, attribution studies influenced by the discursive turn have re-
framed the processes of attribution as social actions and it is this understanding I 
want to carry forward in the thesis, but with a more critical questioning of 
diversity and variability, and with particular attention on success and failure as 
sites of discursive trouble.  
2.3. Success, failure, and emotion 
This section turns to literatures on some of the emotional associates of success 
and failure.  These have been important in the way they attend to consequences 
for lived life experience when people take up success and failure as emotionally 
laden concepts.  Laird (2007) suggests most emotion theory distinguishes between 
‘prototypical emotions’, such as fear, and ‘feelings’, such as self-esteem.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, I do not do that.  Instead I group, albeit roughly, a set 
of literatures on fear and self-esteem.  I begin in section 2.3.1 with women’s fear 
of success, drawing on two particular bodies of work. The first is rooted in Matina 
Horner’s projective cue study of ‘women of ability’, the second introduces a 
revival of psychoanalytically informed fear of success literatures which can be 
traced back to Karen Horney.  In 2.3.2 I turn to fear of failure, with particular 
reference to ‘the impostor phenomenon’ and self handicapping theories.  These 
lead into questions about self-esteem which I explore briefly in 2.3.3. 
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2.3.1. Fear of success 
A controversial body of work grew out of Matina Horner’s proposition that 
‘women of ability’ have a greater tendency than men to ‘fear’ success (Horner, 
1968 (cited in  Hoffman); 1969; Hoffman, 1974) and this, in part, helped account 
for why women of ability were less likely to achieve career successes equivalent 
to their male counterparts.  Despite early interest in the theory’s potential 
explanatory power (Tresemer, 1976a), a number of wide ranging, damaging 
critiques have been offered with reference to how the original research questions 
were conceptualised, the method of investigation, and the interpretive claims 
made (Tresemer, 1976a; 1976b; Zuckerman and Wheeler, 1975).  A valuable 
review of women, motivation and achievement theory by Hyde and Kling (2001) 
suggests research on fear of success (FOS), or the motive to avoid success, has 
largely faded away.  Nevertheless, there are periodic attempts to reinvigorate the 
field which suggests that, despite extensive critique, the notion of women’s ‘fear 
of success’ continues to hold some kind of narrative capital (Metzler and Conroy, 
2004;  Singh and Agrawal, 2007).   
Horner’s original study (1969 and see Tresemer, 1976a and 1976b for a 
valuable introduction) presented participants, all psychology undergraduates, with 
a series of verbal thematic apperception tests (TATs).  These were cue sentences 
such as “Tom is looking into his microscope” (cited in Tresemer 1976a).  
Participants were asked to write short stories in response.  It was Horner’s (1969) 
report of the sixth of these cue sentences which has underpinned much subsequent 
attention to FOS.  The sixth cue sentence was given to female participants as: At 
the end of first term finals Anne finds herself at the top of her medical school 
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class; and given to men as: At the end of first term finals John finds himself at the 
top of his medical school class (Tresemer, 1976a).  Participants’ stories were then 
coded for content.  FOS was measured by scoring comments expressing any 
negative imagery in response to ‘Anne’ doing well (Horner, 1969). These 
included any references to negative consequences, to negative affect, to 
instrumental activity away from the field – such as changing jobs to more 
traditional female work, and any ‘bizarre, inappropriate, unrealistic, or 
nonadaptive responses to the situation described by the cue’ (Hoffman, 1974:355). 
This is a broad sweep, and one which imports some questionable assumptions that 
these categories of response all suggest FOS. Nevertheless, Horner concluded 
women of ability were simultaneously motivated to avoid failure, motivated to 
achieve success and motivated to avoid success. These alleged motivations to 
avoid success, Horner argued, arose out of fear of negative consequence, social 
rejection, and loss of femininity.  Collectively, she claimed, these indicated an 
underlying fear of success.  Crucially, Horner added that this underlying motive to 
avoid success ‘is a stable disposition within the person, acquired early in life’  
(Horner, 1969:38). 
Seu (1998) argues that locating cause in this way, within women’s stable 
internal psychological states, allows social structures to be written out of 
explanations.  While Horner (1969) did recognise social pressure to conformity, 
and was alert to social structures which helped maintain the dilemma women 
experienced, she argued that women fuelled their own ‘psychological barrier’ to 
success.  This firmly located the resolution to the ‘dilemma’ of success within 
women’s psychology, and reinforced the separation of social life into 
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psychological and sociological divisions. 
The original study has been subject to much scrutiny, much of it 
methodological.  For example, a particular concern has been the manner in which 
meaning-making variables were controlled.  Gravenkemper and Paludi (1983) for 
instance cite a range of amendments to the projective cue. Tresemer (1974), with 
others, suggested Horner’s medical school cue was too specific because it placed 
the female character, Anne, in what was a male dominated field: perhaps 
participants were reacting to sex-role appropriateness rather than FOS.  So, 
Tresemer’s cue became ‘After much work, Joe(Judy) has finally gotten what he 
(she) wanted.’  But, Gravenkemper and Paludi suggest this implied causal 
attributions to effort and ability in the phrase ‘after much work’.  In the same vein 
they noted potential attributions to luck in Horner’s original cue ‘finds 
her(him)self’.  For both studies they queried whether participants were reacting to 
attributional claims rather than successful outcomes.  By way of resolution, they 
opted instead for ‘Anne has succeeded’ and ‘John has succeeded’.  Casting back 
to the discussion of attribution studies earlier in this chapter, these different 
versions of the stimuli phrases illustrate nicely that attributions can be inherent in 
descriptions of achievement, not something ‘separate’.  But, rather than work with 
this quality of language-in-use, these studies try to eliminate attribution from the 
situations they manufacture. 
These games of attempting to control meaning continue to be endemic to 
the field.  Krishnan and Sweeney (1998) noted that Horner’s original study 
provided a female cue – ‘Anne’, and male cue ‘John’.  Hyde and Kling (2001) 
point out that this is itself a confounding variable: females given one stimulus, 
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males another.  But, this was not Krishnan and Sweeney’s particular concern.  
Instead, they noted, without saying whom, that some critics have suggested ‘Ann’ 
[sic] invoked ‘more femininity… contaminating the findings’ (Krishnan and 
Sweeney, 1998:301).  As a result, in a naïve methodological move, Krishnan and 
Sweeney named their female cue ‘Susan’ claiming this was more ‘neutral’ – again 
according to unreferenced ‘prevailing research’.  The principle that names may be 
neutral appears untenable in this context and difficult to imagine in any context.  
It is a particularly bizarre claim in this instance given that gender – via name – is 
the independent variable to be manipulated.  Ironically, Krishnan and Sweeney 
(1998) did subsequently note, following a point from a reviewer, that ‘Susan’ 
might have invoked a particularly positive cue for female participants given their 
possible knowledge of the doctor character ‘Susan’ in the American television 
series ‘ER’.   
Clearly this way of doing psychology is wrestling with the idea that 
participants will ‘make meanings’.  It is both essential to the project – ‘what are 
the projective meanings generated by participants’; and simultaneously seen as a 
major hurdle to be overcome, meaning-making is to be held in check.  But, one 
cannot eliminate the imaginative contextualising work participants will undertake 
in order to make sense of the task set: indeed, participants need to make meaning 
to complete the task.  This problem is compounded by the failure to appreciate the 
dynamic, situated and partial nature of language.  These attempts at control take 
futile forms and ultimately display a blindness to the fertility of meaning-making 
language users will engage in.  
In a series of studies Pollak and Gilligan (1982; Gilligan and Pollak, 1988) 
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used pictorial TATs which relied explicitly on this fertility. They asked 
participants to write imaginative stories in response to pictures. They too noted a 
pattern which they interpreted as women making connections between 
competitive success and danger by associating success with social isolation and 
relationship difficulties. (In contrast, men were reported to make connections 
between intimacy and danger.)   
The detail of their methodology raises another important issue.  
Participants were presented with five pictures and for each one were asked: What 
is happening? Who are the people? What has led to this situation? What has 
happened in the past? What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom?  And 
then, in a point of special importance to the kind of critique I am drawing on here, 
is this final instruction: participants were requested ‘to make their stories 
“interesting and dramatic”’ (Gilligan and Pollak, 1988:248).  
 This is an interesting approach. Potentially we could learn a lot from 
participants’ responses to this TAT challenge: participants will mobilise a 
revealing set of discursive resources to produce their stories.  However, great 
caution is needed in regard to claiming that these imaginative stories could be 
interpreted as revealing characteristic states of mind or abiding traits.  Gilligan 
and Pollak have assumed the stories indicate inner states, in this instance states of 
fearfulness and anticipations of danger.  However, as with the critique made 
above in regard to appreciating the social actions inherent in doing attribution 
work, we need to ask careful questions here also about what participants are doing 
when they recruit one set of story resources over another.  What kinds of narrative 
capitals do they have available?  What inferences might be made?  Rather than 
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revealing inner states, these imagined stories might simply (or indeed not so 
simply) be showing participants’ skills in creative writing, or what they 
understand by ‘interesting and dramatic’, and more importantly for this study, 
what concepts and storylines, what interpretative repertoires, they had available 
for the task set.  Like Horner’s FOS study above, the ambivalence exhibited in the 
stories generated is an interesting puzzle; again it suggests some kind of dialogic 
dilemma is being reproduced.  But, linguistic products, in this case TAT stories, 
are not neutral mirrors to the mind.  They are partial, interested, situated, 
versioned social activities which have the potential to tell us much about the 
social world participants inhabit, but which require a sophisticated theory of 
language as social action to accomplish this.   
Hyde and Kling (2001) suggested that fear of success literatures have lost 
momentum. However, one area of psychology which has re-opened propositions 
on women and FOS is psychoanalysis.  A recent attempt to reinvigorate the field 
came from a conference in New York in April 2005 which was organised around 
the themes of women, FOS, and ‘the unconscious saboteur’ (Pappenheim, 2006). 
The concept of the unconscious saboteur is only loosely defined, but refers to 
involuntary unconscious behaviours stemming from the individual psyche and 
which sabotage people’s attempts to achieve their goals.1  Wrye (2006) recites 
examples of unconscious sabotage provided by her colleagues, such as 
accidentally deleting notes needed for writing a chapter, or failing to add one’s 
professional qualifications to one’s name on a professional workshop booklet 
                                               
1
 There are a range of psychoanalytic theories which might offer explanations for ‘unconscious 
sabotage’ but a fully worked up review and critique of particular psychoanalytic theory lies outside 
the scope of this thesis.  However, I do return to a debate between psychoanalytically inflected 
accounts of the person and discursively orientated accounts in chapter 3.3. 
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when other colleagues had done so.  The term ‘unconscious saboteur’ receives 
scant attention outside of psychoanalysis but bears some resemblance to socio-
cognitive concepts of self-handicapping in attribution and the impostor 
phenomenon addressed in studies of self-esteem.  I discuss both of these below. 
On a final preliminary note to this section, the conference papers discussed here 
are framed by their authors as ‘fear of success’.  Undoubtedly though there are 
overlaps here with notions of fear of failure coming up shortly.  My continuance 
of that division is a pragmatic strategy rather than an intellectual conviction. 
The papers from the unconscious saboteur conference focused on themes 
such as unconscious depression, rage, resentment, and feelings of failure. 
Pappenheim (2006:68) summarises this as ‘dysphoric feelings of guilt, shame, and 
self-loathing’ felt by many women as a consequence of a ‘forced … inauthentic 
choice between their own ambition for autonomy and power on the one hand, and 
devotion to their children on the other’ (ibidem).  Notably, the collection 
addresses both women who have children and women who do not, but this is done 
through a lens that assumes all women have an innate fundamental psychic need 
to be mothers.  This assumption erases differences between women in favour of a 
monolithic category.  In the next chapter I will be drawing on recent work on 
gender and intersectionality – the multiple identity ‘categories’ one subject may 
inhabit – to outline arguments against this homogenising tendency (see section 
3.4).  
Nevertheless, this set of unconscious saboteur articles does demonstrate an 
intriguing feature relevant to the interests of my study.  This is the way in which 
highly educated women, with remarkable professional successes, some of whom 
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are also trained in managing anxieties and fears for themselves and others, are 
also reported speaking of their ongoing battles with anxieties about their success.  
For example, Wrye (2006) says: 
 
When I mentioned to several colleagues that I would be giving a paper on 
“…  the unconscious saboteur,” I was struck by how many bright, 
accomplished psychoanalysts vigorously nodded their heads that they 
personally lived with the unconscious saboteur.  I also had the same reply 
from a former patient, from a superstar in broadcast journalism, from my 
popular and gifted yoga teacher, and from my radiologist, who, even as the 
head of a phenomenally successful cancer treatment center whose “Doctor 
of the Year” awards line her office, still says she constantly battles the 
unconscious saboteur. (Wrye, 2006:70-71) 
 
Wrye notes that common discourses constitute little in the way of positive notions 
of success or ambition in women, embedded as they are in phallocentric 
discourses marginalising women as inherently inadequate.  Ironically Wrye’s own 
discourse does little to dispel this. Women are presented as inevitably and self-
destructively struggling with success.  Moreover, success is yet again marked out 
in a particularly restricted way, framed within a particular context of American 
individualism, and with little recognition of this as one version of success.  With 
one unidentified exception (a former patient whose ‘successes’ are not worth 
mentioning), success means career success, and generally extraordinary success at 
that: in addition to the ‘accomplished psychoanalysts’, Wrye cites ‘a superstar’, a 
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‘popular and gifted’ specialist teacher, and ‘the head of a phenomenally 
successful cancer treatment center’ with multiple “Doctor of the Year” awards.  If 
these are the models for success it is hardly surprising that many of us might 
experience some tensions as we relate to their talk of self doubt.  Interestingly, 
while Wrye recognises that cultural discourses constitute and constrain the social 
moral orders women must negotiate, she argues that these moral orders are 
maintained and fuelled internally through hidden psychic determinants.  This is 
the key distinction between Wrye’s position (see also Josephs, 2006; Ruderman, 
2005) and the ones I draw upon for this study.  In the position I will outline later, 
the constituents of success and failure, their moral ordering, and the troubled 
positions they orchestrate, are generated and maintained ideologically through 
(re)production in the intersubjective practices and conducts of everyday life 
(Billig, 1991; Rose 1996; 1999).  
So, on the one hand psychoanalytically inflected talk of anxiety and 
unconscious self-sabotage could be a valuable resource as a pointer to ongoing 
trouble. On the other, whilst appearing to recognise the constitutive power of 
discourse, it nevertheless universalises and essentialises women, and places 
cultural tensions and the ‘solution’ to cultural tensions within the individual.   
This critique holds despite other attempts to take cultural location 
seriously.  For example, Rosas (2006) in the same special issue tries to weave a 
cultural account of subjectivity in with a psychodynamic model of FOS.  Her 
topic is the emotional development of Mexican women and in particular, the 
continuation of ‘internal conflict and insecurity’ despite apparent economic and 
professional emancipation.  Rosas’ recognition, albeit partial, of the constitutive 
Chapter 2.  Reviewing psychologies of success and failure  
46 
effect of time and place, and the creation of a space for a non-Western focus are 
both welcome additions to the literature. However, the paper tends to assert, 
rather than explicate.  In the process it too essentialises much that it discusses, the 
mother-daughter relationship, for example, and sex stereotypes which it claims are 
‘impossible’ to overturn and which prescribe against ambition and success for 
women.  The arguments lack conceptual clarity, relying as they do on 
unelucidated concepts such as the ‘social unconscious’; and lack epistemological, 
and ontological clarity in talk of ‘natural’ responses to cultural productions.   
Both papers, Wrye (2006) and Rosas (2006), typical of their field, suggest 
women are unconsciously, defensively, motivated to fear success.  These internal  
states, variously supposed to originate from Oedipal conflicts (Josephs, 2006); or 
fear of the loss of the internal object of the mother (Ruderman, 2006); or some 
other internal self sabotage, all imply, as with Horner’s (1968) work above that 
women’s ambivalence to success is produced, generated and maintained as an 
internal process. 
A more plausible and empirically supportable suggestion may be that 
women are reflexively engaged in competing ideological discourses (Billig, 1991;  
et al., 1988);  discourses which make sometimes conflicting demands, positioning 
women within and without competing moral orders which are made visible and 
empowered in the daily practices of institutions and technologies (Rose, 1996; 
1999).  If this is so, then these fear of success narratives and the unconscious 
saboteur narratives are highly pertinent resources, but as meta-narratives; 
discourses framing participant meaning-making, reproducing ‘knowledge’ rather 
than revealing truth, or in Foucauldian terms, as ‘a discursive regime that 
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reproduces its own meanings’ (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006:21).  This is the 
alternative I favour as a framework for thinking about the kinds of social action 
taking place in the quote from Wrye above (page 44).  Undoubtedly, FOS 
literatures have been valuable in pointing to material concerns and to the notion 
that talking about success has the potential to generate imaginings of possible 
‘trouble’ to be navigated. This indicates clearly that ‘success’, whatever that may 
be, is not simply, ‘a good thing’.  So, while like many other critics I take issue 
with the explanatory conclusions reached, the issues conceived in FOS studies – 
negative consequences, social rejection, loss of femininity, moral conflicts 
(Horner, 1968; Gravenkemper and Paludi, 1983, Wrye, 2006) are certainly 
plausible as material concerns for women and therefore deserving of 
investigation.  
2.3.2. Fear of failure 
A common counterpart to talk of FOS is fear of failure (FOF).  Indeed, there are 
places where the distinction becomes difficult to sustain.  One of the contributions 
of this thesis is to illustrate that the distinctions, where they exist, do so via the 
social action taking place, rather than via a simple lexicography.  For the moment, 
I will work quite straightforwardly with the distinctions made in the existing 
literature.  
Methodologically and conceptually FOF bears some resemblance to the 
FOS literatures already reviewed and so immediately this points to some of the 
criticisms that will be made in terms of talk as situated social action: FOF studies 
too lack an adequate theory of language.  Similarly, it should of course hardly be 
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surprising that FOF points to ‘trouble’ for those experiencing it.  For example, 
McGregor and Elliot (2005) found a positive correlation between shame and FOF 
manipulated by student test performance feedback. Those reporting high FOF 
went on to report higher levels of shame when encountering failure than those 
reporting low FOF:  
 
For individuals high in fear of failure, achievement events are not simply 
opportunities to learn, improve on one’s competence, or compete against 
others.  Instead, they are threatening, judgment-orientated experiences that 
put one’s entire self on the line… and that put one’s sense of relational 
security in jeopardy (McGregor and Elliot, 2005:229).  
 
Rowe (1988), whose popular self-help books are grounded in clinical training, 
picks up a similar sense of extreme jeopardy in failing.  She suggests that for 
some, the idea of failing is so powerfully fearful that it threatens to ‘annihilate’ 
the self: 
 
If we know self  we know not-self, and the threat of not-self is the greatest 
danger we can ever know…We can come to terms with bodily death… 
But if our self is destroyed, we have vanished, like a wisp of smoke in the 
wind or chalk off  a blackboard… We feel the fear of this threat whenever 
… we fail at something important to us.’ (Rowe, 1988:24-5). 
  
Despite the lyrical but somewhat obscure rhetoric here, Rowe’s description 
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suggests failure is, for some of us at least, a catastrophic account of painful 
desolation. 
 Other accounts may be more tempered but still the dominant position in 
the literature is that failure is, by definition, negative.  However, Martin and 
Marsh (2003) ask whether failure should be feared, or whether it may be ‘friend’ 
rather than ‘foe’.  Their review of the literature suggests that while it can be both 
foe and friend, it is not a good friend. What they mean by this is that the 
motivation to avoid failure acts as a powerful drive to succeed.  However, even 
where successes are frequent the fear of failure means anxiety and unstable self-
esteem ‘come along for the ride’ (Martin and Marsh, 2003:32).   
In some of the literature this is described as the impostor phenomenon. 
This was a term coined by Clance and Imes (1978) initially to describe high 
achieving women who reported feelings of being an impostor in their successful 
career achievements. That is, achieving high levels of success but also 
experiencing high levels of insecurity about deserving and maintaining those 
successes, and exhibiting intense fear of imminent failure and being ‘found out’ to 
be inadequate or incompetent (Want and Kleitman, 2006).  Since its early days the 
impostor concept has been extended to include men’s experience as well although 
there are conflicting findings for any relationship between gender and the 
impostor phenomenon (Kumar and Jagacinski, 2006; Langford and Clance, 1993).  
Recent studies suggest a correlation between the impostor phenomenon and with 
depression (McGregor, Gee and Posey, 2008). 
A review of the literature by Langford and Clance (1993) indicates the 
impostor phenomenon continues to be understood as a stable personality trait 
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correlating highly with parenting styles and reflecting high levels of insecurity 
and extreme sensitivity to criticism, all correlating with a particular attributional 
style which locates success externally.  Failure is interpreted as proof of suspected 
incompetence and can lead to counter-productive self protection.  This might be 
either through ‘self-handicapping’ or ‘defensive pessimism’(Martin and Marsh, 
2003).  Both of these concepts warrant much more critical attention than space 
here allows but some brief introduction is necessary.   
Self-handicapping (Jones and Berglas, 1978) refers to behaviours such as 
procrastination for example, or failing to prepare for an examination; behaviours 
which are likely to interfere with achieving the outcome aimed for.  These 
behaviours are taken up voluntarily, as a ready made excuse in the event of failing 
to achieve the goal (Martin and Marsh, 2003; Want and Kleitman, 2006).  This 
handicapping behaviour deflects attributions for failure away from personal 
ability and towards some other factor.  This interpretation side-steps the 
psychoanalytic accounts given above.  Rather than unconscious involuntary 
sabotaging drives, self-handicapping in this version is a strategy mediating 
discomfort for those high in FOF.  It allows the claim that one has the ability, but 
something else got in the way.  However, while this argument almost appears to 
recognise that ‘doing attribution’ is a dynamic form of accounting, it continues to 
direct attention internally, to private processes, rather than externally to the social 
accountability practices which require people to take up particular positions in 
relation to particular contingent discursive constructions of ‘failure’. 
Theories of defensive pessimism are subject to the same critique.  
Defensive pessimism means setting low expectations of success to cushion against 
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emotional affect in the event of failure (Norem and Cantor 1986); or alternatively, 
setting safer, more easily attainable goals and lower standards for success 
(Baumgarden and Brownlee, 1987; Showers and Ruben, 1990), ultimately leading 
to underachievement (Martin and Marsh, 2003). 
How one reacts to failure is a central issue for Cigman (2001) also, who 
like Martin and Marsh (2003) above cautions against oversimplifications of links 
between success, failure and negative effects.  Cigman’s interests are in 
implications of failure for education, but she extends her argument more broadly.  
Her aim was to draw a distinction between failing well and failing badly.  By 
failing well she means being able to accept failing as a temporary instance which 
preserves self-esteem and boosts positive motivation to succeed in another 
instance; as opposed to failing badly, which means to see oneself as incapable and 
without worth. This shares some similarities with the position Shields et al. (2005) 
offered (page 27 above) in that people may be resilient to failure when they have 
the resources to make sense of themselves as in control of future success.  This is 
a broader ethical project for Cigman though.  She argues that what she calls the 
grey area between success and failure is where people: 
 
grapple with ethical questions about what really matters. One may fail 
bravely or timorously, intelligently or stupidly, not to mention wisely or 
unwisely.  A person may fail because she has set herself extraordinary 
rather than ordinary targets, and this may merit praise.  Failing is not easy; 
one may do it more or less ‘successfully’, and I have suggested that the 
capacity to fail well is a precondition for many future successes. (Cigman, 
Chapter 2.  Reviewing psychologies of success and failure  
52 
2003:574-5).   
 
Essentially, Cigman is arguing that interpretations of success and failure are 
crucial components to people’s sense of themselves and their resilience to 
challenge.  I am not so much arguing against this position as suggesting we do not 
properly know what people’s interpretations of success and failure are, and with 
what variety of purpose these constructs are deployed.  Too little attention has 
been paid to what interpretative resources people draw on when they negotiate 
meanings of success and failure.  Without this empirical investigation abstract 
claims, however plausible and potentially persuasive, continue to be deeply 
undermined.  In this next section I take this concept of interpretation, and 
mattering, a little further by exploring connections between success, failure and 
self esteem.  
2.3.3. Success, failure and self-esteem 
The literatures introduced so far on FOS, FOF and attribution, have already 
started to make connections between success, failure, and self-esteem.  Emler 
(2001) suggests in his review of self-esteem literatures, it is both a lay and 
scientific supposition that: 
 
Real successes should raise self-esteem.  Real failures should lower self-
esteem. A history of continual success should secure permanently high 
self-esteem. Experience of continual failure should result in chronic low 
self-esteem. (Emler, 2001:38) 
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However, Emler acknowledges considerable scepticism towards these 
propositions.  Working from a constructionist perspective I would raise some 
obvious questions about what ‘real success’ or ‘real failure’ might be.  That aside, 
Emler’s point is to argue that there is surprisingly little evidence for any global 
connections between actual successes or failures, and levels and consistency of 
measures of self-esteem, or indeed the much touted alleged relationship between 
low self-esteem, violence, criminality and poverty (Emler, 2001; see also Brown 
and Dutton, 1995).  He suggests instead that the effects of successes or failures on 
self-esteem depend upon  perception, that is whether individuals themselves take 
outcomes to be successful or failing, and just as important, although this has 
received much less attention, with whether particular sites of success and failure 
are taken to matter.  As he points out, this takes us back directly to William James 
(1890).   
 
I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am 
mortified if others know much more psychology than I.  But I am 
contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek.  My deficiencies 
there give me no sense of personal humiliation at all.  Had I ‘pretensions’ 
to be a linguist; it would have been just the reverse.  So we have the 
paradox of a man shamed to death because he is only the second pugilist 
or the second oarsman in the world.  That he is able to beat the whole 
population of the globe minus one is nothing; he has ‘pitted’ himself to 
beat that one; and as long as he doesn’t do that nothing else counts.  He is 
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to his own regard as if he were not, indeed he is not. 
 Yonder puny fellow, however, whom every one can beat, suffers 
no chagrin about it, for he has long ago abandoned the attempt to ‘carry 
that line,’ as the merchants say, of self at all.  With no attempt there can be 
no failure; with no failure no humiliation.  So our self-feeling in this world 
depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. (James, 
1890:310, original emphases)   
 
In effect, James is saying that it is how we take outcomes to reflect back on our 
sense of self, our sense of who we are, that matters; not some ‘objective’ measures 
of success or failure per se.  
 Over a century later, Brown and Dutton (1995) were trying to disentangle 
much the same issue.  They noted some studies suggest people with low self-
esteem (LSE) experience greater emotional distress following failure than people 
with high self-esteem (HSE).  Other studies suggest HSE and LSE make no 
difference to emotional responses to failure.  Brown and Dutton suggest a possible 
resolution to this inconsistency lies in distinguishing different ways of measuring 
emotional responses to success and failure.  Some studies measure people’s 
reports of feelings according to whether they are ‘pleasant/unpleasant’, 
‘happy/unhappy’, or ‘glad/sad’, etc.  Others measure reports of feelings 
implicating self-worth, such as pride, humiliation, shame, etc.  It is this second 
set, they suggest, which interacts with HSE and LSE. To test this they studied 
self-worth measures amongst undergraduate students following linguistic tests.  
The task was to provide a common associate of three cue words (their example is 
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‘car’, ‘swimming’, and ‘cue’, all associated with ‘pool’).  In the success condition 
the task was easy; in the failure condition the task was difficult.  Results 
suggested self-esteem effects were stronger for those emotions implicating self-
worth, rather than the more general unpleasant emotions. Moreover, the effect was 
greater following failure.  In short, both HSE and LSE groups ‘feel good (happy 
and proud) when they succeed’, but differences emerge when people fail: 
‘[feelings of self-worth] plummet among LSE people but remain relatively high 
among HSE people’ (Brown and Dutton, 1995:718).   
There is an important critique to be mentioned here.  Brown and Dutton 
are concerned with the salience of failures or successes for people’s sense of self 
worth.  Emler points out that in the highly active field of self-esteem research (and 
beyond), the overwhelming majority of tests are explicitly or implicitly tests of 
intellectual competence, a form of success particularly privileged by academic 
researchers; and participants are almost always students, for whom this particular 
domain carries particular significance.  This was precisely the point behind the 
now famous critique that the study of psychology was largely the study of 
psychology students (Gergen, 1973; Sears, 1986).  What is startling is that thirty 
years on Norenzayan and Heine (2005) are still able to make the same critique of 
much contemporary work, arguing that it represents the continuing implicit 
assumptions in experimental psychology of generalizability outside of time, era 
and social class.  This is a serious problem and is indicative of a general failure to 
take seriously the context of meaning-making – the repertoires available, the 
ideological dilemmas lived out, the semiotic histories that make up a life, and the 
interactional demands of the moment. 
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The underpinning assumptions about the ontology of the person in Brown 
and Dutton’s work, for example, are quite different from those I draw on for this 
thesis.  Their experimental reductionism sits unhappily against the approach used 
here with the focus on contingent variability in talk, where language is situated, 
constitutive, variable social action and so on.  But, the point Brown and Dutton 
make, that what matters is what gets reflected back on to people’s sense of self, is 
a particularly useful one for this thesis.  Like James’ introspectionist account, their 
work points forcefully to the need to work directly with people’s constructions of 
success and failure, and in particular, most importantly, with the way these 
constructions reflect back on speakers in particular interested and invested ways.  
The constructions speakers mobilise in their talk of success and failure, and the 
way in which these are integrated with other repertoires about what it is to be a 
particular kind of person, in a particular time and place, is enormously 
consequential for the kinds of self constructed in particular kinds of talk.  
Combine this with some reach for the personal, moral, ordering reproduced in our 
talk, what kinds of person we think we and others should be, and we have 
something of consequence to attend to.   
2.4. Marking out success:  career, status, and gender. 
I just want to take a step back for the moment.  So far, I have looked at how 
psychology has typically explained reports of lay explanations for what causes 
success and failure; reports about what success and failure feel like, in terms of 
the fear they generate, the implications for self-esteem; but we still have little 
sense of what success and failure might be held to ‘be’.  Certain sites have been 
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getting marked out with some regularity; most notably, career (for example, 
Sturges, 1999; Dyke and Murphy, 2006), and eminent careers at that (Pahl, 1995; 
Schlosser, 2001) but also academic successes, in attribution studies and  
correlations with self-esteem in feedback on intelligence tests (McGregor and 
Elliot, 2005).  Sporting achievements are also commonly marked out as sites for 
success (Locke, 2004) and in the growing field of health psychology behaviours 
such as giving up smoking, maintaining exercise programs and so on 
(Schoeneman and Curry, 1990).  What stands out however, is that these sites, and 
the markers of success associated with them, such as ‘promotion’ and ‘financial 
progression’ in career terms, ‘winning’ in sport, passing exams in academic 
settings, are usually taken for granted in the literature as self-evidently successful, 
or (less marked and more implicit) an absence of such markers to be self-
evidently failing.  There is seldom any critical attempt to explore this.  Shaver 
(1976) and Tresemer (1976a) both made this point in relation to Horner’s study of 
women’s fear of success and much of the work following in the wake of that 
makes an assumption that success means specifically career and/or academic 
success. Despite their recognition that this reflects a particular cultural time and 
space, attention to this characteristic has been left largely underdeveloped.  Even 
where studies set out to examine constructions of success, some key presumptions 
about sites of success are left uninterrogated, most particularly that careers should 
be a primary route for building identities of success. 
Sturges (1999) used a grounded theory analysis to ask what career success 
meant for male and female managers of different age groups and noted a range of 
differences in conceptions pointing to much more complexity than previous 
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literature had recognised.  This potentially makes the paper an interesting 
interlocutor for my thesis.  However, there are profound differences in the way 
this thesis approaches participants’ talk and the approach to talk from grounded 
analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  Sturges’ analysis 
identifies interesting patterns in themes, such as managers prioritising enjoyment, 
expertise, and influence rather than financial reward.  She identifies four different 
orientations to career success: Climbers, Experts, Influencers, Self-Realizers.  
Sturges suggests women have a broader definition of success in comparison with 
men (see also Dyke and Murphy, 2006, for a similar finding from a thematic 
analysis of female and male high career achievers).  In Sturges’ study, women 
were more likely to value accomplishment and recognition, job content was 
valued over grade; men were more likely to value hierarchical positions, and 
accompanying status and influence.  Older workers in the sample, managers in 
their forties, were more likely to value enjoyment of job content and having 
influence, over hierarchical position and grade.  Sturges suggests that this 
indicates two things.  One, it reflects women’s socialisation to be less competitive 
and individualised than men and to value connections with others more; and two, 
it indicates a psychological adaptation by aging employees to realistic 
expectations and opportunities.  As companies de-layer, hierarchical advancement 
is harder to attain, and this is more so she suggests for women and older workers.   
Sturges argues that these categories do not represent ‘different types of 
managers, but rather are a means of categorizing the different ways in which the 
managers who participated in this study talked about career success’ (Sturges, 
1999:244-5, my emphasis).  Success is framed differently for participants who are 
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differently situated.  And yet, when Sturges raises all too briefly the possibility 
that these definitions of success might be moderated by the way it reflects back on 
speakers, such as whether they appear mercenary or status conscious (or indeed 
failing), she quickly dismissed this on quite bizarre grounds.  Her brief argument 
points out that the phenomena appear robust insofar as other studies have found 
these kinds of patterns in talk.  She uses this to suggest that one can therefore 
more confidently assume this suggests individual predispositional factors.  But 
this is simply illogical.  One might just as well, and indeed preferably, say the 
robustness of the patterns indicates this is a pervasive ideological dilemma which 
people negotiate in similar ways, drawing on shared interpretative resources, and 
attentive to culturally normative moral orders in talk fit for the situation (Billig, 
1991; Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  What Sturges’ data suggest is that negotiating 
talk of success and failure is enormously complicated, diverse, and consequential 
social action.  Unfortunately her analysis stops short of pursuing the connection 
between ‘talk’ and the social action talk accomplishes.  The same is true of Dyke 
and Murphy’s (2006) analysis of their Canadian sample of high achievers.  Their 
study is certainly interesting in the way it illustrates gendered differences in the 
way success is spoken of.  Men prioritised material success and women prioritised 
work-life balance and making a contribution.  However, they also note:  
 
Our findings may also have been influenced by the social desirability of 
responses.  Women may have responded that relationships are important to 
them because they are aware that society expects such an answer. (Dyke 
and Murphy, 2006:368)  
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So, the situated and contingent nature of talk, the way it reflects back on the 
speaker, and the action talk carries for working up particular identities, all of this 
is nodded to here, but as a confounding quality which frustratingly receives no 
further analytic attention in their language neutral approach.   
Wagner and Wodak’s (2006) study of British and European women’s talk 
of career success drew on a sample drawn from two kinds of site:  fields 
traditionally dominated by men (such as architecture), and new fields where 
identities are being newly worked up (such as IT and multimedia).  Like Sturges, 
a stated aim was to explore women’s new ways of working up what counts as 
success.  While their starting point – career – reinforces the taken for granted 
ideological assumptions about career as a self-evident primary measure of 
success, they do recognise it is one which is far from straightforward in the 
ambivalent accounting it gives rise to.  However, again, their analysis never quite 
tackles this head on.  
Methodologically the analysis is a strange hybrid of content analysis, 
representations analysis, metaphor analysis, some attention to ideological 
dilemmas, and an all too brief and undeveloped reference to social action.  The 
results lack epistemological discipline.  For example, Wagner and Wodak read the 
discourse of public-private space used by the architects in their sample as 
gendered relational metaphors where inside-outside may be read as metaphor for 
the body.  First, there is no comparative data from male architects to support this 
gendered claim; moreover, at no point do they ask whether talk of configuring 
public-private space is better explained as the discourse of architecture, rather 
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than the discourse of women who are architects.  
Beyond this, there is a bigger concern that talk in this study is again 
treated as a representation of something ‘real’: Wagner and Wodak write of 
speakers’ ‘beliefs’ (2006:389), moreover, of our beliefs as the audience for this 
talk (2006:395), distinctions are made between talk as performance and ‘actual’ 
behaviour, as if the former is not behaviour (2006:386), finally, in a conclusion 
which lacks any empirical support, they claim ‘a significant gap between 
performances and organizational realities’ (2006:407, my emphasis).  No analysis 
has been offered as to ‘organizational realities’.  
 Some valuable pointers do come from the contrasts Wagner and Wodak 
find with previous literature on success anxiety.  They report that participants in 
their study speak in very positive terms of success.  They also note though that 
this is not without ambivalence.  For example, one of the themes identified is the 
expression of a desire to be visibly recognised as successful by others.  This 
theme runs alongside a counterpart where participants describe themselves as 
setting their own measures of success and not being led by what others expect.  
Wagner and Wodak suggest other possible inconsistencies, such as talk of 
enjoying fame, whilst simultaneously down-playing it.  Analysis makes passing 
references to Billig’s (1991; 1996) notion of ideological dilemmas and rhetorical 
accomplishments as a means of understanding the ambivalences displayed.  
However, the interactional context in which the talk occurs, and the performance 
of success as a requirement of the interview is entirely overlooked.  One of the 
few occasions where analysis refers explicitly to the social action in language is in 
a throwaway comment about the modesty work accomplished in women’s talk of 
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luck in career success.  This brief comment raises yet more important questions 
about what participants are doing in their talk but again these questions remain 
unanswered. Overall, the socio-cognitive, socio-linguistic, critical, but realist 
account Wagner and Wodak offer entices with the phenomena it sets out, but 
disappoints in the lack of epistemological discipline it brings to analysis of the 
situated interactional work taking place in the talk reported. 
A study by Smulyan (2004) exploring teachers’ and doctors’ definitions of 
career success again generated fascinating data but is subject to much of the same 
critique. Her all female sample of women from an elite ‘highly selective’ college 
in the USA looked at the changing career identities over ten years of women who 
went on to become doctors or teachers.  Her analysis shows participants 
negotiating a range of conflicting discourses and identity positions framed around 
themes of  ‘wanting to help’; ‘balancing the personal and the professional’; and 
‘status and success’.  This starts to point to wider configurations for talking up 
‘success’ but again there is the usual problem in that participants are categorised 
in advance as elite students, carrying their own and other people’s high 
expectations, going into professional posts which carry particular statuses.  A 
second point of particular interest is the extent to which Smulyan’s data, like 
Wagner and Wodak’s, shows considerable accounting work by participants. The 
following is a data extract from one of Smulyan’s 1995 interviews with a teacher:  
 
I was struggling with myself, like I felt like I should be something else 
other than what I am.  And I really think that it’s kind of who I am that I 
am an educator, that I care about education.  I like to teach.  I like to work 
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with people.  And all these things are a part of me.  And you know, there’s 
some voice inside me saying it’s not good enough somehow.  That I 
should be doing more.  That I should have some name-droppable job or 
something.  But, you know, I think I’m really lucky in that I can look 
forward to going to work most days, which apparently a lot of people 
don’t.  (Data extract from Smulyan, 2005:240) 
 
This short extract is shot through with accounting, with rhetorical strategies, with 
ideological reproductions, and more.  Unfortunately Smulyan’s analysis, whilst 
constructionist in its philosophical approach, does not attend to language 
specifically as situated contingent interactional social action and as a consequence 
misses the centrality of this accounting process.  I will be taking up this point in 
the empirical chapters here (5, 6, 7 and 8) where I will be working with similar 
data but much more attentively to language as social action.  
One small but intriguing point of note in this data extract is that like 
Wagner and Wodak’s participants above, and Locke’s study of elite athletes’ 
attributions for success and failure (see page 34), participants again draw on 
‘luck’ as a strategy for managing accounting.  Smulyan makes no comment about 
this but it is certainly worth attention.  Talking about luck accomplishes 
sophisticated social action.  Above, Försterling et al. (2007) talk about attributions 
to luck being a means to derogate others.  In Locke’s study, luck was a discursive 
resource for managing modesty, but simultaneously allowing the speaker to ‘do 
success’ – to speak openly about his successes.  ‘Success’ there was not in 
dispute, but luck served to manage the interactional moment by adhering to and 
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reproducing norms of politeness.  In marked contrast, Smulyan’s data suggests 
luck is being used in this instance to boost a much more limited claim to success; 
to endorse and prop up a potentially disputed success.  To claim that the situation 
is lucky is to claim it has value, and thereby to take on an identity of a person 
having something of value (McAvoy, 2004).  It allows the speaker to claim a form 
of success despite the doubts she expresses when she says ‘I should be something 
else…it’s not good enough…’.  This is an area which requires much more 
attention but already, this additional level of analysis, with its emphasis on action, 
makes available a much greater sense that ‘success’ is a complicated and troubled 
identity to manage.  But what is missing, is a closer analysis of when trouble 
manifests; in what kinds of interactions; and how it is managed; and what other 
resources, outside of career, and material achievement speakers might have 
available to work up; what other sites and forms of success ‘work’, or fail to 
work; what business is accomplished by setting out different markers for 
successes and failures, and what are the various reflexive stakes for working up 
particular identities.  
These studies of women and career success point to an enormous range of 
complicated, nuanced, accountability-demanding identity work, which form a 
commonplace of stories of the self, and yet which are grossly under researched in 
terms of the precise form function and accomplishments they constitute.  
2.5. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed a broad range of typical approaches in psychology to 
studies of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ and along the way has pointed to a number of 
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particular and related critiques.  Phenomena associated with concepts of success 
and failure, such as people’s attributions, the variability in how attributions are 
worked up, people’s ambivalence towards high achieving performances, and the 
dilemmas women negotiate in working up identities of success, particularly in 
terms of career, and indeed variability in what counts as success or failure; all 
these have typically and conventionally been constructed empirically and 
interpreted theoretically with too little reference to the social setting in which 
these phenomena are lived out, with an inadequate model of the person, and with 
an inadequate, or indeed absent theory of language.  The turn to language across 
the social sciences has provided a compelling argument for re-thinking both.  The 
next chapter takes up this argument 
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Chapter 3. Theorising discursive subjects 
The previous chapter has presented some illustrations of the way success and 
failure have been understood as psychologically pertinent concepts within 
traditional modes of research.  But, running alongside that, it also illustrated some 
of the key critiques which arose out of the turn to language and the related 
developments in discursive psychology. So, while that previous review provides 
interesting phenomena to think about, the critique demonstrated that to understand 
the implications and consequences of discourses of success and failure for 
speakers, for subjectivity and identity as successful or failing subjects, a more 
convincing notion of the subject is needed.  This is one theorised within this 
discursive framework as a subject constituted in discursive practice, not one who 
merely uses language to reflect some other ‘reality’.  This chapter gathers the 
intellectual resources needed in order to capture much more richly that subject 
pointed to in the turn to language.   
The first section, 3.1, briefly outlines poststructural theories of self and 
identity; Foucauldian grand theories of subjectification, power and technology, 
fleshed out with an account of the psy complex, and neoliberal meritocratic 
individualisation which gives a particular reading to the idea of a successful 
subject. These meta theories, though, are charged with insufficient empirical 
specificity for lived life experiences, and a clearer theory of language-in-use is 
needed to resolve the critique.  Therefore, section 3.2 addresses language practice 
more closely by outlining Bakhtinian ideas of language as dialogic, and considers 
how this has been elaborated through accounts of ideological (re)productions, 
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positioning theories and psycho-discursive concepts of trouble, and imaginary 
positions.  An influential but contestable critique however, has been to question 
whether this psycho-discursive perspective has the capacity to theorise adequately 
emotions, moments of investment, and so on.  Section 3.3 therefore, explores this 
critique from the perspective of a psychoanalytically informed psychosocial 
theory.  I recognise the appeal of a psychoanalytically inflected approach but I 
contest some of the crucial assumptions and methods.  In the process, I set out the 
theoretical position I take up for this thesis.  This establishes my position as one 
firmly located within a dynamic dialogic and reflexive psycho-discursive 
framework.   
Throughout this chapter runs an argument that in order to make sense of 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ as consequential and variable elements in practices of 
subjectivity and identity for contemporary women in Britain, one needs to 
understand the subject as contingently constituted and occupying multiple 
positions, subjectivities and identities.  The final section, 3.4, complements this 
argument by exploring ideas of multiple locations and developments in theories of 
intersectionality.  The focus for this is on configurations of gender, age, and class.   
This chapter, then, establishes thoroughly the theoretical framework for 
working, and points to the key debates which will inform and flow through 
subsequent empirical chapters. 
3.1. Poststructural theories of self and identity 
Poststructural theories of the self begin with the concept of the person as a subject 
constituted in language, organised and understood through discourses and, in a 
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crucial development of a Saussurean structuralist approach, posits a subject not 
fixed, but one that is provisional, contingent, situated and open to contest.  The 
common starting point for elaborating this poststructuralist position is Foucault’s 
genealogical work on knowledge productions and discursive regimes (e.g., 
Foucault, 1961; 1969; 1973; 1975; 1976; 1984). This is an anti-essentialist, anti-
humanist perspective, where subjects and subjectivities are understood to be 
produced by circulations of ‘knowledges’ and the flows of power coming from the 
organisations of knowledge.  This Foucauldian account provides the heavyweight 
theoretical resource for understanding my opening orientation to the ‘subjects’ of 
social psychology.2   
3.1.1. Making subjects, making selves:  Foucault and subjectification 
Foucault’s argument is that the subject is formed in and by discourses; discourses 
that constitute the world in particular ways, with particular regimes of knowledge, 
which generate particular ways of doing things (Foucault, 1961; 1973). These 
knowledges divide the world up into sites of practices and meanings, and people 
come to understand the world and themselves in relation to these regimes of 
knowledge.  As we operate within these discursive regimes, we are also operating 
on ourselves, making subjects of ourselves, to ourselves via the flows of 
discourses circulating around and through us. 
For Foucault, these regimes of knowledge were primarily theorised as 
                                               
2
 There are other routes in to understanding the rise, premises and reach of poststructuralism – 
Lacan’s development of Freudian psychoanalysis through a theorisation of language and the 
symbolic order is one such alternative (Lacan, 1977; Homer, 2005). However, see Billig (2006) on 
the fundamental flaw in the central Lacanian concept of the mirror stage.  In addition, the 
emphasis on ‘the law of the father’ in the Lacanian argument, with its implication for an 
inevitability of male dominance, is a position I reject.  However, constraints of time and space set 
this debate outside the scope of my interests for this study.    
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acting on the body, through a wide range of disciplinary practices – governmental, 
legal, medical, and so on (Foucault, 1961; 1973; 1975). Through engagement with 
these practices, people come to understand themselves and others as, for example, 
citizens, with rights, responsibilities, as embodied subjects living within a 
conventionally formulated framework of health or illness, youth and aging, as kin, 
daughters, mothers, family, and so on.  These ‘ways of knowing’ (Lawler, 2008) 
are socially constructed. This claim to social construction is not to deny the 
materiality of the body for example;  rather it points to the manner in which 
socially constructed knowledges, such as dividing actions into categories 
indicating mental illness, crimes, and so on, organise both the material world, 
such as the body, and the abstract world, such as justice (McNay, 1991). 
 This notion of knowledges constructing ways of being in the world, is 
intimately linked with power and the way power operates is a crucial concept for 
this thesis. 
Power has often been conceived primarily as a top down process; 
prohibitive, and oppressive (Hall, 1997).  The Marxist concept of ideology as a set 
of practices which maintain the privilege of the ruling class over subordinated 
classes is a prime example (Wetherell and Potter, 1992).  Foucault conceived of 
power in different terms, not as a uni-directional force, solely passing down from 
governments, laws, institutions and other authorities.  Rather, power is a 
circulating force, flowing down, up, and through all the social relations and the 
minutiae of daily practices which ground power in lived life.  So, although 
Foucault argued that the practices of knowledge regimes support the interests of 
ruling or dominant groups, he also argued that power is not exclusively the 
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province of the privileged. The complexity of Foucault’s writing on this is 
notorious (see Hook 2007 for a detailed discussion), but some threads need to be 
clarified here.  
 Discourses are regimes of knowledges about how to do being a person, 
how to do relating to the world.  Discourses then, do not simply constitute 
repressions and controls; they also constitute possibilities and prescriptions for 
pleasures (Foucault, 1975).  Furthermore, different knowledge regimes operate in 
relation to each other, producing different opportunities for ways, and sites, of 
being a subject, as the regimes circulate in interconnecting flows.  These flows 
operate at the grand and the local level, from governments, hospitals, churches, to 
homes, families and intimate relationships.  
Knowledges are not simply, factually, ‘true’ or ‘false’.  They are socially 
constructed, and as they get taken up they take on a prevailing status of ‘truth’.  
This status makes them difficult, but not impossible, to challenge. This possibility 
for challenge, for resistance, is a contentious point in readings of Foucault. For 
example Billig (1996:14-6) draws a line between his own work on subjects as 
products and producers of discourse, and Foucault’s, over just this point. Billig 
reads the Foucauldian subject as one unable to speak outside of locked down 
unitary discourses.  This is a position Billig rejects in favour of a theory of 
language which is inevitably shifting in its interactional use and by this nature 
makes openings for argumentation (see section 3.2).  However, Butler (1993) uses 
the same argument, illustrated by resignification of terms such as ‘queer’, to 
explain how the Foucauldian subject is capacitated by the slippage in language. 
As constructions, knowledge regimes are always under threat, more or less, 
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sooner or later, of alternative configurations. So, while some discourses are 
particularly abiding, they are not entirely stable; the slippage in meaning, inherent 
in language and more importantly, language in use, means alternatives arise, with 
possibilities for subversions and resistances and new ways of doing.   
The crucial point here though, is that discourses are productive power.  
Production works through circulating knowledges about ‘ways of doing’ things to 
generate acting subjects who come to know themselves in certain ways by acting 
with those knowledges that circulate.  This conjures up a very different image of 
the psychological subject from the last chapter. There the subject was the rational 
unitary owner of language, inhabiting a space outside of language, and using 
language as a neutral reflection of an internal individualised perspective on the 
world.  Instead, in this chapter we see a subject who is situated in language, 
contingent on available regimes of ‘truth’; multiply positioned by different 
knowledge regimes, which interconnect, in sometimes conflicting ways; and 
which are taken up in practices of living.  This subject then is a discursive 
contributor to the production of her or his self, and her or his way of being in the 
world.  What is more, understanding the subject formed in multiple discourses in 
this way, offers resources for understanding the variable and contradictory 
practices people execute (Lucey and Rogers, 2007; Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  I 
revisit this  in section 3.2 when I discuss the interactive mobilisation of subject 
positions in local discursive orders.  For the moment I want to concentrate on the 
meta narratives organising the production of subjects. 
The format in which dominant, routine power is exercised is not fixed, 
even though it may show long periods of apparent stability.  For example, 
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Foucault (1976) argued the contemporary Western forms of governing 
populations have passed from sovereign power, the juridical, an ‘obey or be 
punished’ form dominating up to the mid 19th century; to the current forms which 
are instead regulatory, or self-disciplinary, an ‘obey or be ill, unhappy, [and] 
unfulfilled’ form (Lawler, 2008).  This regulatory power operates contingently 
through government strategies and social policies promoting ‘normalisation’ 
(Foucault, 1975; Rose 1996).  Lawler’s (2000) work on the technologies of 
mothering and the scrutinising practices of midwives, health visitors, social 
workers and so on, is an example of the kind of work which has grown out of this 
theoretical framework. Significantly, these scrutinising practices, whilst being 
‘steering mechanisms’ are not simply institutionally led; in addition, they lead 
mothers to act on themselves, to take up self-inspections of their performances as 
‘good mothers’. This regulatory, self disciplining form of governmentality 
induces reflection on the self: in the practice of these knowledge regimes of good 
mothering, mothers come to know themselves – and other mothers – as particular 
kinds, good, or bad.   
This notion of the self-inspecting self-disciplining subject – via the 
technologies and practices of language – is central to my examination of women’s 
constructions of the successful or failing self, and others.  The practices of 
language are both the sites and means for ‘knowing’ the self in these ways.   
For Rose (1996; 1999), this production of a self-monitoring self is 
intimately connected to the current neoliberal market economies of the west.  
These ideas are developed in the following sections; first with an exploration of 
the self monitoring subject of the psy complex, and then connecting this to a 
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neoliberal framework of individualisation and self-improvement. 
3.1.2. The psy complex  
The most well known elaboration of the influence of the psy complex has come 
from Nikolas Rose’s work on governmentality and the constitution of selves, 
mind, and categorisations of behaviour (Rose, 1985; 1996; 1999; see also Miller 
and Rose, 2008).  The psy complex refers to that collection of ‘psy’ knowledge 
regimes – psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, psychometrics, 
etc., which establish knowledges and supply the tools, the technologies, for 
shaping subjects and behaviours along axes of normalisation; subjects shaped into 
categories and classes of ‘normal’ both by acts on the subject by the expert, and 
importantly, acts on the self by the self taking up circulating psy discourses.  
 The psy complex is crucial to understanding a Foucauldian critique of the 
kinds of psychologies discussed in chapter 2.  For example, rather than 
attributions being seen as a ‘natural’ evaluation of cause and effect (section 2.2); 
and rather than ‘fear of failing’ stories being a ‘natural’ expression of  inner fears 
(section 2.3), all of which sees language as representative of internal states; we 
have instead an appreciation of how the discourses of the psy disciplines create 
the language ‘out there’ for what is experienced as the real and private self ‘in 
here’ (Rose, 1999).  
There is still relatively little empirical work exploring the functioning of 
the psy complex as a constitutive force although Miller and Rose’s work, 
particularly their analyses of the Tavistock Institute for Human Relations, is part 
of a compelling compendium (Miller and Rose, 2008).  Other valuable 
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illustrations are emerging, such as the examinations of the way in which regimes 
of normalisation have been brought to bear on the family in western societies 
during the 20th century (Hollway, 2006; Ingleby, 1985; Lawler, 2000; Walkerdine 
and Lucey, 1989, as examples). 
 This reading of the psy complex helps ground the poststructuralist 
argument that there is no natural ‘truth’, no real private self (Henriques et al., 
1984).  There is only an epistemological self, a subject known to itself by being 
historically crafted in practices of (psy) regimes which teach the language of 
talking, and therefore thinking, about the ‘self’ in the same kinds of psy expertise 
ways (Billig, 1996; Parker, 1997; Rose, 1996; 1999).  
Despite critical deconstruction, the psy technologies remain tremendously 
powerful and continue to exert a resistance to subversion.  As Sloan says in his 
preface to recent work by Hook (2007):  
 
ideological functions of psy-work and their subversion have been 
noted in previous scholarly work, but it is obvious from the 
ongoing expansion of the psychological enterprise that the 
critique is not taking hold.’ (Sloan, in Hook, 2007:viii).   
 
Rose (1999; see also Miller and Rose, 2008) argues that the growth in psy work, 
and particularly, the capacity of subjects to relate to themselves as autonomous 
individuals is intimately connected with contemporary neoliberal government:  
 
[psy] is intrinsically linked with transformations in the practices for 
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‘the conduct of conduct’ that have been assembled in contemporary 
liberal democracies…I suggest, this history is not intelligible without 
taking account of the complex relations between problems of 
governability and the invention, stabilization, and institutionalization 
of psy knowledges…. In particular, I suggest that the novel forms of 
government being invented in so many ‘postwelfare’ nations at the 
close of the twentieth century have come to depend, perhaps as never 
before, upon instrumentalizing the capacities and properties of ‘the 
subjects of government’, and therefore cannot be understood without 
addressing these new ways of understanding and acting upon 
ourselves and others as selves ‘free to choose’ (Rose, 1996:) 
 
I will come back to the individualising technologies of psy work and the fictive, 
political, production of subjects ‘free to choose’ (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989: 
29; Skeggs, 2004) in more depth in chapter 6 where I examine the mobilisation of 
discourses of choice in the context of my own data.  For the moment I want to 
address briefly the connection between self, identity, and success as a neoliberal, 
meritocratic subject.  
3.1.3. Individualisation and the neoliberal, meritocratic subject 
The psy knowledge/power discourses do not act on psychologised individuals in 
isolation from other knowledge/power discourses (Rose, 1996).  The psy complex 
works in relations with other sets of discourses, some of which also act on 
subjects to encourage a reflective understanding of the self as a project to be 
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worked on. Prominent amongst these are the discourses of the neoliberal 
meritocratic subject; a subject who is able to transform her or his self into an 
‘authentic’ and ‘realised’ self.  
 
In the last thirty years, the increasing influences of markets and 
neoliberal ideology have transformed the social category of the 
individual.  The individual struggle to create a personal identity has 
become the defining paradigm of how we live in Western cultures: we 
are called upon to invent our own identity and live in our own way and 
be true to ourselves.  It is the means by which individuals struggle to 
give themselves meaning and representation. (Rutherford, 2007:19)  
 
This concept of individuals having to invent their biographies for themselves 
according to their own wants and desires is at the heart of the 
‘individualisation theses’ of both Beck (1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
1995; 2001), and Giddens’ (1991) ‘reflexive project of the self’.  The 
prominence of individualisation as the organising framework for westernised 
living is traced back to combined influences of the Protestant work ethic, 
urbanisation, secularisation, and the breakdown of traditional industrial, 
community and familial ties.  As previous community and family bonds and 
restrictions were loosened, people were both more free and more expected to 
decide their own life trajectories.   
 However, Walkerdine (2003) illustrates what an insidious task is set 
this individualised, psychologised, self-regulatory, neoliberal subject 
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operating in an uncertain global economy.  As she explains so well: it bites; 
hard.   
 
While self-realisation is what is expected of the life project and one in 
which success is judged by the psychological capacities to succeed, 
the ability to handle uncertainty, the never knowing where work will 
come from etc., in fact produces an almost inevitable failure that will 
be lived as a personal failing, ....  The issue is that, in the Foucauldian 
sense, the practices of subjectification produce a constantly failing 
subject who has to understand their position in essentially personal and 
psychological terms…. 
… One way in which governments can keep order is to make citizens 
responsible for their own self-regulation by producing discourses in 
which success as a constantly changing successful entrepreneur of 
oneself is possible.  Psychology has a central role in providing both 
the discourses through which the psychologised self is understood and 
the clinical discourses and practices which put that subject together 
again after the inevitable failure.  Equally important are the discourses 
through which that success and failure is understood and therefore the 
techniques of self-regulation and management which both inscribe the 
subject and allow him or her to attempt to refashion themselves as a 
successful subject: the subject of neo-liberal choice.  (Walkerdine, 
2003:241) 
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To be a successful subject in a neoliberal context then, is to ‘choose’ to 
constantly work on the self, to improve the self, via education, employment, 
the makeover – of home, garden or self, or the acquisition of other social 
capitals (see for example section 3.4.2 below on youthfulness as capital), all 
of which mark out ‘successful citizenship’ (Dench, 2006, cited in Nunn and 
Biressi, 2008; McRobbie, 2004).  But, this moment of ‘becoming successful’ 
is always deferred, achieved only in partial, limited, snatched, moments, and 
thus is always in a state of being ‘not yet’, ‘not enough’, a state of ‘failing’ 
(Walkerdine, 2003).  
 More than that, the notion of choice is something of an ironic deceit.  
There is a compulsion to understand oneself as a choosing subject.  For 
Walkerdine and Lucey, this starts with childhood.   
 
Successful parenting rests on creating an illusion of autonomy so 
convincing that the child actually believes herself to be free.  We 
believe that this fiction, this illusion of autonomy, is central to the 
travesty of the word ‘freedom’ embodied in a political system that has 
to have everyone imagining themselves to be free the better to regulate 
them. (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989: 29) 
 
Individualisation is a compulsory quality of contemporary citizenship: 
practical moments of choice are woven into routine patterns of living – 
employment, living arrangements, education, and so on (Clarke, 2005; Clarke 
et al. 2006).  Skeggs (2004) argues that the market rhetoric of 
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individualisation reproduced by Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) organises 
not just around choice; but around a moral imperative to be an autonomous, 
agentic, ‘choosing’ self.  There is ‘an ethical duty to self and society’ (Skeggs, 
2004:57) to be a successful ‘entrepreneur of oneself’ (du Gay, 1996, cited in 
Walkerdine 2003).  Lawler, like Walkerdine, argues that this subject-self is 
generally impossibly positioned in ‘a social system in which only a minority 
can ‘succeed’’ (Lawler, 2008:73).  This is not the least because the pursuit of 
‘successful’ individualisation – successful self-making – is a classed process 
(Skeggs, 2004).  This is something Giddens in particular is accused of 
overlooking.  Individualisation is classed both in terms of access to resources, 
and in terms of what constitutes ‘success’ – and of course ‘failure’.  Skeggs’ 
work on the aesthetics of class argues that success is defined by middle class 
priorities, interests and habits, and that these priorities set a boundary between 
the successful self (that is a self exercising good middle class choice) and a 
failing self (a self exercising bad working class choice). This delineation of 
success by class is in direct collision with current discourses of meritocracy.  
 Young’s (1958) satire The Rise of the Meritocracy defined merit as 
‘IQ plus effort’.  It was intended to serve as a warning against the growing 
emphasis on defining ‘ability’ according to a narrow set of educational values 
(Young, 2001).  Instead, as the concept has been taken up, first in America 
and then in Britain, it has largely been culled of its satirical origin.  It has now 
taken on treacherous qualities – as Young (1958) predicted – legitimising 
inequalities on the grounds that those in receipt of social rewards and in 
positions of high status have earned and deserve the right to be there, by 
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virtue of their ability and effort. Meritocracy, the claim is, promotes the right 
men – and it is still usually men3 – for the job. 
 The National Child Development Study data-set, a longitudinal study 
of all children born in Britain between 3 and 9 March 1958 (Nettle, 2003), has 
been used by some to argue that British society is meritocratic (for example 
Nettle, 2003; Saunders, 1996; 2002), and by others to argue that it is not (for 
example Breen and Goldthorpe, 1999).  I am not concerned here with whether 
Britain ‘is’ a meritocratic society, rather with the existence of a discourse of 
meritocracy which places people in positions of inequality as if that is entirely 
fair (Applebaum, 2005; Lister, 2006; McCoy and Major, 2007).  Consider this 
from Young: 
 
The business meritocracy is in vogue.  If meritocrats believe, as more 
and more of them are encouraged to, that their advancement comes 
from their own merits, they can feel they deserve whatever they can 
get…The newcomers can actually believe they have morality on their 
side. (Young, The Guardian, 29 June 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/politics/2001/jun/29/comment) 
 
Applebaum (2005) says much the same in her analysis of how the discourse 
of meritocracy in the USA works alongside discourses of ‘colour-blindness’ 
                                               
3
 Meg Munn MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State May 2006-June 2007, speaking in March 
2007 reported only 10.3% of all FTSE 100 Directorships were held by women 
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/corporate/equality-boardroom);  
Jessica Evans writing in The Guardian, 17 June 2008 reported women account for 38% of all UK 
academics on permanent contract, 14% of vice-chancellors, and 19% of professors 
(http://education.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,335044317-108229,00.html).  
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to obfuscate continued inequalities between racial and ethnic groups.  
Assumptions of success by ‘merit’ conceal the social and economic privileges 
some groups experience thus making ‘innocent bystanders’ out of them; the 
corollary is that those who fail to achieve should hold themselves responsible. 
 The moral message of individualised neoliberal meritocratic rhetoric is 
insidious.  In Britain, Lister (2006) reports the findings of the Performance 
and Innovation Unit (PIU), a division of the Cabinet Office of the British 
Government, where it is argued that ‘meritocracy’ actually works to maintain 
inequality in that it generates a climate where it can be said that ‘the losers 
…have no one to blame for their circumstances but their own lack of ability 
and commitment’ (PIU, cited in Lister, 2006:234).  It is within this discursive 
climate that subjects are propelled into reflecting on and experiencing 
themselves as successful or failing subjects.   
3.1.4. Critical engagements  
A number of critiques are raised against the theory of the Foucauldian 
subject, and from a range of quarters, modernist and poststructuralist.  I am 
concerned here only with  those critiques committed to, or at least sympathetic to, 
the poststructural project. 
Feminist scholars have engaged extensively with post-structuralism.  
Social feminism takes the anti-essentialism of post-structuralism as a means of 
countering homogenising accounts of ‘woman’.  It provides a resistance to claims 
to universal core characteristics of ‘woman’ (Butler, 1990).  (See also postcolonial 
critiques for alternative sources of anti-homogenising discourses: hooks, 
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1997[1984]; Mohanty, 1988).  Approaching gender as a set of practices inscribed 
on the body, rather than the product of absolute sexual difference, opens up 
gender (and other) inequalities to critical and emancipatory examination and 
makes space for challenging and changing gendered practices (McNay, 1991). 
However, some scholars criticise Foucault for being blind to gender, for 
failing to address the different ways institutions and technologies impact on 
women and men (McNay, 1991). In addition, other scholars argue the 
Foucauldian account neither presents, nor allows, an adequate theory of resistance 
(Billig, 1996).  Thus, for some commentators, the Foucauldian subject is one 
represented as too passively sculpted by disciplinary practices.  As McNay (1992) 
notes, this passivity challenges feminist emancipatory goals because of its anti-
agentic implications.  However, McNay (1992) suggests that while early 
Foucauldian writings did indeed construct a passive subject, in his later work,  
The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1984) carried a different flavour.  There, 
McNay says, ‘individuals are no longer conceived as docile bodies in the grip of 
an inexorable disciplinary power, but as self-determining agents who are capable 
of challenging and resisting the structures of domination in modern society’ 
(McNay, 1992:4).   
Foucault’s reading of power is intensely complicated though.   Power that 
resists, simultaneously confirms.  The argument is this:  power is exercised 
precisely because people do have choices; it is this quality which makes resistance 
possible.  And because there is choice, power is inevitably exercised in every 
action.  Every time a subject re-enacts a practice, the practice is re-empowered.   
However, resistance also implicitly maintains disciplinary powers in the sense that 
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to resist is to acknowledge, to confirm the thing resisted (Wetherell and Potter, 
1992).  To resist is to re-produce, to re-invigorate, the normativity of the 
organising framework being resisted.  
The theoretical capacity for resistance is present in Foucault’s writings, 
but what that resistance looks like in practice is not well documented.  His 
attention was on the genealogy of practices, the history of how certain ways of 
knowing the world have come into being, rather than the everyday doing of 
particular practices.  It lacks an attention to the ethnomethodologies of living – 
people’s everyday ways of doing things (Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1963; Sacks, 
1995).  But as Wetherell (1998) points out in her argument for a synthesis 
between Foucauldian genealogy and ethnomethodology, there is no inherent 
conflict between the macro Foucauldian account of the subject and the micro fine 
grained analysis of everyday practice typical of conversation analysis.  There is 
however, a need for empirical elaboration through analysis at the local level.  This 
critique still stands and I take up this point in section 3.2. 
Finally, for some critics the central problem of Foucauldian thought is 
much more fundamental, in that it can appear to read not only the subject, but 
subjectivity – experience, emotion, investments, etc., through notions of 
discursive practices alone (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000a; 2000b).  The argument 
here is that a complete focus on discursive practice leaves aside too much that is 
internally held in the psychic and bodily experiences of living.  I return to this 
argument in section 3.3. below.   
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3.1.5. Summary 
This section has outlined the Foucauldian framework for thinking about subjects 
and subjectivities formed in discourse. It has introduced some of the overarching 
contemporary themes of those discourses, the individualised, psychologised, self-
regulating, neoliberal self.  It has started to pick up on some of the challenges this 
presents for people embedded in these particular ways of making sense of the self, 
and some of the challenges for positioning the self in positive relations to 
discourses of success and failure.  However, it has also pointed to some of the 
criticisms of this theory of the subject; most notably that the Foucauldian 
framework needs to be supplemented with a closer theory – and a more 
empirically grounded theory – of everyday discursive practices to help explain 
how these grand narratives are turned into lived lives as ‘successful’ or ‘failing’ 
subjects, how movements take place between different discourses, and how 
enactments of resistances and reproductions and re-workings are constituted.  I 
take this up in the next section. 
3.2. The dialogical subject: negotiated selves 
This section shifts emphasis, moving from the macro Foucauldian narrative where 
discursive practices set out the broad frameworks for ways of doing social life; to 
looking more closely at how subjects work, moment to moment, with these 
discursive practices to generate and negotiate local meaning.  In chapter 2, I 
outlined briefly the pressure for a paradigm shift in social psychology coming 
from theories of language as situated social action.  This section looks a little 
more closely at this reading of language.   It explains the performance of actions 
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such as thinking, arguing, positioning, resisting, and so on; and illustrates 
understandings of how subject ‘practices’ take on particular subject ‘meaning’, 
worked up in the moment. 
3.2.1. Bakhtinian voices 
The last two decades have seen growing references in social psychologies 
attentive to the constitutive nature of language, to the work of Mikhail Bakhtin 
and colleagues Pavel Medvedev and Valentin Voloshinov.4 (For selected works 
see Holquist, 1981; Morris, 1994; Morson and Emerson, 1990).  Bakhtinian texts 
deliver a number of concepts which provide valuable resources for thinking about 
talk of success and failure and how this is figured for subjects engaged in it.  
Bakhtin (1981) argued that talk is formed in dialogic, intertextual, 
polyvocal flows (Maybin, 2001). So, when people work to make sense of 
themselves in talk, they do so through a multiplicity of intersecting competing 
possibilities. Taylor (1989, cited in Benwell and Stokoe, 2006:35) summarises 
this notion of the self as one that ‘exists only within … webs of interlocution’.  
Some key concepts make this clearer.   
The first of these is the contestable nature of language and meaning. For 
Bakhtin (1981), any utterance is ‘always half someone else’s’.  Meaning is not 
under the sole control of the speaker, it must be negotiated with interlocutors.  
Moreover, meaning resides in large part in the uses words have already been put 
                                               
4
 There are ongoing debates about the authorship of several papers in the Bakhtinian corpus.  
Holquist (1981) favours primary authorship by Bakhtin; Morson and Emerson (1990) argue there 
is insufficient evidence for this position and favour retaining Voloshinov and Medvedev as the 
primary authors of the texts bearing their names. I follow this latter position. I refer generically to 
Bakhtinian texts, but to individual texts by individually named author.  My reason is to indicate the 
particular texts in dispute; not to assert a position on authorship.  
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to in their historical but flexible sedimentations.  To use words, then, is to join in 
with meanings which have been running for many years, but which are worked up 
anew for the particular moment and context (Maybin, 2001; Wetherell, 2003).  
Meanings carry historical usages, but these may compete, intersect, change.   
In Bakhtinian writing this change is understood through notions of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces in language use.  This goes some way to fleshing 
out the missing detail in Foucauldian arguments of resistance to dominant 
knowledge/power regimes.  The Bakhtinian argument is that there is an ongoing 
struggle between the centralising – centripetal – force of language, the 
authoritative unified cultural canon such as religious dogma, scientific truths, 
ideologies, etc., pulling thinking and meaning towards a common currency; and 
the diversifying – centrifugal – force of language, where thinking and meaning 
stratify outwards around different groups, with different language habits, 
generating alternative versions (Bakhtin, 1981).5  Utterances are always inhabited 
by these forces, pulling meaning towards one or other direction.  It is this tension 
which keeps language, and meaning, on the move (Maybin, 2001).   
As these forces operate, language use settles into particular speech genres. 
These ‘genres’ are typical structures for particular sites and situations, patterns 
appropriate to conventions of time and place, such as the genre of the PhD thesis, 
the informal greeting with a neighbour, and so on.   
This background of possibilities, the intersecting voices, texts, genres and 
ideologies in which we are immersed and through which we communicate and 
                                               
5
 Ideology here means a much more loosely defined notion of people’s view of the world rather 
than the structure of oppression in Marxist thought. 
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think, is captured in the Bakhtinian idea of heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1986): what 
Wertsch (1991) calls ‘the multivoicedness of meaning’.  Each utterance is just one 
of many possibilities.  Heteroglossia and multivoicedness are closely related to the 
notion of dialogicality, the idea that all meanings, all words and utterances, carry 
meaning only ever in relations with other words, utterances, meanings, and usages 
(Voloshinov, 1986).  Language use assumes some shared meaning, but the 
listener/reader will orientate themselves to the utterance, draw on previous 
centripetal and centrifugal usage, and assume other meanings.  Language use then, 
is an unavoidable collaboration: its meaning lies in interaction (Maybin, 1996).   
These multi-voiced, dialogical, alterical meanings carry evaluative accents 
too, the judgements words carry for their object of reference.  As Maybin 
(2001:65) writes: ‘language inevitably passes judgement on the world, even as it 
describes it’. This conception of the dynamic, dialogic, contestable and situated 
nature of language is particularly important for this study.  These are resources for 
moving from the broad strokes of grand theories of the constitutive knowledge 
regimes and institutional discourses of Foucauldian thought, which are crucial for 
understanding the historical construction of the subject; through to an 
understanding of the mundane practices of language-in-use, which are crucial for 
articulating the contested search for meaning, and the beginnings of a social 
‘interiority’.  What this gives us is a sense of the moment to moment negotiated 
production language use entails.   
While Bakhtin was writing primarily within literary scholarship, the same 
kind of heteroglossic thinking has been brought into social psychology through 
the work of Billig.  For Billig (1991; 1996; et al., 1988), this negotiated 
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production of meaning also takes the form of competing possibilities; what he 
describes as ideological dilemmas; the argumentative rhetoric of working with 
competing versions, through which thinking itself is made possible.  I take up 
these readings now.   
3.2.2. Subjects of ideology and dilemma 
Within discourse studies in psychology, the notion of ideology has been 
broadened out from its classic Marxist reading where ‘ideology’ sits in opposition 
to ‘truth’.  Marxist ‘ideology’ refers to a set of ideas and practices which maintain 
the privilege of the current ruling class over subordinated classes as if that order 
were a ‘natural’ order.  Subsequent reworkings of the concept of ideology are 
more diverse and have opened up some important new theoretical possibilities.  
Billig (1991) has retained the notion of the power of ideology to fix subjects in 
place, but coming from a social constructionist perspective he has argued against 
the opposition of ideology and ‘truth’ (see also Billig et al., 1988).  In Billig’s 
account, ideology refers to all the collections of ideas people work with to make 
sense of the world, including everyday ‘commonsense’.  
Crucially though, these grand and mundane ideologies throw up 
contrasting and conflicting versions of the world, typified in deceptively simple 
tropes such as ‘out of sight, out of mind’ and ‘absence makes the heart grow 
fonder’. This idea shares close similarities with the notion of interpretative 
repertoires outlined in chapter 2 (2.2).  Billig (1996) argues it is precisely this 
variability and diversity which makes thinking possible.  Thinking works through 
the argumentative organisation of competing ideologies, competing repertoires, 
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tropes, and so on.  Everyday reasoning is made up of these argumentative 
possibilities, the dilemmas of choosing between conflicting, dissonant, ambiguous 
utterances. Negotiating meaning involves a rhetorical address to these 
alternatives. 
 Antaki (1994) argues against this rhetorical and dialogic stance, suggesting 
that attention to everyday talk reveals instead that speakers work towards 
agreement and to resolving dispute so that conversation may move on, and not as 
he says Billig implies, to sustain a battle of ‘witcraft’.  Billig’s argument however, 
is not that every conversation is orientated to as a ‘dispute’; rather, all talk is 
hearable as just one particular version, and therefore always open to challenge.  
This versioned nature of talk keeps meaning ‘on the move’.  Crucially though, 
talk settles into some familiar patterns which are received as ‘truth’. This is the 
particular power of ideologies: they carry their power to shape the social world 
through the ways in which their familiarity is reproduced in talk.  Ideologies are 
open to challenge, but their routine reproduction carries an implicit, fictional, 
authenticity.  The contested ‘truths’ can not ultimately be resolved; and because of 
this, dominant versions may prevail (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). 
Billig’s development of a rhetorical psychology (1991; 1996; et al., 1988) 
was derived outside of Bakhtinian work (Billig, 1996), but picked up many of the 
same themes discussed above; the dynamic, dialogic, anticipatory, ideological and 
negotiated qualities of language.  Like Bakhtin, Billig has argued that what people 
say is assembled with a view to how it might be received: with an orientation to 
norms, to alternatives, to challenges and how might they be countered or 
forestalled (see also Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  These norms include things like 
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norms against prejudice (Billig, 1991) which does not mean prejudice is ruled out, 
but that speakers must in particular contexts perform careful rhetorical acts to 
orientate themselves around a charge of breaching the norm (see also McAvoy, 
2004, for a discussion of norms of rationality in talk of being lucky).  What is 
produced, the talk or thought generated, is contingent, serving different purposes 
and fulfilling different functions at different times.  Thinking about language 
through this lens of contingent argumentation, opens up an account for why talk 
may be, indeed could be expected to be, inconsistent and variable, and makes 
space for agency, albeit agency constrained by the building blocks of available 
discourse.   
So far, I have traced a route between ideas of Foucauldian grand narratives 
acting on (possibly) passive bodies; to a Bakhtinian account which starts to 
theorise the slippage and moment to moment negotiation through dialogic 
language, making space for agency and shared, provisional, ownership of 
meaning through collaboration; then moving to the resources and discursive 
demands of competing ideologies.  These resources provide a strong sense of 
subjects negotiating their movements through language.  What is needed now, is a 
way to theorise that movement in practice.  For this, we can turn to the notion of 
position and positioning. 
3.2.3. Subjects, positions and trouble. 
When people act, when we communicate, part of that task relies on being 
‘recognised’ as a particular kind of speaking subject, speaking from a position 
within particular discourses.  Speaking to or about others involves recognising 
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them too as other particular kinds of subjects within discourse.  This concept of 
the centrality of ‘recognition’, along with the possibility for misrecognition, has 
its roots in Althusser’s (1971) claim that people are interpellated into particular 
subject positions in order to take part in social practices (Edley, 2001; 
Widdicombe, 1998).  If one is to join in practices, one must have a recognisable 
identity through which to do so or one may be denied a voice.  McFarquhar 
(1987) cites the example that until the 20th century married women in the UK 
were not recognised in law as persons with capacity to enter into contracts.  As a 
consequence, they could not take up this position in a court of law to seek redress 
for contractual breach.  This example, though, is quite formal in nature; clearly 
demarcated by explicit institutional – legal – discourse.  Much of our everyday 
practice involves speaking from positions which are more subtle, nuanced and 
worked up in the interactional contingencies of the moment.   
The Althusserian idea of interpellated subjects (Althusser, 1971) has been 
developed via the concepts of subjectification via discourse outlined above. 
Knowledge/power regimes, ideologies, talk, make available different ‘categories’ 
of subject which may be assigned, taken up, or resisted; slots such as the good 
parent, the unruly child, the criminal, the mad, etc.  There are discursive ‘slots’ for 
people to place themselves and others in.  This way of using the concept of 
location, of positioning subjects in social science, can be traced back to Hollway 
(1984) and her discussion of subjects taking up gendered positions in talk of 
heterosexual relations (van Langenhove and Harré, 1999:16).  Since then, the 
elaboration of concepts of subject positions and positioning has been most closely 
associated with widely influential work by Davies and Harré (1990), Harré and 
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van Langenhove (1999) (see also Harré and Moghaddam, 2003); and more 
recently through the notion of troubled and untroubled positions developed by 
Wetherell (1998; 2005a). 
 An intrinsic feature of positioning is its dynamic quality; its fluidity. 
Positions are provisional. Subjects move, or are moved, between different 
‘classifications’ of person as people talk and act.  Davies and Harré (1990:52) 
contrast this with the earlier theories of lives practiced via ‘roles’ which they 
argue conjures illusions of transcendental, pre-existing, self-contained, static, 
dramaturgical models, with little room for agency.  In contrast, thinking of 
subjects as constituted in positioning occurring in interactional moments, attends 
more carefully to the dynamic and fleeting multiplicities of self.  Crucially, it 
offers an account of discontinuities of self, and contradictions in talk, as different 
discourses are mobilised, and different discursive ‘locations’ become possible 
(Edley, 2001; Reynolds 2004). 
 This taking up of a position may be reflexive, in that one positions oneself 
by one’s utterances (although this notion carries tensions around intentionality 
which I discuss later); or interactive, in that one positions or is positioned by 
another.  In addition, positions carry attendant ‘rights, obligation and 
expectations’ (Davies and Harré, 1990:52).  Davies, Harré and colleagues 
understand these as ‘local moral orders’: the judgements and evaluations 
interlocutors bring to the interaction.  Harré and van Langenhove (1999:6) make it 
the first of their key features for understanding local interaction.  However, while 
‘moral order’ is integral to this account of positioning, it is somewhat ‘glossed 
over’, both as an object of analysis and as an analytic resource.  Empirically, it 
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misses an adequately multilayered analysis of ethnomethodological practices of 
positioning – how people do positioning in everyday talk.  Taking up or being 
assigned a particular position brings with it access to wider discursive resources, 
particular storylines, repertoires, and so on, and it closes down others (Harré and 
van Langenhove, 1999).  Moreover, this is not an abstract decontextualised 
process; it happens in contingent dialogical interactional moments.  Jones (2003) 
provides much needed empirical illustrations of what that looks like in certain 
practices.  She examines the way in which positioning women as ‘older’ allows 
them to speak authoritatively about what it is like to grow older.  In contrast, 
positioning them as ‘old’ and ‘widowed’, makes it difficult for them to speak 
easily about being sexually active.  Therefore one potential position may mobilise 
quite different sets of attendant and competing discourses for different 
interlocutors.  Configurations of discursive positions, and movements between 
positions then becomes an important focus for analyses of contestation.  This 
addresses one of the gaps of Foucauldian accounts:  how ‘resistance’ happens in 
practice.  Positioning is contingent on available discourses.  It may pass unmarked 
because it draws on established, taken for granted spaces in discourses; or it may 
be contentious where positions are resisted.   
 An important resource for firming up both the notions of local moral order 
and the action of resistance comes in Wetherell’s explication of troubled and 
untroubled positions (1998; 2005a).  ‘Trouble’ is marked out not by particular 
positions per se, but by particular ethnomethodological activity in positioning 
work; moments of hesitation and unease, corrections and repairs or retreats, 
confusion and conflict (Wetherell 2005a).  Wetherell (1998) develops this through 
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an analysis of data generated with Nigel Edley for their project on masculinity 
(Edley and Wetherell, 1995).  Similarly, Reynolds’ (2004) study of women’s 
discourses on being single explores some of the resources participants have for 
‘accounting’ for being single.  It is telling that this is a position which, in 
participants’ orientations, needs to be accounted for.  ‘Single’ signals trouble, in 
some positionings.  Reynolds describes, in a delightful phrase, ‘the dance of 
choice and chance’ (2004:163) performed by her participants.  While ‘wanting to 
feel chosen’ (for marriage) is orientated to as acceptable and not in need of being 
elaborated or countered, not having been chosen is more problematic. The claim 
that this is ‘trouble’ lies in the way in which not being chosen is countered by 
speakers as they position themselves as not wanting or needing to be married.  
But, this too appears to carry its own trouble.  Speakers are now potentially 
positioning themselves as ‘asexual spinsters’, and positions are quickly further 
negotiated and realigned around the idea that it is a mistake to assume marriage 
suits everyone. These movements around trouble speak clearly both of difficulties 
around local moral orders, and the value of this close analysis to the interactional 
movements.  Importantly, untroubled positions are equally interesting for what 
they show about the taken-for-granted reproductions of moral orders; those 
organisations which pass smoothly, without comment or delicate manoeuvres.  
One of the tasks for this thesis is to delve further into this concept of normative 
moral orders and explicate moral order practices, that is, moral order in action 
through attention to speakers’ orientations to, and navigations through, trouble 
and absences of ‘trouble’.  I take up this point again in each of the empirical 
chapters as I consider what constructed sites and objects of success, and what 
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claims to success, require particular warranting, and what passes without dissent 
or apparent dilemma.   
Subject positions and positioning are now central to Foucauldian accounts 
of subjectification and make a valuable resource to take forward.  They are able to 
accommodate both the robust position, such as ‘legal personality in law’, and the 
more fleeting and precarious, such as ‘successful parent’ (Hollway, 2006; Lawler, 
2000; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989).  However, positioning theory requires 
greater empirical elaboration of some of its inferences and associated concepts.  If 
the notion of dynamic subject positions is set within a framework that 
incorporates the knowledge/power/truth regimes of Foucault, with the dialogical 
fluidity and contestability Bakhtin points to, and the workings of ideology, 
dilemma and argumentative texture Billig makes visible; alongside the 
ethnomethodological notions of trouble Wetherell makes visible; then subject 
positioning takes on a complexity which makes it a powerful resource for 
analysing patterns of activity occurring in talk.   
However, to present this synthesis in such a way does perform something 
of a sleight of hand.  For some commentators, such as Billig (1996), the ‘subject’ 
of Foucauldian knowledge regimes and the subject of Bakhtinian heteroglossic 
dialogism are at odds: subject positions in Foucauldian knowledge regimes are 
more stable than a Bakhtinian account favours; and subject positions in a 
Bakhtinian account are more locally negotiable, precarious, and open to contest.  
However, some sort of synthesis of the two seems called for.  A productive 
resolution appears to lie in the combined Foucauldian and ethnomethodological 
analyses Wetherell (1998; 2003) advocates.  I will discuss this more in chapter 4 
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where I account for my analytic procedures; and where I raise an important 
critique by Jones (2003) on analytic claims to ‘intentionality’ in speakers’ 
positioning acts.  For now, I want to turn attention to some particular aspects of 
Wetherell’s framework for understanding a psycho-discursive subject.  
3.2.4. Psycho-discursive practices: from grand theory to lived life.  
Understanding social psychology as psycho-discursive practice means 
understanding people as beings acquiring the ability to speak as psychological 
subjects, that is, to exercise contemporary narrative capital  which, in our time and 
place, means the ability to speak of the self, of internal states, emotions, beliefs, 
and so on (Edwards, 1997; Wetherell, 2003; Wetherell and Edley, 1999).  In 
Wetherell’s words: 
 
‘Psycho-discursive practices are those which among the sum of social 
practices constitute a psychology, formulate a mental life and have 
consequences for the formation and representation of the person’. 
(Wetherell, 2007:668) 
 
Wetherell’s framework for working draws explicitly on Foucauldian concepts of 
socially constructed, discursively operating, institutional practices (Wetherell, 
1998; 2007).  The connections she makes between the constitution of 
‘psychology’ and the ‘psychologised individual’ picks up the constructionist 
account of the psy complex outlined above (Wetherell and Edley, 1999).  But, 
what Wetherell brings to theory and analysis is a closer focus on lived practice; 
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what grand narratives, ideologies, dilemmas, representations, look like when 
people are engaged with them, or by them; what people do with them; in other 
words, what psycho-discursive practices look like in action.   
 Within this framework of psycho-discursive practice Wetherell opens up a 
concept which is particularly important for this thesis; the notion of the 
‘psychological capitals’ people draw on to construct and inhabit particular subject 
positions of success and failure and particular kinds of agentic and experiencing 
subjectivities of self (Wetherell, 2003; Wetherell and Edley, 1999).  I will be 
revisiting these ideas throughout the empirical chapters.   
 In addition, Wetherell and Edley (1999) open up a further rich resource in 
their account of ‘imagined’ positions.  They borrow the term ‘imaginary’ from 
Lacan, albeit in a more contained, empirically driven form. Lacan’s contention 
was that talk of the self means by necessity to identify with something outside of 
the self – with a pre-existing linguistic device, ‘I’, and therefore with something 
which is not the self, but an unsatisfying approximation (Redman, 2005).  Talk of 
‘I’ then strives to procure and protect the illusion of a complete and whole self, 
‘I’, to match the sense of wholeness attached to the material image, the spectacle, 
of the unitary body. In Lacanian thought, the wholeness of this ‘I’ is a discursive 
fantasy, trying to suture mastery of the self in place (Redman, 2000).   
Wetherell and Edley leave aside this ontology of being.  They focus 
instead on what positions of ‘I’ look like in talk when people take up particular 
discourses of ‘I’ in relation to imagined, potentially available, subject positions.  
In their particular study of men negotiating hegemonic masculinities, for example, 
Wetherell and Edley suggest that men position themselves in relation to 
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discourses of an heroic ideal.  But in this process, three discourses of 
contemporary masculinity are negotiated; the heroic ideal, the ordinary and the 
rebellious position.  As speakers take up ‘I’, their talk imagines themselves and 
others as certain kinds of men, with certain kinds of psychological, privatised 
qualities and characteristics. As speakers imagine themselves in these locally 
occasioned actions they take up and reproduce socially available intelligibilities, 
the shared form of making sense of ways of being ‘masculine’.   
Wetherell and Edley have marked out an exciting concept full of potential 
but it needs more detail, theoretically and empirically.  I will be coming back to 
the notion of ‘imagining’ in chapter 7.  There I discuss my reading of my own 
data on women’s talk of their own and others’ successes and failings and the 
practices of imagining that go hand in hand with this and which carry telling 
implications for understanding subjectivities and identities. 
3.2.5. Summary 
This section has started to address a particular gap in the grand Foucauldian 
narrative by fleshing out some of the specificities of how subjects work with 
discourse in practice.  It has illustrated some of the resources which connect the 
Foucauldian subject with the dialogical speaker.  It has gathered a range of 
resources for understanding the way language works at the grand and the local 
level to create meaning.  It has illustrated subjects as practitioners in dynamic 
negotiations, working with dialogical alterities, and oppositional forces; subjects 
working through ideological dilemmas, rhetorical thinking, and the taking up of 
consequential, implicatory, troubled and imaginary positions.  These resources 
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extend the Foucauldian conceit that grand regimes of knowledge promote 
reflexive self regulation.  They offer resources for understanding the way 
language use takes on particular and contestable meanings, and is inevitably 
dialogical, collaborative and therefore social and negotiated in action. The grand 
narrative has been focused a little more finely:  the speaker is now consequential. 
But, this individual is still somewhat elusive.  Why does any particular 
person take up one particular meaning rather than another; why this subject 
position, rather than that; why attend to this discourse, rather than that; why invest 
in this discourse, rather than some other?  In what way might an analysis of 
discourse, drawing on these intellectual resources, begin to account for what 
matters for any one individual.  This is the focus for the next section. 
3.3. Emotions, investments  and individual specificities: a 
psychosocial province? 
There are, of course, many theories of emotion in psychology, many perspectives 
from which to view them (see for example Griffiths, 1997; Laird, 2007; Roberts, 
2003).  However, in this thesis, I have been staking out a theoretical framework 
which is post-structuralist, anti-essentialist, and anti-humanist.  As a consequence, 
my engagement is with those debates on emotion and agency and investments in 
talk which are within, or sympathetic to, a post-structural framework for thinking.  
Engagement then, is with contemporary moves in what is loosely called a 
psychosocial turn, although this is a contested phrase (Frosh and Baraitser; 2008; 
Hollway, 2004; Walkerdine, 2008).  Psychosocial psychologies take many forms, 
as the inaugural meeting of the UK wide ‘Psychosocial Network’ in December 
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2007 testified (Hollway, 2008a6), and evidenced in the special issue of 
Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society from December, 2008.  However, there do 
seem to be some important points of agreement which might run across all 
versions of the psychosocial: Hollway (2008a:200) suggests a minimal shared 
definition at least, that the psychosocial ‘does not reduce either to the individual 
or the social’.  This allows a broad college.   
However, in this section I am most interested in debate with those 
psychosocial approaches which whilst simultaneously sympathetic to a post-
structuralist, constructionist stance, also speak on internal psychic worlds of 
emotions, investments, and individual specificities, in all their consistencies, 
variabilities, and contradictions.  This version calls up a psychoanalytically 
inflected psychosocial framework: one still attentive to post-structural readings of 
the constructive and constitutive functioning of language, one that appreciates 
language as social action, but one which is reluctant to privilege language alone as 
the constitutive site of subjects and subjectivity (Hollway, 2004; Hollway and 
Jefferson, 2000a; 2000b; 2005a; 2005b; Frosh, 1989; 1997; 1999; Frosh and 
Emerson, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2008). 
An important critique of the theoretical frameworks referenced earlier in 
this chapter is that they are absent of any adequate theory of personal investments 
in particular discursive figurations (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000a; 2000b; 
Jefferson, 2008; Frosh, 1999 ).   As Jefferson puts it: 
 
                                               
6
 see also  www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/psychosocial/contributors.shtml for a series of 
documents outlining different institutional approaches to psychosocial study. 
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Foucault … is not psychosocial because his subjects are essentially the 
amalgam of the subject positions (in discourse) that they adopt; and 
Althusser is not because his subjects are interpellated (or hailed) by 
ideology but do not interpellate. (Jefferson, 2008: 368)  
 
In other words, the personal, the ‘psyche’, is lost in this social account.  There is 
some substance to this critique of early post-structuralist discourse analysis; but 
subsequent discursive studies have begun to develop responses.  It is fair to say 
this is a project still in its early days, but there are important productive 
beginnings.  In discourse studies emotions are examined as a particular kind of 
negotiable performance,  such as Capps and Ochs (1995) on agoraphobia, and 
Edwards (1997; 1999) on talk of emotion as a functional interactional 
accomplishment.  Wetherell and Edley’s development of psycho-discursive 
practices discussed above also of course includes this dialogic interactional 
reading of the situated work of emotion (Wetherell, 2007; Wetherell and Edley, 
1999).  Billig’s work on repression (1999a) and the practical skills of language 
also took him into the territory of emotion.  He too argued against commonsense 
notions of emotion as reified distinguishable bodily states, and reframed emotions 
as social products, ‘bound up with social relations, expectancies and a sense of 
moral order’ (Billig 1999a:187).  This is not to deny the senses of bodily 
‘agitation’ or ‘repose’ which may be attached to some talk of emotion.  It does, 
however, mark out the relational, interactional, function of talk of emotion; the 
way talk of love, or anger, is rarely a ‘description’; but more generally, the 
conduct of relational moralities of validation, justification, criticism and so on.  
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These are negotiated practices (Billig, 1999a; Edwards, 1997).  Moreover, these 
negotiated understandings of emotion are the very stuff from which we make 
sense of ourselves as persons experiencing emotion.  So, it is not the case that 
discursive analyses entirely lack an approach to studying emotion and investment.   
However, it is the case that for some scholars the style of this discursively 
led analysis is inadequate for the object of study. This tends to be the position 
taken by scholars working within a psychoanalytically inflected psychosocial 
framework (Frosh, 1989; Hollway and Jefferson, 2000a; 2000b; Walkerdine and 
Lucey, 1989).  In this framework the weight and consequence of the experience of 
internal emotions, experienced outside of any talk of emotions and investments, is 
a central object of analysis.  Furthermore, it is something which, while mediated 
by language, is nevertheless held to lie beyond ‘discourse’.   
3.3.1. Behind and beyond words? 
Frosh (1999) asks ‘What is outside discourse?’  In answer, by way of example, he 
writes powerfully of the dread of abjection, the loss of the self, shame, the 
eruption of shock, anxiety, terror, moments which can lie outside the constituency 
of language; experienced, but inarticulable. These are moments when what 
characterises language is its insufficiency.  Such a moment may be rendered 
discursive retroactively, but ‘at the time of its bursting forth, it is something else’ 
(Frosh, 1999:386).  There is a ‘gap’ for Frosh between ‘experience’ and 
‘narrative’ (Frosh, 1989).  
 Frosh draws on enormously powerful and provocative imagery in 
constructing this gap and it is one which discourse studies in social psychology 
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must address.  Cautiously, I propose that what Frosh points to in the ‘gap’, the 
insufficiency of language, is the messiness of language.  Language is ‘inadequate’ 
in that it is fragmented and conflicting, not complete, or wholly ‘rational’, not 
always instantaneously available in fully ‘coherent’ worked up organisation.  
Language is worked up from competing versions.  The moments of ‘inarticulable 
eruption’ are the moments when language is ‘in process’, ‘in competition’.   
In another vein, Hollway and Jefferson (2005a; 2005b) ask about 
differences in people’s behaviours.  They accuse Foucauldian approaches of a 
discourse determinism (2000b) which brackets off the lived life experience of the 
individual.  They are interested in explaining why one person may respond in one 
way to a situation, while others may act quite differently.  Their interests are 
intellectually stimulating; this is an enormously consequential area. But their 
critique is inattentive to differences in theories and analytic practices of discourse, 
collapsing the Foucauldian readings of the formation of the subject with some of 
the very different aims of discursive approaches in psychology.  (I discuss these 
differences in discursive psychologies more in chapter 4).  Moreover, Hollway 
and Jefferson’s own psychoanalytic resolution to the concerns they raise is highly 
contentious.   
A useful vehicle for drawing out some of the detail of this debate comes in 
a recent dialogue between Hollway and Jefferson (2005a; 2005b) working from a 
psychoanalytic psychosocial position, Spears (2005) from a social identity theory 
position and Wetherell (2005b) from a psycho-discursive psychology.  In their 
case study analysis of ‘Vince’, Hollway and Jefferson (2005a) describe a man 
who has worked as a lorry driver for 12 years.  Some three or four years before 
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the interview takes place, Vince became embroiled in a lengthy and disputed 
insurance claim following the theft of his lorry.  He was persuaded by his 
employer to commit perjury, and the employer’s insurance claim was upheld.  
Sometime after the case was resolved Vince took sick leave and was subsequently 
diagnosed with depression.  The research interviews (two, one week apart) take 
place 5 months into this sick leave period.  
Hollway and Jefferson assert that the main puzzle is ‘why did Vince go off 
sick as and when he did’ (2005b:175, emphasis in the original). For them, a 
straightforward account of physical exhaustion from years of hard work, long 
shifts, added to the strain of a lengthy court case, where Vince was bullied into 
lying, and where his employer had threatened to terminate Vince’s contract, are 
all insufficient to account for why Vince might finally become ill some few 
months after the court case was resolved (Wetherell, 2005b).  They describe this 
as a counter-intuitive puzzle and maintain that the answer must lie in unconscious 
defences.  Their reasoning rests on the proposition that Vince’s illness appeared to 
have no organic cause; they question Vince’s motivation in not taking up 
alternative employment, and they target inconsistencies in the way Vince 
describes and positions his boss, and himself.  Hollway and Jefferson contend:  
 
‘The fact that someone else would not have responded in quite this way 
forces us to posit an internal world… that is not simply reducible to social 
discourses, even though it can only be understood through, and in relation 
to, such discourses, i.e. psychosocially.’ (Hollway and Jefferson, 
2005b:175) 
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Speers (2005) and Wetherell (2005b) note that a substantial group of assumptions 
come together here:  that Vince’s behaviours are indeed ‘unusual’; that this must 
be due to some inner psychic quality; that his actions cannot be made sense of in 
terms of discourse practice; that his illness has no straightforward biological 
origin; and that therefore, explanation must be by recourse to unconscious 
dynamic defence mechanisms.  
In Hollway and Jefferson’s analysis, the illness is translated into 
unconscious identifications.  They begin by pointing to Vince’s recruitment of 
discourses of the family man, one who can protect and provide (Gilmore, 1993, 
cited in Hollway and Jefferson 2005a). But they suggest this carries historical 
complications that are too painful for Vince to work with directly; his 
disidentification with his own ‘wastrel’ father; his idealisation of his boss as an 
alternative father – an identification which no longer works because of the boss’s 
betrayal of Vince; an inability to admit this to himself; alongside the fear that he is 
no longer the father to his own children he had wanted himself to be.  For 
Hollway and Jefferson, the analysis thus far could be worked up without recourse 
to unconscious internal self-directing dynamics.  However, what points decisively 
to unconscious dynamics for them is twofold.  First, is their conviction that Vince 
could quite simply have got another job, this is what they indicate to be entirely 
and practically possible.  Second, that Vince became sick without an identified 
apparent organic cause.  This sickness, they argue, indicates an unconscious 
‘choice’ as an alternative resolution to dealing with his painful predicament.   
Wetherell’s (2005b) critique of this case study is damning.  She presents a 
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brief but effective alternative analysis.  This alternative analysis is not thoroughly 
worked up – that was not its function – but what is enormously significant about it 
is the way in which Wetherell is able, contrary to claims by Hollway and 
Jefferson, to point to the huge range of resources a discursive approach has 
available to account in great detail, great elaborate and empirically grounded 
detail, for what Vince says.  Wetherell lists: troubled and contradictory identity 
positions; accounting practices; attributional work; local moral orders; narrative 
demands; acceptable subject positions for actual and imaginary audiences; 
multiple, practiced, and canonical story versions.  There is nothing in Vince’s talk 
that suggests irrational incoherence, even where his words show him to be 
multiply situated in competing and troubled subject positions. There is no 
requirement to go beyond the words to ‘elective’ illness.  The processes in action 
here lie in the practices of language.  There is nothing here which Hollway and 
Jefferson light upon which appears, for Wetherell, to go beyond the scope of a 
discursive analysis.  So, with these resources in mind, and to revisit Frosh’s 
question, what then, lies beyond discourse?  What is the residual appeal of a 
psychoanalytically inflected poststructural theory of the subject?   
For some, much of the appeal of the psychoanalytic comes in the radical 
work the notion of a dynamic unconscious does to undermine the ‘modernist 
valorisation of the rational, unitary subject’ (Stopford, 2004:15) and working 
within a poststructural framework I too am committed to this aim. Yet, discourse 
theory is much more massively disruptive of assumptions of a consistent, unified 
subject, positing as it does a fragmented, distributed subject produced in moment-
to-moment situated and contingent practices (Wetherell et al. 2001a; 2001b).   
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 As for the appeal of a dynamic unconscious, I am sympathetic to such an 
idea, or rather, to follow Hollway’s (2008b) preference on this, to the idea of 
unconscious dynamics, a phrasing which directs attention to activity, rather than 
the more static notion of ‘the unconscious’.  However, I am suspicious in many 
ways of the systematisation in accounts of internal unconscious processes and the 
methods for accessing, identifying and validating accounts of these internal 
processes.  Instead, I will be pointing later in my empirical chapters to an 
alternative route for thinking about unconscious action:  Billig’s (1997; 1999a) 
framework for thinking through a dialogic unconscious; that is, what gets made 
‘unconscious’, through the workings of language; to what is said and not said, 
sayable and unsayable.   
Wetherell (2003; 2005b) points to a range of concerns: the continuation of 
the split between the external (social) and the hidden, private, internal (the 
psychological) – despite claims to understand the two as irrevocably integrated; a 
tendency to overlook the discursive demands made by particular sites, be they 
interviews, therapy sessions, or some other accounting; also the ambiguously 
defined discrimination between eruptions of unconscious dynamics such as 
transference-countertransference, and routine interactional exchange not requiring 
explanations beyond the text.  On this point, Edley (2006) argues psychoanalytic 
psychosocial analyses switch inevitably between language as representational and 
its functional or performative quality.   
There are serious questions raised from within and without psychoanalysis 
around the transfer of clinical concepts to non-clinical settings. Frosh and 
Baraitser (2008) criticise Hollway and Jefferson for applying concepts intended to 
Chapter 3.  Theorising discursive subjects 
108 
be worked out over repeated therapeutic settings, with the therapeutic contract in 
mind, to just one or two interviews.  They suggest that falling outside the 
therapeutic contract, these concepts might be expected to work in different ways.  
Hollway (2008b) agrees that theoretical purity may quite rightly be crucial for the 
clinical setting where the mental well-being of the patient is paramount; but in 
empirical research outside the clinic she argues it is entirely appropriate to borrow 
from these concepts to explore intersubjectivities.  This is predicated primarily on 
the assumption that unconscious dynamics such as transference and 
countertransference are not restricted to the therapeutic encounter but are features 
of ordinary everyday practices.  However, Frosh and Baraitser suggest that these 
radically different ‘conditions of emergence’ ‘are so far removed from the analytic 
situation as to make their affiliation with psychoanalytic terminology strained and 
potentially misleading’ (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008:362).  
There is an irreconcilable dilemma here.  The variability with which 
interlocutors approach any discursive task makes it hard to see what particular set 
of theorised unconscious processes should be privileged for any particular 
interaction.  Neither Frosh nor Hollway circumvent the creative leap of reading 
‘behind’ words to some presumed essentialist basis; which for Hollway is broadly 
a Kleinian reading of defences against anxiety (Hollway and Jefferson 2000a) and 
for Frosh (for example, Frosh, Phoenix, and Pattman, 2003), a merger between 
Kleinian and Lacanian strands of thought.  Both are concerned not with what 
language is doing, but with what language tells us about speakers’ underlying 
states of mind (Edley, 2006).  
There is a direct conflict here for psychoanalysis and discursive 
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psychology.  As Edley noted in his reanalysis of Gough’s (2004) study of anxiety 
around homosexual masculinities, the underlying assumptions about the theory of 
language are incompatible: ‘to some extent at least, psychoanalysis is predicated 
on the very model of language that discourse theory has served to destablilize’ 
(Edley, 2006:604). 
Does this then invite an antagonist stance, attentive only to ineluctable 
differences?  This seems to be a wasteful option.  Psychoanalytic psychosocial 
approaches and psycho-discursive approaches make valuable interlocutors for 
each other.  This is precisely the approach modelled productively by colleagues 
Wetherell and Hollway for example. Similarly, Billig’s re-working of Freudian 
repression, examining what discourse leaves, or makes, unsaid is an important 
demonstration of reworking an intellectual legacy to open up new theoretical 
possibilities (Billig, 1999a:8).  I draw on both of these debates later. 
Psychoanalytic readings have been critically attentive to ruptures, to 
inconsistencies and irrationalities; to subjects’ commitments to and investments in 
particular patterns of being, to life history and continuities, emotion, and trouble, 
and so on.  I value the attention a psychoanalytic psychology pays to such 
phenomena; and in particular to its attentiveness to a valid concern for the 
personal, for semiosis at the level of the individual.  But for explanatory capital, I 
am more captivated by the stance that contends discourse analysis does have the 
capacity, albeit one in need of greater elaboration, to address all these (Taylor, 
2006; Wetherell, 2007).  I will return to this position throughout the remainder of 
the thesis engaging with notions of personal order, projection, repression, and 
investment, but within a framework of the discursive.  All of these concepts are in 
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need of much more elaboration both theoretically and empirically.  But this is 
precisely what makes contemporary developments in discourse studies in 
psychology exciting and fruitful. This, then, is the intellectual commitment going 
forward into the rest of the thesis – a discursive approach to psychology, grounded 
in combined macro and micro analyses of talk and text, attentive to trouble, 
eruptions, investment, and personal order; attentive to the take up of particular 
discourses, and to what is left out; attentive to the constitution of subjects, 
positions, subjectivities, and identities, to the constitutions of moral order in talk, 
as all of these are made visible when speakers negotiate their way through 
discourses of success and failure. 
 
So, this brings me full circle to my starting point for the chapter: who are 
these ‘speakers’?   Who are the ‘subjects’ who make up the participants in this 
study.  The next section moves more closely to look at the different ways this 
group of women are located as particular kinds of people with particular kinds of 
‘identities’. 
3.4. Locating subjects: intersections of gender, age, and class  
So far I have set up a particular framework for understanding the discursive 
formation of subjects, and their dialogic and intersubjective multiple locations in 
discursive positions.  This section moves from these general debates to explore 
some of the specificities of these locations for this thesis.  The construction of the 
sample here, women in mid-life, draws on two kinds of subject categorisations; 
gender and age.  But I also want to consider a third, class, because of the way in 
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which class has been re-centred in some key social theory debates over the last ten 
years or so. Both gender and class have been introduced above (3.1), as critical 
sites. The notion of positioning subjects within such categories raises important 
questions about how these categories might be assigned, and be taken up in 
practice, and how multiplicities of identity categories might assemble, interact and 
dissolve.  Therefore, I finish this section on ‘locating subjects’ with a discussion 
of recent debates on intersectionality – a concept intended to explicate these 
multiplicities of identifications, and the relational flows of power they entail, but a 
concept also which is problematic in what it can imply about the nature of identity 
categories and what this means for subjects.  
3.4.1. Gender  
Gender is one of the most privileged constructs for classifying subjects in western 
societies.  We are gendered from the moment of birth, and with modern prenatal 
technologies, sometimes earlier (Butler, 1993).7  Poststructuralism has been taken 
up as a means of dismantling the taken for granted, naturalised, distinction 
between ‘woman’ and ‘man’.  As McNay (1991) argues, the categories are 
mutable.  Nevertheless, there is a pervasive practical deployment of gender as a 
primary meaning making construct.  
 Paradoxically, at the same time as gender is the most privileged of 
identifications; ‘woman’ is also rendered invisible.  Haraway (1984, cited in 
Stainton Rogers, Stenner, Gleeson, and Stainton Rogers, 1995) noted, to be 
                                               
7
 There are a range of medicalised conditions such as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome which 
may delay identification of sex at birth.  Lawler (2008) suggests however that there continues to be 
a pressure to ‘fix’ gender at the earliest possible point sometimes leading to conflicts between 
assigned gender and later development of sex organs and hormone patterns. 
Chapter 3.  Theorising discursive subjects 
112 
‘woman’ and ‘female’ is to be marked out as something other; to be male requires 
no marking, it is the standard.   This marking out has led to ‘woman’ being 
constructed as the deficient, deviant, ‘Other’ to the normative status ‘man’ (de 
Beauvoir, 1953).  The extraordinary study by Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, 
Rosencrantz and Vogel (1970) illustrated the almost impossible ambition for a 
woman to be identified as a ‘healthy adult’ amongst mental health practitioners, 
for example.  Whilst the sets of criteria constructed to describe ‘healthy men’ and 
‘healthy adults’ were similar, ‘healthy women’ were identified by a different set 
of criteria, aligned with constructions of ‘femininity’, rather than constructions of 
the healthy adult.  Seem and Clark (2006) continue to find ‘healthy women’ 
differentiated from ‘healthy men’ in current counsellors-in-training.   
Perversely though, as Bartky (1990), Skeggs (1997) and others have noted, 
contemporary constructions of successful femininity also produce a set of 
demands unachievable for most women (Bordo, 1993; Gullette, 2004; McRobbie, 
2004; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001).  In multiple ways, ‘woman’ is both 
a naturalised position, and one which cannot easily be inhabited successfully. 
Gender invokes additional categories, or subject positions, beyond 
woman/man.  For ‘woman’ it brings wife, mother, daughter, sister, friend, and so 
on.  For ‘man’, husband, lover, father, brother, and more.   These categories-in-
use prescribe the relationships that ‘matter’ amongst contemporary ideologies and 
psy discourses, such as the regulation of wives, mothers, daughters (Hollway, 
2006; Lawler, 2000; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989) compared to the much less 
visible attention to women as sisters, friends, and so on (Mauthner, 2002). In 
chapter 5 I consider the discursive practices of naturalising motherhood and 
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family as components in working up identities of successful womanhood, along 
with the ‘absent space of the woman without children’.  In chapter 8 I come back 
to the notion of sistering as a hidden practice in comparison with brotherhoods.  
This section has pointed to the trouble and multiplicity of subjects, 
subjectivities and identities worked up in discourses of ‘woman’.  A particular site 
of trouble for contemporary women comes in ideologies of age; I address this 
now. 
3.4.2. Age 
Within the psychological literatures a common device for classifying people has 
been within biological age bands of life cycle models.  These are designed to 
describe and account for particular behaviours and commitments at different 
stages of life.  The focus on biological age brings with it assumptions that the 
stages are natural, unfolding across time in fixed sequences.  Reynolds’ (2004) 
review of life cycle literature notes that while biological models may make space 
for variations in cultural traditions, such as at what age people might be presumed 
ready for marriage or retirement and so on, the erroneous underlying assumption 
is that certain transition points will inevitably be negotiated regardless of cultural 
context.   
Compatible with the arguments outlined above of the psy complex 
influences, these life cycle discourses are not only the discourse of psychological 
disciplines, but are common currency for people making everyday sense of 
themselves and their passage through life (Gergen, 1990; Reynolds, 2004).  
According to Gergen, the most commonly taught model is the eight stage 
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psychosocial theory of development across the lifespan proposed by Erikson 
(1963, 1968).   This is a neo-Freudian account of linear, fixed, stages; albeit stages 
inevitably embedded in a socio-historical framework.  Each stage is characterised 
by a central, normative crisis – a task which must be addressed, and which 
contributes to the unconscious build up of the ‘ego identity’.  The resolution of 
each task sets characteristic traits of behaviour which will be carried forward as 
the starting points for subsequent life stages and life stage tasks.  For example, in 
the context of this study, the years of middle adulthood are located in Erikson’s 
seventh stage. The claim is that this stage is inevitably characterised by the need 
to address conflicts between generativity versus stagnation; generativity being a 
libidinal investment in ‘establishing and guiding the next generation’ (Erikson, 
1995[1963]: 240), and stagnation being a regressive and indulgent prioritisation of 
the self (op. cit.).  The task, Erikson argues, is to establish a sense of oneself 
somewhere between these two poles.   
Gergen suggests this model has passed beyond the classroom though and 
is currently the principle account underpinning the discourses most people (in the 
West) have available for making sense of who they are, what they are doing, and 
indeed, what they ‘should’ be doing at any given age/stage of their lives.  Part of 
the research interest here is to explore whether these prescriptions of aging appear 
as an organising framework for women in mid-life talking about themselves and 
others in relation to concepts of success and failure; and what space is made for 
variability (Reynolds, 2004) and resistance to what Gergen (1990) presents as the 
oppressive function such biological models play in supporting prevailing 
structural and ideological constraints against enriching and expanding women’s 
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choices and opportunities.  
Gullette (2004) shifts concern from psychological theories to a broader 
canvas. Middle-ageism is, she says, a toxic elephant in the room; one which puts 
us all in jeopardy if we fail to see it.  She argues that youth operates as a form of 
capital and people are being resocialised ‘to “recognize” themselves as “aging”’, 
and therefore lacking capital, ‘starting at ever younger ages’ (Gullette, 2004:33).  
In the work place for instance, the aging worker becomes an ‘ever more atomised 
individual, required to justify her or his value’ within discursive configurations 
which are more and more ageist.  Rutherford links this to the impact of the 
neoliberal discourse outlined above.  Market ideologies of ‘successful aging’ 
promote: 
 
an individualised response to the process of growing older.  Manage your 
body, take responsibility for your health and invest for your retirement…’. 
(Rutherford, 2007:137) 
 
He points out this ignores the social economic inequalities that make this kind of 
‘personal self-help regime’ beyond the reach of the great majority.  But, deviation 
from the ideals of youth, or the pursuit of such ideals, not only positions women 
in midlife as bodily deficient, but also morally deficient, a particular kind of 
failing subject – one held accountable for lacking self discipline and appropriate 
self management (Bordo, 1993; Ogle and Damhorst, 2005).   
There is an important paradox here. At the same time as women are 
interpellating into failing body positions, the privileged ideals of feminine identity 
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under late capitalism also insist women should be happy, confident and 
independent-minded (Ferreday, 2008).  So, as the neoliberal discourse tells us we 
are not measuring up and could do better, it also tells us to be happy, secure, and 
confident in ourselves.  This conflict prepares multiple dialogic, rhetorical, 
opportunities for confrontations with failing identities, or indeed for arguing 
multiple versions of successful identity.  It is precisely these conflicting, 
contradictory dialogic confrontations which open up space for resistances. Ogle 
and Damhorst (2005) report women in their sample (age range 37-47) come to 
terms with age related bodily changes by re-defining cultural messages about 
what matters.  What happens in these conflicting spaces, and the positional shifts 
made, is important for understanding figurations of identity and subjectivity 
available for ‘ordinary’, ‘everyday’, mid-life women, going about the everyday 
businesses of living, which of course includes composing particular subjectivities 
and identities.  Broad cultural critiques are valuable, especially grounded in 
material objects; but what needs greater elaboration is a complementary empirical 
grounding of these arguments in everyday discursive practices.  In what way are 
these ideological messages (re)produced in women’s talk; what psycho-discursive 
practices are women calling on when they mobilise them, what flows of power are 
evident, what subject positions become available within them; which are taken up, 
which are resisted? 
3.4.3. Class  
Class is one of the more controversial topics in the social sciences (Kirk, 2007; 
Skeggs, 1997; 2004; Walkerdine, 2003).  It has been a primary means of 
Chapter 3.  Theorising discursive subjects 
117 
structuring academic focus; has been displaced; and has been revitalised with 
renewed interest (Kirk, 2007).  
 Class is a moral domain, and as Walkerdine suggests, it always was: the 
term originated with the mapping of crime and disease with a view to managing 
populations (Walkerdine, 2003).  But, the extent to which class inscribes a 
moralised organisation on subjects has been brought out with renewed force in 
recent years (Sayers, 2005; Skeggs, 1997; 2004; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 
2001).  A key point which unites much of this work is the way in which ‘class’ 
brings ‘trouble’ for identity, for subjectivity, and for access to practices and 
capitals.  Skeggs, for example argues that to be working class means internalising 
‘intimate…knowledge of always not being “right”’ (Skeggs, 1997:90).  For 
Skeggs, the working class woman is always positioned as the inadequate Other to 
the middle classes. To be working class means always having to account for 
respectability, for not being ‘good enough’, for not being middle class, to seek 
self-improvement.  The argument is a powerful one.  There is a danger though, 
that this argument begins to reify class: it treats the middle class as 
unproblematically middle class; and unproblematically ‘untroubled’.  However, 
Lucey and Reay (2002) in their study of the pursuit of academic excellence as a 
means of producing middle classness, have indicated that this is not the case: 
doing ‘being middle class’ has its own arrangements of dilemmatic discursive 
formations.  Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody (2001:137) write of ‘a powerful fear 
of failure … operating within the middle class families’.  Their study of middle 
class young women argues they too are beset by fears of not measuring up.  
Wrye’s (2006) work on the unconscious saboteur presented in the previous 
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chapter also pointed to routine expressions of inadequacy by women with higher 
education degrees and working in professional careers typically associated with 
the middle class.  Fearing inadequacy cannot simply be located according to 
divisions along class lines, then, but nevertheless, ‘doing class’ brings with it fear 
of failing the local moral order. Much more work is needed to explicate the 
practices and subjectivities of working and middle classness, and a recognition 
that class, whilst a powerful intersection in subjectivity, is itself in constant 
variable (re)production. 
 Giddens’ (1991) and Beck’s (1992) concept of the neoliberal subject 
(section 3.1.5) is entirely linked with claims about the demise of ties to class.  
What contemporary work does show however, is that class is still a hugely 
consequential signifying practice albeit in changing formations.  Tyler (2008) 
writes of heightened class antagonisms; and Skeggs (2004) of an ‘underclass’, 
marked out as ‘waste’.  Nunn and Biressi (2008) pull these points together in their 
review of media descriptions of ‘the undeserving poor’.   
 Constraints of space and time mean this is only the briefest gloss on class 
as a meaningful intersection for subjects’ talk of success and failure, but I will be 
returning briefly to class, and in particular to the ‘passing’ and ‘failing’ subject as 
that is made relevant in participant talk in chapter 7. 
3.4.4. Intersectionality and multiplicity: category or practice? 
Bringing these locations of gender, age, and class together is a complicated 
theoretical and methodological issue (Wetherell, 2005a).  The ‘multiplicities of 
identity’ is a commonly stated quality of the post modern subject. This means 
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recognising that any one individual can be located within several different identity 
categories, or in Wetherell’s (2005a) preferred term – I will come back to this 
shortly – located in different subject positions, such as gender, race, class, age, 
sexuality and so on.  The concept of these multiple locations has been developed 
in much feminist work from the 1970s and 80s (McCall, 2005; Phoenix and 
Pattynama, 2006), but in recent years has come to be approached through the 
concept of intersectionality (Brah and Phoenix, 2004; Phoenix and Pattynama, 
2006; Wetherell, 2005a; Yuval-Davis, 2006).   
The term was introduced by Crenshaw (1989) to highlight interactions in 
gender and race in women’s employment opportunities, and developed further as 
a critique of identity politics in her better known paper on violence against women 
(Crenshaw, 1991). It has since been taken up with some momentum, although it is 
not without its tensions. 
Working with concepts of intersectionality means trying to understand 
how  different identity categories, or subject positions, act together.  How this 
might be theorised and approached in practice is contested (Burman, 2003; 
McCall, 2005; Phoenix and Pattynama, 2006; Wetherell, 2005a; Yuval-Davis, 
2006). For McCall (2005) and Wetherell (2005a) much of this contest revolves 
around the ‘starting point’ for thinking about intersections: the notion of identity 
category.  
Focus on categories risks treating categories as stable units which can be 
layered up, often in some kind of hierarchical level of impact:  woman + working 
class = x.  This risks reifying categories rather than approaching them as 
historically contingent (Yuval-Davis, 2006); it risks homogenising category 
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members and eliding differences within groups (Burman, 2003; Fernandes, 2003).  
Burman (2003) argues that intersectionality is precisely a way out of elisions of 
difference, by recognising that interactions between identity categories change 
identity locations.  Yuval-Davis (2006) suggests categories be approached as 
locations on axes of difference. McCall’s (2005) resolution is to offer three ways 
of thinking about intersections – anti-categorical, which is a deconstructivist 
approach, alert to reifications; inter-categorical, which explores differences 
between intersected groups; and intra-categorical, which explores differences 
within intersecting groups.  Knapp (2005) suggests these last two are two sides of 
the same coin; thinking about what is inside or outside of one, can only be 
understood relationally in the context of what might lie inside or outside of 
another.  How these approaches might be turned into method is more ambiguous 
and ultimately still tends to begin with the analyst’s a priori concept of categories 
to be worked with.   
Wetherell (2005a) proposes a different solution by advocating a ‘bottom 
up’ approach. Wetherell contends that beginning the study of intersectionality 
with identity categories is to begin ‘in the wrong place’.  This is primarily because 
this is not how people ‘do’ the business of invoking and working up identity 
‘slots’ when they are doing the identity work that suffuses everyday practices (see 
Rampton 2006, for a discussion of the fluid, collaborative reformulation of 
identities worked up in adolescents talk with friends).  An analytic focus on 
category neglects the intricacy of what happens when momentary, provisional, 
situated, positions are mobilised, when ‘fragments of identity’ are recruited, the 
subtle, or indeed rupturing positional shifts which take place as alternative identity 
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slots are worked up. 
In this framework, what is needed is an analytic sensitivity to the different 
ways these intersecting, dynamic, fleeting, locations are mobilised, the practices 
by which they are recruited and the different functions they accomplish.   I will be 
returning to this point in chapter 5 where I explore the working up of intersecting 
positions when women negotiate routes through discourses of being a mother and 
managing a career.   
3.5. Chapter summary 
The critique from the previous chapter highlighted the failure of conventional 
studies to recognise the nature of language as a site and tool of interested action.  
It presented the critique from the turn to language which argues compellingly that 
language is not neutral, and participants are subjects immersed in reflexive 
consequential interactional discursive practices, practices in which they have a 
stake.  
In this chapter I have assembled arguments to show how these subjects are 
not simply users of language, but are subjects produced in language.  This chapter 
has gathered some of the intellectual resources for thinking more closely about the 
formation of this subject, and the technologies and practices through which the 
subject is knowable, in constrained ways, to itself and to others.  Language is a 
productive power, making subjects, and making ‘positions’ in relation to those 
subjects; positions which carry implications for what is available to some, and 
denied to others.  Positions, then, are sites of trouble, power, and contestation.   
A serious critique is posed by some: that this poststructural, Foucauldian, 
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dialogic, ideological, ethnomethodological understanding of the subject as a 
subject of language, is too limited an account; that while it may be rich and even 
compelling in its accounts of social constructions, it fails to explain the 
experience of these constructions – the emotions and investments that connect up 
with these subject-making, subjectivity-making, practices.  In response, it 
presented arguments that it is precisely the complexity of intersecting discourses, 
intersecting ideologies, intersecting voices, which does indeed offer a route in to 
understanding these investments and the moral and emotive register through 
which they are formulated and performed.  However, it agrees, that this 
understanding of intersecting discourses is still a project under development, in 
need of additional empirical elaboration.  The rest of this thesis takes on some 
small portion of this project as it considers the discursive work and functional 
accomplishments participants enter into as they speak about themselves and 
others.   
 The research challenge is to explore how these grand meta-narratives of 
the successful self are taken up in the everyday practices of lived lives. What does 
the successful or failing neoliberal meritocratic subject look like? Are these in fact 
the discourses by which people constitute themselves?  Or are there resistances to 
such constitution?  Indeed, what constitutes success and failure, and for whom?  
What does this all look like empirically?  These are key questions for the 
remaining chapters. 
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Chapter 4. Methods: accessing the making of 
meaning 
The previous chapters have presented a theory of subjects and subjectivities as 
reflexive beings constituted in discourse, joining in social life discursively, and 
experiencing themselves discursively. The argument is that people make sense of 
themselves through the discursive resources they have available. They take up 
positions, negotiate meanings, work up identities in dialogic, ideological, 
argumentative deployments.  This approach takes an action orientation to 
language:  people do things with language; language does things with people.  But 
it understands this notion of language action both as a quality of local 
interactional meaning making (Edwards and Potter, 1992), but meanings which 
are also embedded in the wider practices of subjectification (Foucault, 1961; 
1973; Rose, 1996; 1999) and ideological debates and contests (Billig, 1996).  This 
is the ‘synthetic’ position advocated by Wetherell (1998; 2003).  It allows for an 
analytically rich exploration of constructions of subjects, subjectivities and 
identities, of success and failure for women in mid-life in Britain in the 21st 
century.  This chapter provides an account and rationale for the methods chosen 
for accessing and analysing some of this ‘language action’ in talk of success and 
failure.  
Section 4.1. explores some of the different approaches within discourse 
studies in social psychology and locates this thesis in a synthetic analytic 
framework attentive to notions of Foucauldian subjectification practices, 
ideological contests and ethnomethodology.  4.2. offers a rationale for generating 
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data by interview.  4.3  describes the processes by which participants were 
selected and recruited.  4.4. discusses the interview materials – the question 
schedule and the collection of photographs; and the conduct of the interviews.  4.5 
addresses processes in analysis, beginning with  issues around transcription, and 
processes of working up analyses.  Throughout, I consider the ethical concerns 
encountered.  Research decisions adhered to the code of conduct of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) and the design was approved by the Human 
Participants and Materials Ethics Committee (HPMEC) at the Open University.  
4.1. Discourse studies in social psychology 
This study is theoretically and methodologically underpinned by developments in 
discourse studies in social psychology (DSSP) (Antaki, 1988; 1994; Billig, 1991; 
1996; 1999a; Billig et al., 1988; Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992; 
Potter, 1996; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 1998; 2003; Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992).  Within DSSP the common project is to approach language as 
situated social action (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  This rules out language as a 
neutral mirror reflecting the world.  Instead, language is the topic, not the 
resource. Language is not standing in for something; rather language is the 
constitutive site for analysis.  Investigation attends to the social order in language-
in-use, to the ethnomethods of lived lives, to the business that is done in language-
in-use.   
However, different interests have carved out different ways of framing and 
conducting the investigative project (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006; Wetherell, 1998; 
2007; Wetherell et al., 2001b; Wooffitt, 2005).  Potter and Wetherell (1995a) 
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described this primarily as a difference between discursive practices – what 
actions are accomplished in talk, and discursive resources – what resources people 
have available, such as interpretative repertoires.  They do though caution against 
treating the distinction too rigidly.  Over recent years however, the division has 
become somewhat more polarised and more focused around ‘levels’ of analysis 
(Billig, 1999b; 1999c; Schegloff, 1999a; 1999b; Wetherell, 1998; 2005a; Wooffit, 
2005).  One approach to the study of discourse, discursive psychology, continues 
to be influenced strongly by conversation analysis (CA) (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 
1998; Schegloff, 1999a; 1999b).  This has its roots in ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967), the study of people’s everyday ways of doing things. It has 
been developed in psychology in the work of Edwards and Potter (1993), Edwards 
(1997; 2006), and Speer (2005) for example. Here, discursive psychology is a 
theory of language, rather than a theory of what it is to be a person.  It is 
concerned with how people do the business of social life; manage accusations, 
justifications, stake, and so on.  It focuses on the text, and participant orientation 
to the turn-taking. It is agnostic as to inner processes, and to experience.  This has 
been a valuable strategy for building an understanding of patterns of interactional 
exchange.  Kitzinger and Frith (1999) offer an excellent example from a feminist 
critical CA of the patterning of sexual refusals, for example.  But, CA can be 
accused of too narrow a focus; that it brackets off and ignores the argumentative 
threads that weave a backcloth of interaction which is also a feature, albeit a 
broader example, of participant orientation (Wetherell, 1998). 
 A second approach takes up this broader frame of reference and this is the 
approach adopted for this study. The focus is again the study of language-in-use, 
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but attention lies with both the fine grained micro analysis of CA, and analysis of 
macro discursive formations, the historical narratives and ideologies running 
through talk, reproduced in the moment, and what Wetherell (2005a) calls the 
meso level, personal order and habits, the routine ways of sense making.  Here, 
talk is understood to be embedded in a longer, broader body of discourse, 
extending beyond the interview and situated in a lived-life history and beyond.  
This approach aims to say something more about lived lives, about how minds are 
formed, about how ‘the internal’ works, how, and why certain patterns repeat; 
about what objects are constructed and constituted in language practices. It is 
illustrated in a broad range of work (see for example Billig, 1991; 1992; Reynolds 
2004; Taylor, 2006; Wetherell, 1998; 2003; Wetherell and Edley, 1999; Wetherell 
and Potter 1992).  This approach draws on the intellectual resources outlined in 
the previous chapter; the Foucauldian subject of knowledge regimes and practices, 
working with dialogic, heteroglossic voices, taking up multiplicities of shifting 
troubled and untroubled subject positions, reproducing the ideologies and 
argumentative threads which constitute the world.  This forms the starting point 
for my analytic thinking in this thesis.  
4.2. Generating data 
The focus for study is women’s discursive resources for managing accounts of 
themselves and others in relation to concepts of success and failure.  A crucial 
question concerned the broad notion of site.  In terms of clarity of purpose and 
containing the scale of the project, there was a strong argument for selecting a 
single site, or social institution, where success and failure is made consequential 
Chapter 4. Methods 
127 
for participants.  This might for example have been career promotions, 
educational achievements, relationship breakdowns, and so on.  All, and many 
more of which, would have made valuable sites for investigation.  However, a 
particular critique I have already raised in regard to existing literature is the a 
priori nomination by researchers of markers of success.  Typically student 
participants are tested on academic achievement; outside of education adults are 
typically investigated for career or sporting successes, and so on.  I specifically 
wanted to leave the participants in this study free to mark out their own arenas of 
success and failure and not be limited to one area I might prioritise.  As a 
consequence I was reluctant to narrow down ‘site’.   However, this also has 
consequences for deciding between ‘naturally occurring’ sources of data, or from 
researcher generated sources such as interviews (Potter and Wetherell, 1995; 
Taylor and Littleton, 2006). 
There are reasonable claims that naturally occurring data are more 
‘authentic’ for accessing the consequential ways people actually use language in 
everyday life in comparison to that generated by researcher constructed interviews 
(Potter and Hepburn, 2005; Taylor, 2001a).  However,  Gubrium and Holstein 
(2002:8) draw on Foucauldian notions of governmentality and the psy complex 
outlined in the previous chapter to suggest ‘the interview is one of the 20th 
century’s most distinctive technologies of the self’ (see also Atkinson and 
Silverman, 1997).  From this position, the interview is familiar 
ethnomethodological territory, albeit another genre, and there is not such an 
unequivocal distinction between ‘naturally occurring’ and ‘researcher generated’ 
data as may be presupposed.  Potter and Wetherell (1995a) suggests interview 
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data can make for entirely sensible analysis if the researchers’ interventions are 
made just as material to the content as participants’ responses, with both 
understood as situated contingent interaction.  The interview is not the ‘problem’; 
the problem would be the subsequent failure to take adequate account of the 
situated conversational interaction between researcher and researched (Wooffitt, 
2005). 
Nevertheless, reasonable concerns are expressed that interview data reflect 
the agenda of the researcher rather than participants’ concerns (Schegloff, 1997), 
and in some ways this critique is inescapable.  However, interviews are still 
interactional dialogic co-constructions of meaning which mobilise and negotiate 
shared resources for making sense:  ‘interviews are culturally rooted 
communication situations in which meanings are reinforced, challenged and 
negotiated between interlocutors’ (Taylor and Littleton, 2006:28).  Interviews are 
sites set up by the interviewer, but the resources interviewer and participants bring 
do show something of the meaning making resources available, and the pattern of 
deploying them, and orientations to trouble and dilemma.  This can be enhanced 
by processes of ‘active interviewing’.  The active interview is one in which 
interviewers ‘converse with respondents in such a way that alternative 
considerations are brought into play’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995:17).  As they 
point out, this presupposes participants who are not passively waiting to place the 
content of their cognitions on show; but who are active interlocutors engaged in 
moment to moment meaning making via the mobilisation of available discourses, 
ideologies, repertoires and so on.  Potter and Wetherell (1995a) agree, suggesting 
that an interventionist and challenging approach to interviews is ‘more 
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analytically revealing’ (p.85).  It facilitates a fuller deployment of repertoires and 
creates the opportunity for contrasting and contradictory themes and alternative 
accounts to emerge.  Opening up discussion of the reactivity of interview 
interaction also helps to challenge the myth that ‘passive’ interviewing somehow 
brackets off the interviewer from co-constructions (Potter and Wetherell, 1995).  
The interviewer is always (re)actively present and a co-constructor to the text.  
The issue is what is made of that presence in analysis. 
Talk of ‘challenge’ is not of course intended to suggest that the active 
interview is an excuse for bullying and coercion. Ethical reflexivity is an 
important feature of good research (Etherington, 2004; Finlay and Gough, 2003; 
Taylor, 2001a). It is particularly important when the topic at hand invites 
discussion of potentially ‘delicate’ topics such as this here, where participants are 
asked to take up positions of success or failure with all the ‘trouble’ that might 
entail.  What is ‘delicate’ is a matter of local production, not a pre-given ontology.  
No topic is inevitably ‘sensitive’, and none can be held to be beyond sensitivities 
(Adler and Adler, 2002; Silverman, 1997).  The researcher always owes a duty of 
anticipatory care to what might be delicate and I have sought to be attentive to this 
here.  Consequently, active interviewing, that is, encouraging consideration of 
alternatives, is intended to be supportive rather than confrontational, invitational 
rather than insistent. 
On balance, loosely structured interviewing promised to be an effective 
means for making space for variability to emerge in the way success and failure 
might be constructed by women.  Moreover, while this carries some costs for 
examining situated consequential action, interviews do provoke different and 
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telling kinds of identity work as speakers reproduce and negotiate resources 
(Rampton, Harris, Georgakopoulou, Leung, Small and Dover, 2008).  These kinds 
of productions are of particular interest for both the multilayered macro-micro 
analysis intended here, and the interest in contributing to current discursive and 
psychoanalytically inflected psychosocial debates running throughout this thesis. 
4.3. Participants 
4.3.1. Selection criteria: women in mid life. 
The project was motivated in part by a desire to address the relative invisibility of 
women in mid-life in the psychological literatures. Therefore these were key 
criteria for selecting participants. However, what constitutes ‘mid-life’ is not clear 
cut. Dominant life cycle models suggest broadly 40-65 (Erikson, 1968; Levinson, 
1968).  Gullette (2004) however suggests contemporary women are encouraged to 
see themselves as aging at ever younger years.  One interest then, was to see 
where women would site themselves in relation to this category of ‘mid-life’.  The 
lower age limit was therefore flexible but anticipated a cut-off around 35.  In the 
end, two participants were aged 34, and one further exception was made for a 
participant who took part in a paired interview (see below) and recruited her 
younger sister, aged 33 as her interview partner.  The upper age of the sample was 
set at 59, locating all participants within ‘working age’ boundaries.8  Twenty four 
women participated, six in their 30s, eight in their 40s, ten in their 50s. 
                                               
8
 State pension entitlement ages have recently been increased for women born after 5 April 1950 
but remain at 60 for women born before that.  
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4.3.2. Class: sampling ‘by proxy’ and ethical tensions 
Previous literature suggests success and failure intersect with class to generate 
particular configurations of subjects in morally charged and consequential ways 
(Nunn and Biressi, 2008; Skeggs, 1997; 2004).  Therefore, class was expected to 
be salient for the study.  However, discourses of neoliberalism and meritocracy 
(see section 3.1.5) and changing discourses of class structures complicate a priori 
assumptions of class.  To accommodate these concerns a plan was devised for 
sampling class by proxy markers of career status, education, and affluence. 
However, this plan was subsequently complicated, appropriately, by 
ethical concerns.  The early participants interviewed were volunteers from 
professional backgrounds or affluent locations.  They might have been expected to 
have had readier access to a range of discursive resources for telling stories of 
success than some other participants.  Quickly, however, these early interviews 
pointed to some of the trouble participants encountered when taking up positions 
of ‘success’.  Reflecting on this raised serious concerns for participants targeted 
precisely because they might be expected to experience difficulty in telling a  
conventional, ‘passing’ story of success - women living in poor housing areas, or 
in low paid, low skilled jobs, etc.   
The concern here is not that these accounts would be ‘flawed’ or 
‘inadequate’.  Quite the opposite.  The approach to discourse used here is 
concerned with what people do and if that means hesitant speech and broken 
continuities, then that is appropriate for analysis. So, ‘trouble’ per se was not a 
problem. The concern was that participants were exposed to a high level of 
interrogatory risk – difficult for me to justify or feel comfortable with. It was my 
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conclusion that the interviews had at least the potential to act on participants in 
negative ways.  
Given that the substantive empirical interests for the thesis were women in 
mid-life, constructions of success and failure, and theoretical debates on 
subjectification and identity, rather than a sustained examination of the social 
psychology of class,  I decided not to seek out particular women to fulfil points on 
a class sampling matrix.  My preference was to accept volunteers regardless of 
proxy class markers, and locate speakers retrospectively according to measures 
such as background, profession, affluence and so on, where these appeared 
relevant to analysis. 
4.3.3. Recruitment 
Poster advertisements (see Appendix A) were placed on notice boards in two 
office premises for health and social work professionals, two hair and beauty 
salons, one jewellery and craft shop, three community buildings housing a wide 
range of local community and voluntary groups, community action groups, self-
help groups, support groups, etc.  The advertisements in professional work places 
generated five contacts all of whom went on to participate, the salons two 
contacts, one went on to participate, the shop generated three contacts, one of 
whom went forward, and the community groups advertisements generated one 
response from a candidate participant in her early twenties, much younger than 
the boundaries set for the study.  The remaining participants came from my 
approaches to people known to me whom I thought might be willing to take part, 
which recruited 10 participants, and asking people I knew to pass my details on to 
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others, which generated 11 further contacts, 7 of whom took part.  In total, twenty 
four women were interviewed for the study.  Eighteen were married or living with 
a partner, six were single at the time of interview, two of whom had never 
married.  Twenty one of the women were mothers.  All participants lived across a 
range of urban and rural districts, with varying degrees of affluence, in the north 
of England.  All participants were British born and white.  This ethnic dimension 
was not planned and ‘whiteness’ is not made a feature of the study.  While there is 
some useful homogeneity amongst the sample, this does prevent analysis of any 
ethnic differences.  Appendix C provides a demographic summary of participants.  
Recruitment is not random then, nor can I make claims to representative 
sampling.  However, there are claims to informative and consequential regularities 
across the 29 hours of interview recordings.  As Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
argue, discourse analysis does not explain patterns in language-in-use in terms of 
individuals (or the number of individuals) with particular characteristics, even 
where it is attentive to settlements of life history. The focus is on the discursive 
practices.  So, the aim here is not to make foolhardy generalisations about how all 
women in mid-life understand themselves in relation to concepts of success and 
failure; rather it is to explore what shared cultural discursive resources 
participants have available (Jones, 2003; Taylor, 2001a). 
4.3.4. Allocation to solo or paired interviews 
After initial information-giving discussions with candidate participants, all 
participants were offered the choice of completing the interview with the 
interviewer alone, or in a pair with a partner of their choice, such as a colleague or 
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friend.  Two participants chose to recruit a second person to be interviewed with 
(one a friend for over ten years, one a sister); and four women I recruited 
separately knew of each others’ involvement and chose to be interviewed together 
(one pair were work colleagues and friends for over ten years, one work 
colleagues for two years).  
 The decision to include paired interviews came out of the desire to 
encourage variability, diversity and elaboration in discursive practices and 
resources.  Having participants who already knew each other in conversation 
together generated possibilities for a more active discussion, less dependence on 
researcher initiated talk, more shared understandings, and therefore more 
opportunities to examine the taken-for-granted, the untroubled, the troubled, and 
the marked, in action. 
 However, placing participants together to discuss potentially sensitive 
topics generated its own ethical concerns.  Hence the invitation to participants to 
choose solo or paired interviewing, and more importantly, the control over choice 
of partner.  A crucial concern for me as the instigator of these interviews was that 
the relationship between participants would be going on beyond the interview and 
therefore there was a duty of care to safeguard that relationship.  This generated 
some notable differences across the interviews, particularly in regard to Holstein 
and Gubrium’s (1995) concept of the ‘active’ interview discussed above.  In solo 
interviews, participants might hint towards sensitive topics, and with care, these 
can be pursued by the interviewer.  In paired interviews participants are exposed 
to more risk.  Therefore as they take up positions, work up identities and negotiate 
dilemmas, it is less appropriate ethically to pursue topics which might present 
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participants to each other in ‘difficult’ ways.  Additionally, the researcher has less 
control over the flow and direction of conversation in paired interviewing making 
this ethic of care more difficult and the emotional labour for all involved 
potentially much higher.   
4.3.5. Consent 
In line with the BPS code of conduct researchers should seek the informed 
consent of participants. The advertising poster (Appendix A) and initial 
conversations repeating information from that poster provided a starting point.  In 
the week preceding the interview two copies of an information letter were sent to 
participants giving them more details about the study, its aims, the limits on the 
use of the data and participants’ rights to withdraw (Appendix B).  Prospective 
participants were informed all names would be changed to protect anonymity.  
were asked to sign one copy of the letter indicating they were happy to go ahead 
with the study, and asked to return it to me in a pre-paid envelope provided, either 
in advance or on the day of the interview.  One copy was retained by participants 
to ensure they had full contact details. The day before interview I contacted 
participants again to confirm arrangements and answer any questions they raised. 
Three participants withdrew at this stage.   
These practical activities, whilst adhering to BPS principles, disguise the 
complexity of seeking and giving informed consent.  Participants were advised of 
the topic and some of the themes to be explored.  But they may not have 
anticipated, just as I did not always anticipate, what topics would emerge during 
the interview as participants raised particular examples of success and failure.  
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The safeguard here, in line with BPS and HPMEC codes, was to remind 
participants before the interview and again at the end, of their right to withdraw 
any or all of their data up to the point of publication of any reports arising from 
the research, and to withdraw it from any further analysis at that point. Two 
participants contacted me in the week following their interviews to ask for 
specific sections to be removed from the recordings.  This was done.   
4.4. Interviews and interview materials 
The twenty four participants were distributed across twenty interviews (four 
interviews were held in pairs).  The procedures for solo and paired interviews 
were the same. 
4.4.1. Interview materials 
Interview materials comprised a semi structured schedule of questions (see 
Appendix D) and a series of photographic images (see Appendix E(1)).   
The question schedule was composed of 10 lead questions with available 
prompts (see Appendix D).  Questions covered the main markers and sites of 
success and failure which emerged from literature discussed in chapters 2 and 3:  
work/career, money/material possessions, relationships, appearance, being ‘good 
enough’, class influence, change across the lifespan, and looking back, whether 
participants might have wished for anything to have worked out differently. 
However an important consideration for this project was to allow the emergence 
of participants own markers of success and failure. Therefore, each discussion 
was researcher initiated with the broad question: If you think about ideas of 
success and failure, what does that mean to you, either for you personally, or for 
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other women you might think of.  Subsequent discussion was largely participant 
led, guided by questions from the schedule when conversation faltered. These 
questions were usually in the form What about x, is that something that matters to 
you in terms of success and failure?  Common additional prompts were:  Could 
you give me an example of that, or Could you say a bit more about that.  
Questions were therefore not addressed in the same order for each participant. 
This approach capitalised on one of the benefits of interviewing, allowing 
conversation to flow, whilst also ensuring an address to some common themes 
across all the interviews (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  
Three preliminary interviews (Cathy, Louisa and Sue-Ruth, Appendix D) 
indicated that the schedule worked well in eliciting rich talk of success and 
failure, and consequential concerns, particularly in participants talk of themselves 
and their own interests.  However, the research interest extends to how 
participants position others in relation to success and failure. Two risks were 
identified here. The first was that leaving ‘other women’ open and unspecific, 
whilst allowing participants freedom of choice, also left participants with the 
problem of working out which ‘other women’ were appropriate choices for the 
discussion. The second risk, related to this, was that conversation might slide into 
abstract theorising about success and failure rather than talk of actual sites, actual 
others.  To support discussion around concrete examples of other women, a series 
of 49 photographic images  were collected, printed on 28 laminated cards 
(Appendix E(1)).  Figures 1-5 below are examples.  
All images were taken from internet databases and websites specifically 
stating the contents were available to use for educational and research purposes  
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without copyright infringements.9  With 
one exception (Figure 6 below) content 
consisted of different images of women; 
some celebrities, some public and private 
individuals, some anonymous, reflecting a 
range of employments, ages, classes and 
affluence.  Images dated across the last 60 
years which opportunistically coincided 
with the life span of the older participants.  
Some images were in colour, others black 
and white.  Some were presented as 
individual plates, such as Figure 1.  Others 
were presented in combinations on one plate, such as Figures 2-5 below.  
All were printed on laminated cards, and presented to the approximate 
scale and format as  displayed in Appendix E(1) except that presentation images 
carried the figure text on the reverse of the image, not face side.  Images were 
introduced towards the end of the schedule.  Participants were told they might 
recognise some of the subjects as famous faces while others were unknown; and 
that there was a brief description on the reverse of each photograph.  I asked 
participants to look through them in any order, and tell me about any of the 
photographs they found interesting in terms of how the images might relate to 
participants’ ideas of success and failure and what a successful life looks like. 
                                               
9
 In line with fair use policies of the database sources for these images, photographs are shown 
with their original title as well as the description provided for participants where these differ. 
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Figure 1.  JK Rowling, creator 
of Harry Potter, receiving an 
honorary Doctor of Laws 
degree from the University of 
Aberdeen, 6 July, 2006. Photo: 
Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images. Plate 5 in 
Appendix E(1). 
______________________________ 
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 One further image, Figure 6 below, was included to encourage participants 
to reflect more directly on themselves.  The image shows a kitten looking into a 
mirror and  a lion reflected back.  When participants selected this image for 
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Figure 2. Planting potatoes, 1957. 
Photo: Maeers/Fox Photos/Getty Images. Plate 
2a in Appendix E(1). 
 
Figure 3. Textile factory.  
Photo: George Freston/Fox Photos/Getty Images. 
Plate 2b in Appendix E(1). 
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Figure 4. Emptying the washing 
machine in a laundrette. (Original Title: 
Barbican Laundrette.) Photo: Mike awn/Evening 
Standard/Getty Images.  Plate 2c in Appendix 
E(1). 
Figure 5. A Soho prostitute waits for 
custom.(Original Title: Lady Of The Night.) 
Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images.  Plate 2d 
in Appendix E(1). 
________________________________________________  
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comment I also asked What do you see when 
you look in the mirror?  If they did not select it I 
drew attention to it and asked the question then.  
Images were not presented in the same 
order every time.  This is not considered to be a 
problem in that my interest here is not in the 
effects of a pseudo-experimental control of 
presentation order variables. Rather, attention is 
on those discursive resources which follow the 
particular images, analysed for what they illustrate about participants’ discursive 
strategies for making sense of themselves and others in relation to ideas around 
success and failure.   
A point to note is that most participants appeared greatly engaged by the 
photographs.  The images were not without ‘trouble’ for participants as they took 
up discursive positions in relation to them (see chapters 6 and 7 for more on this).  
Nevertheless, there appeared to be a change in style and register, one which 
generated what seemed to be a more easily negotiated, albeit highly productive 
discussion.  This had the effect of moving discussions on from the sometimes 
intense reflexivity of the question schedule to what appeared to be easier territory 
in some ways.  While this particular change in style and register has not been 
properly analysed in this study, it is worth noting that it appeared to fulfil a useful 
task not only in generating valuable data, but the change in register contributed a 
useful platform for preparing to exit the interviews.   
 In total, interviews generated 29 hours, 4 minutes, 54 seconds of talk, 
 
Image removed pending 
permission from the 
copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
Figure 6. The cat or the lion.  
http://www.paloaltolions.org/Tails/ 
TailsText.html 
_______________________ 
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ranging from 34 minutes 57 seconds, to 153 minutes, 53 seconds, with an average 
of around 87 minutes each (see Appendix D).  Interviews were recorded using a 
Sanyo Digital Voice Recorder, ICR-B130, transferred to  computer for copying to 
CD and access protected by password.  Computer copies were then deleted for 
security reasons.  CDs are stored securely when not in use. 
4.4.2. Field notes 
Detailed field notes were made in the period leading up to interviews and 
immediately afterwards.  These were in the form of a private reflexive log which 
attempted to capture as much detail about the environment and feel of the 
interviews; the immediate location (usually the participants’ homes, occasionally 
their work place) and the surrounding locality.  I am ambivalent about the status 
of these notes.  I am not using them as the kind of reflexive, transference-
countertransference material treated as both data for analysis and part of the 
validation for analyses suggested by Hollway (1999).  Rather, they are memory 
aids, reminding me of those things I attended to either at the time, or 
subsequently, so that I may reflect critically on the way in which those situated 
impressions may have continued over into my subsequent readings of the data.  
However, the talk forms the data, not the reflexive log.  
4.5. Analytic procedures 
4.5.1. Transcription 
Transcription is treated here as part of the analytic process rather than something 
which precedes it (Taylor, 2001a).  What gets recorded on the transcript, what 
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gets marked out, is an interpretative decision about what matters.  Transcripts are 
only ever partial, and never neutral: the interests and assumptions of the research 
are embedded in the transformation of the recordings of ‘language-in-use’ into 
‘data for analysis’.   
What form that transformation should take is contested. Some authorities 
suggest a pragmatic albeit ambiguous ‘sufficient for the research purpose’ 
(Cameron, 2001; Taylor, 2001a).  Others recommend transcription should extend 
beyond the perceived needs of the researcher and research questions to identify 
and discriminate as many features as possible, rendering the data available for 
alternative readings from alternative theoretical or analytical commitments 
(Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; Potter, 1996; Potter and Hepburn, 2005; Wood and 
Kroger, 2000).  Parker (2004) is suspicious of this approach for the tendency it 
displays to empiricist ideologies of data as achievabley whole, objective, and real; 
and Hollway (2005) for the way it makes a fetish of written symbols which can 
only, at best, stand in for the actual object of study, interaction.  
 In addition, aiming to ‘go beyond’ the perceived needs of the research 
question and to provide as much detail as possible seems to me to invite the 
research process to be hijacked by endless analytic moves, all still unavoidably 
and inevitably partial, all only ever standing in for ‘language-in-use’ and all, as 
Potter and Wetherell (1995a) point out, quite likely to outrun the material 
resources of the research project. 
Therefore, I have been guided by the choices outlined by Potter and 
Wetherell (1995a) who recognise both the value of more comprehensive 
transcripts for bringing out features such as audible aspirations which can be 
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shown to have interactional significance for participants, and the problem of the 
amount of research time absorbed by transcription.  They suggest either closer 
reading of less material; or more sustained use of the audio record.  I have opted 
for the latter. This was aided by having digital audio recording rather than tape: 
digital recording technology allows easy extraction of stretches of talk for close, 
repeated, attention, whilst simultaneously holding the extract in its original 
location within the interview as a whole. 
Throughout analysis I have routinely moved between readings of the 
transcript, repeated listenings to the audio record, and reflections on the location 
of the fragment within the interaction as a whole, such as prior questions, prior 
mobilisations, etc.  During this process the transcript was continuously amended 
and marked to reflect new hearings and new insights for coming to terms with the 
research questions at stake.  
Generally, conventional orthographic representation was used to aid 
readability. This is on the assumption that, for this study, local accents and 
variation in pronunciation had no interpretative meaning for the research 
questions outlined in chapter 1; therefore ‘my’, for example, is not rendered ‘me’ 
(which creates its own confusions) or ‘mi’ (Cameron, 2001; Coates and 
Thornborrow, 1999).  There were some exceptions to conventional spellings, such 
as when speakers use ironic pronunciations (‘channel’ for ‘Chanel’ perfume, for 
example).  Expressions such as ‘gonna’ and ‘won’t’ are used in preference to 
transformations into ‘going to’ and will not’.  These choices may represent some 
inconsistency but the deciding factor throughout is to represent the flow of 
interaction, rather than the contentious habit of treating some accents as 
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unproblematic renderings of the spoken word, and others as markedly not 
(Cameron, 2001).   
The conventional rules of punctuation were not adopted for transcription.  
Instead, the notation used is an adaptation of a reduced Jeffersonian system which 
aims for an intelligible compromise between readability and attention to 
interactional detail.  For the most part I have relied largely on signalling pauses 
thus (.); overlapping speech by opening square brackets, [; emphasis by 
underlining; quieter speech marked at the start and finish by º; upward inflection 
by ↑; and a sharp break by an adjoining dash-.  Unclear text is presented in 
brackets (thus) and comments in double brackets, ((laughter)).  Omitted speech in 
extracts is identified by […] together with a note of the length of the omitted 
sequence.  A summary of all the notation used in the data extracts is provided in 
Appendix F.   
All interviews were transcribed in full except for sections deleted from the 
audio recording at the request of two participants.  I transcribed thirteen of the 
interviews myself; seven were given a ‘first pass’ orthographic transcription by a 
paid transcriber and then I corrected and annotated these further.  All transcripts 
were then revised and corrected for interactional detail; pauses, overlapping 
speech, interjections such as mm, and so on and to indicate figure numbers and 
photographic content where speakers referred to the photographic images.  All 
names were changed, and potentially identifying sequences (such as references to 
participants’ workplace, residence, etc.) were anonymised.  Transcripts continued 
to be reworked for detail throughout analysis.   
Reworking the transcripts means line numbers are always ‘on the move’.  
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What remains constant is the location of the talk within the audio recording as a 
whole.  Therefore extracts presented in the text are located in the overall interview 
by time, for example [05:37/78.10] where the first figure 05:37 refers to the 
minutes and seconds into the recording where the extract starts, and the second 
figure 78:10 refers to the total length of the recording again in minutes and 
seconds.  Line numbering on extracts begins at 1, except where a new extract is a 
direct continuation from the point a previous extract halted.  In these instances 
numbering follows on from the previous extract. 
On the extracts speakers are identified by names.  I appear as Jean; 
participants are given pseudonyms.  This raises questions about what might be 
inferred by naming.  Billig (1999b) provides a valuable commentary here.  Some 
conventions favour identifying speakers by sequential letters of the alphabet, or  
initial letters of names.  Other possibilities include institutional role naming, such 
as interviewer, nurse, teacher.  This is not appropriate for this study, even though 
participants could have been allocated such ‘role’ names, but these kinds of 
category memberships were not an analytic focus.  Another alternative, the one 
selected here, is to allocate pseudonyms.  But this too carries contextual pitfalls.  
Names usually indicate gender which brings implicit readings and can be used to 
suggest unintentional, or unwarranted claims to gendered patterns of talk.  
However, the participants in this study are recruited precisely because they are 
women so identifying them as women by the pseudonyms given is not itself a 
problem.   However, it is not my intention to treat ‘gender’ as an analytic category 
despite my privileging of women participants.  By this I mean that without 
comparative data from men I would risk reinforcing an uncritical gender dualism 
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(Stokoe and Smithson, 2001).10    
In addition to gender, names carry further social meanings in their 
associations with class and age;  Kylie, Guinevere, and Gladys are likely to 
conjure a variety of images for each us, different over time, class, and other 
locations.  This is more problematic.  The fictional character ‘Waynetta’ from the 
BBC comedy series Harry Enfield and Chums works as a comedy figure in part 
because of the work her name does as a means of classifying her as a member of 
the ‘undeserving poor’ (Nunn and Biressi, 2008).  In my own study I became 
aware of selecting pseudonyms according to some unarticulated sense of ‘fit’, 
which is an unexplored subjectivity.  I have been unable to locate a study which 
has examined the implicit meaning making researchers take on when they allocate 
pseudonyms in non random ways.  Ultimately, despite some tangled reflections 
about what might be imported into those choices, I have opted for pseudonyms in 
order to more forcefully preserve the sense of speakers as ‘people’, with lives and 
life histories outside of the extracts.  This area of pseudo-naming is nevertheless 
one which warrants much more attention. 
For my own identification, I refer to myself by my name, Jean, in extracts.  
When my own talk is the subject of analysis I refer to myself as I.  Rebecca Jones 
(2003) demonstrates an alternative approach, naming herself in transcription as 
                                               
10
 Speer (2005) makes a persuasive argument that gender is available as an legitimate focus for 
discourse analysis including locally focussed CA insofar as gender is invoked or orientated to by 
speakers.   Certainly, the data here could profitably be explored for ‘doing gender’ in talk, such as 
participants’ comments about the (sometimes particular) responsibilities they face as women (see 
extract 19 on page 225 for example).  However, whilst I do analyse speaker’s reproductions of and 
orientations to different subject positions such as housewife and mother in chapter 5, sister and 
daughter in chapter 8, I am not setting out to claim that these are ‘gendered’ ways of talking: this is 
a separate debate.  Rather, I am interested in the positional ways of talking and the positional 
ideologies reproduced as language-in-use constitutes these positions.  I still talk about women, 
then, but not to presume difference with men – rather to attend to what I have described in chapter 
1 as an ‘invisible’ group.     
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Rebecca, but also analysing ‘Rebecca’s’ talk.  This serves to dislocate Rebecca 
the interlocutor from Rebecca the researcher constructing analyses.  I am 
sympathetic to the stated aim – to draw attention to the interviewer’s talk as 
integral for analysing interaction; but not persuaded by the discontinuity implied 
between interviewer, co-constructor of talk, and analyst.  So, when I refer to my 
speech during analyses, it is as I, simultaneously co-constructor and researcher.   
4.5.2. Working up analyses 
The overall approach aims to take up the synthesis of Foucauldian and 
ethnomethodological analyses recommended by Wetherell (1998; 2003).  
The transcription process explained above was an integral aspect of early 
analysis and provided familiarity with the broad patterns of talk and with finer 
detail of specific segments.  From that point on, analysis was guided by a 
fundamental question: what work is this utterance doing. This is the guiding 
question from CA (Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 1998).  In CA this is used to 
maintain a focus on the immediate local sequential order.  For my broader 
analysis, I follow Wetherell (1998) to use it to guide my attention to both the 
micro focus and a much broader focus on what discourses are being mobilised, 
and what is not being said.  I discuss a specific example of this in chapter 6.3. 
 I began by following Potter and Wetherell (1987) and copied different 
extracts into datafiles around common themes and topics.  This includes the 
objects or events marked out as success and failure, the take up of particular 
identities, recurrent phrases and tropes, and so on.  In addition I prepared datafiles 
for talk around the photographic images and cross references for concepts running 
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across particular sets of photographs.  All of these involved an inclusive approach, 
allowing extracts to be copied into several datafiles.  Points of interest were 
discourses in common, apparent shared meanings, variability in the way themes 
were deployed and, crucially, the work they appeared to do, and the debates and 
contests they appeared to index. 
 This process is revealing in further ways.  As collections of extracts are 
examined, variabilities point to further potential patterns not initially recognised.  
Additional examples were then sought.  This process allowed the data to ‘speak’ 
and to ‘surprise’ as new categories emerged, and new avenues of interpretative 
possibilities opened up.  In addition, as the process of grouping and re-grouping 
developed, attention was also drawn to those segments of talk left unmarked.  
This provided an opportunity to discover other potential activity, or to set aside 
those segments of transcript as outside the particular interests of the research 
questions.  
 Following Wetherell (1998; 2003) I wanted to work with the data at both 
the close level, focusing on participants’ orientations, positionings and 
repositionings in particular segments, making connections to bigger patterns in  
the interviews as a whole, and with an analytic eye for argumentative threads and 
the troubled and untroubled recruitment of broader macro and ideological 
discourses. 
 This entailed checking for particular and repeating patterns of discursive 
resources and strategies within an interview, and checking the same against the 
shared resources and strategies exhibited across the collection of interviews.  This 
was a recursive process.  Close focus on short extracts dislocates meaning from 
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the longer interaction of the whole interview.  Therefore provisional analytic 
interpretations were cross checked for coherence and consistency by reading 
extracts in relation to the overall interview and to the other interviews.  This cross 
checking was carried out both against the transcript, and by re-listening to the 
audio recording.  Continuing attention to the audio record was a crucial feature in 
analysis which needed to be repeated often.  It quickly became apparent that there 
was considerable ‘slippage’ between what I ‘heard’ in the delivery of the talk as I 
read the transcript in silence, and what could be heard on the audio record when 
that was replayed alongside my developing interpretations.  For example, a slight 
emphasis on the audio record could easily become magnified when reading the 
transcript if it had been marked ‘emphasis’; equally a slight emphasis on the audio 
record not considered sufficient to mark out during initial transcription, might take 
on a new interpretative significance when it is heard later following more detailed 
knowledge of patterns across the interview as a whole. 
Warranting analytic claims is a vital part of the research process.  I discuss 
this more in the context of specific analytic segments in the empirical chapters to 
follow, but my emphasis draws on a range of tools.  These include speakers’ 
orientations, the exploration of diversity, coherence of the argument, the 
consideration of alternative interpretations and a reach for a scholarly analysis 
(Taylor, 2001b; Wetherell, 1998).  My analysis also requires reflexivity as I 
indicated in chapter 1.2.  I share much familiar territory with my participants, as a 
woman, in mid-life, and concerned with my own various self projects.  Whilst this 
allows insights from shared cultural understandings, it also risks taking for 
granted those shared understandings.  I have tried to address this throughout by 
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explaining my reasoning, pointing directly to those aspects of the interaction that 
underpin my reading, both in terms of the immediate local organisation and to the 
broader discursive resources mobilised within individual segments and across the 
corpus as a whole.    I have cited at length, and often, from the interviews to allow 
readers opportunity to think about the legitimacy of my arguments. 
 
Chapter 5. Negotiating successful selves 
151 
Chapter 5. Negotiating successful selves and 
dilemmas of positioning 
Chapter 3 presented a combined Foucauldian, Bakhtinian and psycho-discursive 
argument that the psychologised subject is one produced in discourse; produced 
through the ethnomethodological mobilisation and negotiation of particular 
ideological configurations and reflexive rhetorical sense-making; a subject 
drawing on, and answerable to, a heteroglossic milieu of situated, contingent, 
discursive possibilities and constraints.  In particular, it argued that in Britain in 
the final decades of the 20th century and the first of the 21st century, this subject 
is psychologised and responsibilised through a combination of normative psy 
complex discourses linked with contemporary neoliberal governmentality.  This 
combination, it is argued, promotes the individualisation of subjects through the 
notion of the self as a project to be worked on and experienced in particular ways.  
The subject is constructed as a site for self-regulation, self-management, and self-
production (Walkerdine, 2003:241; see also Clarke, 2005; Clarke et al., 2006; 
McRobbie, 2004; Rose, 1996; 1999; Skeggs, 1997).  
Although my thesis picks up some of the extensive debates in social theory 
around individualisation, it does not follow them in detail.  Instead, my interest 
develops from discursive and social psychological standpoints.  In particular, 
following the critique outlined in chapter 3, I am interested in what this neoliberal 
individualised psychologisation looks like in practice when people take up 
discourses and work up particular subject positions, subjectivities and identities.  
The critique has suggested that this currently lacks adequate empirical 
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elaboration.  This chapter starts to address this gap by developing more empirical 
illustration of these moments of subjectification as people take up particular 
discourses and construct particular personalised identities of contemporary 
successes and failures. 
I begin in section 5.1 by presenting an extended extract from one interview 
as a way of previewing some of the key interests and concerns for this chapter and 
beyond, and showing the value of interview methodologies for capturing an 
abundance of consequential discursive action and semiotic patterns.  In section 5.2 
I raise a cautionary note about simplistic binaries of success and failure, and draw 
attention to shifting constructions of success and failure, multiple indexicalities 
and different ‘acts of translation’.  The chapter then continues with an explication 
of some of the different ‘sites’ of success.  By this I mean the objects, 
relationships, events, etc., that get marked out as successes and failures.  This 
begins in section 5.3 with an illustration of participants’ talk of family and 
relationships as sites of success and continues in 5.4 with the ideological contests 
in discourses of a work-life balance, and the implications this carries for marking 
out identities of success and failure.  Throughout I will be working with an 
analytic focus which is attentive to the social action and accomplishments evident 
in the immediate interaction, but which locates that work within broader patterns 
of contemporary social orders.  
5.1. Capturing discursive phenomena 
Underpinning this thesis is the notion that language is social action.  But, any 
segment of discourse may constitute many different forms of action which 
Chapter 5. Negotiating successful selves 
153 
collapse together in the interactional moment.  The extended extract presented in 
this section pulls out some of these many points of action.  It introduces key topics 
in the research, and acts as a precursor to subsequent analysis where these 
different threads will be disentangled and explored separately.  In addition, this 
longer extract helps illustrate the importance of approaching analyses of fleeting 
momentary interactions as something embedded in much longer histories; 
histories of the era, and of a life time of meaning-making resources, as well as the 
more immediate history of the interview interaction itself.  This analytic eye for 
interactional histories beyond the immediate sequential utterances is of course a 
recurrent debate within discourse studies (Billig, 1999b; 1999c; Schegloff, 1999a; 
1999b; Wetherell, 1998; Wooffitt, 2005).  I broached this in chapter 4 (see page 
124 ff.) but this extended extract helps illustrate some of the issues empirically. 
This extract starts 2 minutes 29 seconds into a recording lasting for 124 
minutes 46 seconds overall (the locations of all segments of talk are similarly 
identified at the start of each extract).  The speakers are Paula, a participant in the 
study, and myself, Jean.  Up to this point I have been reminding Paula that I am 
doing research for PhD study, that the interview is being recorded, and that if she 
wishes me to stop recording I will do so immediately.  I have set some further 
context by saying I have been talking to women from our age-group – Paula and I 
were both in our mid-forties at the time of the interview – about their ideas of 
success and failure, and being good enough.  I have said I am not focusing on any 
pre-set notion of success or failure; instead, I am interested in those things that 
matter to the women I am talking to, ‘what people feel resonates for them in their 
circumstances’.  This preamble is typical of all the interviews.  I continue:  
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 Extract 1. 
[2:29/124:46]  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Jean so (.) as a general start (.) erm (.) if you think about that 
phrase (.) success and failure 
Paula mm 
Jean erm (.) in (.) your own personal terms but also (.) or if you 
prefer in broader (.) cultural terms 
Paula mm 
Jean what (.) what does it (.) bring to mind 
Paula erm (.) well it's difficult for me because (.) I don't know if I 
told you before when I was eighteen I was really ill (.) 
Jean no (.) no 
Paula oh didn't I tell you that (.) so (.) my life’s like in two halves (.) 
since I've been ill (.) and before I was ill 
Jean  yes 
Paula and my mindset is completely different since I've been ill to 
wh- to what it was before (.) and th- the everything re- 
revolves around that (.) so (.) before I was ill (.) I just thought 
I would be successful I think (.) I don't (.) y’know (.) I (.) I 
was very positive 
Jean  [mm 
Paula [and y’know nothing fazed me and then (.) I became really 
really ill (.) I had something called Hodgkin's dis[ease 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Jean                                                                               [oh yes 
Paula erm (.) but it was very severe (.) and it- I was a long ti::me (.) 
erm (.) without it being diagnosed (.) and I had (.) a big lump 
in my chest (.) that (.) crushed (.) my (.) was laying (.) closely 
to my heart (.) and crushed my right lung I mean and I was (.) 
I was really really really poorly (.) I mean I was very close (.) 
to not being here (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula and erm (.) so I had to have chemotherapy for (that) eighteen 
months (.) and (.) I was an absolute wreck (.) so for like (.) 
and I was only eighteen and I mean and coming to terms with 
that when you're eighteen is pretty horrendous because 
eighteen is a difficult age group anyway isn't it 
Jean  [yes 
Paula [you're not quite an adult and you're not really a child (.) and I 
knew that I’d nearly died (.) and I was scared that I was going 
to die (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula so I lived with that (.) I was an absolute (.) physical and 
emotional wreck (.) for (.) a lot of years (.) ten- ten years or 
more (.) and there was nothing that (.) the doctors could do 
for me because (.) they'd save my li::fe (.) 
Jean mm 
Chapter 5. Negotiating successful selves 
156 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Paula because I'd had all this chemotherapy (.) but the- it couldn't 
make me that one step further to be well so I was always ill 
(.) always something wrong with me never felt well (.) 
couldn't sleep (.) I was in- in a terrible mess (.) and erm (.) so 
(.) y’know when you've had something like that (.)  
Jean mm 
Paula it completely changes (.) where you're going in life 
Jean yes 
Paula y’know because before then (.) erm (.) I suppose even before 
that before I was eighteen (.) it was in two halves (.) the first 
half (.) I didn't really think about (.) being successful I didn't 
real- because I'd (.) I’d had a very (.) erm (.) er (.) lovely (.) 
family (.) upbringing where they really wrapped me in cotton 
wool 
Jean mm 
Paula and (.) they’d had no expectations of me whatsoever (.) I 
could be anything or do anything (.) y’know my mum and 
dad (.) weren't (.) pushy (.) parents or anything (.) so (.) 
y’know they they (.) they just loved me who I was so I 
suppose (.) being successful or (.) or being a failure or 
whatever never ever came into it because (.) I was so well 
loved (.)  
Jean [mm  
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68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Paula [I don't think (.) that ever came into it (.) erm (.) when I- 
when I went to senior school I- I was (.) I mean I know it 
sounds horrible but I was good at everything when I was at 
senior school age (.) I just seemed to be (.) just seemed to fit 
into the school and (.) everything I did was successful (.)  
Jean mm 
Paula y’know erm (.) everything (.) I-I (.) y’know everything I did 
everything that I tried to do I was really successful at it (.) and 
that is a nice place to be 
Jean yes 
Paula it's a really really nice place to be when (.) you do something 
and people say (.) oh you- ah that was brilliant y’know (.) it 
makes you feel really good inside but the downside of that is 
(.) some people don't like you because of it (.) 
Jean  yes 
Paula y’know (.) some people don't like you because (.) y’know 
you've been successful in things (.) and I suppose (.) I really 
erm (.) just I-I suppose I just thought I would be successful in 
life whatever I wanted to be (.) erm and then I became ill (.) 
and then I wondered if I'd have a life at all then so (.) 
wondering about success or failure then didn't really come 
into it until (.) I met a teacher (.) that I'd (.) had at school at 
my secondary school (.) an::d this is quite a few years down 
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91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
the line (.) and she said to me (.) what are you doing now (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula and I said (.) well (.) nothing really I said y’know I've had my 
boys (.) now having my boys (.) to me (.) was (.) an im- (.) an 
immense success (.) because (.) I was told when I'd had all the 
(.) chemotherapy I wouldn't be able to have children 
Jean mm 
Paula so to be able to have children was (.) the most (.) incredible 
thing that ever happened [to me in my life 
Jean                                         [mm 
Paula so it was a fantastic success (.) but to her (.) who was in the 
educational system (.) it wasn't 
Jean yeah 
Paula y’know (.) and she went ((Paula gestures, makes a 
  contemptuous face)) 
Jean and she’d known you at (.) that earlier (.)  
Paula yes   
Jean spell [with all those expectations [of  
Paula          [she knew me (.)                  [yes (.) yes she knew me  
 when I was (.) when I was [successful 
Jean                                            [yeah 
Paula and I'd got such a lot of potential (.) and I- it really (.) cut me 
up (.) and she said to me (.) what a waste (.) 
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114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
Jean oh that- 
Paula what a waste (.) and that (.) it re::ally really upset me (.) 
Jean yeah 
Paula because that- I mean I did feel like a failure then (.) because 
in her eyes (.) I hadn't reached my potential 
Jean mm 
Paula but she didn't know what had happened (.) after I left school 
she didn't know (.) the journey this most terrible journey that 
I’d been on that just being alive (.) was a success for me 
Jean mm 
Paula and she didn't know that so (.) it really did upset me I mean I 
didn't hold it against her because she just didn't know as far as 
she was concerned (.) she was in the educational world and 
she saw that I’d a lot of potential (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula and I hadn't (.) met that potential so she thought (.) it was a 
waste that I'd wasted my life (.) and that (.) actually (.) and I 
thought (.) ºhave I have I wasted my life y’know (.) have I (.) 
perhaps I should’ve done somethingº (.) so that gave me the 
motivation then (.) to prove to the rest of the world I suppose 
(.) that (.) y’know (.) I could be successful in something   
[that I did  
Jean [mm (.) 
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138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151  
152 
153 
154 
Paula erm (.) 
Jean did you feel that (.) that you were (.) it was for out there it 
was 
Paula for for for everybody else [not for me real- y’know  
Jean              [yeah 
Paula to prove that so that if I was filling a form (.) I didn't have to 
put housewife 
Jean yeh  
Paula y’know because that seems (.) really (.) derogatory (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula putting (.) oh she does the house work- oh (.) housewife 
((dismissive gesture)) 
Jean [yeah there is a just in front of it isn’t there 
Paula [but to me it was huge it was a huge thing (.) yeah (.) just a 
housewife (.) 
Jean yeah 
Paula so (.) y’know that- that was really (.) that really motim- 
motivated me (.) to think well I need to do something 
 
I have presented a substantial extract here so before I do anything else, I want to 
explain why it is useful to have done so.  In conversation a wide range of 
discursive strategies and resources are mobilised.  Interpretative repertoires are 
called on, canonical narratives deployed, ideologies engaged and reproduced, 
dilemmas negotiated, subject positions taken up, or resisted, personal orders 
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worked up, trouble navigated, accounting, justifying, and warranting carried out, 
and so on.  They interweave a tapestry of starts, stops, and overlaps, of indexical, 
contingent, references backwards and forwards, sometimes fleeting, sometimes 
sustained.  We can see all of this in this one long extract.  To analyse these 
different resources and strategies effectively we need to disentangle them and look 
at their workings separately and I do this later.  But, to understand the power 
language exercises, the way it simultaneously holds subjects fixed as certain sorts 
of people at the same time as it shifts and relocates and reconfigures subject in 
different ways, we need to hang on to the embedded flow of intersubjective 
meaning-making, the kaleidoscope of both immediate and historical 
contingencies.  It is for this reason I follow Wetherell (1998) and Billig (1999b; 
1999c) in their debates with conversation analysts (see Schegloff, 1997; 1999a; 
1999b; Wooffitt, 2005).  Valuable, indeed crucial, explanatory insights are 
available from raising an analytic eye beyond the boundary of the immediate 
sequential interaction.   
 In the extract above for example, we can see how thoroughly Paula’s 
narrative is embedded in multiple contexts.  It is of course a direct response to the 
immediate interactional moment, in this instance my opening interview question 
(lines 1-2) which is embedded in the needs of the research project.  There are 
other more interesting examples of this embedding though, such as when Paula 
checks with me about my prior knowledge: ‘I don't know if I told you before’ 
(line 8-9).  Paula and I had met at an evening class and had fallen into casual 
conversation whilst waiting for classes to start.  Our interview exchanges, and the 
intersubjective understandings and meaning-makings we produce are embedded in 
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this broader relationship, one preceding the interview and one, we probably 
assumed, continuing afterwards.  But, our familiarity was limited, with only little 
knowledge of personal details, family circumstances or life histories.  
Paula’s comment, together with my implicit acceptance that there has 
indeed been a ‘before’, ties ‘the past’ to the present and quietly constructs 
expectations of a consistency with prior accounts.  This is what Bourdieu referred 
to as the biographical illusion – a habituated expectancy of a constancy of self 
(Bourdieu, 1987).  Drawing on the past in this way generates continuities and this 
sense of continuity is a key element of the analysis conducted here.  I am not 
talking about ‘actual’ pasts as if there is a true version which can complement and 
supplement the data for analysis.  However, talk of the past, talk that invokes, 
produces and reproduces pasts, is a central component of individualised 
psychologised selves.  This is one of the main interests for this thesis:  the 
production of particular subjectivities – how the grand narratives of ‘the social’ 
get taken up as ‘the personal’; how particular discourses and ways of making 
sense come to be taken up and understood as personal histories, personal qualities, 
as qualities of ‘the self’.  
Organising such continuities of self are critical moments when subjects 
construct themselves as biographical, whole, and unified across time and life 
events despite apparent breaches in continuities (Taylor, 2003; 2006).  This is how 
Gergen (1994) conceptualises the function of the self-narrative: an interactional 
resource in story form used ‘to identity ourselves to others and to ourselves’ 
(Gergen, 1994:247); it addresses a form of accounting which assembles, unifies, 
and explains the self.  Paula’s account illustrates these concepts of continuities so 
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well. 
Paula’s account here is of a life ‘in two halves (.) since I've been ill (.) and 
before I was ill’ (lines 11-12). This life ‘in two halves’ is used as a framework 
which organises the rest of the narrative.  Through this account, Paula is unified as 
‘a self’ in this moment of telling ‘the life story’.  This is a history of ‘whats’ and 
‘whys’ and ‘effects’ which entwine early successes at school (lines 69-75), future 
potential and expectations of success (lines 85-86), interrupted by a fight for 
survival following illness (lines 86-87), then achieving the thought-to-be-
impossible by becoming a mother (lines 93-101), but being called to account 
when an ex teacher asks ‘what are you doing now’ (line 91), being found 
inadequate (lines 113-115), with a potential left unrealised (118), prompting self 
questioning and a desire to redeem the self: ‘ºhave I have I wasted my life y’know 
(.) have I (.) perhaps I should’ve done somethingº (.) so that gave me the 
motivation then (.) to prove to the rest of the world I suppose (.) that (.) y’know (.) 
I could be successful in something that I did’ (lines 131-135). 
In Gergen’s terms the particular story form Paula reproduces here is of a 
heroic narrative; a series of advancements, set-backs, and further advancements. 
This is also a story which may have been told in more or less this way, many 
times.  It is Paula’s story, but it is also a story shape which pre-exists her in a 
canonical form (Bruner, 1990); a story of adversity overcome is a recognisable 
story form.  Moreover, it is one Paula can recruit for the task my interview has set. 
The heroic story is itself a recognisable story of success:  a contemporary story of 
challenges, battle scars, and victories.  In telling this account Paula is ‘doing 
success’ in our exchange. 
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Paula’s account assembles a range of familiar resources to build a 
storyline of adversity overcome, and personal development.  It is an account 
which appears to flow readily, with a practiced, established quality.  I say this 
because the extract shows how little work I do as the interviewer, beyond saying 
‘mm’ and ‘yes’ frequently. ‘Mm’ and ‘yes’ are of course still co-constructing 
elements in the flow of interaction, elements which encourage the furtherance of 
the account.  But, the contributions are unevenly distributed between speakers.  
This is Paula’s story; this is her discursive ensemble, albeit one I can join in with.   
Saying this account has a rehearsed and practiced quality is not a 
description intended to undermine the importance of the story, or the power of the 
life events it reports.  Rather, as constructionist and discursive researchers have 
argued (Bruner, 1990; 2002; Gergen, 1994; Taylor, 2005; 2006), these substantial 
flowing narratives have an already-available quality to them, one which provides 
a framework for making sense, for organising the telling of a life.  But, 
importantly, this is also a versatile resource.  It is possible to see in this instance 
how Paula locates my interview question about the meaning of success and failure 
for her within this bigger account of the pattern of her life.  These big, familiar 
accounts are recruited and reproduced as building blocks to fulfil new accounting 
demands.  At the same time, this reproduction of a life history reinforces the 
construction of a continuous self, an individual with a personalised biography, a 
past, a present and a future, a self that is constructed as superseding the immediate 
relations in which it exists.   
This concept of the reproduction of accumulated  tellings of the self is how 
Taylor (2003; 2006) has addressed the critique of discursive psychology from, for 
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example, Crossley (2000).  Crossley works within a narrative analysis framework 
and has argued that, with its focus on fragmentation, discourse analysis is 
inattentive to the continuities and coherences in the accounts people give of their 
lives and their experience of living their lives.  Taylor (2003; 2006) has begun to 
address this directly by drawing on a range of resources from discursive 
psychology and understanding them as accumulations, accounts not worked up 
from scratch at any time of telling; but rather accounts of a life which draw on 
familiar, rehearsed, resources which have been worked to accomplish similar 
tasks previously and which are in any particular moment of telling, a new version 
of a familiar story.  Moreover, for Taylor, this is the route in to understanding 
imaginings of futures, not simply pasts and presents.  These repeated resources lay 
the groundwork for future tellings too. 
The extract from the interview with Paula demonstrates an apparent ease 
with which participants across the corpus were able to give accounts of the self in 
response to questions of success and failure.  Accounts were detailed, sometimes 
celebratory as in Paula’s comment ‘everything I did everything that I tried to do I 
was really successful at it (.) and that is a nice place to be…it's a really really nice 
place to be when (.) you do something and people say (.) oh you- ah that was 
brilliant y’know (.) it makes you feel really good inside’ (lines 74-80).   
Oftentimes though, accounts also signified trouble, such as Paula’s first 
comment, ‘well it's difficult for me’ (line 8).  This is a direct alert that the account 
to follow might not be a conventional story of success.  Then, a different kind of 
trouble when Paula says, ‘I know it sounds horrible but I was good at everything’ 
(lines 69-70).  This intriguingly indicates trouble around claiming success even 
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when it might be readily available.  Some kinds of claims to success appear to be 
frowned upon – which hints at some trouble for participants in my study being 
invited to claim success. 
In addition, this account which Paula and I worked up together, drew on 
and reproduced ideological dilemmas, such as the tensions demonstrated in 
extract 1 around being ‘just a housewife’ (lines 147-151).  Indeed, this is 
something I contributed:  I offered the ‘just’ (line 149) in response to Paula’s 
dilemma of a ‘wasted’ life (line 131 ff), and Paula takes it up: ‘yeah (.) just a 
housewife’ (lines 150-151).  There is also an apparently unquestioned assumption 
of accountability here too; that one should consider oneself answerable ‘to the rest 
of the world’ in these terms; that one needs to find other ways ‘to prove to the rest 
of the world’ (line 133) that one ‘could be successful in something’ (line 134).   
This ‘accountability’ implicitly constitutes notions that some subject 
positions are adequate, some will pass, and some are inadequate – yet again, more 
trouble.  Indeed this concept of proving oneself to others hints at a theme which 
flows in a range of ways across the interviews; not only ‘what’ might pass as 
success and what might be failure, but who decides.  Paula for example, orientates 
to success as meeting others’ expectations and judgements; most notably here the 
judgements of her ex-teacher.  Her comment ‘I did feel like a failure then (.) 
because in her eyes (.) I hadn't reached my potential’ (lines 117-118) is just one 
example.  Paula recruits the imaginary voices of others against which she works 
up a particular moment of identity; in this case someone who has failed to 
measure up to the expectations of others.  Paula is not alone in this practice.  
However, there are also interesting contrasts between this pattern of talk and that 
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from some other participants who are able to mobilise other discourses prioritising 
the satisfaction of their own expectations and wishes as a means of working up a 
particular (imagined) identity.  I come back to all of these points later. 
Taken all together, what this extended extract illustrates is the rich product 
of the interview methodology.  It facilitates the mobilisation of resources and 
strategies and negotiations in several ways.  These resources are inevitably 
contextualised by the particularities of the interview, but the interviews draw on a 
rich depth of culturally available resources and strategies.  This tells us much 
about the cultural slots women are able to mobilise to both reproduce and address 
the tensions in identifying themselves as successful or failing subjects of 
contemporary times.  The interview creates a particular kind of space to narrate a 
life, a self and a time.  Contrary to claims by advocates of a ‘pure’ conversation 
analysis approach (see Wooffitt, 2005, for example), the combined micro-meso-
macro analytic synthesis proposed by Wetherell (1998; 2005a) and favoured here 
in my analyses, offers a rich and grounded opportunity to explore the multiple 
intersecting layers of speakers’ resources, and the difficulties to be negotiated in 
claiming particular kinds of identities and subjectivities.  
 This attention on the combination of both broad and fine-grained 
resources, and the interactional moments in which they are mobilised in practices, 
and the constitutive consequences for the making of individualised, psychologised 
subjects and subjectivities, firmly positions this thesis within social psychology.  
It is not a sociological account of a history of ideas; although throughout I do call 
on contemporary sociological descriptions of our times.  My emphasis, however, 
is on the mobilisation of cultural resources for working up particular kinds of 
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selves; interpreted analytically through a critical lens orientated to the dialogical, 
the rhetorical, the argumentative, the persuasive.   
5.2. Problematising a success-failure binary 
In chapter 2 I argued that much of the traditional psychological literature 
on success and failure has displayed a taken-for-granted quality about what counts 
as ‘success’ or ‘failure’, with a priori emphases on academic attainment and 
career outcomes.  By implication, success and failure are also routinely presented 
as a fairly straightforward binary.  Indeed, many of the methods critiqued there 
guaranteed such a division by orchestrating participants into ‘success condition’ 
and ‘failure condition’ feedback tasks (for examples see Ensari and Miller, 2005; 
Stucke, 2003). But, when participants here talk about successes and failures it is 
frequently much more nuanced than that.  There is much more of an 
argumentative texture to what gets marked out as success or failure.  This was 
evident in the opening extract from the interview with Paula where she was in 
debate with herself about a ‘wasted life’ (page 157ff.).  Talk of success may 
contain shadows of failure; and talk of failure may suggest what might be success.  
But, there is no simple algorithm here about what is success and what is failure.  
Nor, indeed, should it be expected that there would be – despite some of the 
traditions in the literatures in chapter 2.   
There are several ways to problematise this indexing of success and 
failure, through multiple shifting sites, multiple shifting rhetoric, and multiple acts 
of interpretative translation.  Different sites of success, family, career, etc., 
provide different contexts for different kinds of argumentative resources, 
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challenges and interpretations.  What might be worked up as success or failure in 
one moment may shift in the next.  Moreover, as Billig has demonstrated, the 
rhetorical nature of talk means there are multiple indexicalities in motion when 
discourses are deployed.  In other words, there are many different meanings and 
associations which might be invoked by any utterance (Billig, 1997; 1999a; 
Taylor, 2001a). 
Kulick (2005) has borrowed from Billig (1997; 1999a) to argue this 
through the notion of ‘dual indexicality’, saying that ‘utterances always 
simultaneously manifest their inversion’ (Kulick, 2005:622).  While I agree in 
part, I am suspicious of any simplistic notion of ‘duality’; one which might 
assume given binaries and dichotomies and simple inversions.  Language-in-use is 
indeed frequently dichotomous in the way it constitutes objects – woman/man, 
old/young, and of course success/failure, and so on.  Indeed, one might imagine 
an apparent binary such as success and failure could be understood precisely 
through this idea of duality and inversion.  But, these simple binaries, and the 
possible inversions invoked by the deployment of one or other, are frequently 
disrupted by ethnomethodological practices of argumentation and nuance.  This 
point can be illustrated in relation to another concept; interpretative acts of 
‘translation’.  
I am asking women to talk about successful or failing subjects, and 
through the course of the interview I ask them to do this in relation to themselves, 
and to others.  They recruit a wide range of resources to accomplish that, 
including a range of interpretative acts of translation. Put simply, in order for 
participants to undertake the task, they must try to work out what my questions 
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might mean.  Participants invariably establish an interpretative frame for 
scaffolding their answers.  This extract from the interview with Ruth illustrates a 
common frame for accomplishing this.  
Extract 2. 
[01:30/104:40] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Jean  what do you think of (.) as success (.) if you were to think of 
that (.) what would it- what would it (.) mean to you 
Ruth a successful marriage 
Jean mm 
Ruth erm (.) mother?  
Jean yes 
Ruth or wife (.)  
Jean yeh 
Ruth they’re my (.) y’know (.) they’re the (.) they’re the things that 
are important to me 
 
So, Ruth answers my question with some examples; marriage, mother, wife; these 
are typical across the corpus and I come back to them in some depth shortly.  Here 
though I want to draw attention to the interpretative action in ‘they’re the things 
that are important to me’ (lines 9-10).  This is the frame Ruth is applying; this is 
how she is, here at least, interpreting my question, and setting provisional 
parameters to her response.  This typifies the versioned texture which runs 
throughout the entire data. There are frequent similar acts of interpretative 
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translation throughout the corpus and I attend to them as we pass.  
Here though, Ruth has translated my question about success into terms of 
‘things that are important’.  Perhaps the likely ‘inversion’ invoked here might be 
‘unimportant’, perhaps much more so than ‘failure’, although this too is available. 
These dialogic interpretative resources appear then to index multiple alternatives.  
The interesting question raised now is what function a given selection might 
accomplish.   
The particular translation here, ‘important’, fulfils a number of functions.  
Deploying the notion of ‘importance’ gives weight to those objects to which it is 
attached, in this case ‘a successful marriage’ (line 3), being a ‘mother’ (line 5), 
‘wife’ (line 7).  But, by marking these things out as important, Ruth is also, in 
Billig’s terms (1999a), simultaneously indexing and repressing those unspecified 
alternative objects she or someone else might have mentioned as successes, but 
that are now (for this moment) excluded from this designation ‘important’.  So, by 
marking these things as success Ruth is simultaneously attending to other 
possibilities, side-stepping other more troubled responses, and working up a 
warrant for her own answer.  But the argumentation goes further.  There is also a 
qualifier here in Ruth’s use of ‘to me’ when she says ‘they’re the things that are 
important to me’ (lines 9-10).  ‘To me’ works to take an ownership of the 
comments made; it claims the opinion expressed.  This ‘personalises’ a speaker’s 
take on success, but it also helps inoculate her answer against dissent – should any 
be deployed – these are ‘her’ opinions.  It points very clearly to the potential for 
different kinds of response.  It announces other speakers may say something quite 
different. 
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With these caveats in mind, I am moving on to examine some of the 
shared patterns in constructions of success and failure as they appears across the 
interviews.  I begin with the most dominant of these in my sample; the 
construction of family and relationship as a central, albeit troubled, measure of 
success.  
5.3. Family and relationship 
 
‘Could they say of me that mine was a successful life? I think so. I did not 
marry; I did not have children.  That was my great achievement.’ 
  
So says Fay Weldon’s character Gabriella Sumpter in The Rules of Life (1987:10). 
It is a startling claim.  Its power comes precisely from the way it subverts 
normative expectancies of successful womanhood – above all, marriage, and 
children.  Twenty years ago, when Fay Weldon published that, her audience of 
readers may well have included the women in my study. They would, I think, 
have recognised Gabriella Sumpter’s contravention of a norm.  Twenty years on, 
it seems that Gabriella’s position continues to function as a startling, defiant, 
resistance to the still present ‘rules’ of normativity.  Amongst this sample of 
women, above all else, having children is repeatedly marked out as their greatest 
success, often along with their marriages – at least where marriage is marked out 
as enduring.  This next extract illustrates this trend.  At the start of this extract I 
have asked Mel what a successful life would be for her. 
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Extract 3. 
[02:33/67:37] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Mel the most important (.) [thing (.) for me is family (.)  
Jean                                     [yeh 
Mel that’s never (.) never changed (.) I’m (.) I’m very fortunate (.) 
I’ve (.) only ever been married once (.) twenty eight years I’ve 
got two lovely children (.) that’s it  
Jean   mm 
Mel erm (.) and if everything else (.) stopped tomorrow Jean (.) it 
wouldn’t really bother me (.) I just (.) existed for my family 
    
This appears to be an unequivocal response from Mel.  Family is prioritised.  
More than that, though, there are also clear signs of the identity work Edwards 
(1998) describes when he talks about speakers deploying a discourse of ‘married 
with kids’ to construct not simply ‘facts’ but a particular understanding of 
themselves.  When Mel says ‘I’ve (.) only ever been married once (.) twenty eight 
years I’ve got two lovely children’ (lines 4-5) this is not just ‘information’; this is 
an identity, an identity constructed around an abiding, enduring subject.  This is 
not a momentary success; this is one constructed as having been lived out for 
twenty eight years.  
This prioritising of family (line 1) as the most important success is a 
dominant discourse across the interviews.  That prevalence does not mean this 
particular ideological stance is trouble free however.  This idealising of ‘family’ 
as women’s greatest concern reproduces ideologies of ‘woman’, of successful and 
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proper womanhood.  But, it carries contentious and conflicting ideological 
demands too.  This was evident in the way Paula and I constructed ‘housewife’ as 
problematic in the first extract.  Some of the tensions in taking up an identity in 
terms of one’s family and relationships were marked out vividly there.  I want to 
attend to this more closely now. 
An intriguing sequence, and one I found moving during the analytic 
phases of this study, occurred where Paula recounted an incident from some years 
earlier (see lines 85-102 and 113-119).  For convenience I have reproduced that 
segment of the extract here. 
Extract  4. 
[06:24/124:46] 
 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
Paula erm (.) just I-I suppose I just thought I would be successful in 
life whatever I wanted to be (.) erm and then I became ill (.) 
and then I wondered if I'd have a life at all then so (.) 
wondering about success or failure then didn't really come 
into it until (.) I met a teacher (.) that I'd (.) had at school at 
my secondary school (.) an::d this is quite a few years down 
the line (.) and she said to me (.) what are you doing now (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula and I said (.) well (.) nothing really I said y’know I've had my 
boys (.) now having my boys (.) to me (.) was (.) an im- (.) an 
immense success (.) because (.) I was told when I'd had all the 
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96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
(.) chemotherapy I wouldn't be able to have children 
Jean mm 
Paula so to be able to have children was (.) the most (.) incredible 
thing that ever happened [to me in my life 
Jean                                         [mm 
Paula so it was a fantastic success (.) but to her (.) who was in the 
educational system (.) it wasn't 
[…] 
Paula and I'd got such a lot of potential (.) and I- it really (.) cut me 
up (.) and she said to me (.) what a waste (.) 
Jean oh that- 
Paula what a waste (.) and that (.) it re::ally really upset me (.) 
Jean yeah 
Paula because that- I mean I did feel like a failure  then (.) because 
in her eyes (.) I hadn't reached my potential 
 
The thrust of the story appears to be that during a meeting with an old teacher, the 
teacher had asked Paula what she was ‘doing now’ (line 91).  Paula tells me she 
responded ‘well (.) nothing really I said y’know I've had my boys’ (lines 93-94).  
Paula also tells me that the teacher’s reaction to this made her ‘feel like a failure’ 
(line 118).  Paula elaborates by saying ‘because in her eyes (.) I hadn't reached my 
potential’ (lines 118-119, my emphasis).  But, if we look at Paula’s reported 
response to that question ‘what are you doing now’, it is Paula who says ‘nothing 
really’ (line 93).  It is Paula who has been explaining that having children 
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following chemotherapy has been ‘incredible’ and ‘fantastic’ and it is easy to 
share that sense of celebration, as the interviewer, analyst, and perhaps reader too.  
But, when held to account in this reported story, Paula is incited in some way, 
some ideological, dialogical, dilemmatic way to position this remarkable 
achievement, and her life with her children since, as ‘well (.) nothing really’.   
 This fragment captures what appears to be an intense dilemma; reconciling 
a commitment to one’s children as ‘fantastic’, in Paula’s words, as ‘the most 
important thing’, in Mel’s words, with a contemporary position that this is 
somehow ‘inadequate’, or ‘insufficient’ on its own.  
Most of the women in this study appear to manage this dilemma by 
constructing ‘family’ successes as a priority whilst also marking out their 
potential for claiming other successes too, often in career terms.  In other words 
by activating more than one option, they inhabit both possibilities, albeit with one 
prioritised.  The next extract illustrates this. 
Extract 5. 
[00:56/73:34] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Jean so (.) at a very very general level (.) what do you think of (.) as 
success (.) for you (.) what is it 
Rachel it's a straightforward question for me and it may sound really 
daft because it's not (.) at a professional level (.) but it's actually 
having my three kids (.)  
Jean mm 
Rachel er somebody asked me (.) a friend of mine asked me (.) er (.) a 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
couple of years ago (.) what had I achieved in my life (.) and 
because I was actually going through a bit of a problem at work 
at that stage (.) erm and she said well (.) you know what have 
you achieved (.) thinking that I would turn round and say (.) 
well all these students that had gone through their A levels  
Jean yeah 
Rachel and I just turned round I've had my three kids (.) and that was (.) 
the biggest success in my life (.) I suppose   
 
In this extract from the interview with Rachel, Rachel is able to simultaneously 
recruit two sites of success, professional and family.  When she says ‘it may 
sound really daft because it's not (.) at a professional level (.) but it's actually 
having my three kids’ (lines 3-5), this works as a kind of ‘surprise’ device not 
uncommon across the interviews.  It is possible to read Rachel’s words as ‘you 
might expect me to claim my career perhaps, and I could if I wanted to, but I am 
actually going to say it’s my children’.  Rachel, in effect, mobilises both positions 
for herself, but in a more constrained manner than directly claiming both.   
Also, claiming one’s children as one’s biggest success is marked out as 
‘daft’ (line 4).  Rachel’s talk is perhaps alert to ideological tensions.  Furthermore, 
it suggests that participants are never themselves that clear about what might 
count as ‘success’ and an answer has to be worked up for the context and moment. 
 Both Paula and Rachel identify their children as their biggest success, but, 
it appears to work more easily for Rachel because she is able to do this in 
conjunction with other possibilities:  she could claim something else as well.  
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Rachel mobilises the discursive resources here to surmount the diminished 
position of being ‘just a mother’ or ‘just a housewife’ in the terms Paula and I had 
used (see lines 142-151, page 160).  However, in the process of doing this, in the 
moment of placing her children at the centre of her sense of a successful self and 
simultaneously configuring herself as a professional woman also, Rachel can be 
heard to reproduce (if not endorse) the normativity of motherhood and career, 
with implicit shadows of an ideologically diminished position of motherhood 
alone. 
 The point I am making here is that the women in this study appear to more 
easily sustain a discourse saying their children are their biggest success when they 
simultaneously mobilise other positions which they could also claim.  If these 
other slots can be mobilised, women appear more free to select their children as 
their primary success.  However, if like Paula, one is unable to mobilise other 
slots, if only this slot is available, it becomes a diminished position, one more 
difficult to sustain.   
 Let me go back to Mel who opened this section.  Like other mothers in the 
sample, Mel presented her children as the most important thing for her when she 
reflects on the successes in her life.  Unlike Paula, this appears to be trouble free 
in that the account is direct and receives little warranting.  But I want to show 
what happened next.  I pick up the extract from line 7:  
Extract 6. 
[02:50/67:37] 
7 Mel erm (.) and if everything else (.) stopped tomorrow Jean (.) it 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
wouldn’t really bother me (.) I just (.) existed for my family 
Jean  yeah 
Mel the (.) job that I’ve got (.) was not a job I ever set out to do (.) I 
(.) set out (.) seventeen years ago with ((name of a national 
organisation)) thinking I will do a few hours (.) here and there 
and it will fit very nicely round my children   
Jean right 
Mel and things happened (.) erm as they do (.) and I ended up in the 
position that I’m (.) in today 
 
Mel too, can and does claim family as her success.  But Mel too, subtly mobilises 
other slots – ‘everything else’ (line 7).  Downgrading the importance of 
‘everything else’ as Mel does when she says ‘if everything else (.) stopped 
tomorrow Jean (.) it wouldn’t really bother me’ (lines 7-8) works to underline her 
prioritisation of her children.  But, once again, it makes visible some of the 
alternative slots Mel could have claimed, but did not.  
There seems to be a normative order across the interviews that children 
will, or should, be prioritised in response to my questions about successes.  But 
this appears to work best as a measure of personal success for participants when it 
exists as a companion option in combination with other success slots. 
Before I move on to think more about some other ways in which this 
combined motherhood/career discourse might function, I want to think just a little 
more about the cultural norm of centralising motherhood for women’s identities.  
It leaves a peculiarly ‘absent space’ – if that is not too much a contradiction in 
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terms – for women without children.  Cathy marks this out directly in this next 
extract.  At this point Cathy has been talking about women experiencing greater 
difficulty obtaining career promotions in comparison to men.  
Extract 7. 
[11:05/90:29] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Cathy we’re not happy to put (.) twenty three year old women into 
management because they’ll go and have babies (.)  
Jean   mm 
Cathy but then you’re seen as odd if you don’t want babies 
 
This is a longstanding dialogical charge women are aware of, and if childless, one 
that can be difficult to navigate (Letherby and Williams, 1999; Letherby, 2002). I 
do not have children and indeed participants frequently checked this with me – 
usually shortly after they had started to tell me something about their own 
families.  Therefore, I am potentially perhaps positioned by my participants as one 
of these ‘odd’ women.  This may well have changed the kinds of things 
participants would say to me; or the kinds of expectations to shared knowledge 
they might make, but it did not prevent participants talking enthusiastically about 
their children as their greatest success.   
This position of the ‘childless oddity’ is not one I have sufficient data to 
explore adequately.  Only three of the participants did not have children.  One of 
these three expressed an expectation that she still would; one, a possibility that she 
might; and the third, although I am not claiming this is equivalent, worked in child 
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protection services and talked at length about those successes which mattered 
most to her being the children she was able to help.   
Understanding the particular identity negotiations of women without 
children will have to be a project for another time.  However, I do just want to 
draw attention to one particular segment of talk which sheds some light on how 
centrally ‘successful womanhood’ can be tied to having children.  This picks up 
from extract 2 where I spoke of acts of interpretative translation.  I continue that 
extract here. 
Extract 8. 
[01:49/104:40] 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Ruth they’re my (.) y’know (.) they’re the (.) they’re the things that 
are important to me (.) at one time when I was younger it it 
would have been a job (.)  
Jean yeh 
Ruth but erm it’s family life and people 
Jean  yeh (.) do you sai- (.) you said at one time (.) that’s that changed 
(.) that sense of you has changed over time 
Ruth  it ha::s erm (.) I think when I was really young a career was 
important (.) and then (.) er I had a change of direction (.) when 
I met the love of my life ((Ruth laughs)) (.) erm (.) and so I 
changed direction (.) erm (.) and then of course (.) when I had 
my family (.) then (.) it was (.) y’know (.) family orientated and 
they are the important things and still are the important things 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
(.) erm (.) whereas I think if someone’s not had a family it may 
well (.) y’know erm (.) their- their impor::tant things of life 
might be (.) erm (.) career (.) y’know’ (.) but yeh (.) as times (.) 
time does change (.) I think (.) your views on what’s important 
and what’s not important (.) do you understand where I’m 
coming from 
 
What is intriguing here is what happens when I ask Ruth about her reference to 
things having ‘changed over time’ (line 15).  Ruth tells me what changed was 
meeting ‘the love of my life’ (line 18).  She adds ‘and then of course (.) when I 
had my family (.) then (.) it was (.) y’know (.) family orientated and they are the 
important things and still are the important things’ (lines 19-21).  Her comment 
‘of course’ (line 19), works to invoke a ‘natural order’ in what comes next:  ‘of 
course…. it was… family orientated’.  That this is so much the case in Ruth’s 
account is made clear when she concedes that it might be different for other 
women, for some women ‘their impor::tant things of life might be (.) erm (.) 
career’ (lines 23-24), – but only those without children, only those who have ‘not 
had a family’ (line 22).  Ruth further reinforces an ideology of natural order here 
by constructing an implicit position of knowledge deficit for non-mothers, as 
those who perhaps ‘understandably’ cannot know better.   
Interestingly though, in the light of the argument I presented above, even 
Ruth who constructs a natural order of family first, also reproduces alternative 
sites of success she could have called on.  She tells us ‘at one time when I was 
younger it it would have been a job’ (lines 10-11), and ‘when I was really young a 
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career was important’ (lines 16-17); although notably this position is implicitly 
attributed to a naivety of youth, of pre-motherhood.  Nevertheless, it is available 
to Ruth. 
Ruth is able to prioritise ‘family’ as most important to her sense of success 
partly because she has reproduced this as natural, partly because she has worked 
up an identity of greater experience and clearer knowledge now; and partly 
because she has also mobilised other possibilities, the possibilities of a career.  
Ruth was not in paid employment at the time of the interview; she had 
taken early retirement from nursing some years before.  But, unlike Paula earlier, 
Ruth is not presenting herself as doing ‘nothing really’ in the way Paula reported.  
While this is partly because the two conversations proceeded differently – Paula 
reported being asked directly what she was doing and I did not ask Ruth precisely 
the same direct question – nevertheless there is a qualitative difference in the way 
the two women speak about being mothers at home.  Ruth is not inviting a ‘just a 
housewife’ positioning.  Instead, Ruth is positioning herself as doing the thing that 
is of most importance to her.  This qualitative difference lies in part in making 
available other positions, of having strategies for calling up other positions and 
holding them in the wings.  This strategic support makes Ruth’s claims to success 
more tenable.  But what is striking is that deploying such strategies reinforces the 
troubled position of mother/housewife as a claim to success.  Despite the 
possibilities for recourse to ‘natural order’, ethnomethodologically, 
mother/housewife still appears to be a position which currently continues to 
require strategic support.   
The position of ‘housewife and mother’ has been complicated as second 
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wave feminism destabilised and deconstructed stories of the family as the natural 
centrepiece for women’s lives (Lucey, 2009).  The participants in my study make 
very limited reference to changing political landscapes.  Where they do this is 
generally more ambiguously through a reference to intergenerational differences 
in physical hardship and practical choice which I discuss later.  Their talk 
nevertheless appears to reflect this feminist disruption to the interpellating 
discourses women must navigate if they are to work up accounts of themselves as 
particular kinds of succeeding or failing subjects.  To be a housewife/mother is an 
identity which struggles now to pass, at the same time as ‘good mothering’ 
continues to occupy multiple agendas (Lawler, 2000; Marshall, Godfrey and 
Renfrew, 2007; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989). 
These exchanges also shed light on another current debate raised in 
chapter 3; understanding intersectionality (see 3.4.4.).  Intersectionality appeared 
in the social sciences literatures through Crenshaw’s (1989, 1991) work on race 
and gender in employment.  In its original form, intersectionality began with the 
notion of identity categories, so for me, this might be ‘woman’, ‘white’, ‘working 
class’, etc.; and the challenge was to explore the way these different ‘identities’ 
acted together on subjects.  The critique however, has suggested that working with 
the notion of identity categories risks homogenising category members, for 
example ‘women’, and reifying them, for example ‘middle-aged’, rather than 
understanding them as historically contingent (Burman, 2003; Fernandes, 2003; 
Yuval-Davis, 2006).  Wetherell’s (2005a) proposed solution to this is to not begin 
analysis with the a priori identity categories in mind, but to explore the 
ethnomethodology of intersectionality: to examine how people ‘do’ intersecting 
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identities in everyday practices. 
My analysis here, of speakers mobilising different subject positions, 
mother, wife, teacher, lover, career woman, younger, older, and so on, is an 
analysis of precisely this ethnomethodological practice of doing intersectionality 
as a response to ideological demands.  To use Wetherell’s terms, these ‘fragments 
of identity’ are on display here as ‘the currency of practice’, accomplishing the 
interactional accounting task set in the interview.  Recruiting different subject 
positions, positioning and repositioning the self, as Mel and Ruth both do so well, 
allows them both to work up an effective accounting at the same time as claiming 
a particular kind of identity.  Intersecting these positions in this way, functions as 
a kind of positioning ‘capital’. 
5.4. Work-life balance: ideological contests. 
In the previous section I illustrated one of the more prevalent themes in talk in this 
study; family and children as these participants’ greatest success.  I argued that 
this discourse of being a mother was central to working up these women’s 
identities as successful, but that on its own, there were hints of an orientation to 
this as an inadequate position.  I suggested that taking up a subject position as 
both a mother and having a career seemed to offer a solution to a dilemma of 
adequacy.  However, I want to show here that because of the dialogic, ideological, 
dilemmatic nature of discursive practice previously pointed to (Billig, 1991; 1996; 
et al., 1988), this is a momentary solution only.   
In this section I turn attention to a second theme which recurs across the 
interviews: this is a repertoire of managing a work-life balance; in particular, the 
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conflicting demands of combining motherhood and career.  What was seen to 
work as a solution, can also function as an ideological dilemma as participants 
move through the shifting positions and demands of their accounts.  There is a 
positional challenge in negotiating the right balance between family commitments 
and commitments to paid work, with a constant threat of failure in both.  Amy, 
cited in this extract, captured this dilemma well. 
Extract 9. 
[02:27/82:39] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Amy well if y- (.) I've just read a book funnily enough (.) and (.) it's 
just a fiction book but it just totally broke it down if you're a 
stay at home mum (.) you have to explain to working parents 
why you stay at home 
Jean mm 
Amy and if you're a working parent you feel like you have to explain 
to the mums on the school gates (.) why you're not there or (.) 
you get the nursery phoning you up and (.) you know (.) 
Jean  mm 
Amy can you possibly do this and can you do that and so you feel 
like you want to justify to everybody why you're doing it (.)  
 
This is a very familiar repertoire and it is not at all surprising to see it reproduced 
here.  But, there are still a number of valuable points to make.  Amy, in reporting 
these tensions, reproduces and re-energizes a position for women – that there is 
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always some threat of failure to fulfil perceived responsibilities, whether one is a 
‘stay at home mum’ (line 3) or a ‘working parent’ (line 6).  This is something that 
runs through many of the interviews here.  What is more, this discourse from Amy 
reproduces an implicit accountability for this in the same manner as Paula’s 
account earlier.  Paula spoke of proving herself to ‘the rest of the world’ (line 
133); that her need for success was driven by the expectations of others, ‘for 
everybody else’ (line 140).  Similarly, Amy suggests ‘you have to explain to 
working parents’ (line 3), ‘to the mums on the school gates’ (line 7), ‘the nursery’ 
(line 8); so much so that ‘you feel like you want to justify to everybody why 
you're doing it’ (lines 10-11).  Amy’s recruitment of this discourse of 
accountability appears to be a vibrant illustration of the Foucauldian proposition 
that subjects are disciplined into practices of accountability and accounting.   
 What is also worth noting is what gets reproduced in Amy’s resolution to 
the dilemmatic position she has mobilised.  The extract continues: 
Extract 10. 
[02:52/82:39] 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Amy but I (.) I think I'm very lucky (.) because (.) I (.) have a very 
good job (.) that gives us family time and (.) I only have to work 
part-time because my husband earns enough for me to work 
part-time 
Jean yes 
Amy so I can go to work three days a week and feel no guilt 
whatsoever (.) at leaving Ben in nursery because (.) he's happy 
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19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
he's secure he's educated (.) 
Jean mm 
Amy he's well looked after he's well fed (.) I get to go and be me (.) 
for three days (.) 
Jean yeah 
Amy and then I can come home and be a mum (.) for four (.) but (.) 
it's when they're poorly that you feel guilty (.) but (.) if they're 
not poorly (.) nine times out of ten y'know they’ll go to nursery 
and I don't feel guilt (.) I refuse to feel guilt and I consider that a 
level of (.) success for me whether somebody would look at that 
and say well actually you haven't got the best job in the world 
or (.)  
Jean mm 
Amy y'know you do leave your son (.) or (.) you do let him eat 
chocolate or you do let him watch telly ((laughs)) or whether 
they consider that successful (.) I'm not going to justify myself 
(.) I (.) have reached a level that I'm happy at 
Jean yeh 
 
Lucey (2009) argued that 1970s and 1980s feminisms tore apart reassuring stories 
of the family as a natural, heterosexual, haven of societal success.  But, as I have 
already demonstrated, this does not mean these reassuring stories no longer 
circulate.  Amy initially mobilises one such story in this extract to address the 
dilemma of being a mother working outside the home (lines 12-15).  However, it 
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is an account which goes on to resonate with dialogic trouble.   
 Amy’s opening, ‘I think I’m very lucky’ is an immediate alert that 
something to follow is to be positioned as valued.  I have argued elsewhere 
(McAvoy, 2004) that taking up a position of ‘being lucky’ is a rhetorical, 
strategic, identity practice, rather than a cognitive attributional practice.  This is a 
social action, not evidence of a private cognitive action. The literatures reviewed 
in chapter 2 interpret this kind of ‘being lucky’ comment through concepts of 
causality, understood through dimensions such as site and stability (Heider, 1958; 
Weiner, 1971; 1985).  So, for example, an attribution might be said to be external 
or internal to the person; stable or unstable, controllable and so on.  Outcomes 
attributed to luck have traditionally been understood as external, unstable, and 
uncontrollable (Weiner et al., 1971).  However, the vibrant discursive critique of 
such attributional readings (Antaki, 1994; Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 
1992; Locke, 2004) undermines this simplistic approach to language as 
representation of a pre-existing internal cognitive state.  Instead, it re-focuses the 
language of attribution as socially contingent action.   
 This action of positioning one self as ‘lucky’ now takes on very different 
qualities.  Here, Amy is able to mobilise ‘being lucky’ to set up what follows in a 
positive light; ‘luck’ casts what follows as valued, as good fortune, as a happy 
solution to the dilemma she has previously outlined.  What follows is the 
reproduction of the ‘heteronormative haven’.  The content of this valuable 
commodity is presented as a mix of ‘a very good job’, ‘family time’, ‘part-time’ 
work, and a husband who ‘earns enough’ for this.  
But, at the same time as this case is being made, it begins to slip.  It is a 
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contestable argument, and Amy mobilises that contest.  Her statement, that she 
‘can go to work three days a week and feel no guilt whatsoever’ (lines 17-18), 
indexes the argument that this is something one might feel guilty about.  This is 
even more apparent later when Amy repeats ‘I don't feel guilt (.) I refuse to feel 
guilt’ (line 27).  Again drawing on Billig’s understanding of the functioning of 
ideological dilemmas (Billig, 1991; 1996; 1999a) it is apparent that at the moment 
these resources are recruited to repress a possible charge of guilt, they 
simultaneously index and reproduce an ideology that suggests Amy should feel 
guilt.  So too, at the same time as Amy marks this out as a ‘level of (.) success’ 
(line 28) there is an alternative dialogic space to recognise herself as potentially 
failing in standards of mothering.  Amy reproduces a selection of some of these 
standards as she constructs for me an image of her son: ‘happy… 
secure…educated…well looked after… well fed’ (lines 18-21).  This list marks 
out some of those items which Amy orientates to as criteria against which she 
may be judged.  These are ones she presents as ‘achieved’.  A few lines later 
though she changes ‘footing’, to borrow Goffman’s (2001[1981]) term, and 
constructs charges a generalised ‘somebody’ might make against her: ‘you do 
leave your son (.) or (.) you do let him eat chocolate or you do let him watch telly’ 
(lines 32-33).  This imagined, potential positioning as a ‘bad mother’ is one Amy 
is simultaneously resisting and advancing.  
In this extract Amy twice broaches the question of whether other people 
would accept her claim to success.  Her response is ‘I'm not going to justify 
myself (.) I (.) have reached a level that I'm happy at’ (lines 34-35).  This 
statement is fascinating.  As with ‘I refuse to feel guilt’ earlier, ‘I’m not going to 
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justify myself’ raises precisely the notion that perhaps this stance might require 
justification.  Indeed, Amy has very carefully been elaborating her position in a 
way which could well be described as justification, having constructed a family 
life around ‘a very good job (.) that gives us family time’ (lines 12-13) and a 
husband who ‘earns enough for me to work part-time’ (lines 14-15); and having 
described her son as ‘happy’, ‘secure’, ‘educated’, ‘well looked after’ and ‘well 
fed’.  Coming here though, ‘I’m not going to justify myself’ functions to 
provisionally close what is otherwise an infinite, unwinnable debate and 
temporarily blocks actual or imagined interrogation.  But, the contestability that 
Amy has been working with is the very thing that prevents this closing becoming 
fixed and final.  It is this contestability which keeps speakers caught in this 
precarious, shifting, accountable, position of the succeeding/failing mother.  
5.5. Chapter summary  
So far, I have shown what a rich resource the interviews are for exploring 
consequential discursive action around taking up positions of success and failure, 
the identity work taking place, and some of the implications for subjects and 
subjectivity.  I have drawn on a range of resources developed in discourse analysis 
in psychology to work up an analysis which is attentive to the sequential 
interactions of the interviews, but crucially, is attempting to locate this analysis 
within larger semiotic social orders.  
I have argued that success and failure are not simple binary opposites 
where one, success, is untroubled, and the other, failure, is troubled.  Such an a 
priori assumption fails to grasp the moment to moment shifting and debated 
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identity work which is incorporated in talk of success and failure.   
The chapter has introduced some of the objects central to participants’ 
working up of constructions of success and failure.  These include family, 
enduring relationships, and managing a balance between paid work and family.  
Lucey (2009, in press), citing Budgeon and Roseneil (2004), says the dominance 
of theories of individualisation processes have led to some commentators 
‘questioning whether or not the very notion of families is even relevant anymore 
when thinking about the ways in which people construct self-identity’.  For the 
women in this study discourses of the family are pivotal to the way they work up 
passing identities.  This is mediated though by dilemmas of adequacy and 
sufficiency.  These dilemmas are temporarily resolved through recourse to 
multiple intersecting identities, intersections worked up in interactional practice. 
What this chapter has shown is that asking speakers about success and 
failure is not a route to accessing cognitions or beliefs.  Deploying concepts of 
success and failure is not a lexicographic task, but a social task.  It is one which is 
managed with attention to normative rules of practice.  It is a demand for a 
particularly precarious kind of identity work. 
It is fair to say the extracts show few, if any, surprises in what women 
mark out as their successes and failures.  But, this study does not set out to argue 
that we should be surprised by what women say counts as successful or failing.  
What it does set out to do is to argue for a particular way of understanding the 
complexity of the social actions inherent in the way these markers are constructed 
and deployed; what this says about how the discursive-psycho-social territory is 
constructed for and by women, the ideological dilemmas they encounter in 
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conversational interaction, the subject positions made available, or denied, the 
discursive resources available for managing those dilemmas and positions.  These 
are resources to utilise, but they reflect back on speakers and so require careful 
navigation.   
The next chapter continues all of these themes and styles of working, but 
turns attention now to the making of particular kinds of psychologised subjects:  
ones taking up discursive performances of modesty, agency, and emotional 
capitals.  
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Chapter 6. Psychologised and individualised selves 
This chapter continues the exploration of sites of success and failure begun in 
chapter 5 by examining two more: a material domain, and a psychological 
domain.  However, it connects these two domains through one of the central 
components of this thesis: an empirical illustration of the take up of 
psychologising and individualising discourses.   
This notion of ‘psychologising discourses’ refers to the way certain 
patterns in talk make available the concept of a subject with a particular kind of 
interiority of experience, possessing ‘feeling’ states and exercising particular 
kinds of psychological capital; the psycho-discursive subject (Wetherell, 2003; 
2007; Wetherell and Edley, 1999) of the psy-complex (Miller and Rose, 2008; 
Rose, 1996; 1999) presented in chapter 3.  
‘Individualising discourses’ refers to the take up of patterns which assert 
and reassert the subject as a private, personal self, and an agentic subject, ‘I’.  
Skeggs (2004) argued that enacting this autonomous, agentic, ‘choosing self’ is 
now a moral imperative, a cultural ‘order’ for those wanting to understand 
themselves and be understood as ‘successful subjects’ (see also Bauman, 2001; 
2005; 2007; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995).  Moreover, the individualised, 
psychologised, responsible self, is one who not only must choose, but must also 
‘bear in full the consequences of their choices’ (Bauman,  2007:4). 
These concepts of psychologisation and individualisation are typically 
worked up in psychological and sociological literatures  from different historical 
and intellectual trajectories (see chapter 3).  In this chapter I combine the two, not 
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to disguise these different intellectual origins, but to draw attention to the way 
these two concepts are interwoven in mundane talk.  When we look at how people 
talk, the business of ‘doing’ individualised selves – and individualised others – 
and of ‘doing’ psychologisation are utterly interwoven:  understanding the self as 
an individualised subject is, in this particular historical location, to talk of the self 
as having a boundaried, individuated being, a particular kind of acting, choosing 
self with an internal individuated and individuating psychological life.    
As I argued earlier, what is often missing from the grand debates of the 
contemporary subject is an empirical analysis of how these social theories of the 
successful psychologised, individualised, subject are taken up in constitutive 
discursive practices.  This chapter provides a substantive empirical analysis of 
these psychologising, individualising discourses as they appear in talk of success 
and failure.  It illustrates a deft nuancing in the way speakers mobilise resources 
and strategies as they work up contextualised ideological complexities and 
conflicts in this ‘neoliberal subject’. 
 Section 6.1. begins, perhaps somewhat surprisingly then, with the notion 
of material possessions as markers of success and failure.  In one sense material 
wealth could be understood as something quite different to any notion of 
‘psychologised’ states of success or failure.  However, I will be looking at some 
of the intricate social action that takes place when speakers negotiate the 
conflicting demands of working up identities in relation to material possessions.  
Wealth is managed with displays of modesty, and a privileging of feelings of 
sufficiency and security. In addition, a concern for material goods is marked out 
as a particular kind of psychological deficit. 
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 In sections 6.2. I briefly introduce two objects of psychological capital 
which appear particularly efficacious in constructing identities of success and 
resisting identities of failure.  They are a discourse of happiness and a discourse of 
choice and doing what one wants.  I show these resources in action throughout 
sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5.  However, participants also orientate to choice as a 
source of tension and trouble and I explore this in section 6.6. Participants 
question the ‘authenticity’ of contemporary choice; and I explore the constitution 
of the ‘bad (failing) subject’ and the ‘good (successful) subject’ through ideas of 
good and bad choice, and responsible and irresponsible citizenship. 
6.1. Material possessions: dilemmas of success, modesty, and 
deficit  
At face value material wealth in a Western context  might readily be understood 
as a form of success; and a counter story of poverty and economic hardship as a 
story of some sort of ‘failing’, either in a personal or collective sense.  However, 
there appears to be a dilemma to be negotiated in working up identities of success 
around material possessions.  On the one hand the imperative of contemporary 
sociopolitics is the conduct of a successful project of the self, one who provides 
materially for the self (Clarke, 2005).  On the other, this appears to intersect with 
a normative demand for modesty in claims to success.  Locke (2004) argued this 
in relation to athletes’ discussions of their sporting victories.  A similar orientation 
appears to be activated in talk of wealth and possessions, alongside a different 
kind of stricture against talk of desiring such goods.  Material success, or rather 
what gets worked up as material success, can threaten trouble if it is not well 
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negotiated.   
Maria was one of the few participants to openly express delight in her 
affluence; but even this was very carefully handled.  As this extract opens, Maria 
has been telling me that amongst other things financial success has allowed her to 
help her children.  She then adds: 
Extract 11. 
[16:12/62:34] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Maria erm (.) and it’s nice having a nice car to drive round [in 
Jean                                                                                     [yeah 
Maria and having a nice house and (.) if they’re symbols of success 
well then I love ’em 
Jean yeah 
Maria I enjoy them ((laughter)) 
Jean yeah 
Maria I think though (.) the thing is it’s nice to have the (.) it’s not a 
showy offy kind of success it’s knowing that (.) if I want things 
I can get them 
Jean mmm 
Maria and if if (.) if I- if we want to go on holiday we can and to me 
that’s successful because 
Jean mmm 
Maria we don’t have to scrabble about [for stuff 
Jean                                                     [yeah 
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17 Maria rather than swanking around 
 
Maria constructs a body of contemporary material capital in this exchange.  This 
begins with a nice car, a nice house, and later holidays.  Taking up this identity of 
material success is a position which appears to be managed with care.  This is first 
signposted by Maria’s comment ‘if they’re symbols of success’ (line 3).  This 
suggests caution about presenting these possessions as resolutely successful, and 
suggests some orientation to the possibility that others might challenge the notion 
of material goods in general, and these goods in particular, as measures of 
success.  However, there is no hesitancy about presenting them as a source of 
delight.  Strong feelings are attached here to having a nice car and nice house:  ‘I 
love ’em… I enjoy them’ (lines 4-6).  There is an exuberance in this.  This 
exuberance is quickly toned down though as Maria also enacts another kind of 
currency – a social currency of restraint.  The delight in material wealth gets 
refashioned as a form of confidence in economic security, ‘knowing that (.) if I 
want things I can get them’ (lines 9-10), not having ‘to scrabble about for stuff’ 
(line 15).  What is particularly interesting here is the way Maria’s claims to 
success are managed.  The house, cars, the holidays, are presented as not about 
‘swanking around’ (line 17).  Success is not to be flaunted, not ‘showy offy’ (line 
9).  So, even though Maria expresses a delight in these particular ‘symbols of 
success’, this material success is quickly re-positioned as a personal, private 
satisfaction, a security in not having to struggle to provide.  This is a more muted 
success, sensitive to intersubjectivity, to how ‘success’ and claims to success 
might appear to others.  It orientates to and reproduces a normative moral 
Chapter 6. Psychologised and individualised selves  
199 
sensibility to managing ‘success’ with discretion.   
 Material possessions appear to be difficult territory for claiming a 
successful identity.  Despite the fact that several participants appear visibly 
affluent, living in more expensive districts, driving expensive cars, talking of 
several holidays a year, and satisfaction in being mortgage-free, etc., most are 
inclined to distance themselves from any concern for wealth.  There appears to be 
a stricture at work against celebrating materiality and affluence.  Participants 
speak of material wealth usually in modest terms rather than grand ambitions; as 
‘sufficient for security’, rather than ‘excess’. 
Extract 12. 
[19:12/78:03] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Jean is (.) has money been important (.) or things 
Sheila  (unclear) god (.) money (.) to me (.) is security 
Jean right 
Sheila and if I was to win the lottery (.) after (.) making sure (.) that all 
my children (.) which I still think of as children even though 
they’ve grown up (.) after (unclear) for the rest of their lives and 
all my grandchildren (.) you know they like (.) pay for (.) make 
them secure (.) I’d still go and shop at Primark Jean  
Jean mm 
Sheila  I would (.) y’know (.) I can’t honestly see (.) what I’d need 
Jean yeah 
Sheila quite (.) I’m sure it must be very nice not to ever (.) but I don’t 
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14 
15 
have to worry about paying bills (.) between us we earn enough 
(.) so money is not important (.) in one sense (.) but it is (.) 
because everybody needs security don’t they y’know 
 
Money is important to Sheila as ‘security’ she says (line 2); to allow her to 
provide for her children and grandchildren, to ‘make them secure’ (lines 7-8) and 
indeed, this is constructed as an ordinary, normal, everyday concern: ‘everybody 
needs security don’t they’ (line 15). So, money is valued, but restricted in its 
value, not endorsed or enjoyed for its own sake; but for ‘security’.  
 The discourses Sheila recruits here are also directed to working up a more 
general position of restraint and contentment, an absence of greed or self-
indulgence.  More money would not change her, is her message here: ‘I’d still go 
and shop at Primark’ (line 8) (‘Primark’ is a high street clothing chain known for 
its low prices).  But, the argumentative texture shines through again.  Sheila also 
appears careful to avoid an extreme position, a piety perhaps, in her claims to not 
care for money.  She starts to say ‘I’m sure it must be very nice not to ever’ (line 
12), but then pauses.  Given what follows, it seems reasonable to imagine Sheila 
was about to say ‘not to ever worry about paying the bills’.  This appears to work 
as a concession; there is something Sheila would appreciate about money.  Then, 
Sheila stops herself and adds: ‘but I don’t have to worry about paying bills (.) 
between us we earn enough’ (lines 12-13).  This conjures up an identity here of 
‘material sufficiency’.  This kind of material sufficiency was the most common 
form of doing material success across the interviews.  It suggests an orientation to 
restraint; a problem with excess.  
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Here in this extract Sheila has worked hard with these dilemmas.  She has 
produced a finely tuned position of modesty, restraint, and discreet financial 
success, so exquisitely orientated to the nuances of positioning around claims to 
wealth, and problems of excess, whether that be excessive self-indulgence, 
excessive desires, or excessive self-denial of the comforts of having sufficient 
money to not have to worry about paying the bills.  This is a position of 
moderation.  
That talk of money might be treated in this circumspect way points to how 
troubled that talk can be in the way it reflects back on speakers. But, this is a 
trouble of ‘talk’; of the reflexive indexical consequences of speaking about 
wealth.  It appears to be quite different to ‘actual’ ownership.   
Extract 13. 
[20:49/124:46] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Paula Tom has got a really good job (.) but (.) we're not really (.) 
materialistic people (.) 
Jean mm 
Paula y’know (.) so (.) when we go to his (.) company dos and what 
not (.) I don't almost fit really ((laughs)) into it (.) because 
they’re all (.) business people who live in (.) houses like 
mansions and (.) y’know they've got all the designer [things and 
(.) 
Jean                                                                                       [yes 
Paula and that really isn't (.) isn't us because we don't (.) like (.) one 
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11 
12 
person I know he needs all those things (.) to make him feel 
good about himself 
 
This opening comment ‘Tom has got a really good job’ (line 1) sets up a position 
of wealth for Paula to inhabit, at the same time as she is about to mobilise a 
discourse claiming a disinterest in materialism.  This is just like the discursive 
strategy identified in the previous chapter, where considering alternative positions 
of mothering versus career effectively allowed the speaker to inhabit both.  Paula 
is simultaneously claiming wealth and claiming a disinterest in wealth, which she 
uses to construct a difference between her and her husband and his business 
colleagues.  
What is notable for me though about this particular extract is that the claim 
Paula makes about not being materialistic (lines 1-2) appears to be so at odds with 
the surroundings of our interview.  This interview took place at Paula’s home, 
memorable to me for its conspicuous affluence.  Paula had told me elsewhere in 
the interview about having grown up in a small two-up, two-down terraced house; 
and going to school with children of more wealthy families who lived on this 
same street where she now lived.  This street is in an expensive district of the city.  
Paula’s home appeared to have been recently renovated to a high standard 
throughout, with an expensive design style, ultra chic fittings and modern 
technologies in all the rooms I passed through.  There were also two new sports 
cars on the drive.  This is not intended to dispute a ‘truth’ in what Paula says 
about not being materialistic.  This study is not in the business of attempting to 
pin down ‘truths’ – an impossible goal for the epistemological and ontological 
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position underpinning the work.  Rather, I am trying to draw attention to some 
pressure to make certain discursive reproductions.  The pressure then, appears not 
to be directed at not having luxurious material goods but in constructing oneself 
as unaffected by material desires; constructing oneself as not ‘needing’ opulence.  
The final part of this extract is indicative of particular trouble. 
It is common across the corpus to position others who do show an interest 
in material possessions as lacking in some ‘psychological’ attribute.  Paula does 
this in extract 13 when she draws a contrast between her own case and someone 
she knows who, she says, ‘needs all those things (.) to make him feel good about 
himself’ (lines 11-12).  There are many similar versions of this across the 
interviews.  The interest in, or pursuit of material possessions is marked out as a 
psychological deficit.  
Generally across the interviews this is applied to others; participants rarely 
claim an inadequate psychology for themselves.  However, there is one exception.  
Sally, quoted below, was one of the few participants who expressed any 
desire for more material wealth; and she too makes sense of this desire by 
organising it around a similar discourse of psychologised lack.   
Extract 14. 
[11:23/124:45] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Sally I mean (.) I really pride myself in (.) y’know nice things [and (.)  
Jean                                                                                            [mm 
Sally strive (.) for more (.)   
Jean mm 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Sally and this is where the money comes into it you see (.) if I was 
[earning more (.)  
Jean [right 
Sally I could spend more (.) I could buy more expensive things (.) or 
whatever (.) they’re all material (.) things I think (.)  
Jean mm 
Sally but they're things that I I felt that (.) I lacked (.)  
Jean er like what 
Sally so (.) that was the thing (.) y’know because I didn't like myself 
that I don't think anybody else (.)  
Jean right 
Sally necessarily (.) would like me 
 
Sally implies, uniquely in these interviews, she would like to buy more expensive 
things: ‘if I was earning more … I could spend more (.) I could buy more 
expensive things’ (lines 5-8).  She appears to link this to not liking herself (line 
13) and an expectation that nobody else would like her either.  The connection 
Sally is drawing here is not entirely clear.  Immediately before this extract opens 
she had been talking about being unhappy with her weight.  This path through 
priding herself in nice things (line 1) and things she lacked (line 11) and not liking 
herself or being liked seems to imply that Sally is making sense of her experience 
by interpreting a desire for material possessions through a discourse of emotional 
difficulty.  Both Sally here, Paula above, and other participants throughout the 
interviews, organise an understanding of pleasure in, or need for, material 
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possessions around a story of psychological deficit.  Possessions are positioned as 
a substitution, a compensation for some form of ‘emotional’ lack.   
 To claim material wealth then, or an overt interest in material things, 
appears to risk being understood as showing off, or of advertising some other 
psychological trouble.  This is a great source of tension for subjects 
simultaneously alert to normative performances of modesty; to the need to 
navigate a route through suspicions that material goods are substitutes for 
psychological lack; and to manage this alongside contemporary cultural 
expectations of psychological, economic, embodied and material self-
improvement projects. 
6.2. Constructing psychological states of success 
So far I have shown how participants mark out a series of sites where they locate 
and construct objects, subjects, and identities of success and failure: family and 
career in chapter 5; and material possessions here.  I have also started to show that 
this site of the material incorporates discourses of psychologised territories of 
‘security’ and ‘compensation’.  Now I want to concentrate attention on this idea of 
a ‘psychology’ of success: the way speakers construct psychological states of 
success and failure and in so doing reproduce and reinforce an individualised 
psychologised subject.  I will be focusing on two repertoires running across the 
interviews.  The first is a discourse of ‘being happy’, powerful for the privileged, 
personalised knowledge it can constitute.  The second is a particularly versatile 
discourse of  choice:  having choice, making choice, and doing what one wants.  I 
understand both of these as discourses which contribute to the construction of 
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subjects who understand themselves to be ‘psychological’ subjects.  To speak of 
emotion or feelings such as ‘happiness’, is to reproduce the self as a subject with 
personal psychological states (Wetherell, 2003; 2007; Wetherell and Edley, 1999).  
I similarly read choice as a ‘psychologised’ notion because I see ‘choice’ as a 
discourse which also asserts an individual, thinking, feeling, aware, agentic 
subject, ‘I’.  To speak of a choosing subject reasserts an individualised, 
experiencing, ‘I’.  This explicit reading of discourses of psychologisation 
addresses one of the key questions I raised in chapter 3:  if psychologisation is a 
social process, what does it look like when subjects take up particular discourses 
and produce themselves as ‘psychologised’ selves? 
6.3. Being happy 
‘Being happy’ as a measure of success is a concept repeated frequently across the 
interviews and with remarkable similarity.  Typically it is constructed as a 
necessary condition for ‘success’.  This is illustrated in this extract from Sue who 
was interviewed with her friend Ruth: 
Extract 15. 
[09:23/104:40]  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Sue I think (.) really (.) success is (.) doing and being what makes 
you happy 
Jean mm 
Sue because I think if you’re not (.) then (.) there’s no success there 
is there (.) 
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Ruth no 
Sue it’s like you could- you  could win the lottery (.) and say ah 
look y’know brilliant (.) I’ve won the lottery y’know it’s really 
successful (.) materialistically (.) but (.) except at the end of the 
day (.) you can be the most unhappy person in the world and (.) 
to be unhappy you can’t be successful the two (.) two are 
opposites 
 
This extract begins with a clear statement of success: ‘doing and being what 
makes you happy’ (lines 1-2).  And, to make the point more persuasive Sue is able 
to mobilise an illustration:  ‘you could win the lottery (.) and say ….it’s really 
successful (.) materialistically (.) but (.) except at the end of the day (.) you can be 
the most unhappy person in the world’ (lines 7-10 ). ‘Happiness’ then, outweighs 
even extreme material ‘success’. In the definition worked up here, if one is 
unhappy, one cannot be successful.   
This extract again reproduces the ambivalences around wealth noted 
earlier.  This sequence of talk is another elegant illustration of the argumentative 
texture of talk conceptualised by Billig (1991; 1996).  On the one hand, money is 
marked out as a potential measure of success, and notably with no attached 
requirement for ‘earning’ it.  To simply possess wealth is its own form of success.  
On the other hand this material kind of success is played down and qualified; it is 
presented as having little value if it is absent of ‘happiness’.  
There is, though, no appearance of any pressure amongst any of the twenty 
four participants in this study to justify the prioritising of personal ‘happiness’.  
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Billig (1999a) has argued that attention to what is not said can be as analytically 
revealing as what is said.  I think this can be a difficult practice to implement in 
that the range of things ‘not said’ is infinite.  Wetherell’s route through this is to 
contrast the discourses in play with those that might be mobilised by different 
discursive communities (personal communication).  However, this concept of 
happiness and the way it is deployed here provides an alternative and valuable 
example of what Billig’s recommendation can offer.  Thinking about what is not 
required to be said in connection with ‘being happy’ provides some important 
insights into current dominant cultural orders.  There is no circumspection or 
precarious movement around claiming ‘happiness’.  There is a taken for granted 
quality about the reasonableness of mobilising a discourse of happiness.   
Above, Sue was talking about happiness.  Now, I want to show what it 
looks like to ‘inhabit’ this discourse of being happy.  Again, this absence of a 
defence of happiness is notable:  here though ‘happiness’ works in tandem with a 
second discourse, a discourse of choice.  I will be analysing the two together.   
Extract 16. 
[1:06/64:32] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Jean what does success mean (.) to you what do- what sorts of things 
does it conjure up 
Dot for me? 
Jean mm 
Dot  for me being successful is being happy (.) and (.) and there are 
lots of things that- (.) that (.) go into that 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Jean yeh 
Dot the most important thing in my life is my family 
Jean yeah 
Dot and if they’re (.) happy content and well (.) then I am (.) hh 
which begs the question of whether I think I’ve been a 
successful parent doesn’t it (.) and I suppose (.) for the most 
part I think I’ve been a reasonably successful parent in that I’ve 
got three (.) .hh well adjusted (.) kids 
Jean mm 
Dot who are (.) oh one’s in his twenties (.) one’s nearly twenty (.) 
one’s (.) approaching seventeen (.) and (.) they’ve not been in 
any trouble they’re (.) all doing (.) reasonably well in their lives 
Jean yeh 
Dot erm (.) then there’s (.) my marriage (.)  
Jean mm 
Dot well I’m just coming up to twenty seven years so (.) I have to 
class that as fairly successful 
Jean yeah 
Dot erm (.) my job? (.) my job is a new job (.) and I’m loving it and 
I really really enjoy (.) but it’s not a high powered job I’m just a 
clerical worker in a hospital (.) I’ve actually (.) specifically 
chosen that because (.) I’ve been self-employed for (.) fifteen (.) 
sixteen years 
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31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Jean mm 
Dot and I actually don’t want the responsibility any[more 
Jean                         [yeah 
Dot I’ve walked away from that 
Jean yeah 
Dot I’ve got into a job where (.) I come home at (.) half past four (.) 
and I don’t have (.) the responsibility hanging over me 
Jean mm 
Dot because I don’t want that any more (.)  
Jean mm 
Dot so this is ideal (.) and at the moment I can honestly say I’m (.) 
my life (.) in my life (.) generally (.) I’m the happiest now that 
I’ve been for a long long time 
 
I said at the start of chapter 5 that many discursive resources collapse together in 
the interactional moment.  Having teased out some of those resources there is now 
much familiar territory in this extract.  What is particularly interesting now, seeing 
them recombined, is examining how these discourses are taken up together as an 
identity, as a subjectivity, as a personalised individualised psychologisation.  
Dot begins by identifying success as happiness (line 5).  What constitutes 
that happiness for Dot is first her family and whether they are happy and content 
(lines 8 and 10), and what that says for her as a successful parent in that her 
children are ‘well-adjusted’, ‘not been in any trouble’, and ‘all doing (.) 
reasonably well in their lives’ (lines 11-18); then Dot’s marriage (line 20), 
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successful for having lasted twenty seven years; her job (line 25), successful for 
Dot in part because she is ‘loving it’, but also because she has ‘specifically 
chosen’ it (lines 27-28). 
 This account unfolds as if Dot is reproducing a kind of ‘checklist’ of 
subject positions where one might be evaluated on achievements; the list indeed 
that emerged in the last chapter as concerns shared amongst the women in this 
study.  But, what holds this account together, is this discourse of happiness, and a 
discourse of choice.   
Dot begins by setting out the criteria for judging her successes.  It is a 
personal, private measure – being happy.  Whether Dot ‘is’ happy would be 
difficult to challenge because Dot can mobilise a discursive resource of ‘insider 
knowledge’ here.  This makes any personalised claim to happiness a powerful 
resource.  But, it is not impossible to challenge it.  One can readily imagine the 
question ‘are you really happy?’ amongst, of course, many other possibilities.  
Dot’s account is effective though because she does not rely on simply claiming 
happiness to do all the work for her.  She is able to mobilise other discursive 
resources to work up a persuasive, elaborated, argument to back up that claim.  
Dot not only tells us that success is being happy; but she also says what goes in to 
that, her children’s happiness, her enduring marriage, her job of choice, and Dot is 
able to claim success in all of them, underpinned by this discourse of ‘happiness’.  
When Dot elaborates on what goes into happiness (lines 5-6) it works to 
legitimise both her claim to happiness and via happiness, to success.  But, while 
‘being happy’ is elaborated, it is not justified, or defended. The deployment of 
‘being happy’ as a self-evident marker of success appears to require no warranting 
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of itself.  What this suggests is that personal happiness is treated, here at least, as a 
legitimate goal, a legitimate end in its own right.  The pursuit and attainment of 
happiness is for the moment uncontested.  However, different resources mobilised 
by Dot do receive different levels of warranting and this is analytically useful. 
Dot positions herself, her interests, her investments centrally on her 
family. That this should be so passes without comment; like happiness, no 
justification is required.  This is taken as an entirely reasonable ‘given’, something 
akin to Ruth’s use of the discourses of naturalised order of ‘family first’ explored 
in the last chapter.  But, Dot does rhetorically raise a query about her own claims 
to success;  ‘whether I think I’ve been a successful parent’ (lines 11-12).  She 
deals with this in a fairly straightforward way:  she mobilises talk of  three ‘well 
adjusted (.) kids’ (line 14) who have ‘not been in any trouble they’re (.) all doing 
(.) reasonably well in their lives’ (lines 17-18).  No further accounting is needed; 
this is, quite literally, enough said.   
Dot’s ‘then there’s (.) my marriage’ (line 20) adds another dimension to 
her successful identity.  This requires even less warranting: ‘twenty seven years’ 
is treated as entirely persuasive in its own right – so much so that there is room for 
irony when Dot says ‘I have to class that as fairly successful’ (lines 22-23), an 
irony which works to emphasise further that a long marriage is an unquestioned 
success.  Indeed, the idea that a successful marriage is an enduring marriage is a 
familiar construction across the interviews.  Mel produced almost identical talk in 
extract 3 (see page 173).   
However, at this point in Dot’s account, things get a bit more complicated 
and this provides some important insights which are taken up in the next section.  
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6.4. Choice 
The focus moves now to a discourse of choice.  I am continuing to draw on 
extract 16 taken from my interview with Dot because her intricate weave of 
discursive resources is so interesting.  The patterns in the way this discourse of 
choice are used however, are not restricted to Dot but appear across the 
interviews. 
So far in this extract from my interview with Dot, constructions of success 
have passed muster with relatively little orientation to contest.  Dot has marked 
out family and marriage as sites for evaluating success, and has claimed them for 
herself as measures of her own success.  The clinching details have been delivered 
efficiently and with little preamble.  Dot moves on to speak of a ‘new job’.  
However, accounting for the new job, and fashioning this new job as a success 
receives much more work.  This additional work suggests some tensions around 
the claim Dot is making, and points to some strategies for managing that tension.   
The job is presented with an enthusiasm which works up its credentials as 
a success: ‘my job is a new job (.) and I’m loving it and I really really enjoy’ 
(lines 25-26).  The job is quickly worked up, in terms of a psychologised, feeling, 
self, as an outstanding success.  Dot is ‘loving it’ and she ‘really really enjoy[s]’ 
it.  But, this preamble also postpones delivery of more ambivalent details: ‘but it’s 
not a high powered job I’m just a clerical worker in a hospital’ (line 26-27).  ‘Just’ 
positions clerical work as low(er) status, in a similar vein to the way ‘just a 
housewife’ is a diminished position for Paula in extract 1 (see lines 142-151 on 
page 160, discussed on page 166).  The difference however, is that Dot mobilises 
a particular discursive resource to re-fashion this job ‘just a clerical worker’ as 
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something of much greater value, something she has chosen:  ‘I’ve actually (.) 
specifically chosen that’ (lines 27-28).  This presents the job as something 
desirable, something one would particularly want, and something Dot is in control 
of.  Speaking of choice, speaking as a choosing subject, is a readily available 
recognisable cultural ‘slot’ in this data.  Contemporary culture in Britain 
disciplines subjects to ‘understand’ themselves as having choice, even if and 
where that choice is heavily constrained or indeed illusory (Walkerdine, 2003; 
Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989).  Deploying the concept  in the way Dot does 
asserts and reproduces the ideological status of choice as a desirable object.  
However, making a choice brings its own accounting demands (Bauman, 2007; 
Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 1995; Clarke, 2005; Skeggs, 1997).  This 
low status ‘choice’ needs to be accounted for if it is to pass as a ‘good’ choice, a 
‘reasonable’ choice, a ‘successful’ choice.  Dot elaborates: this new job means a 
reduction in responsibility compared to the previous responsibilities of fifteen or 
sixteen years of self-employment (lines 28-36).  This is quite a charming sleight 
of hand.  At the same time that Dot describes her employment as a clerical 
worker, which she constructs as a low status job signified by her use of ‘just’, a 
job orientated to as not a success in its own right, she is also able to position 
herself as someone who could and indeed has held much higher status 
employment, having been independently successfully self-employed.  Dot may be 
a clerical worker now, but recruiting talk of previous responsibilities and self-
employment marks her out as in possession of additional competences. 
  Dot legitimises her choice with a discourse of ‘not wanting’ (lines 31 and 
38) – in this case, not wanting ‘the responsibility anymore’ (line 31).  Moreover, 
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Dot avoids being positioned as having ‘lost’ her self-employed status, or have it 
taken away from her.  Dot presents herself as in control of this change in status:  
‘I’ve walked away from that (line 33), ‘I don’t want that any more’ (line 38). 
Dot has drawn on a discourse of choice to legitimise her new job as a 
success, and has drawn on a discourse of wanting freedom from responsibility to 
legitimise that choice as a reasonable choice.  Finally, Dot returns to her starting 
point in this very efficient working up of a successful identity.  She is able to 
warrant her choice as the ‘right’ choice by weaving in again a discourse of 
happiness:  ‘so this is ideal (.) and at the moment I can honestly say I’m (.) my life 
(.) in my life (.) generally (.) I’m the happiest now that I’ve been for a long long 
time’ (lines 40-42). 
These two strategies, recruiting discourses of happiness and choice, have 
been very effective for working up an identity of success.  The ‘being happy’ 
discourse provides enormous flexibility and freedom for claiming success.  It 
allows ‘success’ to be separated from career accolades, economic goods, even the 
tensions and dilemmas of being a particular kind of parent, by reconfiguring it as 
a personal psychological measure.  It is a highly individualised kind of success, 
reproducing and reinforcing the supremacy of the ideological project of the self, 
and the practical social construction of a psychologised reflexive, feeling, 
experiencing, self.  ‘Happiness’ is constructed as a more ‘authentic’ form of 
success, or at least, a more meaningful form.  As Sue suggested earlier (extract 
15), material success is held in little consequence without psychological success. 
  Moreover, claiming happiness acts as a counter to propositions, imagined 
or actual, that one could be more materially wealthy, occupy a more senior 
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position in one’s career, be more attractive, be held in higher regard, and so on.  In 
other words, one might have made oneself to a higher specification in the 
neoliberal project of self production, but, if one is happy, then the absence of 
these other forms of success is mitigated.  These other forms of success, desirable 
as they might appear, can be held in check by countering them with a claim to 
happiness.  If one does not possess these other things, but one can claim 
happiness, the loss of these other objects to one’s credibility as a successful 
person is less damaging.   
In addition, claiming ‘happiness’ is a difficult claim for someone else to 
challenge. ‘Being happy’ is a personal evaluation.  And by personal I mean of 
course a socially constructed, socially shared discourse applied as a personal 
statement, as intimate ‘insider’ knowledge, and thereby privileged.  Being able to 
claim happiness is an effective strategy then in legitimising alternative and 
unconventional claims to being a successful person.  However, that this is so, also 
points to how thoroughly established it has become in contemporary culture that 
individual ‘happiness’ is received as a ‘good thing’. 
So too, claiming choice is both a powerful accounting resource and an 
identity practice.  Dot is not simply reporting abstract notions of ‘success’.  
Rather, there is an identity being worked up here for Dot to inhabit and what we 
see are not only some of the familiar cultural resources for doing this, mother, 
wife, worker, but also Dot ‘owning’ the credit; this success is worked up (at least 
in part) as her doing; the rewards of her ‘good’ choices.  
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6.5. Re-fashioning ‘failure’: ‘living the life one wants’  
Satisfying one’s choices, one’s wants, is an effective discourse for disrupting 
conventional expectations of a success and failure binary.  In this next extract 
from an interview with Nora, we can see how similar claims to making a choice 
can be deployed to fend off and re-fashion proffered identities of failure.  There 
are some close similarities between this extract and the last.  Both speakers are 
engaged in similar activity; Dot appeared to be orientating and responding to an 
unspoken, but potential query about the successful status of her new low paid, low 
responsibility job.  Nora below, is responding to a spoken suggestion (albeit 
tentative) that she had failed at her marriage.   
In this extract Nora has just explained that she initiated the divorce from 
her first husband.  As the interviewer, I begin to offer Nora the opportunity to 
frame this divorce as failure: after all, lengthy marriages have commonly been 
worked up as successes (extracts 3 and 16).  This is an available ‘inversion’, to 
borrow from Billig (1999a) and Kulick (2005).  However, my hesitation is clear 
(lines 7-8). 
Extract 17. 
[16:10/48:02] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Jean is that something that you (.) look back at and feel confident 
you did the right thing (.)  
Nora oh (I never had) no doubt (.)  
Jean yeah 
Nora absolutely never had a doubt about it (.) not (.) to this day (.) 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
absolutely not (.)  
Jean you don’t see it as (.) erm I’m not suggesting that you should 
but I am aware [that some people think it’s a (.) 
Nora                          [did I see it as failure (.) 
Jean yeah 
Nora no (.) because it didn’t work (.)  
Jean yeah 
Nora it didn’t work (.) y’know when you think you’re nineteen and 
twenty (.) it’s (.) very difficult to make anything work at that 
age and add a baby to it y’know you are in trouble (.) 
Jean mm (.) mm 
Nora so it’s y’know it’s just (.) you can’t (.) I don’t think you can 
ever (.) you can apportion blame (.) which I can (.) ((laughs)) 
but (.) at the end of the day (.) it didn’t work and it makes you a 
stronger pers- but it’s not what happens to your life (.) it’s what 
you do about it (.)  
Jean mm 
Nora if it makes you a stronger person that’s fine (.) y’know and it to 
me it made me a stronger person (.) and (I needed to decide) 
what I wanted to do in life and it wasn’t that 
 
Earlier analysis has already demonstrated a shared cultural repertoire of an 
enduring marriage as a taken for granted success.  Here, in a contrast case, Nora’s 
talk of a marriage ending is not however simply talk of failure. Instead, any 
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associations with failure are resisted.  But, the talk here indicates both Nora and I 
orientate to the possibility of divorce implicating her in failure, although we do it 
in different ways.  
For me, the interviewer, this is treated as a delicate moment reminiscent of 
the kind Silverman (1997) addresses.  My delivery in lines 7 and 8 is cautious.  I 
begin with ‘you don’t see it as (.)’.  I stop, hesitate, I backtrack and say ‘erm I’m 
not suggesting that you should’ – but of course that is precisely the query I am 
raising – should one see a divorce as failure?  So, I put some distance between 
myself and the question; I change my footing and I say ‘I am aware that some 
people think it’s a (.)…’ (line 8).  Notably I still do not deliver this delicate word 
– ‘failure’.  Nora though takes up the point more robustly on my behalf in line 9: 
‘did I see it as failure’ she says for me, and immediately rejects it; ‘no (.) because 
it didn’t work’ (line 11).  This is not delicate for Nora.  While a position of failure 
has been opened up here, albeit offered tentatively, Nora has been able to reject it 
decisively.  This makes an interesting contrast to the way Paula above reported her  
response to her teacher.  There, Paula ventriloquised an invitation to take up a 
position of failure and that invitation was taken up.  Paula says that her teacher 
‘saw that I’d a lot of potential … and I hadn't (.) met that potential so she thought 
(.) it was a waste that I'd wasted my life … and I thought (.) ºhave I have I wasted 
my life y’know (.) have I (.) perhaps I should’ve done somethingº’ (page 159, 
lines 127-132).  Here Paula is ‘trying on’ this position she has been offered, 
temporarily inhabiting it, testing out the interpellation to see if it fits, ‘have I 
wasted my life’.  Nora in contrast rejects adamantly my proffered position of 
‘failure’; and maintains that resistance by continuing to work to persuade me.  Her 
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strategies are worth attention.   
 The first is a simple outright rejection, ‘did I see it as failure… no’ (lines 
9-11).  Then, it gets more interesting.  It was not ‘failure’, ‘because it didn’t work’ 
(line 11).  Nora works up a contrast between the possibilities of the marriage as 
failure, and a marriage that ‘didn’t work’.  This is an interesting preference which 
speaks to pressures to resist positions of ‘failure’.   
 Next appears to be the beginnings of a strategy to avoid apportioning 
blame, ‘when you think you’re nineteen and twenty (.) it’s (.) very difficult to 
make anything work at that age and add a baby to it y’know you are in trouble’ 
(lines 13-15). This hints at exoneration of the individuals; the difficulties were 
ones of circumstance, inexperience of youth, and weight of responsibility.  And 
indeed Nora begins to suggest ‘you can’t… [apportion blame]’, but then changes 
direction and says instead ‘you can apportion blame (.) which I can’ (line 18).  
This change in direction allows Nora to deflect any personalised responsibility for 
the marriage not working. 
The next strategy is to recruit something of a homily on the virtue of 
working through ‘failures’ – or as Nora prefers to describe them, things that didn’t 
work:  ‘it didn’t work and it makes you a stronger pers- but it’s not what happens 
to your life (.) it’s what you do about it … if it makes you a stronger person that’s 
fine (.) y’know and it to me it made me a stronger person’ (lines 19-24).  Failure 
then can be re-inscribed as ‘strengthening’, as another form of success; a 
particularly moral success – one of ‘character’.  This is a particularly worrying 
strategy to me.  To re-inscribe the painful possibilities of life as ‘fine … if it 
makes you stronger’ is a powerful way of manoeuvring people into accepting, or 
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overlooking injustice, inequality, and exclusion.  It maintains its power because it 
can be deployed both by the ‘oppressor’ and the ‘oppressed’ as a means of 
configuring events, to make them appear more acceptable, more tolerable.   
The final strategy in this extract brings the analytic focus back to the 
notion of choice; to deploying talk of ‘what is wanted’:  ‘(I needed to decide) 
what I wanted to do in life and it wasn’t that’ (lines 24-25).  There is an implicit 
evaluation here that to have continued doing something one did not want to do 
would have been the failure.  To terminate it was success.  Deployed in this way, 
to cease doing what one does not want to do is another way of re-inscribing 
failure as success. 
This is hugely consequential in the ideological positions it reproduces.  
One can image that the notion of ‘doing things one does not want to do’ could 
have been framed in very different ways; doing what is right, what is moral, what 
is dutiful, what is better for someone else, and so on.  We can speculate that many 
other alternatives are available.  But this is the discourse in use.  As an available 
repertoire, as a means of legitimising actions, this discourse is extraordinarily 
powerful in encouraging an individualisation of the self, with a privileging of the 
self as a project to be prioritised.  It also appears to be widely available and 
contextually flexible.  Taylor and Littleton (2008) found a similar repertoire in 
their interviews with artists and designers who typically reported changing to art 
and design as a career because of the personal gratification it brought.  This was a 
‘good enough’ reason for entering and continuing a potentially precarious career.   
However, Nora’s narrative is also dialogically vulnerable.  Each point is 
readily challengeable in precisely the rhetorical, heteroglossic way Billig has 
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argued.  The success of the narrative is provisional and not quite fixable.  This is 
in part because the notion of ‘choice’ is a concept full of tensions for working up 
identities of success and failure.  Choice is not a benign concept, and I address 
this now.  
6.6. Whose choice? What choice? 
‘Choice’, having choice, making choice, is frequently aligned across the corpus 
with responsibility for making the right choice. Simply deploying a discourse of 
‘wanting’ works on some occasions; but not others. As a consequence it is a 
particularly mobile tool in working up and reproducing a range of troubled 
positions and moral orders.  The women in this study though are far from naïve in 
this; instead they appear alert to living out a politics of choice.   
‘Choice’ is deployed throughout the interviews as an intergenerational 
mark – an identificatory construct for marking social change between women now 
and constructions of women in previous eras.  Speakers all draw on this as a 
cultural imaginary – a representation of past subjects deployed to achieve a  
rhetorical task now.   
These two images in Figures 7 and 8 were presented together on one plate 
and so it is not surprising that direct contrasts would be made.  However, a 
discourse of intergenerational differences in choice appeared in a range of places 
across the interviews, not solely in response to these photographs.  It has wider 
relevance.  
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Figure 7.  A woman pours 
tea for her family, 1969. 
(Original Title: A Cup Of Tea. 1969.)  
Photo: Evening Standard/Getty 
Images.  Plate 3a in Appendix E(1).  
 
 
Figure 8.  A woman looks 
at a website on a kitchen 
laptop. (Original Title: Woman 
Looking at Website on Laptop in 
Kitchen. 2002.)  Photo: Photodisc 
Collection/ Getty Images) Plate 3b in 
Appendix E(1). 
 
Extract 18. 
[21:45/73:34] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Tess I guess the difference in (.) I mean there are obviously (.) so 
many differences but the difference in the amount of choice 
that's available (.) 
Jean mm 
Tess the simple choices that have to be made (.) erm (.) for for our 
woman on the right ((Figure 8: A woman looks at a website on 
a kitchen laptop)) (.) I think that's interesting 
Jean in what way 
Tess in that she probably had a choice about well she she probably 
has a choice about where she's going to work how she's going to 
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work how she's going to manage her time whether or not she 
chooses to be a mother (.) erm (.) how she chooses to run her 
relationships (.) who she chooses to have them with she 
probably has much more choice over all those issues than our 
nineteen (.) I'm amazed that's nineteen sixty nine (.) ‘cos it 
looks about (.) well (.) y’know it looks like twenty years earlier 
or whatever (.) erm  
Jean yes it does 
Tess is life is life (.) necessarily easier for having a lot more choice 
(.) I'm not sure that people necessarily think it is easier (.) 
Rachel ((unclear overlapping speech)) 
Tess ((unclear overlapping speech)) you know (.) making choices is 
not always comfortable 
Rachel mm 
Tess and (.) you know perhaps we've changed one set of chains for 
(.)  
Jean yeah 
Tess a less visible set of chains in the kind of choices that we have (.) 
I mean (.)  
 
Tess constructs the kinds of choices women must make today (and by default, the 
kinds of choices they may be judged against – I come back to this shortly).  It is 
also clear that choice is presented as problematic. Tess asks, ‘is life is life (.) 
necessarily easier for having a lot more choice (.) I'm not sure that people 
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necessarily think it is easier (.) … you know (.) making choices is not always 
comfortable’ (lines 19-23).  ‘Choice’, then, is potentially trouble.  In addition, 
choice is constructed as quite the opposite to freedom: ‘perhaps we've changed 
one set of chains for (.)  …  a less visible set of chains’ (lines 25-28).  
 In chapter 3 I presented an outline of the prevailing sociological argument 
that contemporary neoliberal practices compel subjects to take up certain choices 
in certain spheres of life (Clarke, 2005; 2006; Rose, 1996; 1999; Skeggs, 2004; 
2005; Walkerdine, 2003).  This is framed not as an actual ‘choice’ about being or 
becoming a choosing subject, but a compulsion to practices which make choice – 
decision-making – irresistible.  
In the light of all this I referred to the notion of choice as an ironic deceit 
given this compulsion.  But this is a deceit, or at least a tension, which participants 
appear to be rhetorically alert to.  In my data, running alongside a discourse of 
choice is a discourse of a compulsion to do everything – to not have choice.  
 This compulsion is laid out in this next extract from a paired interview 
with two participants Cheryl and Barbara.  Women are constructed here not as 
having more choices, but as having a bigger variety of demanding expectations 
laid upon them.  ‘Choice’ as a facet of contemporary life for women is over-
written here by notions of expectations and demands.  This extract reproduces a 
checklist of those expectations: 
Extract 19. 
[01:39/64:32] 
1 Cheryl women are always bombarded with (.) ideals of womanhood (.) 
Chapter 6. Psychologised and individualised selves  
226 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
 
14 
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and now (.) we’ve got to the stage we’ve gone through 
feminism (.) and got to the stage where (.) a woman has got to 
be (.) in a care::er (.) a woman has got to have (.) a really good 
ho::me (.) a woman has got to have (.) the requisite amount of 
children and they’ve got to be in a nursery and you’ve got to be 
going out with your husband to (.) back his (.) erm career up  
Jean yeah 
Cheryl and (.) so now (.) you (.) you’ve got to do everything so from (.) 
not having a career probably (.) now we’ve moved right through 
the century to having to have (.) everything (.) and be good at 
everything 
[… 12 seconds omitted] 
Cheryl yeah (.) you’ve got to look good you’ve got to be a good mother 
you’ve got to have a good career you’ve got to be able to do (.) 
everything 
 
This is both a summary of the cultural slots in which women understand 
themselves to be judged and a rejection of the idea that this might be understood 
as ‘choice’.  On the one hand there is an available discourse of choice which has 
been demonstrated to be a versatile tool for doing a range of identity work and for 
navigating a way through potential trouble.  Reynolds (2004) argued a similar 
point in her study of discourses of singleness.  And, not surprisingly, we can see it 
extends beyond relationship accounting to a wider sphere – much as the neoliberal 
narrative would imagine.  On the other hand we can see that people are not 
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passive dupes in this neoliberal story; they are able to question notions of choice, 
reinterpret this neoliberal discourse and re-work it, to resist the ‘authenticity’ of 
ascriptions to choice.  This is a much more nuanced understanding of the way 
subjects take up neoliberal discourses of choice than, for example, Walkerdine’s 
reading.  For Walkerdine, who is an important interlocutor here because of her 
commitment to exploring the discursive psychologisation of the subject 
(Walkerdine, 2003), the neoliberal subject is one who outwardly composes herself 
as the perfect Foucauldian subject through whom neoliberal discourse is spoken.  
In Walkerdine’s reading, the conflicts inherent in making a coherent and 
successful neoliberal subject are dealt with by this subject unconsciously, 
internally, and through a psychoanalytic depth (Walkerdine, 2003; Walkerdine 
and Bansel, 2009).  In contrast, what I am illustrating here is that the complexities, 
intricacies and conflicts of neoliberalism are worked up by speakers through a 
keen grasp of ideological dilemmas and contextualised argument. 
  I noted in chapter 3 that while ‘choice’ is a central construct of much 
contemporary discourse, who has the right to make choices, and what choices, is a 
contentious, moralised issue.  Skeggs (1997; 2005; Skeggs, Thumin and Wood, 
2008) has argued that representations of social class are marked by moralised 
hierarchies of taste, understood as ‘good choice’ and ‘bad choice’.  Clarke (2005) 
has argued that responsibilised citizenship is also marked out by ‘good choice’ 
and ‘bad choice’.  He says:  
 
New Labour’s ideal citizens are moralized, choice-making, self-directing 
subjects.  … choice is framed by sets of injunctions about reasonable 
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choices and responsible behaviour.  Responsible citizens make reasonable 
choices – and therefore ‘bad choices’ result from the wilfulness of 
irresponsible people, rather than the structural distribution of resources, 
capacities and opportunities.  (Clarke, 2005: 451)  
 
The argument is that speakers have been responsibilised into understanding 
certain organisations of choice as good and bad.  Here, I want to show what this 
organisation of ‘good choice’ ‘bad choice’ can look like.  This is a particularly 
telling extract because it comes from the same interview with Dot I drew on above 
in extract 16 to illustrate how effective a discourse of choice can be in warranting 
claims.  Again, these patterns are not unique to Dot, but the contrast with her 
previous use of choice is analytically very useful.  There, Dot was able to use 
‘choice’ to legitimise a claim to a successful work identity, and indeed to a 
successful self, and that included resisting something she no longer wanted: 
responsibility.  Choosing to walk away from responsibility was presented 
unquestionably as a choice she was free and able to make, and did make.  Here 
though, Dot works up a connection between choice and responsibility in a very 
different way: 
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Extract 20. 
[24:21/64:32] 
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Dot oh hate that (.) hate it ((Figure 
9.)) 
Jean really 
Dot absolutely loathe it  
Jean tell me what it is 
Dot I’m full of admiration in some 
ways for this lady 
Jean yeh 
Dot I’ve seen her on television (.) 
and (.) she (.) I’m (.) I (.) I’m 
full of admiration because of 
her determination (.) 
Jean mm  
Dot to (.) to be what she wants to be 
Jean mm 
Dot however (.) I do have this (.) strong (.) problem (.) really big 
problem at the moment (.) of (.) people taking responsibility for 
their actions (.) I mean in some ways I feel this lady doesn’t (.) 
Jean oh right 
Dot because she chose to have a baby when she couldn’t look after 
it 
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Figure 9.  Marble 
sculpture of Alison 
Lapper, by Marc Quinn, 
2005. (Original Title: 
Controversial Statue Unveiled In 
Trafalgar Square, 2005.) Photo by 
Scott Barbour/ Getty Images. 
Plate 23 in Appendix E(1). 
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Jean mm 
Dot and (.) expected (.) that (.) the state (.) should help her have her 
baby and look after it 
Jean mm 
Dot and I’ve got this thing (.) where (.) ((long breath out)) there are 
too many people in (.) our society (.) who (.) just expect other 
people to take (.) to look after them 
Jean yeah 
Dot it’s like y’know these people who have (.) three or four (.) 
children (.) with no (.) there’s nobody (.) no (.) no (.) main 
wage-earner in the family (.) and they live off the state and I 
object to it 
Jean mm 
Dot I do (.) bitterly object to it (.) and the one (.) one of the things 
that I (.) I frequently (.) have said to my children is (.) that you 
have to (.) be able to look after yourself (.) you have to be (.) 
prepared to take responsibility for your actions 
Jean mm 
Dot and whi- (.) on the one hand I can understand she wanted a 
child and she did everything that she could (.) to be (.) mum 
Jean yeh 
Dot but the fact is she couldn’t look after that child 
Jean mm (.) I- 
Dot and I sort of object in a way (.) to the rest of us having to pay 
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The opening to this extract surprised me in the apparent strength of feeling 
conveyed in response to the image of the statue of Alison Lapper:  ‘oh hate that (.) 
hate it… absolutely loath it’ (lines 1-4).11  I asked for clarification – ‘tell me what 
it is’ (line 5).  Dot’s reply, ‘I’m full of admiration in some ways for this lady’ 
(lines 6-7) begins by tempering her opening comments.  But, this is a qualified  
admiration placed in some tension with what Dot later calls her ‘strong (.) 
problem… of (.) people taking responsibility for their actions’ (lines 16-18).  Dot 
mobilises a set of discourses to work up an imagined Alison Lapper.  This 
imagined Alison Lapper is deployed as an exemplar of the cultural imaginary, the 
‘irresponsible subject’.  She is marked out as such because, in the construction 
Dot works up, ‘she chose to have a baby when she couldn’t look after it… and (.) 
expected (.) that (.) the state (.) should help her have her baby and look after it’ 
(lines 20-24).  The ‘state’ is later converted into ‘the rest of us having to pay’ (line 
45).  This subject can be positioned as irresponsible precisely because a discourse 
of choice is available, and her choice can be, and is, inflected as the wrong choice.   
Dot is able to mobilise a contrast case by working up an account of herself 
as a responsible citizen.  When Dot says ‘one of the things that I (.) I frequently (.) 
have said to my children is (.) that you have to (.) be able to look after yourself (.) 
you have to be (.) prepared to take responsibility for your actions’ (lines 35-38), 
                                               
11
 Alison Lapper is a British artist who studied at the Heatherley School of Fine Art and then 
graduated with first class honours from the University of Brighton. Her exhibitions include 
painting, photography, digital imaging and installation.  In 2003 she was a ‘Woman of the Year’ in 
Spain and was awarded an MBE in Britain for services to art.  She teaches seminars and 
workshops at various colleges and is a teacher/ member of the Mouth and Foot Painters 
Association and has been the subject of many national and international television and radio 
programmes and newspaper and magazine articles.  Source:   www.alisonlapper.com   
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Dot is doing a particular formation of a successful subject – the ‘responsible’ 
citizen, one who makes the right kind of choices and moreover one who is raising 
her children to be similarly good citizens.   
 Finally, by invoking ‘the rest of us’ Dot is able to dilute a risky appearance 
of purely self-interested concern and instead align herself and ‘us’ with a 
responsible citizenry who are being taken advantage of. 
 The Bakhtinian notion of the evaluative accent is clearly evident here in 
the ‘bad subject’, worked up through concepts of irresponsibility, and making 
unreasonable demands of the state and ‘the rest of us’.  What Dot is reproducing 
here is a dialogical, ideological, tension around who has a ‘right’ to choose and 
what might outweigh this ‘right’.  Having choice is constructed as morally 
conditional on making the right choice.  And the right choice is contingent.   
There is considerable parity here with the arguments Skeggs and Clarke 
made for example.  But there is something more nuanced in this account which is 
attentive to the ethnomethodological detail of what happens when subjects 
reproduce such ideological discourse as local interactional accounting.  Looking 
back at extract 16 (page 209) illuminates this claim.  There, Dot’s warrant for why 
her new job as ‘just a clerical worker’ (lines 26-27) was a success for her, was 
because as she explained, ‘I actually don’t want the responsibility anymore… I’ve 
walked away from that… I don’t have (.) the responsibility hanging over me…  
because I don’t want that any more’  (lines 31-38).   
Dot justifies her right to free herself from responsibility by calling on a 
narrative of having previously exercised responsibility, having ‘been self-
employed for (.) fifteen (.) sixteen years’ (lines 28-29).  This combination sets up 
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an implication that Dot has ‘earned the right’ to shelve responsibility and 
prioritise her individualised ‘wants’.  Any collective obligations – those she 
imposes on others, are constructed as having been fulfilled, at least for this 
interactional moment.  
There is something important here about the ideological tension between 
discourses of choice and discourses of responsibility.  Because both are so useful 
for challenging the other, they keep each other unresolved and fixed and in 
contest.  Subjects positioned by one are always vulnerable to the evaluative, 
positioning, accents of the other. 
6.7. Chapter summary 
As participants construct themselves as (usually) successful and (rarely) failing 
subjects, they are at the same time constructing themselves as living out particular 
kinds of individualised, psychologised selves, rich in the right emotional capitals 
and moral, relational, agentic, competences.  To manage claims of success and 
failure requires not only the right kinds of claims but the right kinds of 
management of claims: they must be handled with modesty and decorum.  
 The previous chapter considered some of those markers of success and 
failure which work across a relational domain, including family, lasting 
marriages, and the balance between paid work and family.  This chapter has added 
two more domains: the material and the psychological.   
Given the persuasive argument that there is a current cultural imperative to 
be a materially successful self (Clarke, 2005; Skeggs, 2004; 2005; Walkerdine, 
2003), material wealth – an outward, often visible, indicator of contemporary 
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success – is treated with perhaps surprising caution.  It is embraced by a restrained 
vocabulary of ‘security’, and more ostentatious or overt wealth is treated in talk 
with suspicion.  Wealth and material possessions are configured in some kind of 
relation with psychological deficit. 
At the same time, identities marked discursively by an absence of wealth 
can be fortified by claims to happiness.  ‘Happiness’ is discursive capital which 
can be employed to outrank other forms of success.  More than that though, 
contemporary success as it is constructed here, requires claims to happiness as a 
particular kind of psychological accomplishment for the successful subject. 
In addition this chapter has explored some of the consequential action for 
taking up a discourse of choice.  To assert a discourse of choice asserts an 
individualised, psychologised agent ‘I’.  Yet, at the same time, participants 
construct an ‘I’ far from free to choose, but one bounded by expectations and 
constrained to make the right choices. 
Throughout this study participants are engaged in precisely the rhetorical 
dilemmatic, argumentative, vulnerable, working up of their positions and their 
accounts and their claims just as Billig (1991; et. al., 1988) proposes they would 
be.  
In the process of recruiting different resources, making different 
interpretations, participants are interpellated into a range of shifting and 
provisional subject positions.  These shifts show an enormous amount about the 
complexity of contemporary identity making, and the challenge of presenting 
oneself as a whole, unified subject who may pass muster.  This notion of the 
subject who passes flows through my next chapter as I take up a discussion of 
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imagining successful and failing others. 
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Chapter 7. Imagining moral bodies: discourse and 
fantasy  
A central research aim for the thesis is to examine some of the heteroglossia of 
women’s lives: the many-voiced intertextualities out of which meaning-makings 
of success and failure are constructed. As part of this project I want to go beyond 
what women say about themselves, to explore also what women say about other 
women.  My assumption in this is that what women say about other women tells 
us something about the resources available for making sense of selves too.  So, 
this chapter is primarily concerned with how women speak about other women 
but later I also consider what this implies for the reflexive construction of selves 
and subjectivities. 
The data for this chapter are drawn primarily from those sections of the 
interviews which discuss the photo images of other women compiled for this 
study as a means of providing concrete examples of ‘others’ to seed discussion 
and elicit discursive resources (see Appendix E(1)).  I introduced the photographs 
by telling participants they might recognise some of the subjects as famous faces 
while others were unknown; I told participants there was a brief description on the 
reverse of each photograph; I then asked them to pull out and tell me about any of 
the photographs they found interesting in terms of how the photographs might 
relate to participants’ ideas of success and failure and what a successful life looks 
like.  Participants were free to work with the photographs in any order or 
combination and any number.  Consequently sequences differed across the 
interviews.  I will be arguing that the data supporting my analysis is not just an 
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artefact of this visual method, however.  I will be demonstrating that this process 
of constructing imaginary others runs throughout the talk in these interviews and 
is embedded in the culturally shared resources available for making sense of 
selves and others and peopled worlds.   
  I will be interpreting the discursive construction of others through the 
notions of imagination, fantasy and projection.  However, I am using these terms 
as practices of language, and not in their perhaps more familiar orientation as 
unconscious psychoanalytic defences.  I will be arguing that the phenomenon of 
imagining others is a thoroughly social and discursive process. Projecting 
concerns, interests and investments onto others, is a discursive process which is 
accomplished through the mobilisation of intersecting interpretative repertoires, 
ideological dilemmas and subject positions in the rhetorical to and fro of sense-
making.   
I begin in 7.2 by illustrating the pervasive and evaluative orientation to 
‘appearance’ which runs through talk in response to my questions about 
successful and failing others, particularly as that refers to participants’ talk about 
women celebrities, and their focus on the body and appearance as a site of moral 
organisation and constructions of idealised femininity.  I will be exploring moral 
order in talk of others,  what ‘getting it right’, and ‘getting it wrong’, looks like.  I 
will point in passing to how participant commentaries and evaluations of these 
others are elaborated and legitimated through the themes covered in chapter 5 and 
6, particularly in the way psychological states are imagined, such as happiness, for 
example.  Moreover, I will be suggesting that what organises these divisions into 
successful and failing others is a hierarchy of classifications into who is a valued, 
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worthy, respectable woman, and who is not. 
In section 7.3 I turn to the issue of personal order in the way others are 
imagined.  Having argued that the accomplishment of imagining others is built in 
to socially shared resources and cultural investments, here I will be illustrating 
that the way biographies and investments are imagined is also deeply rooted in 
personal history and sedimenting patterns of discursive investments.   
 The final section, 7.4, summarises the analytic lenses drawn on here from 
resources developed in discourse studies in social psychology.  Imagining and 
fantasising others is interpreted not as some unconscious, hidden, ego-directing 
defence mechanisms directing behaviours as a psychoanalytic psychosocial might 
suggest, but rather as mobilisations of sedimented reflexive intersecting discursive 
practices.    
7.1. Imagining moral beauty: getting it right, getting it wrong 
There appeared to be a pervasive and evaluative orientation to appearance running 
across the interviews. I was not surprised that appearance was a topic for 
discussion when participants were asked to turn their ‘gaze’ to photo images of 
others.  But, I was surprised at the similarities in constructions across the 
interviews, both in terms of which of the women in the photographs are 
constructed as ‘getting it right’ and which are constructed as ‘getting it wrong’.  
‘Getting it right’ and ‘getting it wrong’ are my interpretative terms, but I think the 
argument here supports their use. 
7.1.1. Getting it right 
The two images in Figure 10, Nigella Lawson, and Figure 11, Joanna Lumley, 
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were routinely pulled out as women ‘getting it right’.  
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Figure 10.  Nigella Lawson, 
cookery author and presenter, 
2003. (Original Title: The Saatchi Gallery 
Opening Party 2003) Photo by John 
Li/Getty Images. Plate 26 in Appendix 
E(1). 
 Figure 11.  Joanna Lumley, actress, 2005. 
(Original Title: Sea Princess.)  Photo by Chris 
Jackson/Getty Images. Plate 1 in Appendix  E(1). 
 
Extract 21. 
[73:05/113:11] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Gail Nigella Lawson I think is is is actually very beautiful I think 
she’s erm (.) probably the most beautiful er (.) woman on tv and 
I admire her quite a bit I think she’s erm (.) y’know just erm (.) 
looks right (unclear word) (.) y’know I always think everybody 
would like to look like Nigella Lawson 
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Extract 22. 
[57:26/67.37] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Mel oh well she’s got it all hasn’t she (.) ha (.) she is very attractive 
(.) that’s that (.) erm she’s a cook isn’t she 
Jean         that’s right yes 
Mel yeah (.) she’s attractive and she can cook she must be 
everybody’s dream  
 
The woman represented in Figure 10, Nigella Lawson, is a public figure known 
particularly for her television programmes on home-cooking. She is unequivocally 
presented throughout these interviews as ‘beautiful’: and for some speakers, 
‘probably the most beautiful er (.) woman on tv’ (extract 21, line 2).  Moreover, 
her appearance is something that passes moral assessment. She is someone to 
‘admire’ (extract 21, line 3).  In extract 22 she is presented as someone who has 
‘got it all’ (line 1); she is ‘everybody’s dream’ (line 5) of the perfect woman.  
Indeed, there are hints here that her looks and her food are everything a women 
needs to be successful – although this latter comment could suggest some irony.   
It also draws attention to something intriguing and complex about the way 
both participants, Gail and Mel, invoke ‘everybody’ (extract 21 line 4, and extract 
22 line 5).  It seems clear enough that when Gail suggests ‘everybody would like 
to look like Nigella Lawson’ (lines 4-5) she does not mean all people – women 
and men.  It seems more likely she is indexing ‘women’ and probably some 
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particular group of women.  It is obviously not possible to say who, but the 
ambiguity of ‘everybody’ is apparent. 
In extract 22 Mel invokes ‘everybody’ in quite a different way.  Mel 
suggested Nigella Lawson was ‘attractive and she can cook she must be 
everybody’s dream’ (lines 4-5).  This raises a question about whose version of the 
idealised woman Mel is reproducing.  Appearance and cooking are not prioritised 
in the data underpinning the previous two chapters where women construct 
notions of success and failure.  I am not suggesting that this means my 
participants have no regard for either of these objects, simply because they are 
discussed little (although this conundrum is an important topic for another place).  
What I am suggesting is that this version here of the woman that has ‘got it all’ is 
quite different to the versions constructed in the previous two chapters.  One 
possibility is that Mel is imagining Nigella Lawson as every man’s dream. 
In these two extracts then, Nigella Lawson is imagined as someone women 
want to look like, and imagined as what men want in the perfect woman.  In 
addition, both speakers ‘imaginings’ are projected onto others who are also 
constructed in a particular way.  
One of the features that unites these two extracts is the notion that women 
understand appearance to be something which carries capital, and according to 
which women will be evaluated as succeeding or failing.  Also marked out as 
‘getting it right’ is the British actress, Joanna Lumley (Figure 11).  Participants 
call on a wider but remarkably consistent repertoire as they construct this figure.   
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Extract 23. 
[49.03/67.37] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Mel I like her (.) she doesn’t take herself too seriously (.) Joanna 
Lumley (.) she’s got a sense of humour (.)  
Jean         yeah 
Mel          and look she’s got wrinkles (.)  
Jean         yeah 
Mel          and she’s still beautiful (.)  
Jean         yeah 
Mel          I like her (.) I think she’s smashing 
 
Extract 24. 
[09.59/89.07] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Cheryl I was going to say (.) to me she would be (.) a successful 
woman because she’s so (.) unaffected by her beauty and she’s 
so unaffected by her career (.) and she I know she’s a 
grandmother (.) and she’s just so (.) serene 
Jean yes 
Cheryl and [I think 
Barbara        [and feminine as well 
Cheryl yes she’s serene feminine and she’s unaffected by (.) media (.) 
and celebrity (.) and (.) she has succeeded in what she does (.) 
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10 
11 
12 
as an as an actress (.) and and as a woman really and she’s (.)  
Barbara yeah (.) yeah you’re right (.) and she she’s got a good sense of 
humour she can laugh at herself 
 
Again, when the women in this study talk about Joanna Lumley, she is 
regularly constructed as beautiful, but this is only part of her evaluation and it is 
routinely combined with other qualities. This time a multiplicity of sites of 
success familiar from chapters 5 and 6 are mobilised, and this particular woman is 
presented as successful in them all: beauty, career, family (she is a grandmother), 
and moreover, she is accredited with the right psychological dispositions to 
accompany this; she manages her success in these arenas well, she is ‘unaffected’ 
‘serene’, and she has ‘a good sense of humour she can laugh at herself’ (line 11-
12).  She is ‘feminine’; she has ‘succeeded… as a woman’ (lines 9-10).  
Beauty is evaluative here; but it is not explicitly marked out by 
participants as success though, so I want to explain why I am treating it as such.  
Firstly, I ask about success and failure; what I get in reply are descriptions of 
appearance and so it seems clear that appearance is amongst participant 
orientations for addressing success for women.   
In addition, Cheryl’s construction of Joanna Lumley being ‘unaffected’ 
(line 3) by her beauty is reminiscent of the normative rule of ‘modesty’ and not 
‘showing off’ discussed in chapter 6.  That Joanna is praised for not being 
affected by her beauty suggests she is understood as possessing something of 
value in this ‘beauty’, something which other women might manage with less 
decorous disposition, thus making it all the more successful for this figure, 
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Joanna. 
 It is noticeable that throughout the interviews constructions of ‘beauty’ 
rarely appear to be directly aligned with any negative positioning.  The notion of 
‘beauty’ is frequently treated as self-explanatory and is rarely elaborated by 
participants.  It often appears in a list of apparently admirable qualities as in 
extract 24 above, and, because of this and the way it generally appears to require 
little or no clarification there it appears to be orientated to as self-evidently 
‘good’.   
However, beauty is not entirely trouble free.  This is a response to a 
collage of photographs of Elizabeth Taylor (see plate 10, Appendix E(1)). 
Extract 25. 
[34:10/67:37] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Mel she were really beautiful weren’t she  
Jean yeah Liz Taylor yeah 
Mel just naturally (.) [beautiful 
Jean                            [yeah 
Mel sadly however (.) they never know when to let it go (.) do they 
(.) ((laughter)) why don’t they just grow old gracefully 
This constructs a right way, and a wrong, to manage one’s ‘aging’ beauty - 
gracefully.  Joanna Lumley was constructed as getting this right too.  Mel 
commented above, ‘look she’s got wrinkles … and she’s still beautiful’ (extract 
23, lines 4-6).  There is a reminder however, that this must be managed well.  In 
this next extract we see the way Joanna Lumley’s management of her looks is 
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subject to considerable scrutiny.   
Extract 26. 
[46:25/78:03] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Sheila my (.) nephew (.) who used to work at the BBC (.) says she (.) 
looks (.) so dreadful without her makeup on you wouldn’t 
recognise her (.) and I can never look at her now without 
thinking about that (.) because she always seems to come across 
as s::o (.) glamorous 
Jean mm (.) yeah I would have said yeah 
Sheila er if she (.) and if she’s (on a show) you should see her first 
thing in the morning you wouldn’t say that 
 
Someone constructed so positively is also manoeuvrable into a diminished 
position – one on the point of failure.  Even here, success can quickly be made 
precarious.   
7.1.2. Getting it wrong 
Plate 17 in the collection (Appendix E(1)), reproduced in Figures 12 and 13, 
showed two photographs of Victoria Beckham.  Victoria Beckham earned 
international celebrity status and enormous financial rewards during the 1990s as 
a member of an all female popular music group the Spice Girls.  She earned even 
more notoriety after her marriage to David Beckham the England footballer, and 
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Figure 12.  Duchess of York (left) 
and Victoria Beckham (right), 
1999.  (Original title: The Duchess of York 
and Victoria Beckham backstage at Earls 
Court.) Photo by Dave Hogan/Getty Images. 
Plate 17a in Appendix E(1). 
 Figure 13.  Naomi Campbell (left) and 
Victoria Beckham (right) 2003. (Original 
title: Naomi Campbell (left) and Victoria Beckham 
pose for pictures at the Costume Institute’s Spring 
2003 ‘Goddess’ exhibition and Gala at the 
Metropolitan Museum New York, 2003.) Photo: 
Laura Cavanaugh ©UPI/Image Collection (EBSCO). 
Plate 17b in Appendix E(1). 
 
for their lifestyle and business ventures.  Victoria Beckham rarely appears to 
receive favourable press in the British media. Therefore I had anticipated she 
might be an interesting and contentious figure here, but I had not anticipated how 
consistently unforgiving the judgements would appear, to me, to be.  She was 
described as ‘vacuous’, ‘talentless’, and ‘the big I am’.  Talk of her size was a 
common theme.  She was described as ‘skinny’, a ‘stick insect’, and parodied as 
saying ‘look at me I only eat six raisins a day aren’t I great’. The disapproval  
seems palpable.  There were occasional moments of perhaps a more sympathetic 
approach; but these were short lived.  This extract from the interview with Mel is 
fairly typical.  
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Extract 27. 
[51:09/67:37] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Mel Victoria Beckham I think she’s just weird (.) but I think she’s 
probably extremely unhappy (.) that lass (.) because she’s 
married to David Beckham (.) and I think she’s very insecure (.) 
I think she’s terrified of losing him 
Jean mm 
Mel but that’s just me 
Jean yeah (.) 
Mel and I (.) I think she’s strange looking (.) to be honest (.) I mean 
what on earth is that get up 
Jean yeah (.) it’s kind of looks like a cross between a (.) negligee 
[and (.) yeah and a camisole and (.) yeah    
Mel [backwards (.) yeah look at me look at me (.) and she’s got that 
snooty look on her face  
Jean her face has changed quite (.) a bit over the years hasn’t it 
because this one’s quite a bit earlier ((Figure 12)) 
Mel yeah (.) yeah (.) she’s almost normal there (.) but she was 
always strange even when she was normal (.) spring ninety-nine 
so yeah four years on (.) four years on and we’ve got a complete 
change 
Jean yeah 
Mel see (.) I don’t know how people can do that because (.) that 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
obviously was her ((Figure 12)) 
Jean         yeah 
Mel how has she got to that (.) ((Figure 13)) 
Jean yeah 
Mel does she feel comfortable with that (.) or is that all an act and if 
it’s an act (.) how can you keep doing that 
 
In Mel’s description, typical of all the interviews, Victoria Beckham is presented 
as getting the look wrong, and getting the psychology wrong.  She is said to be 
‘strange’ (line 8), have a ‘snooty look’ (line 13), indeed, to have always been 
‘strange even when she was normal’ (line 16).  Moreover, she is imagined to be 
‘unhappy’ (line 2), ‘insecure’ (line 3), ‘terrified’ (line 4), and any feelings of 
being ‘comfortable’ she might have are queried as ‘all an act’ (line 26).  Victoria 
appears to fail all the implicit and explicit tests of successful womanhood, and she 
is thoroughly disapproved.   
 It is interesting to see that this disapproval is vindicated by speakers 
through recourse to one of the central warranting discourses of success from the 
previous chapter: happiness.  Victoria is held to ‘fail’, because she is routinely 
imagined to be ‘unhappy’ (line 2) and ‘insecure’ (line 3). 
‘Imagining’ this other as ‘unhappy’ and ‘insecure’ is a fascinating way of 
castigating someone without appearing to be wanton about it:  one can disapprove 
of and denounce a person, and inoculate that criticism with talk of that person’s 
‘unhappiness’.  Constructing someone as caught up in such a failing psychology 
helps to inoculate a speaker against a charge of envy, for example.  This is still a 
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speculative argument for me.  It may be this particular ‘imaginary’ unhappiness 
does carry strategic reflexive function in this way, but I am uncertain. There are 
other alternatives. 
There is something of a moral panic (Thompson, 1998) around discussions 
of Victoria Beckham.  In this data this seems to centre on her appearance being 
imagined as a bad role model for girls. Dot’s comments in the next extract reflect 
several made during the interviews.  
Extract 28. 
[38:25/64:32] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Dot pretty much everything about her (.) er (.) I don’t like (.) I don’t 
like what she stands for (.) and (.) and I suspect she’s an 
incredibly insecure woman 
Jean mm 
Dot erm (.) but (.) I I don’t like what she represents I don’t like what 
she stands for and I don’t want anybody like Victoria Beckham 
(.) to be a role model for my daughter 
Jean yes 
Dot because (.) because to look like that for most people is 
unrealistic 
Jean yeh (.) yeah  
Dot and she (.) she (.) she may have a lot of money and (.) y’know 
and fame and all the rest of it but (.) I wonder if she’s happy 
Jean mm 
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15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Dot [I do wonder if she’s ha- 
Jean [who would you pick as a role model (.) do you think (.) what 
would be the sort of person that you would like 
Dot er (.) you’ve got one in here (.) erm (.) what’s her name (.) 
Nigella [Lawson 
Jean                  [Nigella (.) yeah 
Dot she makes me laugh (.) now there’s a confident lady who’s (.) 
she’s not (.) she’s not tiny (.) she’s not slim (.) she’s (.) she’s a 
nice chunky lady (.) lots of curves 
 
Size, then, is made a moral issue here. Nigella Lawson, who was seen above 
constructed as ‘getting it right’ is positioned as a good role model – for her 
confidence, but also for being ‘not tiny… not slim’ (line 22), and being instead ‘a 
nice chunky lady (.) lots of curves’ (lines 22-23).  Victoria Beckham is disparaged 
for her psychology and her look: ‘I don’t want anybody like Victoria Beckham (.) 
to be a role model for my daughter… because to look like that for most people is 
unrealistic… and she (.) she (.) she may have a lot of money and (.) y’know and 
fame and all the rest of it but (.) I wonder if she’s happy’ (lines 6-13).  
This suggestion that Victoria Beckham’s look is an unrealistic aim is 
interesting.  At the start of this extract Dot is unequivocal in her condemnation.  
She says: ‘pretty much everything about her (.) er (.) I don’t like (.) I don’t like 
what she stands for (.) and (.) and I suspect she’s an incredibly insecure woman … 
erm (.) but (.) I I don’t like what she represents I don’t like what she stands for 
and I don’t want anybody like Victoria Beckham (.) to be a role model for my 
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daughter’ (lines 1-7).   
There is no weighing of imagined positive and negative qualities.  This is a 
fairly one-sided presentation. This is quite a stark position for Dot to take up.  Her 
next comment, to speak of what is realistic or not as a goal for others, does not 
counter the initial condemnation; but it does work to shift Dot’s own stance from 
something that might appear overly critical and perhaps personally hostile, and 
realign her judgements as more fair and reasonable.  This is now less of a personal 
critique, and more of an impersonal practical observation.   
Similarly, when Dot queries Victoria’s happiness (line 13) her comment 
mimics that from the interview with Mel quoted in the previous extract (27): ‘I 
think she’s just weird (.) but I think she’s probably extremely unhappy’ (lines 1-
2).  Both appear to function in a similar way.  To position this ‘failing’ figure as 
unhappy discourages suggestions that a speaker might be jealous, or mean-
spirited.  
Dot contrasts Victoria Beckham’s imagined insecurity and unhappiness 
with Nigella Lawson: ‘now there’s a confident lady’ (line 21).  Again we can see 
the now familiar patterns which suggest that marking out success and failure calls 
on concepts of having the right psychological, emotional, capital.  Nevertheless, it 
is notable that it is also the ‘body’, its size and shape, around which much of the 
comparison between Nigella Lawson and Victoria Beckham takes place.  But, 
there is a suggestion that the ‘body’ is standing in for something else here. 
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Looking across the set of 
interviews, suggests very strongly 
that being of such slim proportions is 
not inevitably disapproved in these 
interviews. The actress Audrey 
Hepburn for example (Figure 14) is 
lauded across the corpus; consistently 
described as ‘gorgeous’, ‘lovely’, 
‘delicate’, and ‘dainty’.  These 
extracts are typical.   
 
Extract 29. 
[58:13/67:37] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Mel oh (.) oh she was beautiful (.)  
Jean         yeah I think so 
Mel          absolutely beautiful     
Jean and is just so elegant 
Mel gorgeous (.) yes she was lovely and so delicate 
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Figure 14.  Audrey Hepburn, actress 
(1929-1993). (Original Title: Portrait Of 
Audrey Hepburn, 1960) Photo: Pictorial 
Parade/Getty Images. Plate 21a in Appendix E(1). 
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Extract 30. 
[45:23/78:03] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Sheila I just thought she was gorgeous (.) y‘know (.) all the things I 
wasn’t 
Jean would you have liked to have been like that? 
Sheila don’t think I’ve ever thought (.) no (.) 
Jean         mm 
Sheila not really (.) but (.) she was so dainty and delicate and pretty 
and (.) yeah 
 
So, some women can pass muster when they are ‘small’; some women cannot. 
What the comparisons between ‘passing’ constructions of Audrey Hepburn and 
‘failing to pass’ constructions of Victoria Beckham show, is that ‘failing’ in this 
way is a complex intersecting weave.  There appears to be something here about 
accountability: Victoria Beckham is being held morally responsible for her body.  
Implicitly, her own ‘life project’ is found wanting in the choices she makes.  For 
the speakers here, it appears Victoria Beckham quite simply gets it wrong.  In 
contrast, Nigella Lawson, Joanna Lumley, and Audrey Hepburn are particular 
kinds of subjects, constructed and reconstructed, produced and reproduced as 
getting it right.   
 The pattern on display here bears considerable similarity with the Skeggs’ 
account of ethic and aesthetic in representations of class (Skeggs, 1997; 2004; 
2005; 2008).  Both Skeggs’ data and mine here suggests a similar concern 
amongst speakers about who passes in the hierarchy of social capital, and who 
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fails; who is valued, and who is not. 
 For Skeggs this is understood through social class and the failing symbolic 
capital of the British working class woman in comparison to the values and 
capitals worked up she finds in middle class representations of self and (working 
class) others (Skeggs, 2005).  In my data too it seems clear there is a process of 
classification taking place: but what kind of classification? 
One could borrow from Skeggs to argue that this division could be 
organised along conventional class lines as a story of middle class ‘ownership’ of 
good taste, and working class pre-occupations with what is ‘respectable’.  For 
example, both Nigella Lawson and Joanna Lumley have impeccable upper middle 
class credentials.  Nigella Lawson is the daughter of Nigel Lawson, a former 
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer 1983 – 1989, and Vanessa Salmon, 
heiress to the Lyons Corner House business empire.12  Joanna Lumley was born in 
India in 1946, the daughter of a British Army major who was the fourth 
generation to serve in India with all the privilege of an important military family 
living a colonial life.13  Victoria Beckham, also known by her Spice Girls 
pseudonym, Posh Spice, also came from a wealthy family, the daughter of an 
electronics engineer who founded his own successful business.14  The difference 
then is not quite a conventional middle class/working class divide, but there is a 
sense of the arriviste (McRobbie, 2004) in the Beckhams’ success, an old-
money/old-family and new-money/new-family distinction, an ‘authentic’ middle 
class versus, perhaps, a transitional class.   
                                               
12
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1336420.stm 
13
 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/features/3633679/Family-detective-Joanna-Lumley.html  
14
  www.imdb.com/name/nm0065751/bio 
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However; this is not made explicit in the talk.  I am keen to avoid any 
sense of reification of class here – although I am perilously close. The point I 
want to take from sociological literatures is that the semiotics of class and 
classification are constructed and reconstructed in practices; and the practices of 
‘classification’ appear to be on move – as one would predict in the changing 
economic structures of a post-industrial society (Oesch, 2006).   
 I am very reluctant therefore to deploy uncritically these labels of 
‘working class’ and ‘middle class’.  However, Skeggs makes a powerful and 
persuasive argument from her own data that speakers routinely divide subjects 
into a moral hierarchy of those exercising ‘good taste’ and those exercising ‘poor 
taste’ and ‘poor choice’; and that is apparent in my data too. 
 What this section has shown is that the process of imagining others as 
certain kinds of subjects is built in to the shared discursive resources for making 
sense of others, and for what constitutes the passing, that is successful, or the 
wanting, that is failing, subject.  It has also suggested there are clear comparisons 
here with Skeggs’ findings on the pervasive concern with exercising good taste 
and good choice.  What I want to show in the next section however is that this 
process of constructing imaginary, fantasy, others, is not simply a matter of 
socially shared meanings; nor indeed simply a product or producer of particular 
hierarchies of class capital and moral order.  What gets imagined of the other is 
also deeply rooted in the personal history and personal orders and investments of 
the one doing the imagining. 
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7.2. Personal order investments in the fantastic other 
What I want to show in this section is that what gets imagined of others is not 
simply a matter of circulating discursive resources, with one speaker after another 
passively repeating them as if they are nothing more than a particular kind of 
currency passed from one mouth to another.  This is a recognisable criticism made 
of discursive studies in psychology; and in this section I want to illustrate that it is 
one for which a particular kind of discourse analysis in psychology has an 
emphatic rejoinder (Taylor, 2006).  What gets picked up by a speaker is mediated 
through personal history and personal order; and these are enacted discursively.   
Throughout the empirical chapters in this thesis I have been arguing for 
and demonstrating an analytic approach which follows Wetherell (1998; 2005a) 
and Billig (1999b; 1999c), and is both attentive to the sequential interaction of 
talk but is also attentive to the location of particular patterns of talk in bigger 
cultural resources.  The underpinning argument for requiring this multiple focus, 
what Wetherell (2005a) calls the macro, meso, and micro forms of social order, is 
an ontological principle recognising that interaction happens simultaneously in 
macro, meso, and micro organisations of situated, contingent orders – semiotic 
organisations of the immediate interactional exchange, personal orders and larger 
cultural practices (Wetherell, 1998; 2005a).  In this section I want to make use of 
Wetherell’s proposed lens of personal order.  My focus is on the way particular 
patterns in talk settle into meaningful intersecting patterns of personal order 
(Taylor, 2003; 2006; Wetherell, 2007) in which, to borrow Taylor’s terms, 
constructions now are ‘resourced by previous constructions which aggregate over 
time’ (Taylor, 2006: 98).  
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 For this section I am going to continue one of the themes of the last – 
appearance – this time focusing mainly on extracts from just one interview.  Any 
of the interviews would have made equally good illustrative vehicles for this 
notion of personal investment and constructions of imaginary others. This is a 
discursive action accomplished in all the interviews.  The interview I am drawing 
on, with a participant I have called Bridget, is particularly interesting here though 
because Bridget works in the beauty industry.  This means it is possible to 
reasonably anticipate that Bridget’s personal order of discursive engagement is, at 
the very least, attuned to this concept of ‘appearance’, amongst, of course, many 
other ‘attunements’.  In this next segment I want to show how some of these 
multiple attunements, the aggregated resources, unfold as Bridget constructs 
imaginary others.       
 Bridget was 45 at the time of the interview, married, with three children.  
She was living and working in an affluent semi rural district, and she was the 
senior partner in a jointly owned beauty salon.  I will be arguing that this personal 
location, Bridget’s investments in her career and her family and the ideological 
dilemmas this deals out are enormously useful in explaining this notion of 
personal discursive order and its connections with the ‘fantasies’ of culturally 
produced others.  I will be focusing on a selection of extracts featuring Bridget’s 
constructions of imagined others, and presenting an argument that Bridget is 
orientating to these others through the resources and concerns and investments of 
her own biography.  
 It is worth making a note about the method of data generation here 
because it does appear to influence what is said; but in a way which I think can be 
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defended.  Using the photographs to help elicit talk means speakers are faced with 
generating some kind of account.  This much is built into the method.  However, 
participants were free to select whichever photographs they wanted to discuss.  
Several different selection styles were adopted by participants, such as spreading 
all the cards out and grouping them according to some participant category, or 
pulling out those of interest in an apparently haphazard manner.  Some 
participants, like Bridget, gathered the photographs in a pile and worked through 
each image in turn, commenting on every one.  However, what gets said is not 
discourse from ‘nowhere’.  It can be situated and made sense of, and it gives 
insights into how selves and others are constructed.  
 At the start of this extract Bridget had 
been looking at the photograph here in Figure 
15, a colour image of a woman with a tattoo 
on her arm and applying make up to her face. I 
am drawing attention to this because it sets the 
interactional context for what follows when 
Bridget turns her attention to the next image.   
 
 
Extract 31. 
[28:45/34:57] 
1 Bridget tattoos and er (.) piercings (.) make up (.) I mean nothing like 
 
 
 
Image removed pending 
permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 Figure 15.  Make-up and 
tattoos. (Original Title: Tattooed 
Woman Applying Makeup, 2000) 
(Photographer: Monica Lau/Getty 
Images) Plate 25 in Appendix E(1). 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
this (.) fazes me because it’s my world isn’t it it’s what I’m used 
to I mean we have erm (.) transvestites coming here 
transsexuals and (.) everybody aspiring to be (.) beautiful (.) 
that’s what I (.)  
 
This extract opens with Bridget responding to the image in Figure 15, the tattoos, 
piercings and make up.  She tells me ‘nothing like this (.) fazes me because it’s 
my world isn’t it it’s what I’m used to’ (lines 1-3). This short sequence is full of 
the most extraordinarily rich action.  The comment ‘nothing like this (.) fazes me’ 
suggests that some aspect of the image in the photograph is being orientated to as 
potentially strange, potentially unsettling.  The figure in the image appears 
marked out as deviant in some way.  It does not ‘faze’ Bridget, she tells us, but the 
implication appears to be that it may well disturb a different audience.   
  In addition, Bridget claims this world of the ‘strange’ as her own:  ‘it’s 
my world isn’t it it’s what I’m used to’ (lines 2-3).  This establishes her expertise 
in this world and claims it as an aspect of her personal location, her personal 
biography.  It is a position which she mobilises to fulfil the particular accounting 
task of this moment.  This simple statement appears to accomplish an authority, a 
comfort and familiarity with this world Bridget has made strange for others, but 
ordinary for herself.   
But this is not just a world for the strange and the deviant; this is a world 
of  ‘everybody aspiring to be (.) beautiful’ (line 4).  Again, there is cause to be 
circumspect about who ‘everybody’ might be, but it seems likely Bridget is 
referring to all those who enter her world of the beauty industry, and possibly 
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beyond. Nevertheless, what was constructed as unconventional and alien now, in 
‘everybody’, also appears re-figured as ordinary, commonplace, unremarkable 
aspiration.  That people ‘do’ aspire to be beautiful is not elaborated upon.  This 
might indicate a taken for granted ideological quality that beauty simply is 
desirable.  But it is important not to over-interpret and perhaps Bridget might have 
gone on to say more.  However, as Bridget is speaking her attention appears to be 
caught by the next photograph, Kate Maclean (Figure 16).  The extract continues 
from the last line of the previous: 
Extract 32. 
[29:02/34:57] 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Bridget that’s what I (.) ((Bridget picks up photo of Kate Maclean,  
 Figure 16)) but she probably 
had a lovely life(.) h-hh 
Jean h-hh-hh   
Bridget y’know people’d look at that 
and think there’s no beauty 
there she’s wrinkled up to the 
eyeballs (.) y’know she’s 
obviously had a hard life but 
she’s been in the sun a lot and 
that’s why her skin’s done 
that (.) but I bet she’s er (.) 
seen a lot of grandchildren 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Miss Kate 
Maclean of Garrynamonie, 
South Uist, 1947. 
Photographer: Werner Kissling. © 
University of Edinburgh – Dept. of 
Celtic and Scottish Studies.  
www.scran.ac.uk  Plate 6 in 
Appendix E(1).  
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18 
19 
and had a lot of laughs and (.) had a lot of love round her family 
(.) mm y’know (.) 
 
Bridget imagines quite a detailed and, initially one might think, quite a 
personalised biography for Kate Maclean, as she mobilises a range of discursive 
resources for speculating about the woman in the photograph.  Bridget suggests 
that here is a woman who ‘probably had a lovely life’ (lines 6-7); she is not 
beautiful, ‘she’s wrinkled up to the eyeballs… she’s obviously had a hard life but 
she’s been in the sun a lot and that’s why her skin’s done that (.) but I bet she’s er 
(.) seen a lot of grandchildren and had a lot of laughs and (.) had a lot of love 
round her family’ (lines 11-18).  Again there is a wealth of social action contained 
in these few lines constructing this imaginary biography.  What I am interested in 
is what the discursive achievements are here and what this might suggest about 
the personal order of the speaker, Bridget, in the way this figure is imagined.  
 At the moment the new image of Kate Maclean arises, Bridget has been 
working with a discursive framework of the world of the beauty salon, and 
‘everybody aspiring to be beautiful’.  This is the discursive frame which is in play 
when Bridget comes to the figure Kate Maclean.  Some kind of transition is 
required now as the talk moves to this next image; and this transition appears 
somewhat troubled.  This is in part, I suggest, because of a residue from the 
previous theme of beauty, and an ‘awkwardness’ of fit with that frame for Bridget 
as she applies it to Kate Maclean.  I say this for several reasons. 
 First, there appears to be a disjuncture.  The ‘but’ of ‘but she probably had 
a lovely life’ (lines 6-7) suggests Bridget is making an interactional orientation, a 
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dialogic response, but to something that has not actually yet been said out loud.  
Bridget’s previous comment ‘that’s what I’ (line 5) appears to break off 
unfinished.  This ‘but’ suggests something else has become rhetorically salient for 
Bridget.  This is what Billig (1996) talks about when he says we can hear thinking 
in the way talk unfolds rhetorically.  Something unsaid appears to be 
interactionally active for Bridget in the space between ‘that’s what I’ and ‘but’ in 
lines 5 and 6.  So what, for Bridget, might have preceded that ‘but she probably 
had a lovely life’?  What is she responding to? 
Bridget’s next comment provides some suggestions.  She says: ‘people’d 
look at that and think there’s no beauty there’ (lines 9-11).  This, then, appears to 
be the previously unspoken dialogic charge against Kate Maclean which Bridget 
has been addressing.  This, I think, is what the comment ‘but she probably had a 
lovely life’ is orientating to.  Bridget mobilises a discourse of absence of beauty 
but projects it onto some general, unspecified ‘others’, that they – ‘people’ – 
would say ‘there’s no beauty there’.  Bridget and I had been working within a 
discursive frame of ‘beauty’; it appears to have seeped over into this next segment 
of talk, and was addressed by Bridget rhetorically but in such a way that distances 
Bridget from the charge being made, even though in this instance Bridget is the 
one mobilising it:  it is Bridget for whom it is first salient here.  But, Bridget 
counters the lack of beauty with a substitutive, perhaps compensatory, perhaps 
even trumping, ‘lovely life’ comprising grandchildren, laughter, love and family.  
While the notions of success and failure are not made explicit here these resources 
appear to be mobilised as a construction of what would make for a worthwhile life 
for a woman such as this.  However, this construction of the ‘lovely life’ is itself 
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not trouble free and I will come to this shortly.   
So far, this analysis could have been accomplished with a straightforward 
conversation analytic focus on the immediate sequential interaction, with no 
requirement to bring an analytic lens to a wider order.  But that is about to change, 
in several ways.  
 It so happens that other participants address precisely this issue of Kate 
Maclean and whether there is beauty in her face.  This short extract is simply to 
illustrate this point.  
Extract 33. 
[43:18/78:03]  
1 
2 
3 
Sheila now that you see I love old faces like that (.) I think (.) there (.) 
that’s beauty (.) as far as I’m concerned and all that life written 
on that face 
 
By coincidence, Sheila and I had also been working in a discursive frame of 
‘beauty’ when Sheila pulled out this image for attention.  We had been discussing 
the international competition ‘Miss World’ (see Plate 20, Appendix E(1)) before 
moving to the image of Kate Maclean.  These words from Sheila as she looked at 
the new image, ‘there (.) that’s beauty as far as I’m concerned’ (lines 1-2) 
demonstrate that there are resources available to construct Kate Maclean as a 
particular kind of beauty, ‘old faces’ (line 1) with ‘all that life written on’ them 
(lines 2-3).  Perhaps Sheila is providing a contrast case here to the conventional 
(but clearly contestable) notion of beauty symbolised by the ‘Miss World’ 
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competition.  Perhaps also Sheila recognises her position as possibly an 
unconventional interpretation.  Nevertheless, the point is that in the course of 
unfolding interaction a range of ways of constructing Kate Maclean are 
demonstrated.  
This suggests that in addition to the context of the images, and the 
discursive frame in play, there is also something in a speaker’s personal order, 
which leads the interaction in a particular, contingent, way.  
So, with this in mind I want to go back to Bridget and her constructions of 
Kate Maclean, and unpick this exchange a little further to look for indications of a 
personal order.  I am going to be arguing that there are several threads to this 
personal order that unfold across Bridget’s talk:  her professional investments as a 
successful business woman and knowledgeable practitioner in the beauty industry; 
her interpellation into technologies and ideologies that say beauty is important; 
alongside her interpellation into an ideology which resists the importance of the 
‘look’.  In addition Bridget is living out that central dilemma identified in chapter 
5, the tensions in prioritising family whilst simultaneously identifying oneself as a 
(good) mother in paid employment.  All of these themes can be seen flowing 
through Bridget’s talk, interwoven and repeating as regular resources shaping our 
co-constructed sense-making across the interview.   
I have suggested that deploying the notion of a ‘lovely life’ has countered 
the lack of beauty accredited to the image of Kate Maclean, and that this is not 
itself trouble free.  Bridget begins to elaborate this ‘lovely life’ by drawing on an 
imagined history for Kate: ‘she’s obviously had a hard life but she’s been in the 
sun↑ a lot and that’s why her skin’s done that’ (lines 12-16).  This diagnosis 
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reinforces Bridget’s professional expertise and her position as a specialist.  
However, at the same time as it begins to explain Kate’s beauty shortcomings, it 
also confirms them; they are being accounted for, not resisted, not rejected.  While 
Kate Maclean fails, for Bridget, on any measure of beauty, Bridget nevertheless 
seems to be motivated to work up an identity for Kate which does pass.  This 
alternative identity is one where old women are constructed as compensated for 
absent beauty and hard lives by family, grandchildren, love and laughter. 
The fantasy biography raises several points.  Bridget had little information 
about Kate Maclean to draw on. The photograph was labelled on the reverse as 
‘Miss Kate Maclean’, which suggests no husband, children or grandchildren.  
However, Bridget may not have noticed this and there is nothing in the transcript 
to indicate she did.   
Also striking is Bridget’s prediction that Kate has had a lot of laughs and a 
lot of love.  Compared to other participants’ comments, these suggestions of 
‘laughs’ and ‘love’ are an unusual reading of the photograph.  Like Bridget, other 
participants speak of a ‘hard life’, ‘toil’, and ‘poverty’ in reference to this image; 
some also comment on the ‘wrinkles’; and indeed several conjure an imaginary 
family for Kate Maclean, such as Sally’s comment here: 
Extract 34. 
[83:31/124:45]  
1 
2 
3 
Sally I would think she’s been dealt (.) some tough times real tough 
times and I (.) y’know (.) she’s probably again the mainstay 
she’s 
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4 
5 
Jean yeah 
Sally  probably the grandmother of th- y’know (.) the family 
 
But, unlike Bridget, other participants do not use the discourse of the ‘family’ to 
overwrite the discourse of hardship, and conjure up love and laughter. 
Extract 35. 
[94:58/106:19]  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Hannah I just hope I never grow up to look like that I really do  
Jean in what way 
Hannah erm (.) to y’know (.) to look sort of (.) so gnarled and erm (.) I 
mean she looks like she’s had a hard life  
Jean yeah it’s etched and 
Hannah [yeah 
Jean [yeah 
Hannah y’know and er (.) and not a happy one 
 
Drawing on these other participants’ interpretations and my own, it seems to me 
that Bridget’s suggestion of Kate Maclean’s lovely life is a ‘bad fit’. 
This raises two questions.  Why might Bridget have been motivated to 
construct this defence – this countering of the charge that Kate Maclean lacked 
beauty; and why was this notion of the lovely life of family, grandchildren, love 
and laughter recruited as the means to do it?  I will take the second of these first. 
For Bridget it appears that Kate Maclean has failed in any measure of 
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beauty.  Bridget appears to be motivated to find an alternative way to fashion Kate 
Maclean where she does pass muster.  The resources are telling and Billig’s 
(1999a) notion of repression is very important here.   
There is a readily available canonical quality to Bridget’s story.  This 
move by Bridget, the lovely life, family and grandchildren is a story that is ‘ready 
to hand’ and mobilised for the interactional task – to construct a commentary on 
an imagined other.  In the process, it lays out a set of conditions for the 
redemption of age and wrinkles: family, love, and laughter.  Moreover, its 
deployment pushes aside and represses a story of poverty and hardship. 
Conjuring up this idealised, imaginary, ‘acceptable’, version of wrinkled 
old age for Kate is a means for Bridget to reconcile her own professional interests, 
and her personal commitments, with this other world of women like Kate 
Maclean.   However, this version of ‘acceptability’ is conditional on family, love, 
and laughter as a trade off for failed beauty; and on sunshine as an excuse for 
wrinkles.   
One could read family, love, and laughter as valued alternatives to a world 
of beauty and youth; this is, Bridget says, ‘a lovely life’ (line 7). But, the 
conditionality reproduces a range of demanding normative rules for ‘passing’.  
This ill-fitting conditional, fantasised life story speaks quietly but firmly to the 
undesirability of aging, of being old, of wrinkles, of being single, of not having 
children, of not sharing laughter.  Excusing Kate’s ‘absence of beauty’ on these ill 
fitting grounds precisely reinforces the privileging of beauty; and moreover leaves 
the single, unmarried, childless, older, hardworking, female subject even more 
ideologically depleted.  In the process of imagining a romanticised family, an 
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alternative life, perhaps a hard life of poverty and toil, is silenced and over-
written.  But there is something else to glean here too.   
Kate Maclean enters this extract depersonalised: ‘people’d look at that’ 
(line 9) and ‘there’s no beauty there’ (lines 10-11, my emphasis in both) are both 
ambiguous referents which may indicate the photo, or the body, the face, the 
person, and so on.  Bridget’s imaginary account begins to put flesh to the bones of 
this woman looking out from the photograph.  But the canonical quality of that 
fleshing out makes any ‘actual’ Kate Maclean living on this island of Uist in 
1947, even less visible.  This is not a story of ‘Kate Maclean’.  What we have 
instead, are Bridget’s investments, her discursive resources, and the working 
though of her lived-life ideological tensions and strictures; and these are made 
visible in her manoeuvres through trouble, her projections on to Kate and her 
selection of one set of resources at the expense of another.  
But, crucially, why am I saying this is a personal order as much as a social 
order? There are many similarities between what Bridget imagines for Kate 
Maclean and what other participants imagine, particularly in imagining her as a 
woman with family.  Indeed, the underlying principle of shared communicative 
resources which runs throughout this thesis would expect that there might be such 
similarities.  So, why posit this as anything more than social order?  Does that not 
suffice?  The answer, is that yes this is a social order, but it settles into a personal 
order too.  And it makes its appearance in the way Bridget (as with other 
participants in other interviews) picks up a particular set of discursive patterns 
throughout her interview, as a series of repeating themes that intersect in relations 
with each other  This notion of the intersections of personal investments and 
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personal order are developed in this final extract, and this is the primary purpose 
for this extract.  However, it is also useful for another reason.  It demonstrates that 
the invented, fantasised other is not simply an artefact of the photographs but is 
embedded in the discursive resources for making sense of the world and oneself in 
that world.  Two threads are being picked up for analysis:  Bridget’s investments 
in family worked up through the notion of the work-life balance; and a short but 
telling reference to the ‘problem’ Bridget constructs with the beauty industry 
which I will be reflecting back to some unfinished business in my analysis of 
Bridget’s talk of Kate Maclean.  
Just before this extract opens Bridget had been telling me that success for 
her has changed over the years; that at one time it would have been a big business, 
a house and car and such things but that having now achieved all of that, it is no 
longer as important as it was and sometimes she thinks about being at home 
looking after her house and children and family pets full time.  Nevertheless, 
Bridget says, she still admires business success in other women. 
Extract 36. 
[2:28/34:57] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Bridget but then again I would look at- I will I would look at somebody 
(.) and admire them (.) some women and admire them (.) and 
actually if they are (.) sort of striving business women (.) I’ll 
probably look at them and admire and I’d think (.) I admire 
what they’re doing (.) and I don’t really know how they’ve done 
that (.) because (.) I know how difficult it is to do what (.) the 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
stage that I’ve got to (.)  
Jean mm 
Bridget and the sacrifices I’ve had to make in my personal life and my 
family life (.) to get here (.) 
Jean mm 
Bridget so (.) I admire them for what they’re doing (.) but at the same 
time I wouldn’t want to be them 
Jean in what way 
Bridget I think I’d probably look at somebody (.) y’know maybe I’m 
comparing myself to other people in my business there’s a lady 
who owns (.) erm (.) an academy (.) in ((city)) where she’s got a 
training academy (.) and er (.) she’s really big in the beauty 
world (.) and she pushes and pushes and pushes and strives and 
strives she’s (.) she’s had (her name) in all the publications we 
get about the beauty she’s well known and (.) all the rest of it (.) 
erm (.) I could be wrong↑ (.) I don’t know her personally I 
could be wrong but I look at her and I think oh that must be 
fantastic she’s done really well and (.) y’know to have that 
admiration from this wo::rld (.)  
Jean mm 
Bridget y’know to have done what she’s done to be changing all the 
training structure and all that sort of thing (.) erm (.) that must 
be fantastic but at the same time (.) I- then I think what 
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30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
sacrifices has she made what sort of life has she got to get that 
[1 minute 59 seconds omitted where Bridget and I talk about the work 
women take responsibility for in their homes and the difficulties of 
achieving a balance.  I ask Bridget if she can think of examples when this 
does not work out ‘quite right’.  Bridget returns to the example above of 
the businesswoman in the same industry] 
 
 
Bridget there was a docu- there was a little programme on of her 
recently (.) and she was seen buying these boots for four 
hundred and fifty pounds in a shop (.) y’know and that’s what 
she (.) thinks is (.) 
Jean mm 
Bridget successful to be able to buy these boots (.) and I think that’s the 
problem with the industry that we’re in (.) it’s all seen as 
materialistic it’s all seen as what you look on the outside 
y’know what shoes you’re wearing and (.) everything on the 
outside (.) and (.) I (.) look at her and in a way I feel quite sorry 
for her because I think (.) yes she looks fantastic (.) she’s got all 
the right (.) equipment and toys and everything around her (.) 
and (.) she’s doing well within her job (.) and I would love to 
know what’s on the flip side of the coin (.) y’know what 
sacrifices she’s made for that (.) I doubt very much (.) that she’s 
got a happy marriage and a stable home life (.)  
Jean yeh 
Bridget she’s probably had to sacrifice that for that 
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The extract begins with Bridget confirming that despite her changing priorities, 
she still admires businesswomen for what they are doing, knowing, she says, ‘how 
difficult it is to do what (.) the stage that I’ve got to … and the sacrifices I’ve had 
to make in my personal life and my family life (.) to get here’ (lines 6-10).  The 
tension between personal life and family life and professional life – which is what 
I understand Bridget to mean when she says ‘to get here’ – to this point in her 
business – picks up on precisely the dilemma discussed at length in chapter 5, a 
dilemma of managing multiple commitments, multiple positions and multiple 
accountabilities.  
 Being a mother, with a career, is a hugely fought over space of 
accountable identity.  And, it is one Bridget is living out as she works up her 
‘identity’ and meanings for me (and with me) in this interview.  This is an 
ideological dilemma which holds her to ongoing account.  It is one she interprets 
through the notion of sacrifice, that family and personal life must be sacrificed for 
career.  Bridget then constructs a gap between herself and these other women she 
would admire: ‘so (.) I admire them for what they’re doing (.) but at the same time 
I wouldn’t want to be them’ (line 12-13).  
 Following my prompt, Bridget elaborates by telling me about another 
businesswoman working in the same industry.  She constructs her as eminently 
successful. She is ‘really big in the beauty world’ (lines 18-19); has ‘had (her 
name) in all the publications’ (line 20); it ‘must be fantastic she’s done really 
well’ (line 23-24).  A couple of minutes later when Bridget and I return to this 
same topic Bridget adds: she ‘looks fantastic (.) she’s got all the right (.) 
equipment and toys’ (line ) and is ‘doing well within her job’ (lines 41-43).  So, 
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this indicates one set of ways in which Bridget constructs success in her field.  
But, Bridget also appears to limit this as a partial success only:  ‘I could be 
wrong↑ (.) I don’t know her personally I could be wrong but I look at her and I 
think’ (lines 22-23), ‘what sacrifices has she made what sort of life has she got’ 
(lines 29-30). 
 Here then, Bridget is seen constructing this business colleague through a 
reproduction of her own personal commitments to a particular kind of work-life 
balance; one which she interprets though a notion of sacrifice; and one which she 
projects onto her fantasy of this other woman.  And this goes to some lengths: 
despite having constructed this other woman as so successful in her field, Bridget 
says: ‘in a way I feel quite sorry for her’ (lines 40-41), which she explains by 
saying ‘I doubt very much (.) that she’s got a happy marriage and stable home 
life’ (lines 45-46). 
Apart, of course, from the constructions of business success alongside 
speculations of relationship failures for this other, Bridget is also doing much 
identity work for herself as she positions herself in relation to the way she 
imagines this other woman.  She has constructed a professional distance between 
herself and her colleague.  This other woman is presented as out performing her.  
But, by undermining that success, by suggesting it has come at the price of 
imagined failure in marriage and home, Bridget is able to re-fashion her own 
achievements.  She is the successful one because she is the one that has the 
balance right; she has the business and the home life. When Bridget says ‘I feel 
quite sorry for her’ (lines 40-41) she is claiming a more advanced form of success 
Chapter 7.  Imagining moral bodies  
274 
for herself.  As Bridget positions herself and this other businesswoman in relation 
to each other, the other is to be pitied.   
In response to my questions and to the photo images, Bridget is working 
hard to construct for me and with me a particular version of herself.  An important 
resource is the fantasy image; this imagined possibility of her rival’s inadequate 
home life.  But this ‘damaged success’ the sacrificed home life, is not plucked 
from nowhere.  It is typical of the tensions around work and home life illustrated 
in chapter 5.  These are shared cultural discourses.  But, it is also consistent with 
concerns Bridget expresses throughout her interview.  
In constructing this ‘damaged success’ lived by her business colleague, 
Bridget appears to work up a dialogic projection of her own conflicts and 
dilemmas.  This imaginary other becomes a site to work through them and test 
them out in different ways.   
I want to look at one last segment of this extract, the moment when 
Bridget says ‘I think that’s the problem with the industry that we’re in (.) it’s all 
seen as materialistic it’s all seen as what you look on the outside’ (lines 36-38). At 
the same time I want to revisit a query I raised earlier about why Bridget might 
have anticipated a dialogic charge that there was no beauty in the image of Kate 
Maclean, why she might have been motivated to defend it, and why a discourse of 
a lovely life of family love and laughter was the discursive mechanism for doing 
that.  
Bridget is problematising the beauty industry here for its focus on 
appearances.  But, as part of that industry, Bridget is potentially implicated herself 
in this criticism.  Therefore, there is a personal investment in distancing herself 
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from this ‘problem’ of her industry and working up alternative ‘values’ for 
judging a successful life.  
So, when the image of Kate Maclean (Figure 16) is presented in 
immediate proximity to Figure 15, in response to which Bridget had staked her 
claim and authority in the beauty world, Bridget is reflexively, rhetorically, 
motivated to ‘defend’ Kate Maclean and reconstruct her in a valued image.  
Bridget’s response to Kate Maclean, potentially ill-fitting as it might have been, 
draws on one of the resources in Bridget’s personal order that is routinely worked 
up as something she both values and uses to strengthen her position as she 
constructs comparisons with others such as this businesswoman here who Bridget 
imagines must be lacking in these valued markers of a successful life for a 
woman. 
This appears to be one facet of Bridget’s ‘personal order’.  It is born of 
combining culturally available resources and habitual dilemmas.  This personal 
order is not a projection of a private unconscious and dynamic world of fantasy, 
but a publicly shared world of publicly shared readily available dialogues.  These 
are the common, routinely deployed repertoires of a cultural time, space, and local 
moral order.  But, in addition, they have settled as a set of discourses regularly 
called upon and inhabited by Bridget.  They are also the common, routinely 
deployed repertoires of her personal order. 
7.3 Chapter summary and conclusions 
This section has brought the narrative of the thesis to a particularly interesting 
point.  Exploring and accounting for speakers’ fantasised, imagined version of 
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others has illustrated a range of socially shared cultural resources in play, such as 
the moral organisations of subjects into hierarchies of cultural value: those 
subjects ‘getting it right’ and those ‘getting it wrong’.  In the process of arguing 
that order is also rooted in personal concerns however, I have also worked up an 
analysis of what that personal order looks like as it unfolds in the interaction here. 
A substantial and often voiced critique of the Foucauldian influenced 
discursive subject has been that it struggles to account for personal order, for 
individual differences in the take up of one discourse or another.  This has formed 
a central component of the psychoanalytic psychosocial argument in particular.  
To counter that argument Wetherell (2007) has proposed that attention to the 
repeating patterns in individual discursive practice, examined at the macro, meso 
and micro level of social order is a potentially highly productive means of 
addressing this critique.   
What I have tried to show here is that the notion of personal order and 
investments proposed by Wetherell (2005b), the notion of a biography and life 
history being taken seriously, to borrow Hollway and Jefferson’s phrase 
(2000:136) is entirely achievable in a discursively driven psychosocial 
psychology without the requirement to incorporate a psychoanalytic reading of the 
person to do it – contrary to Hollway and Jefferson’s insistence. 
What this analysis of the patterns in imagining others is starting to 
illustrate is that the ‘individual’ produces and reproduces a personal order – the 
sediment of investments and concerns, in interaction. 
 So, while notions of imagination and fantasy and projection have a long 
history in psychoanalytic work and psychoanalytically inspired psychosocial 
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theory, I am bracketing off any notions of privately organised, unconscious but 
directing and distorting defence mechanisms; and instead exploring projection as 
a thoroughly discursive practice.  By this I mean that when people try to make 
sense of or from an object, they will project onto it, assign to it, their own 
historically situated and habituated  concerns.  Speakers work up understandings 
through the discursive resources they have at their disposal and apply these 
resources to sites and objects that unfold in interaction.  Their concerns, interests 
and investments are revealed as these are projected on to their unfolding 
commentaries and interactions.   
 Moreover, these repeating patterns in projections say something about the 
speaker’s own narrative identity and investments, drawn as it is from available 
cultural resources  - such as the canonical ‘family’ stories Bridget projected onto 
Kate Maclean and the business acquaintance.  These normative family stories are 
practiced over time, ready to hand, and dropped into the talk to solve Bridget’s 
reflexive accounting problem.  They require little discursive work on Bridget’s 
part.  The ease of speaking here testifies both to the cultural dominance of these 
themes – they have a taken for granted quality as they organise a moral world, and 
to the personal privilege these discourses exercise in the habits of Bridget’s sense-
making and working through of her own dilemmatic positions.   
I will be continuing this exploration of personal order and the psychosocial 
in the next chapter.  This time however, I will be working with a different kind of 
data, data which is particularly productive for teasing out the intricacies of 
personally ordered interaction and which allows for an extension of this notion 
into the developments and deployments of interpersonal orders. 
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Chapter 8. Interpersonal orders and the habits of 
engagement 
In previous chapters I have been trying to capture patterns which run across the 
corpus in order to say something about shared cultural resources and how they are 
deployed to work up identities of success or failure.  Throughout, though, there 
have been hints towards the playing out of continuities and personal orders in the 
way discursive patterns connect and repeat for particular speakers.  The last 
chapter started to bring that into focus more clearly.  In this final empirical 
chapter I want to extend the notion to interpersonal order.  I will be exploring 
some of the patterns that run through one interview with two sisters interviewed 
together, so that I can say something more about the interpersonal order, and the 
sisters’ relational habits of engagement suggested in this tale.  
 This data, from a paired interview, contrasts with the material in the three 
previous chapters which drew mostly on data from typical one-to-one interviews.  
A one-to-one framework, despite invoking some constraints such as normative 
expectations that accounts will be generally coherent, and broadly in line with the 
questions asked, still leaves participants fairly free to ‘speak’ themselves in ways 
of their choosing within the discursive resources they have available.  My 
interview style is of course collaborative in this.  I rarely challenge participants’ 
accounts in our co-constructions. 
In this chapter I want to look at what happens when participants are asked 
instead to account for themselves in these terms of success and failure in front of 
someone who knows them well, with whom they have an ongoing relationship, 
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and who has their own versions of the history of events, and their own 
investments in the way accounts are worked up.  This different interactional, 
relational, figuration opens up some important methodological and empirical 
insights about accounting and identity practices.  It provides opportunity for 
developing theoretical potential around the relational interplay of shared histories 
and invested, habituated, personal and interpersonal logics and practices of 
making ‘successful’ or ‘failing’ identities.  It also provides an opportunity to 
investigate some alternative ways of taking up the various recommendations to 
take personal history seriously (Crossley, 2000; Hollway and Jefferson, 2000b; 
Taylor, 2005; Wetherell, 2007).  As before, this will be without invoking privately 
owned psychoanalytic psychodynamics.  Rather, it continues to work with 
resources from discursive psychology (Taylor, 2005; 2006).  
In addition this data exploring the interpersonal orders of two adult sisters 
speaks to an area of study increasingly recognised to be under-represented in the 
literature:  adult sibling relationships.  As recent critiques point out (Edwards, 
Hadfield, Lucey, Mauthner, 2006; Sanders, 2004), what is written about siblings 
comes from a narrow range of standpoints, often problem focussed with 
assumptions of a need for therapeutic intervention, and often disregarding of adult 
identity, relationality, and intersubjective adult practices.  The data for this chapter 
provides an opportunity to make a contribution here too. 
  I begin in 8.1. by capturing a flavour of the data.  I make some brief 
comparisons between the accounts the sisters offer and introduce some key 
themes for the chapter as the two sisters work up troubled and untroubled 
identities of success in the knowledge and presence of each other.  In section 8.2. I 
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consider briefly some of the sibling relationships literature which will make useful 
interlocutors for this chapter.  The next section, 8.3., examines one of the main 
stories of success and failure worked up in the interview here:  the sisters’ 
different careers in banking.  Their different trajectories tell of remarkable success 
for one and struggle and difficulty for the other.  In 8.4. I explore the notion of 
interpersonal order practiced in the interview.  This examines a phenomenon I am 
calling the ‘habits of engagement’.  The two women construct and enact a 
repeating pattern of taking up and taking over each other’s subject positions and 
narrative capitals.  At the same time, a repeating problematic of recognition and 
misrecognition is made visible, both as it occupies the sisters’ talk, and as it offers 
tentative explanatory possibilities for that talk.   
 As a final precursor to this chapter, I offer a note on the pseudonyms in 
use:  Olivia and Yvonne.  Because of the similarities in the sisters’ accounts, there 
is a complexity in this chapter for the reader trying to easily distinguish the two 
women.  I have adopted a simple mnemonic.  ‘Olivia’ is the Older sister; 
‘Yvonne’ is the Younger sister.  This chronological relationship is also 
analytically relevant throughout the chapter.  It is hoped this simple mnemonic 
will assist in keeping track of the biographical accounts that unfold here without 
causing any unnecessary distraction.  
8.1. Data and focus  
I want to begin by capturing a flavour of the accounts on which this analysis is 
based. Both sisters have pursued the same career trajectory in banking; but with 
very different results, according to the content of their narratives.  One account is 
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an ‘easy’ story of success; one is a story of trouble.  This difference is one of the 
central hooks for my analysis.   
The first extract is from Yvonne, the younger sister.  It comes at an early 
point in the interview and Yvonne is talking about her job as a bank manager. 
Extract 37. 
[02:12/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Yvonne y’know it’s what I’ve always wanted to do (.) and (.) part of the 
reason I love my job is because I’m so proud  
Jean mm  
Yvonne that I’m the:re (.) and that I’ve done it and (.) I do love my job 
(.) and (.) yeah I admit it y’know if someone says to me what do 
you do (.) and I say I’m a bank manager 
Jean  ye:ah 
Yvonne yeah I’m proud of saying that 
 
This fragment typifies the ready ease with which Yvonne was able to mobilise a 
story of success drawing on her employment as a bank manager.  This particular 
identification was a resource Yvonne reiterated many times throughout the 
interview. 
As a contrast, the second extract is from Olivia, the older sister.  Olivia 
had also entered banking, but during the interview presents a more troubled 
account.  In this extract which comes from a point towards the end of the 
interview Olivia is summarising some of the ways an account of her life might be 
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viewed. 
Extract 38. 
[125:32/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Olivia I mean (.) a lot of people would look at me and probably say I 
wasn’t a success because (.) divorced (.) didn’t hack it as a 
branch manager (.) still living at home with parents (.) but from 
my point of view (.) came out of an abusive marriage (.) severe 
clinical depression where I tried to commit suicide (.) luckily I 
didn’t (.) to a place where I’m (.) happy with myself (.) strong 
again 
 
These few lines capture a summary of the narrative recounted by Olivia.  It is 
quite different in comparison to Yvonne’s account although of course the two 
interactional tasks are also quite different.  Here, Olivia is providing a ‘review’ 
which occurs after more than two hours of interview talk.  Yvonne’s task in the 
previous extract was to provide an ‘introduction’, coming as it did in the opening 
minutes of the interview.  Despite the chronological separation, these two extracts 
capture much that occupies the sisters’ combined accounting in this interview.  
Olivia’s account summarises a story of troubled positions, or at least, positions 
Olivia orientates to as hearably troubled:  she says ‘a lot of people would look at 
me and probably say I wasn’t a success’ (lines 1-2).  Olivia suggests some reasons 
why, but then changes footing to counter this position:  ‘but from my point of 
view’ (lines 3-4).  But, the contrasts Olivia makes in these two footings highlights 
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one of the dilemmas Olivia is faced with in accounting for herself in terms of 
success and failure.  Narratives are always in relation to other possible narratives 
that could be told, other versions.  This is the rhetorical, ideological, dialogic 
nature of language.  But, this has a particular significance in the context of 
Olivia’s account of trouble because it sits in such close proximity to, and contrast 
to, her younger sister’s celebratory account.  This notion of proximity provides the 
second hook for this chapter.  The accounts from one sister are constrained by the 
actual and anticipated intervention of the other sister.  Both sisters have some 
knowledge of approximately the kind of account each other has to offer and the 
kinds of ways that might be received.  There is a history of shared knowledge and 
rehearsed ways of telling, and this knowledge shapes what they can say, and how 
they can say it.   
So, to open this chapter I am drawing on the notion of contrasting 
trajectories in two stories and how this is complicated by the interactional task set 
the two sisters; to work up constructions of their successes and failures with me, 
and in the reactive presence of each other.   
8.2. Sibling literatures and theoretical options 
I also want to assemble some thoughts from sibling literature to take into this 
chapter.  Recent discussions suggest that the field of sibling research is 
underdeveloped, both theoretically and empirically (Edwards et al., 2006; 
Mauthner, 2002; Sanders, 2004).  Mauthner’s (2002) work on sistering is an 
important development in addressing this gap. However, I just want to clarify 
something of my understanding of this gap.  Mauthner argues that sistering has no 
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language:  
 
…the lack of public representation of sistering explains the absence of a 
language with which women can narrate the sistering aspects of their lives. 
(Mauthner, 2002:14) 
 
I suggest that Mauthner perhaps conflates too many issues when she makes this 
claim.  Her own empirical work is markedly at odds with the idea that women are 
unable to narrate sistering aspects of their lives.  I agree when Mauthner argues 
that there are clear differences in the power and privilege attached to notions and 
consequential practices of brotherhoods in comparison to sisterhoods.  She points 
out that familial brotherhood is as little researched as familial sisterhood.  
However, as she also argues, the notion and function of brotherhoods in powerful, 
patriarchal, areas of social and political life such as the military, pubs and clubs, 
industries and secret organisations such as the Freemasons etc., are much more 
visible than any similar concepts of sisterhoods.  
This is certainly a fair comment.  But, in attempting to quite rightly draw 
attention to gendered imbalances in privilege and power, Mauthner does some 
injustice to the many traditions in sisterhoods by denying them their ‘language’.  
The sites of sistering language practices are abundant.  There are long traditions 
for example in nursing, in religious vocations of nuns, and many other groups 
such as the Union of Catholic Mothers, and the Women’s Institute, and so on. 
There is also, of course, the concept of ‘sisterhood’, both so integral and so 
contentious to feminist movements (hooks, 1997[1984]).  I accept Mauthner’s 
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assessment that these sites function firmly in reduced power relations compared to 
the concomitant brotherhoods in these patriarchal institutions of medicine, church, 
and the idealised family.  So, while I agree with Mauthner that sisterhoods may 
lack visibility in many sites, and have been undervalued in research agendas, I 
contend that ethnomethodologically sisters do not lack a language of narration.  
What has been made of that language is a separate issue. 
 Siblings have been the subject of research, but in a particularly restricted 
way.  Sibling relationships are recognised as commonplace, but rarely examined 
as specific relationships.  Edwards et al. (2006) and Sanders (2004) report that 
psychology has concentrated largely on testing correlates of birth order, often in 
terms of education and career outcomes.  This is somewhat sterile though in its 
ability to illuminate ongoing intersubjective understandings and relational 
practices.   
 Then, they also point out that in family therapy research siblings are pre-
figured as a subset of the family system and any ‘dysfunction’ – family therapy is 
a problem-based approach – any dysfunction is treated as a dysfunction of the 
family system as a whole.  Particular relationships within the family, such as 
siblings, are not explored outside of the whole (family) system, and interventions 
are not separable from parental relations.  Of course, it makes sense to say that 
sibling relationships are embedded in family, and indeed many other 
relationships; but sibling relationships are also worked up in moment to moment, 
specific, interpersonal interactions together.  This lens is generally missing from 
family therapy readings of siblings. 
Social policy agendas also consider siblings in terms of parent-child 
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relationships, attentive in particular to notions of obligations, responsibilities, 
entitlements and care.  There is no specifically sibling focussed social policy 
(Edwards et al. 2006; Mauthner, 2002). 
Generally, as Sanders (2004) and others have noted, any attention which is 
directed to sibling relationships originates in clinical approaches to ‘trouble’, and 
not to any normative sense of sibling relationships.  This is certainly the case in 
psychoanalysis although psychoanalytic approaches have also largely directed 
attention towards the impact of siblings on the parent-child relationship rather 
than sibling-sibling (Sanders, 2004).  Where sibling relationships are explored 
directly it tends to be through a theory of rivalry and unconscious desires to 
destroy the sibling; and all this located in the individual.  Typically, this 
universalising approach lacks attention to the particular situated and local 
specificities of the relationship. 
More recent psychoanalytically inflected psychosocial models of sibling 
relationships do recruit notions of cultural specificities and social productions of 
meaning (see Lucey, 2009, for example).  Lucey places the family at the forefront 
of this notion of the social, arguing that of all contexts it is in our relations with 
family that ‘we come to make sense of ourselves and the world in which we live’ 
(Lucey, 2009, in press).   
Lucey’s (2009) study of two brothers aged thirteen and nine explores the 
way in which these two boys work up and live out identities within the intimate 
relations of close familial others.  Her approach is psychoanalytically driven, but 
discursively inflected.  The two boys were interviewed separately and their talk 
about their relationship is analysed by Lucey as a story of unconscious 
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dependency and ambivalence; a desire for separation interwoven with accounts of 
shared pleasure in the other.  
Lucey argues that what characterises contemporary western experience are 
the conflicting desires to be recognised as unique and special at the same time as 
one is recognised as belonging to a caring collective.  This tension, she proposes,  
holds the brothers in simultaneously aggressive, envious, but mutually dependent 
psychic positions.  This is worked up in Lucey’s analysis through a notion of 
space as the physical space the boys argue over, such as their bedrooms, and the 
(unconscious) psychical space they contest in the family order.  For Lucey this 
contest of claiming space is a contest for ownership of and dominion over the 
physical place of the bedroom, which is itself an unconscious mirroring of a 
contest for owning, belonging, indeed being connected to psychical space in the 
family. 
I want to draw on Taylor’s (2003) work here because, coming from a very 
different, narrative-discursive, approach, it provides a different way of thinking 
about this idea of connecting to space, location, and discursive connections to 
place. Taylor’s study of identity work and talk about place has illustrated talk of 
place as a discursive means of establishing a sense of self, of continuity, of 
belonging within successive generations of a family, or indeed, not belonging.  
This talk of place is a complex, nuanced, working up of identity, of meaning-
making of self and others.  It is talk of being located; but crucially for my 
arguments here, it does not require theories of ‘psychical’ space. 
Both the concept of a desire for recognition, and the notion of space and 
place, are particularly salient for my own analysis.  Like Taylor, I prefer to think 
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of space-place-location discursively, in terms of subject positions; the discursive, 
narrative claims to being particular kinds of subjects, to working up particular 
kinds of subjectivity and identity.  This removes any dependence on a 
psychoanalytic psychosocial approach for offering an explanation of what is 
happening in this dispute over territory in Lucey’s analysis.  There seems to be no 
requirement to locate the source of territorial tension within internal distorted 
needs and desires of the individual.  The struggle for recognition takes place in the 
recruitment and receipt of shared meanings.  The notion of positions, worked up 
in the deployment of interpretative repertoires and narratives, accomplishes this 
work for us, without recourse to an internally, privately owned, unconscious 
motor.  Where perhaps I use ‘place’ differently to Taylor in this particular 
instance of my study of the two sisters, is the idea of ‘place’ not as a means of 
constructing an identity from the discursive resources of geographical location, 
but from a ‘competition’ for the momentary interactional occupation of a 
particular subject position ‘space’ – which in this chapter is to be illustrated 
through the idea of the favourite grand-daughter, the academically gifted sister, 
the successful bank manager.  So, I am borrowing the notion of the importance of 
‘place’ and ‘space’ from Taylor and Lucey, but applying it to the ‘spaces’ 
available in interactional co-constructions of available subject positions, and who 
gets to occupy those subject spaces. 
This psychosocial contribution to the sibling literature by Lucey (2009; see 
also Edwards et al., 2006) has been enormously valuable for opening up new 
ways of understanding the interconnectedness of sibling relationships and the 
constructive work siblings themselves do in organising their understandings and 
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meanings.  But, like many others, Lucey treats the psychosocial as if it inherently 
means a psychoanalytic reading.  Many other alternatives are available (Andrews 
et al., 2000).  My approach to the psychosocial borrows from those versions 
which locate the constitution and semiotics of sibling relationships within 
discourses, not within individuals (see Billig, 1999a; Wetherell, 2005b).   
My work in this chapter will be tackling a similar kind of material to 
Lucey: like her discussion of two brothers, I focus here on two sisters.  However, 
there is an important operational difference as well as a different analytic 
approach.  The brothers in Lucey’s study are interviewed apart, and their words 
integrated in analysis.  The two sisters in my study are interviewed together, and 
they integrate their words in the talk that emerges.  This provides a clearer 
opportunity for exploring the way in which the sisters make sense of themselves 
together in the context of success and failure.  
8.3. Analytic lenses 
Drawing on fiction, myth, and folklore, Sanders (2004) suggests there are four 
common sibling discourses; repertoires of alliance, rivalry, difference, and a 
fourth which draws on family tales of all-female or all-male.  It would certainly 
have been possible to write this chapter around any of the first three of these 
themes, either as interpretative repertoires in use, or as explanatory frameworks 
taken from psy-complex discourses.   
Extract 39. 
[41:15/150:53] 
Chapter 8. Interpersonal orders 
290 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Yvonne I’m not- we’re not friends now (.) we we  
Olivia we’re sisters (.) I mean we’re alright now (.)  
Yvonne yeah (.)  
Olivia and you think family (.) chips are down pull to- I mean (.) we 
will (.) rally round and there’s a wall there and nobody’s 
coming through it  
Jean   yeah  
Olivia but on a day to day basis (.)  
Yvonne we have no (.) we have no interests alike (.)  
Olivia yeah ((laughter)) (.) we are chalk and cheese (.) completely 
[different 
Yvonne [it’s like (.) even down to when we were kids (.) you were just 
I’m sorry you were horrible (.) you were you were you were a 
bully for starters (.) that bully ((unclear overlapping speech)) 
Olivia I were having a brother and my granddad (.) said I’ll have my 
brother you know it were going to be a boy (.) and she wasn’t 
Yvonne but then I [grew up and  
Olivia                 [and she gave my doll chicken pox 
Jean sorry (.) she 
Olivia she gave my doll chicken pox ((laughter)) 
Yvonne she had to have everything perfect (.) so 
Olivia this is the difference between us I was always (.) you need to 
ask my mum I was always like (.) I had this doll and it were 
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24 
25 
26 
perfect (.) all my toys were perfect (.) whereas (.) Yvonne was a 
a right little tomboy she didn’t mind if it were broken or (.) 
whatever 
 
The ‘difference’ repertoire is clearly illustrated here: ‘we are chalk and cheese (.) 
completely different’ (lines 10-11).  It is elaborated with an example: ‘all my toys 
were perfect (.) whereas (.) Yvonne was a a right little tomboy she didn’t mind if 
it were broken’ (lines 24-25).  This repertoire of ‘difference’ is a theme picked up 
many times across the interview.  Following the study of the two brothers cited 
above, Lucey (2009) indicates that establishing ‘difference’ in this way can be 
read as evidence for an underlying psychic drive to separation, through 
unconscious projections.  This means unwanted aspects of the self are 
imaginatively transferred to the convenient sibling.  One may then understand 
oneself as different, as not in possession of that undesirable quality.  To maintain 
this difference is to psychically repress intolerable aspects of the self (see 
Benjamin, 1995). 
 However, while projection and repression are interesting resources here, 
there is no requirement to posit an internally located unconscious motor.  The 
‘difference’ is constructed entirely in the repertoire of difference; a normative 
framework for working up relations of difference entirely commensurate with a 
western ethic of reflexive individualisation. 
 Sanders (2004) also suggested a repertoire of alliance as one of the 
primary ways of making sense of family relations.  In the extract above the sisters 
combined a repertoire of difference with a repertoire of alliance: ‘family (.) chips 
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are down pull to- I mean (.) we will (.) rally round and there’s a wall there and 
nobody’s coming through it’ (lines 4-6).  This could easily be framed in Lucey’s 
terms as an account of dependence; the same account of combined separation and 
dependence she argued in her own analysis of the two brothers.  But again, an 
internal psychic motor is not necessary for understanding what work is being 
undertaken here.  
 The sisters have been telling a tale of difference, and indeed dislike of 
each other; they have been taking up positions of separation.  This repertoire of 
alliance functions to reposition them both, to repair ‘separation’ and ‘difference’ 
to fit another discursive norm for meaning making; a conventional discursive 
expectation that family pulls together in a crisis.  This movement is the same 
negotiation of competing dilemmas observed throughout the thesis.  As one 
position – difference and separation – is mobilised another, similarity and 
cohesion and alliance, is indexed.  The sisters are able to co-construct both. 
The third repertoire Sanders identified was one of rivalry.  While the 
sisters do not describe themselves as ‘rivals’ they do construct accounts of 
competition for attention and recognition which I discuss below (see section 8.5.). 
In some theoretical traditions, particularly psychoanalytic and to some extent 
family therapy (Sanders 2004) it might be tempting to use the accusation of 
bullying (lines 13-14), and the damaged doll, ‘she gave my doll chicken pox’ (line 
18), as evidence of internal rivalries played out in practice.  I will be arguing that 
these exchanges do not need to be read as subtle evidence of unconscious hatreds, 
but instead, as the take up of jostling, argumentative, rhetorical, habituated, 
commonplace positionings. 
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This short illustration shows already that it would be entirely possible to 
organise the chapter around an illustration of these kinds of discourses.  However, 
rather than map out general repertoires of sistering, I am more interested in this 
chapter in the way certain resources sediment into particular interpersonal orders, 
the intersubjective, relational, ethnomethodological habits of engagement between 
two particular sisters working up and living out relational identities.  Of course, 
this draws on and reproduces interpretative repertoires and ideological dilemmas 
and so on, insofar as speakers mobilise them to complete their interactional 
business.  But my interest here is in the notion of sedimenting orders; what Lucey 
(2009) calls a ‘habituality of practice’, but which is developed in this chapter 
without the concept of an internally managed, privately owned psyche that Lucey 
calls on as the motor for this habituality.   
This focus on sedimenting interpersonal orders means that whereas a 
particular focus of discourse analysis in psychology is on language as the unit of 
analysis (see chapter 4) rather than a particular individual or individuals as the 
unit(s) of analysis; in this chapter on interpersonal orders I am trying to find a 
means of reading the way collections of language-in-use are organised into some 
sort of habituated use for particular speakers.  In other words, here the unit of 
analysis is the interpersonal order between the two women as it is mobilised for 
the interactional demands of the interview accounts, and as it appears to say 
something important about lives beyond the interview.  The focus is still on the 
ethnomethodological practices; but a combined personal-interpersonal, historical, 
practice, one which is interactionally situated, but carries elements of past and 
future use (Taylor, 2005; 2006). 
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8.4. Stories of success and failure. 
The interpretative understandings I develop in this analysis draw on wider 
sequences of interaction beyond the specific extracts cited here.  Therefore some 
account of these wider interactions will be useful.  The biographical details are 
drawn from the accounts offered in the interview. In an attempt to maintain 
anonymity some details have been changed or omitted, such as names and places.  
I have attempted to preserve the details of the relationship between the two 
women but I acknowledge that this is a partisan process: possibly the details 
changed carry resonances for the participants, or readers, which I have 
overlooked.  However, I have scrutinised the changes made and am confident 
these have not adversely affected the analytic account I have provided. 
I was aware of Olivia as a volunteer member of the organising committee 
for a social club I used to attend, although we had never met.  I had approached 
her to ask if she would be interested in taking part in my study and left 
information about the project with her which included the note that I was 
interviewing women alone or in pairs if they preferred, with a partner of their 
choice (see Appendix A and B).  I telephoned Olivia a few days later and she said 
she would be happy to take part, and asked me if I would be interested in 
interviewing her sister as well.  I said yes. 
Both sisters lived on the same street in an affluent district where property 
prices were above average for the town.  Olivia, whom I had approached first, was 
the older sister, aged 37.  Following a divorce two years earlier Olivia had 
returned to the family home and was living with her retired parents. Yvonne was 
younger, 33, married and living with her husband and their three children aged 7 
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years, 3 years, and 5 months.  The women’s physical appearance was quite 
different.  This was a point they addressed themselves, mostly in general terms 
simply as a point of ‘difference’, although on occasions Yvonne made more direct 
mention of her size.  This description here though is mine.  Olivia, the older sister 
was shorter, slim, with dark hair worn in a short crop, petite features and a 
serious, thoughtful, perhaps stern, expression. Yvonne, her younger sister, was 
taller, heavily overweight to the extent she appeared to have difficulty walking; 
she had long red hair, a highly expressive face and a ready smile. 
We met at Olivia’s home where we had planned to conduct the interview.  
Olivia’s parents were both present with Olivia when I arrived.  Yvonne, her 
younger sister, was also already there.  One of the family (my field notes do not 
record who), suggested we might have more privacy if we went to Yvonne’s 
house instead, which we did.  This re-location from Olivia’s house to Yvonne’s 
bears interesting parallels with the way the interview narrative unfolded, both in 
the life events reported, and in the particular discursive deployments used.  There 
is a recurrent pattern in the accounts the sisters gave whereby positions and 
narratives occupied by one sister are claimed and taken up by the other to quite an 
extraordinary degree.  Where one sister occupies a position – such as Olivia’s 
position as participant and host for the interview – the second sister will also 
adopt – or be adopted into – that position too: as a second participant and the new 
host.  I will point to more of these movements below as an integral feature of my 
analysis. 
I move now to drawing out the contrasting accounts of their careers the 
two sisters offer: one a readily recognisable untroubled account of success; the 
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other a more complicated and precarious account of difficulties faced.  For ease of 
reference I just want to point again to the device I use at the start of each extract 
[xx:xx/yy:yy] identifying its location within the interview overall.  This allows 
each extract to be understood in chronological relation to the others.  This next 
extract for example begins one minute 33 seconds into the recording.  Up to this 
point I had prefaced the interview in typical fashion, thanking the sisters for 
taking part, reminding them the interview was being recorded, and that they could 
stop the recording at any time.  I continue:       
Extract 40. 
[01:33/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Jean  so just to start (.) a really general question (.) if you think about 
that notion of success (.) and failure (.) and being good enough 
(.) for you what does that conjure up 
Yvonne ((laughter)) do you mean personally  
Jean  ok (.) yeah 
Yvonne personally (.) hh (.) about me- I don’t know- because what I see 
is (.) I was (.) perceiving it that you’re querying- so it’s like 
what what am I happy about with my life [and what I’m not (.) 
so (.)  
Jean                                                                      [mm 
Yvonne I am really (.) proud that I’m a bank manager 
Jean   yeah  
Yvonne y’know it’s what I’ve always wanted to do (.) and (.) part of the 
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14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
reason I love my job is because I’m so proud  
Jean mm  
Yvonne that I’m the:re (.) and that I’ve done it and (.) I do love my job 
(.) and (.) yeah I admit it y’know if someone says to me what do 
you do (.) and I say I’m a bank manager 
Jean  ye:ah 
Yvonne yeah I’m proud of saying that 
 
My question was addressed to both sisters (although even with field notes I can 
confirm few of the visual cues such as eye contact or gestures by or to one or 
other speaker).  The extract shows Yvonne was the first to take up my question 
and she began by clarifying the task, ‘do you mean personally’ (line 4).  In lines 7 
and 8, Yvonne performs the same act of translation from ‘success’ to ‘happiness’ 
illustrated in chapter 6, ‘so it’s like what what am I happy about with my life and 
what I’m not’ (lines 7-8); and then tells me about her pride in her job as a bank 
manager.  This is a highly effective start for Yvonne in negotiating the accounting 
task at hand.  Immediately she is able to position herself as professionally and 
psychologically successful.  In this short piece she iterates and reiterates her pride 
(lines, 11, 14, and 20), and her job title (lines 11 and 18).  Her pride is placed in 
her achievement: ‘part of the reason I love my job is because I’m so proud …that 
I’m the:re (.) and that I’ve done it’ (lines 13-16).  But, Yvonne also explicitly 
presents her job title as a source of pleasure when used as a way of identifying 
herself to people, ‘and (.) yeah I admit it y’know if someone says to me what do 
you do (.) and I say I’m a bank manager… yeah I’m proud of saying that’ (lines 
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17-20).15   
 This practice of ‘identification’ is reminiscent of Paula’s talk from the 
beginning of chapter 5.  There Paula and I shared a co-construction of the trouble 
inherent in addressing this ‘what do you do’ question from others, and what kinds 
of answers might pass.  Both Paula and I had orientated to ‘housewife’ as an 
‘inadequate’ answer (see page 160, lines 140-149).  Yvonne also implicitly picks 
this up.  She is able to answer the question in quite different terms:  ‘I’m a bank 
manager… I’m proud of saying that’ (lines 18-20).  Notably, both women, 
Yvonne here and Paula earlier, orientate to this kind of identity accountability as 
an ordinary everyday occurrence.  Moreover, the identity positions one has 
available in response are recognised as a lived problem, a form of positioning 
which carries evaluative consequence.  
 Yvonne is able to cram even more successful positioning into this short 
extract though.  She says being a bank manager is ‘what I’ve always wanted to 
do’ (line 13).  This adds another layer of success on success:  not only is she in a 
career which gives her pride; but it is presented as the fulfilment of lifelong 
desire. 
 A similar feature in talk was identified by Taylor and Littleton (2006) in 
their ‘Creative Journeys’ project on artists’ accounts of their lives.  Their analysis 
pointed to the way speakers construct a ‘lifelong coherence’ in identity narratives 
to vindicate career choices.  Their study showed a pattern in the way artists 
                                               
15
 This interview was conducted in 2007.  A year later saw the start of a crisis in the international 
banking system, the collapse of several banks, rising unemployment and a threatened deep 
economic recession.  Much of this was popularly laid at the door of the banking industry.  This 
leaves me to speculate whether this ‘pride in being a bank manager’ is a discursive position 
Yvonne would be able to take up in quite the same way today.  This points to how intimately the 
mobilisations of particular identities are embedded within bigger, but still provisional, orders. 
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constructed themselves as particularly preoccupied during childhood in creative 
pursuits, drawing and so on.  This retrospective account, one which Taylor and 
Littleton note could easily be imagined of most children, was used to confirm the 
‘logic’ of art being central in their now adult lives.  Extract 40 here displays a 
similar connection of past and present.  The lifelong desire Yvonne claims adds 
even more to her account of her employment as a story of particular success.  
Working up a lifelong narrative coherence in this way also makes a psychological 
biography; it constructs a seamless, unified, psychological self travelling through 
time, and illustrates empirically the ‘doing’ of unified selves across time.  
At the same time, it is apparent that Olivia, who entered the banking field 
first, is not located anywhere in the account Yvonne gives of always having 
wanted this career, despite Olivia’s practical accomplishment of having started her 
career ahead of Yvonne.  Yvonne’s claim to this lifelong wish takes ownership of 
her career choice to herself, and represses any notion that she was following in her 
sister’s footsteps.  Adlerian scholars drawing on a psychoanalytic reading (see 
Sanders, 2004) might be tempted to call this a continuation of the younger sister’s 
unconscious dethronement of the older: removing the older sister from the 
account just as she removed her from her central position in the family as the first, 
and for a while, only child.  But, drawing on discursive resources for interpreting 
this talk means that if it is the case that the older sister is being pushed aside, 
being dethroned, it is achieved discursively through the absence of any talk 
recognising Olivia’s prior occupation of this slot. 
 Up to this point in the interview Yvonne had occupied the ground and I 
had been responding to her success story.  Olivia had intervened briefly to assist 
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Yvonne calculate her age when first appointed.  
Extract 41. 
[02:50/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Jean how old were you when you (.) 
Yvonne er 
Olivia well I was because you got yours just after me didn’t you and I 
was (.) 
Jean so you’re both bank managers 
Olivia I’m not any more but I was 
Jean oh right  
Olivia erm  
Yvonne about three years 
Olivia yeah well I moved to when was I moved to (.) well I’ve been 
well I’ve been in the CRU (.) two and a half years I did (.) just 
over half a year (.) three (.) about four years ago (.) that I got 
mine so it will be about three and a half years I bet  
Yvonne yeah 
Olivia when you got yours (.)  
Yvonne but then the first year I did it I also got (.) managers’ manager of 
the year 
 
These are Olivia’s first words (line 3) approximately three minutes into the 
interview.  Yvonne’s hesitation about how old she had been when she was 
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appointed (line 2) is taken up by Olivia as an opening to join in the conversation.  
Olivia’s comment ‘you got yours just after me’ (line 3) was the first indication in 
the interview that both sisters had been bank managers.  My comment ‘so you’re 
both bank managers’ (line 5) invites clarification.  Olivia tells me she was, but has 
moved to something else.  Before this conversation develops Olivia returns the 
topic to her younger sister, and passes the interactional ground back to her by 
addressing her directly: ‘it will be about three and a half years … when you got 
yours’ (line 13-15).  Yvonne resumes the ground and continues her story of 
success: ‘the first year I did it I also got (.) managers’ manager of the year’ (lines 
16-17).  Yvonne has additional components to her story of success.  Olivia again 
waits, making conversational space for her sister to continue.  The extract goes on 
(hence the continuation in line numbers):  
Extract 42. 
[03:17/150:53] 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Yvonne but then the first year I did it I also got (.) managers’ manager of 
the year  
Jean wow  
Yvonne now then what that is it’s like (.) I think (.) is it hundred and 
fifty managers (.) so out of a hundred and fifty managers (.) in 
the region (.) I won that (.)  
Jean and that was your first year? 
Yvonne that was my first year of doing it yeah (.) I got my- which 
basically means that staff (.) it was voted by by the managers in 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
your area and then (.) they sat round a table (.) erm (.) oh I was 
going to say normal people y’know what I mean like erm (.) 
normal staff  
Jean yes 
Yvonne and they (.) they described you (.) so they didn’t use names or 
[anything  
Jean [oh I see  
Yvonne they just described the person you were (.) and they chose (.) 
me so out of a hundred and fifty managers (.) and I (.) y’know I 
was very pro:ud  
Jean I’m sure 
 
Yvonne is able to add greatly to her account of success with these extra resources.  
Not only is she doing a job she is proud of, not only was this said to be the 
fulfilment of a lifelong ambition, but also she is able to present herself as very 
good at it and warrant that presentation.  In this account of her ‘managers 
manager’ award (lines 16-34), Yvonne’s achievements have been recognised by 
staff and senior managers alike.  Yet more, as Yvonne continues, this is also 
worked up as an achievement which has overcome obstacles. 
Extract 43. 
[04:03/150:53] 
36 
37 
Yvonne I think I’ve (.) personally I feel I have to fight a lot harder (.)  
I’m not (weasley) I’ve never slept my way to the top or  
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38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Jean   mm  
Yvonne y’know I’ve always felt ((bell rings)) as though (.) sorry that 
was my mobile 
Jean s’alright 
Yvonne erm I’ve had to (.) fi::ght (.) harder (.) because of being big  
Jean   mm  
Yvonne I think that’s stepped in my way being (.) fat (.) I’ve always 
been (.) big and (.) like I say you don’t (.) get any favours  
 
Yvonne constructs this obstacle to her success as her bodily size: ‘I’ve had to (.) 
fi::ght (.) harder (.) because of being big… that’s stepped in my way being (.) fat 
(.) I’ve always been (.) big and (.) like I say you don’t (.) get any favours’ (lines 
42-45).   
Drawing on this discursive resource of surmounting problems related to 
her size, Yvonne’s achievements are made even greater.  Yvonne presents herself 
as having fought for what she has achieved.  Also, by claiming that she ‘has never 
slept [her] way to the top’ (line 37), and does not ‘get any favours’ (line 45), 
Yvonne is simultaneously claiming her successes as her own, earned on merit, and 
distancing herself from this potential accusation women face that they (we) do use 
sex to gain promotion; and reproducing that accusation by marking herself out as 
not having taken that route.   
In summary then, Yvonne has been able to mobilise resources for a 
remarkable account of success.  She has achieved a career position in which she 
takes immense pride, having wanted this all her life, has had her achievements 
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recognised by her peers and has achieved all this on merit, despite obstacles.  
 At this point I move to open up the conversation to Olivia, although 
Yvonne does not relinquish the floor easily and I am complicit in this. 
 
Extract 44. 
[07:31/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Jean ((to Olivia)) and had you always known that that’s (.) what you  
Olivia no 
Jean ((to Yvonne)) ’cos y- (.) you said that didn’t you that you’d 
always  
Yvonne I always wanted banking yeah 
Olivia no (.) I never 
Yvonne for wrong reasons (.) I always thought it was to do with maths 
((everybody laughs)) it is more of a manager now (you) have to 
do things to do with maths but (.)  
Olivia there’s not much maths in it 
Jean well I would have thought there was a lot of- (.) yeah 
Yvonne no it’s people skills  
Jean yes I guess so  
Yvonne in banking (.)  
Olivia yeah  
Yvonne in’t it really (.)  
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17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Olivia and I (.) I didn’t know what I wanted to do (.) I’d applied to go 
to university and then at the last minute (.) decided (.) that I 
didn’t want to go to university (.) so:: (.) I just wrote off (.) to 
different banks (.) because in those days banking was a good 
job 
 
My question bringing Olivia into the conversation ‘and had you always known 
that that’s (.) what you’ (line 1) invited a direct comparison with Yvonne’s 
comment earlier about always having wanted to be in banking (extract 40, page 
296).  In contrast, Olivia says ‘no’ (line 2); and then as I re-emphasise the 
comparison with Yvonne by saying ‘cos y- (.) you said that didn’t you’ (line 3), 
Olivia confirms ‘no (.) I never’ (line 6).  There is no ambivalence here.  Olivia is 
marking herself out in clear contrast to her younger sister.  But, this leaves an 
implicit gap to be filled – if Olivia did not want to go into banking, how did it 
come about?  Olivia constructs quite a casual, opportunistic entry.  She had 
choices, but was undecided:  she could have gone to university but decided not to.  
Instead, she says ‘I just wrote off (.) to different banks (.) because in those days 
banking was a good job’ (lines 19-21).  This comment ‘in those days’ works to 
justify Olivia’s choice as rational, sensible.   
This is a much more circumspect opening to Olivia’s account of her career 
story - although I am interpreting my reading in the light of the whole interview, 
knowing with hindsight that Olivia is about to recount a narrative of troubled 
positions where she ‘didn’t hack it as a branch manager’, to use her words (extract 
38).   
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This sequence of talk, of not particularly wanting this career, functions 
very effectively to play down any suggestion of Olivia having a particular 
investment in the job.  This matters because Olivia is about to recount a story of 
trouble.  To position her entry into employment as something that was simply a 
last minute alternative to university, but not anything that deeply mattered, 
reduces the sting of the subsequent difficulties.   
This contrast points to one of the crucial observations for this chapter.  The 
contingency of having the two sisters together, where their stories are in 
immediate relation to each other, positions the two accounts in direct comparison, 
with each other.  This comparison is not ‘inevitable’, but the point is, all three of 
us in this interview do it.  It is an ethnomethodological practice in action.  The 
components of this interview unfold interactionally, intersubjectively, relationally.  
Olivia has to follow her younger sister’s remarkable account of success, and it is 
with a story which is less easily configured as success.  This is not just my 
reading.  Both Olivia and later Yvonne orientate to it in such a way as to suggest 
the same interpretation. 
 Olivia begins her account of her career path with a report of a conflict; she 
had been ‘passed over’ for promotion.  
Extract 45. 
[09:41/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
Olivia he’d obviously been ill advised by his (.) under manager (.) and 
had gone for the bloke because this under manager was very 
male [orientated 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
Jean           [mm  
Olivia and yet I was sat there going well I got that and I’ve got so and 
so and by the end of it he was like (.) e:::r leave it with me and 
within (.) four weeks I got my (.) y’know 
 
Like her younger sister, Olivia is also able to work up an account of obstacles 
overcome.  She had been passed over for promotion, had lodged an appeal, and 
was awarded her higher grade ‘within (.) four weeks’ (line 7).  Olivia’s comment, 
‘he’d obviously been ill advised’ (line 1) is a beautifully finessed touch.  It 
forestalls the potential query that perhaps this appointing manager had been right 
not to promote Olivia; Olivia provides an explicit alternative to explain his 
decision, one which preserves her ‘competence’.  Both sisters have a successful 
identity available to them here in the ‘overcoming’ accounts they work up.  
However, Olivia then indicates the promotion brought trouble:  
Extract 46. 
[11:36/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Olivia so (.) but I got it (.)  I mean I’ve I’ve gone through (.) but as 
soon as I became a branch manager I knew I didn’t want to be 
one 
Jean oh really (.) what was it [about it 
Olivia                                        [I hated it (.) I hate every minute of it 
(.) because people are not like me ((laughter)) (.) that that is the 
be all and end all of it (.) because I have always (.) I’ve gone to 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
work (.) I’ve done my work (.) I’ve taken pride in my job (.) and 
as far as possible have kept my private life (.) away from work 
(.) which sometimes it does come in (.) y’know but (.) but as far 
as possible I I’ve kept it away  
Jean   [mm  
Olivia [y‘know work’s work (.) work w- is an escape from whatever’s 
happening (.) in your private life works the (.) works the (.) the 
escape (.) but as a manager (.) it’s not the manager’s job (.) if I 
could have gotten on (.) got on and done my manager’s job (.) 
I’d have been quite happy (.) but it’s the little things li:ke (.) 
y’know (.) hh (.) I think I’ve been unlucky with the branches I 
got because I got branches with very big (.) staffing issues (.) 
unfortunately (.) if they’d have put me in a nice little branch (.) 
where everything was running smoothly 
 
Olivia’s comment ‘as soon as I became a branch manager I knew I didn’t want to 
be one’ (lines 1-3) is an intricate manoeuvre signalling some trouble.  I 
demonstrated in chapter 6 the way in which a discourse of wanting not to be doing 
something is available both as a warrant for terminating it, and as a resource for 
configuring a potential failure as a successful act of agency and choice.  
Potentially at least it might have worked in the same way here.  But, rather than 
pursue such a discourse of choice, Olivia continued to orientate to her 
appointment as trouble by pointing to her construction of what went wrong.  Her 
reason for ‘hating’ her appointment, Olivia says, was ‘because people are not like 
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me’ (line 6).  There could be some irony here, and the comment appears 
humorous and is followed by laughter from all of us.  However, the humour 
softens a position Olivia nevertheless maintains.  Unlike these other people who 
fail to do their work, fail to take pride in their jobs and fail to keep their private 
life away from work, Olivia positions herself as a reliable and efficient worker. 
The shortcomings lie elsewhere, in this construction: Olivia elaborates with 
details of her first appointment.   
Extract 47. 
[13:46/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Olivia I’ve got a girl who’s (.) from Canada (.) who’s been off long 
term sick and now decided just to bugger off back to Canada (.) 
no sick note no resignation nothing (.) I’ve got a lad who’s an 
alcoholic (.) got (.) attendance problems (.) etcetera etcetera (.) 
I’ve got an Asian girl who they took on (.) who didn’t pass 
probation (.) but because they were short staffed they kept her 
on anyway  
 
This is just a selection from a list of what Olivia is constructing as staff failings 
she had to try to overcome.  What I want to draw attention to however is what 
happens in response to this.  This is an illustration of the usefulness of this 
methodological pairing of participants who share knowledge.  In this next extract, 
line 1 below, I start to empathise.  I say ‘that sounds like a huge challenge for a 
first appointment’.  Indeed, reflecting on my interview style across the corpus, I 
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rarely directly challenge speakers on their interpretations, and never on the 
‘factuality’ of their biographical accounts.  This story was being ‘accepted’ by me 
and I am a collaborator here in co-constructing it as a reasonable account.  In 
contrast, Yvonne is ready to challenge Olivia’s interpretation of what went wrong.   
Extract 48. 
[14:40/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Jean that sounds like a huge challenge for a first [appointment 
Olivia                                                                       [yes (.)      and now 
I’m not the person who’s going to say (.) oh come here lets give 
you a hug 
Yvonne that’s it 
Olivia I’m not a huggy person  
Yvonne not being 
Olivia I’m sorry (.) [I can’t do it 
Yvonne                      [I don’t think- what she’s just described is 
probably most branches [I’m not saying (unclear) 
Olivia                                        [it is and I can’t do it 
Yvonne but we are (.) to say we’re sisters we are completely [different 
Olivia                                                                                     [I’m sorry 
(.) can’t do it (.) can’t deal with it (.) 
Yvonne [it’s not just looks (.)  
Olivia [come to work do your job 
Yvonne yeah (.) attitude (.) now (.) I’m the sort of manager which would 
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18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
have took all that on (.) and (.) and I am the huggy feely type (.) 
that’s how I succeed by getting [all (.) all my staff 
Olivia                                                   [I mean I will huggy feel to a 
certain extent (.) but then I lose patience 
Yvonne (unclear)  
Olivia no no I’ll huggy feel to a certain extent but when it comes down 
to it (.) I’m only going to help you so way (.) so far you help 
yourself (.) 
 
There is a slightly chaotic feel to the transcript here as both sisters address me as 
the interviewer simultaneously.  Yvonne starts to challenge Olivia’s reading of 
events here by comparing her own approach to staff management with her older 
sister’s.  When Olivia says ‘I’m not the person who’s going to say (.) oh come 
here lets give you a hug’ (lines  3-4); Yvonne says ‘that’s it’ (line 5) and ‘not 
being’ (line 7) – which I hear as the start of an uncompleted ‘not being funny’ – a 
phrase Yvonne appears to start but leaves incomplete on several occasions.  This 
prefaces a disagreement. Yvonne says ‘I don’t think-’ (line 9) but breaks off at 
‘think-’.  She continues.  The branch Olivia has described as particularly difficult, 
with an unreasonable number of issues and expectations, is now constructed by 
Yvonne as quite typical:  ‘what she’s just described is probably most branches’ 
(lines 9-10); and Olivia agrees; ‘it is and I can’t do it’ (line 11).  Yvonne has 
removed Olivia’s rationale for the difficulties, and Olivia has agreed. 
 There is some tremendously difficult positioning work taking place here, 
with big implications for identity.  Gergen (1994) has argued persuasively that 
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taking up a narrative position successfully is relationally dependent on that 
position being recognised and accepted by others.  I appeared willing to accept 
and collaborate in constructing Olivia’s report of extraordinary demands being 
placed on her in her first post.  Indeed, one can imagine the way this story may 
have continued had Yvonne not been present.  If Olivia and I had been on our 
own Olivia might have been free to say something like, ‘I was manager of a 
couple of branches before moving to my current post at head office’.  That would 
have had the appearance of a conventional upwards trajectory, a straightforward 
recognisable story of career success.  However, with her sister present, it is 
difficult for Olivia to present it this way because her accounts are subject to 
challenge from someone with their own claims to knowledge, and someone 
willing to make that challenge.  The semiotic histories the sisters share are carried 
into this narrative moment.  Olivia offers an explanation that she was unable to 
make a good transition to her new post as bank manager, because of other people; 
but this explanation is challenged by Yvonne as an ordinary demand of ‘most 
branches’ (line 10).  Yvonne has refused the primary factor Olivia had offered to 
account for the difficulties in her first managerial appointment, and positioned 
Olivia into accepting responsibility herself:  ‘it is and I can’t do it’ (line 11).  
However, this is not a complete acquiescence.  Olivia accepts that she may have a 
part to play in this but continues to construct her staff as significantly at fault: 
‘I’m only going to help you so way (.) so far you help yourself’ (lines 24-25).  
I am reading Olivia’s position as a difficult one.  As the older sister she 
was the first to leave school and choose a career.  She chose banking and began to 
make progress.  Four years later her younger sister left school and chose the same 
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career.  She too began to make progress.  Both sisters speak of having to fight for 
their promotions to management, but both attained them.  The older sister, with a 
four year head start achieved a promotion to management first, but immediately 
struggled, she says.  The younger sister achieved her promotion soon after, and in 
her first year won a major award for her performance.  Olivia then is the older 
sister who went into the job before her younger sister, and has had a troubled 
passage through; whereas her younger sister has followed in her footsteps, and 
achieved a quicker, smoother, and more successful passage through.  
 The narrative resources Olivia has, told in proximity to Yvonne’s story, 
and Yvonne, means Olivia has to work hard to be seen as an successful achieving 
woman.  This is how I understand extract 38 from Olivia:  ‘divorced (.) didn’t 
hack it as a branch manager (.) still living at home with parents’ (lines 2-3).  
Olivia is not recounting a story of failure when she says this.  Instead, she is 
working hard to construct, inhabit, and have accepted a position of ‘success’, of 
sometimes extreme adversity overcome, bringing her ‘to a place where I’m (.) 
happy with myself (.) strong again (lines 6-7).  This repertoire of adversity 
making one strong is the same as that used by Nora when she was describing her 
marriage and subsequent divorce in chapter 6.  It allows a re-fashioning of failure; 
but its receipt cannot be controlled.  Indeed Olivia herself invokes alternative 
readings, and therefore acceptance and recognition of her account of success is 
precarious even in its beginning.  I want to think more now about this notion of 
‘recognition’ as it runs through the sisters’ talk.  
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8.5. Interpersonal orders: occupying positions and struggles for 
recognition 
My interview set the sisters a task of offering up accounts of their subject-selves. 
Discourse studies have been very effective in pointing to the way in which part of 
the accounting task requires offering up a narrative which will be ‘recognised’ – 
received – as a particular kind of account.  The previous chapters have drawn on 
this legacy of resources to look at some of the intricate work speakers take on 
when they negotiate trouble and dilemma around, for example, what constitutes 
passing subjects, legitimising choice and so on, as they work with concepts of 
success and failure.  This notion of the ease or difficulty in terms of working up a 
passing career has been prevalent throughout this chapter and I finished the 
previous section exploring the way in which Olivia, the older sister, had much 
more difficult territory to navigate in presenting a story which would be 
recognised as its own form of success:  Olivia presented the counter argument 
herself. 
 What I want to suggest now is that this notion of ‘recognition’ – and 
misrecognition – forms part of the habitual way in which the sisters make sense of 
themselves in relation to each other and their families.  It works implicitly, 
through the way accounts are received, and explicitly through the rhetorical and 
dialogical negotiations on show.  I am using ‘recognition’ in three ways.  One is 
the negotiations (troubled or untroubled) which go into the receipt of talk as 
particular kind of talk, with particular kind of meaning, such as Olivia’s account 
of her (troubled) successes and the rejection by her sister of Olivia’s first attempt 
at mitigation.  The second is an explicit deployment of talk of recognitions which 
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I will demonstrate shortly.  The third, related to the first, is one of the means of 
achieving recognitions – the taking up and inhabiting of available subject 
positions, recognisable discursive slots mobilised in other versions at other times, 
and flexibly available for the new interactional moment.  This is not a new 
argument of course; it is central to the combined Foucauldian and 
ethnomethodological argument Wetherell (1998; 2003) makes in her extension of 
the notion of positions and positioning worked up by Davies, Harré, van 
Langenhove and others (Davies and Harré, 1990; Harré and Moghaddam, 2003; 
Harré and van Langenhove, 1999).  There are slots available as resources to draw 
on, to inhabit, in order to complete interactional business.  However, what I am 
pointing to is that there is an interpersonal logic, an interpersonal order in the way 
this happens.  The taking up/taking over of a previously worked up slot, is a 
habitual, routine, pattern of interpersonal engagement enacted by the sisters both 
here in the interview and, I am speculating, beyond the interview.  Taking up, 
taking over, each other’s subject positions is a habitual interpersonal order the 
sisters share in their family discourse. It so happens, that one of the components of 
the narratives that sisters take up, is an account of recognitions.    
This next extract signals patterns which repeat many times.  At this point 
in the interview Olivia has been saying she has been misunderstood by the people 
around her.  (She has just been talking about her A levels at school and I will be 
coming back to this later.)   
Extract 49. 
[91:47/150:53] 
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Olivia there’s other things I mean (.) er like with my granddad I mean I 
was (.) I was my granddad’s apple of my granddad’s eye (.) you 
see there ((Yvonne is rolling her eyes)) (.) instantly (.) huh (.) I 
was the apple of my granddad’s eye  
Yvonne no (.) but I   
Olivia (unclear)  
Yvonne no 
Olivia I couldn’t help being the ha- apple of my granddad’s eye (.) and 
I as a child (.) but this is something that other people don’t 
understand (.) as a child I tried damned hard not to be apple of 
his eye (.) so (.) I wouldn’t go and visit (.) now I now get 
blamed by members of the family well you never used to go and 
see granddad I used to go and see him all the time or you never 
went to see your granddad (.) but as a child what I was trying to 
do (.) was stop being the apple of his eye and let other people 
get in there (.) but it didn’t work but (.) as a child what can you 
do you don’t understand how to change things  
Jean   mm  
Olivia but I get blamed for that now  
Jean   mm  
Olivia but I couldn’t help it (.) what could I do  
Jean   mm 
Yvonne nobody ever blames you (.) not as I was never blaming you I 
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blame (.) I don’t know if I’d say I blamed what I (hhh) what I 
found hard was (.) he erm (.) he’d always favour her 
Olivia he did  
Yvonne I used to visit (.) she says I used to visit (.) and what when I say 
favour y’know (.) he’d answer phone is that you Olivia (.) no (.) 
is it you Glenda no it’s your other granddaughter you know this 
[is it I always came out with (.) 
Jean   [mm  
Yvonne and then I’d visit and you’d walk (.) he’d open door how’s 
Olivia (.) now when I got older I used to answer back it’d be 
like (.) I’m fine thanks granddad she’s at home (.) and it were 
like (.) and I’m not being rude but he was like (.) she’s not 
coming to visit you I’m visiting  
Olivia I wasn’t going to visit because I (.) I was trying to stop that but 
of course as a nine little whatever year old I was  
Yvonne yeah 
Olivia it doesn’t work like that 
 
This is a complex story.  Olivia presents it as a story of stepping aside, and of 
misunderstood actions.  She was, she says, particularly favoured by her 
grandfather, ‘I was my granddad’s apple of my granddad’s eye’ (line 2).  The roll 
of the eyes by Yvonne, and ‘you see there (.) instantly’ (lines 2-3) from Olivia, 
speaks to this being a (still) contentious story; and indeed the you of ‘you see’ 
suggests I am being called on here to witness this contention. 
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 Olivia’s story is that she had stepped aside to make space for a younger 
sister that she claims even as a young child she could see was struggling to find 
favour with her grandfather: ‘as a child I tried damned hard not to be apple of his 
eye’ (lines 10-11), ‘but as a child what I was trying to do (.) was stop being the 
apple of his eye and let other people get in there’ (lines 14-16).   
Olivia says her actions were misunderstood and she has been held at fault 
by her family for not visiting the grandfather.  Yvonne starts to disagree, ‘nobody 
ever blames you’ (line 23), but then stops.  Yvonne explains her older sister was 
indeed the favoured one: ‘he’d answer phone is that you Olivia … no it’s your 
other granddaughter (lines 28-29), and ‘I’d visit and you’d walk (.) he’d open 
door how’s Olivia’ (lines 32-33).  In this account of these early years with their 
grandfather Olivia was the one presented as occupying the attentional space with 
the grandfather, despite her physical absence.  Both sisters construct this event in 
the same way.  Olivia was in this relationship with the grandfather first, and 
Yvonne the younger sister was fighting for space which her older sister occupied 
even when she was absent.  Just a short moment later in this section of the 
interview both sisters speak explicitly about Yvonne not being recognised: 
Extract 50. 
[94:28/150:53] 
1 
2 
Yvonne I was never (.) the favourite (.) which didn’t bother (.) it wasn’t 
being the favourite it was just being (.) recognised maybe  
 
And again shortly after: 
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Extract 51. 
[95:09/150:53] 
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Yvonne it it’s back to being unjust like I say I don’t blame (.) you as 
such (.) y’know it’s my granddad I blame but I thought (.) I felt 
like (.) what do I need to do  
Jean   mm  
Yvonne I visit you (.) I visit you (.) every other night if not ev- y’know 
(.) one bit (.) it were every night (.) y’know I were coming 
home from work and going straight off to see him  
Jean   mm  
Yvonne to put pressure off my mum (.) and (.) 
Olivia yeah for me it’s other way around because what’d I had to do to 
stop him being like he was (.) it didn’t matter what I did  
Jean   mm  
Olivia he wouldn’t (.) recognise anybody else  
 
We do not know if this is how things ‘actually’ happened; but we know it is how 
the two women co-construct it here.  Olivia and Yvonne share a semiotic order 
that Yvonne has grown up struggling to follow her sister; to occupy some of the 
space taken up by her sister, and to be recognised herself.  What is also evident 
though, is that both sisters claim a misrecognition.  Both construct struggles to 
make themselves visible:  Yvonne, in her relationship with her grandfather; and 
Olivia, for her unrecognised attempt to fix this.  Yvonne was the granddaughter 
who was there ‘every night’ (extract 51 line 6), she would telephone her 
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grandfather (extract 49 line 28), visit him (extract 49 line 32), try to take the 
‘pressure off’ her mother when her grandfather was ill, and all the time not being 
recognised by the recipient of all this care.  Olivia however, was also telling a 
story of being unrecognised in her efforts to make space for her sister.  But, what 
is interesting, is this (mis)recognition recurs in various forms throughout the 
interview.   
 What I am developing here is an illustration of an account both sisters 
share of a younger sibling struggling to live up to the image of her older sister.  
The older sister is constructed as effortlessly successful as a youngster; at least in 
her relationships with her grandfather.  The younger sister was constantly working 
out how to inhabit some of that space.  I am speculating that these early identity 
practices have sedimented into habitual practices for what comes later as the 
younger sister routinely works to step into the space her sister has occupied. 
This is reflected succinctly in this next pair of exchanges where both 
sisters recount their hard work completing their A levels.  What is remarkable 
here is how two apparently different stories, stories which attend to working up 
difference between the sisters, end up in almost exactly the same place, with the 
younger sister taking up the precise narrative capital her older sister has been 
utilising and making it her own for this interactional moment.   
Extract 52. 
[87:01/150:53] 
1 
2 
Yvonne growing up (.) things that I will never ever forget (.) my dad 
saying to me (.) the way you carry on it might be you that goes 
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to university if you want (.) and I remember thinking (.) oh so 
weren’t (.) I ever considered for university  
Jean   yeah  
Yvonne you see we’re very different in the fact that (.) Olivia (.) can (.) 
scrape (.)  
Olivia I don’t have to [(unclear) 
Yvonne                         [she don’t have to work but she can scrape 
[through and get 
Olivia [no no now I would say (.) up until A Levels (.) I worked damn 
hard for my A Levels (.) now the problem is because I didn’t 
work hard for anything else (.) because I didn’t have to  
Jean    mm  
Olivia everybody nobody believes me when I say that (.) I worked 
damned hard for those A Levels 
 
Again, both sisters share the understanding that schoolwork, at least at a younger 
age, came easier for the older sister.  Indeed, this is perhaps a family logic on 
show; that Yvonne was not expected to achieve as much as her older sister Olivia.  
Yvonne reports a comment by her father suggesting that she might go to 
university, as if that were contrary to expectations.  Both sisters knit together this 
identity of different academic skills in a kind of duet, ‘I don’t have to’ (line 8), 
says Olivia, ‘she don’t have to work’ (line 9) says Yvonne.  This gives a strong 
sense that either sister, in the absence of the other, would tell this story of school 
work in much the same kind of way:  Olivia passed her earlier exams without 
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having to work hard, whereas Yvonne was less gifted and did have to work.  This 
constructed difference is an organising framework the sisters share.  But, it 
becomes complicated by Olivia asking for recognition for having worked hard 
after all.  ‘I would say (.) up until A Levels (.) I worked damn hard for my A 
Levels (.) now the problem is because I didn’t work hard for anything else (.) 
because I didn’t have to’ – Olivia is continuing the family myth here – ‘everybody 
nobody believes me when I say that (.) I worked damned hard for those A Levels’ 
(lines 11-16).  Again the price is misrecognition in that others, Olivia says, will 
not affirm that account. 
 So far, the story of the sisters has been one of difference; this is the sisters’ 
story throughout – how different they are.  But, as an analyst, a different pattern 
begins to emerge – a pattern of similarities and recognitions.  In this next extract 
we are told that Yvonne also achieved good ‘A’ levels, just like her sister.  Again, 
Yvonne’s premise is that she is quite unlike her sister.  She may have achieved a 
career position that matches her sister; but this was against expectation: 
Extract 53. 
[97:06/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Yvonne and like (.) I’ve always been made to I mean I am (.) again 
proud of myself in the fact I am a bank manager (.) yeah I 
y’know it’s a known thing in my family I haven’t got any 
common sense (.) I am a bank manager ((laughter)) no but I’m 
a bank manager because I had learnt very hard on  
Jean oh I see 
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Yvonne what my job is and learnt (.) y’know  
Jean   yeah  
Yvonne that’s how I’ve done it (.) like (.) you say about (.) learning 
thing I I can’t learn things and it sticks I have to (.) y’know ten 
minutes later I’ve forgotten what I’ve read I have to really (.) 
concentrate (.) so like I’m proud of the fact that (.) yeah I get I 
get the feeling growing up (.) that my mum and dad didn’t ever 
think (.) when I say don’t think that I’d amount to much I don’t 
mean they put me down or (.) were nasty to me or (.) but it were 
comments like that oh you might get to uni I thought oh so you 
were obviously [didn’t think I were clever enough or 
Jean                             [mm 
Olivia you had a poor start though didn’t you because you you didn’t 
start reading till you were 
Yvonne my mum 
Olivia god knows what age 
Yvonne has this (.) thing where she gets an idea in her head and you 
cannot move it [ever 
Olivia                          [oh god (.) it’s like concrete 
Yvonne I could be a s- I mean I worked damn hard at school and I 
weren’t a straight A student but I got  
Jean    mm 
Yvonne good grades but I had to work hard at them I mean my best 
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30 mate always jokes with everyone that I were a swat  
 
Again, everyone invoked here is constructed as agreeing that Yvonne is less 
academically able.  ‘I can’t learn things and it sticks … I have to really (.) 
concentrate’ (lines 10-12); ‘I got the feeling growing up (.) that my mum and dad 
didn’t ever think … I’d amount to much’ (lines 12-14).  Olivia adds Yvonne was a 
late reader, she ‘had a poor start’ (line 19).  The reference to their mother is 
explained later in the interview when Yvonne describes her mother requesting 
extra help from Yvonne’s school for her reading.  What happens here though is 
very interesting.  Whilst still maintaining their academic differences, Yvonne is 
now quietly, explicitly, taking up the precise narrative her sister has just been 
inhabiting in extract 52.  There, and repeated several times elsewhere, Olivia had 
said ‘I worked damn hard for my A levels’ (extract 52, lines 11-12), and ‘I 
worked damned hard for those A levels (extract 52, lines 15-16).  In this extract, 
53, there is now a remarkable mirroring of Olivia’s words when Yvonne also says 
‘I mean I worked damn hard’ (line 26), and ‘I got … good grades but I had to 
work hard’ (lines 27-29).  Yvonne is able to take up, with ease, the precise 
narrative claim her sister had just worked up moments earlier. 
It is increasingly apparent that not only does their ‘order’ of things appear 
to be that Yvonne does much that Olivia has done; it is an order which appears to 
leave Olivia more and more on difficult ground, with fewer subject positions to 
inhabit as her own.  In the account the sisters construct for me in this interview, 
Olivia, according to the habitual family logic, is the academically gifted sister: she 
achieved good A levels.  But so did her supposedly less gifted sister.  This 
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position of distinction is now a troubled one for Olivia to maintain, although both 
sisters continue to construct it so; just as they co-construct the younger sister’s 
special efforts to keep up.  At the same time, the younger sister is also able to 
recruit her own account of success.  
 I want to show another even more startling example now; one that 
illustrates Yvonne does not just step into the positive positions her older sister has 
worked up; both sisters take up each other’s troubled positions too as the sisters 
introduce, and later compete in, narratives of depression and suicide. 
Yvonne introduced the notion of depression first as she responded to the 
photograph in Figure 17. 
Extract 54. 
[75:28/150:53] 
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Yvonne I don’t think there’s 
anything more proud 
than (.) have you got 
children  
Jean   no  
Yvonne having a child (.) 
children having (.) it 
don’t get me wrong its scary because you suddenly have this 
baby and think oh my god  
Jean   mm  
Yvonne I’m re- responsible (.) you see you talk about success and 
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 Figure 17.  Mother and baby. 
Photo: Express/Getty Images. Plate 18 in 
Appendix E(1). 
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failure (.) in the past I’ve suffered from depression (.) when 
before I had children  
Jean   mm  
Yvonne then since (.) having mine (.) I’ve gone through what they call 
baby blues (.) now (.) you go through the (.) I’m not good 
enough (.) I’m not good enough [for my children 
Jean                                                     [what as a mum 
Yvonne yeah (.) that they’d be better without me (.) sometimes (.) and 
then other times I think well no because (.) I don’t think- 
y’know (.) my baby’s face lights up when she sees me (.) she’ll 
do it with others but I can make her laugh within a second  
Jean   yeah  
Yvonne because she recognises her mum (.) 
 
The discourse of the centrality of children for constructions of success amongst 
the mothers in this sample is invoked again here.  Yvonne ties her sense of herself 
as a mother explicitly to questions of success and failure.  It is also worth pausing 
for a moment to note that Yvonne has another story of success to take up here.  
Earlier in the interview Yvonne had told me her first child was born following 
IVF treatment; but the next had followed by surprise, without medical 
intervention, and despite a continuing medical condition understood to make 
conception very difficult:  ‘I shouldn’t get pregnant’ she had told me.  It was not 
said in the interview, but one can imagine an earlier indexical logic in the family 
that if either sister was to have children it would have been more likely to be the 
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older sister.  However, at this point in their lives, the older sister has not had 
children, and the younger sister now has three.  Against the odds, Yvonne has also 
successfully taken over this position of being the daughter to secure the next 
generation of her family.   
 For this section, though, I most want to point to Yvonne’s mobilisation of 
a discourse of depression and baby blues:  ‘in the past I’ve suffered from 
depression (.) when before I had children … then since (.) having mine (.) I’ve 
gone through what they call baby blues’ (lines 13-16 ).  Yvonne was the first to 
mention depression, but not much was made of it as the conversation moved 
elsewhere. 
In this next extract which comes some 50 minutes later Olivia is also 
directly addressing the interview task of taking up identities of success and 
failure.  Yvonne has been positioning herself very successfully throughout, 
particularly in her career, her marriage of 14 years, and her children.  Olivia is 
now attempting to summarise her own position which is ambiguous and troubled 
in relation to Yvonne’s resolute claiming of success.  This extract includes the 
segment I first quoted in extract 38. 
Extract 55. 
[125:32/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Olivia I mean (.) a lot of people would look at me and probably say I 
wasn’t a success because (.) divorced (.) didn’t hack it as a 
branch manager (.) still living at home with parents (.) but from 
my point of view (.) came out of an abusive marriage (.) severe 
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clinical depression where I tried to commit suicide (.) luckily I 
didn’t (.) to a place where I’m (.) happy with myself (.) strong 
again 
Jean mm 
Olivia alright I suppose that the down side to all of it is that I’m still 
and I’ve got to learn to get over this (.) I’m still quite (.) I’ve got 
to this place I’m strong and comfortable and I’m not going past 
that boundary 
Jean mm 
Olivia and that’s probably just my  
Yvonne do you think part (.) 
Olivia my my [problem 
Yvonne             [part of your (.) not problem sorry (.) I see you Olivia 
and it it freaks me out (.) and I’m not saying that I should know 
about this (.) but I would question if (.) saying that you won’t 
you can’t talk to my mum (.) I know you can’t talk to my mum 
(.) you seem so completely different (.) if I’ve got problems (.) I 
will talk to my mates or I will talk to someone 
Olivia but that’s part of my problem why a lot of my family I’ve just 
said something that you didn’t know haven’t I 
Yvonne yeah you said you [think  
Olivia                                 [yeah (.) yeah  
Yvonne it doesn’t (.) I’ll be honest with you it doesn’t surprise me 
 
Chapter 8. Interpersonal orders 
329 
Olivia’s disclosure in line 5, ‘I tried to commit suicide’ was a surprise, something 
I was ill prepared for and it seems, something that had not been discussed before 
between the sisters:  Yvonne says ‘I’m not saying that I should know about this’ 
(lines 18-19) and Olivia, ‘I’ve just said something that you didn’t know haven’t I’ 
(lines 23-24). 
This talk of experiencing attempted suicide was, I think, a difficult area of 
knowledge for Olivia to claim given that it appears not to have been discussed 
amongst the sisters before this point – or at least, this is their orientation.  
Nevertheless, it was one which she did claim and tried to refashion as a way of 
reading success where others might read failure:  ‘I tried to commit suicide (.) 
luckily I didn’t (.) to a place where I’m (.) happy with myself (.) strong again … 
alright I suppose that the down side to all of it is that I’m still and I’ve got to learn 
to get over this (.) I’m still quite (.) I’ve got to this place I’m strong and 
comfortable and I’m not going past that boundary’ (lines 5-12).  
I do not want to dwell on the hesitations and repairs here which seem to 
suggest this is still a troubled position for Olivia to work up.  Instead, I am 
focusing on the conversation the sisters develop from this point.  I have been 
making an argument that the interpersonal habits of engagement between these 
two sisters are that they take up each others subject positions and discursive 
capitals.  In this instance, the younger sister had potentially opened the topic some 
50 minutes earlier in her brief reference to depression and ‘baby blues’.  Now, in 
extract 56 Olivia takes this further when she speaks of ‘clinical depression where I 
tried to commit suicide’ (line 5).  It is not my reading that Olivia’s contribution 
here is a direct reference back to that earlier comment by Yvonne almost an hour 
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earlier, although of course it could be.  Either way, the two narratives of 
depression and suicidal feelings are about to be placed in direct competition.   
At this point both sisters were addressing me simultaneously. Olivia was 
telling me that she traces her depression back to her grandfather’s disappointment 
in her for not being a boy.  This  is remarkable given that the accounts constructed 
above by both sisters emphatically present Olivia as the favoured one and yet now 
Olivia is claiming a troubled relationship with her grandfather: this had been 
Yvonne’s position.  While Olivia was telling me this, Yvonne was simultaneously 
talking to me about conversations with her midwife about identifying symptoms 
of post-natal depression.  This extract starts with both women appearing to 
compete for ‘expertise’ on depression.  Yvonne then moves on to also claim her 
own suicidal impulse.  
Extract 56. 
[133:54/150:53] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Olivia if you’ve got severe depression you don’t know you’ve got 
severe depression (.) you you think it’s normal  
Yvonne unless you feel [(unclear) 
Olivia                          [until you’ve learnt what [(unclear) 
Yvonne                                                                   [because yeah 
 ((unclear overlapping speech)) 
Olivia but at the moment I know I’m fine 
Yvonne there’s certain well I was made to (.) what had happened was 
I’d met (.) my granddad had died in the April I met my husband 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
in the October (.) we were engaged within six weeks three of 
them I were out of country (.) and we were married in the 
February so it all happened all quickly and I remember (.)  
Olivia which freaked my [mother out 
Yvonne                               [thinking (.) early hours of the morning (.) at 
the co- at the computer in our old house (.) thinking (.) I want to 
die (.) I want to commit suicide I’ve had enough (.) I I just had 
it (.) and the only thing that stopped me wasn’t my husband or 
anything it was my mum because I thought (.) my mum (.) 
would be devastated that her child had committed suicide 
 
As one sister works up an account of extreme trouble and suicidal feelings, so too 
the other.  This segment of the interview continued for some minutes with both 
sisters competing to have their version of depression ‘recognised’.  There is 
insufficient space to report more about the nature of the competition here but the 
argument I am making is, I think, now adequately empirically grounded.  At so 
many points in this interview the sisters take up and take over the subject 
positions and narrative capitals each has available.  This is the organising 
framework of the discursive recruitments they call on to make sense of themselves 
in relation to my questions and, importantly, in relation to each other – something 
which I speculate extends beyond the boundaries of my interview.  
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8.6. Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
The central conceit of this chapter is the notion of a repeating interpersonal order 
where the younger sister regularly takes up the subject positions previously 
occupied by the older sister.  The proposition is that this is a habit settled over 
time and practice.  This happens within a weave of institutional and cultural 
practices encouraging such a taking over.  Many contemporary technologies 
encourage, and indeed set up, the taking over the slots occupied by previous 
subjects.  For example, caring for the needs of a new baby in the family supplants 
the older child’s position as the youngest member; younger siblings in school 
follow older ones through the different grades and assessment processes.  Age sets 
up expectations of who might be the next to leave school, get work, marry 
perhaps; and have children of one’s own and so on.   These are cultural practices 
which are so familiar as to have a taken for granted quality.   
The practices of life mean there is a constant take up of slots that are new 
to the individual subject, but have previously been occupied by others.  My 
analysis is taking this speculation further to show empirically a pattern of 
interpersonal practice taking place within this research interview whereby the 
younger sister takes up and takes over the subject positions and narrative capitals 
occupied by her elder sister. 
This interpretation began ‘biographically’, as an account of two sisters 
embarking on similar career trajectories. This was a story of a younger sister not 
just following in an older sister’s footsteps, but outpacing her, and outperforming 
her, moving into and exceeding the subject position of success formally occupied 
by her older sister.   
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My analysis moved on to suggest this appears to be a practice which 
repeats again and again in the interview; it appears to have been taken up as a 
habitual interpersonal order through which the sisters organise their relations, 
their narratives, what they do discursively in the interview, and what they report 
themselves doing.  But, analysis also indicates that both sisters organise meanings 
around struggles for recognition, and two examples given here were recognition 
for their actions in their relationship with their grandfather and their hard work 
academically.  
I have suggested that there is no requirement to understand this as a 
process of unconscious and hidden systematic desires. The intensity and 
emotional charge on show throughout this interview is achieved discursively; the 
relationality here is a dialogic practice.  Projections onto the second sister (or 
other family members), identifications as certain sorts of persons, are not made in 
hidden processes; but are on display in the moment to moment deployment of 
each other’s narrative capitals and subject positions. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
This thesis set out to explore contemporary constructions of success and failure 
for women in mid-life in Britain in the first decade of the 21st century, and to 
provide some empirical analysis of the monolithic sociological narratives of 
neoliberalism and individualisation as these get taken up in discursive practices.  
Further, it set out to make a contribution to current psychosocial debates and in 
particular the dialogue between a discursive psychosocial psychology and a 
psychoanalytic psychosocial psychology, both in terms of the nature of the person 
and appropriate methods for accessing that knowledge. 
 My analytic assumption throughout has been that language is social action 
constituting worlds.  My interests have been in implications for understanding the 
formations of subjects, subjectivity and identity; in the psychologisation and 
individualisation of subjects; and with an analytic attention on a synthesis of fine-
grained orders in interaction along with broader cultural and ideological orders of 
meaning making.  
 In 9.1. I summarise the contributions to literature, beginning with a 
summary of my analyses; then reviewing my demonstration of a multilayered 
analytic focus.  I consider my contribution to understanding how the grand 
narratives of neoliberalism and individualisation are taken up in mundane 
discursive practices and I discuss my contribution to current debates between 
discursive and psychoanalytic psychosocial psychologies.  In 9.2. I reflect on the 
research and consider future directions, finishing in 9.3. with some closing 
remarks. 
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9.1. Summarising the contributions 
The empirical work in the thesis makes a substantive contribution to literature on 
women in mid-life and constructions of success and failure and the implications 
for the formation of subjects and identities.  It illustrates the richness and depth of 
the discursive environment for this group, with a focus on the lived out 
ideological dilemmas as speakers work up different concerns around the concepts 
of successful and failing subjects, both in terms of their selves, and others. 
My analysis throughout chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 has shown what a rich 
resource these interviews, in combination with the use of photographs, have been 
here for exploring consequential discursive action around taking up positions of 
success and failure, the identity work taking place, and some of the implications 
for subjects and subjectivity.  They have generated rich access to the meaning 
making resources the women in this sample have for making sense of themselves 
and other women as certain sorts of subjects.  I have argued that success and 
failure are not simple binaries where success is orientated to as uncomplicatedly 
good and failure uncomplicatedly troubled. Instead, success and failure are 
worked rhetorically in a range of shifting ways according to moment to moment 
interactional business. 
In chapter 5, despite suggestions that discourses of ‘family’ may be less 
important in contemporary climates of individualisation, the talk in this study 
shows that family, enduring relationships, and managing a balance between paid 
work and family are centrally prioritised in the way women in this study work up 
passing identities.  This is mediated though by dilemmas of the adequacy and 
sufficiency of subject positions of ‘housewife’ and ‘mother’ as constituents of 
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identities and whether they may be accepted as forms of success or be understood 
as deficient.  These dilemmas were temporarily resolved through recruiting 
alternative intersecting identities.  Privileging ‘family’ as a priority was orientated 
to as ‘sufficient’ when it was accompanied by alternative co-existing positions.  In 
the process, this reproduced notions that some subject positions, on their own, are 
deficient and inadequate.  
 In chapter 6 I turned to the making of particular kinds of psychologised 
subjects:  ones taking up discursive performances of modesty, agency, and 
emotional capitals.  As speakers constructed themselves as (usually) successful 
and (rarely) failing subjects, they were frequently constructing themselves as 
living out particular kinds of individualised, psychologised selves, rich in the right 
emotional capitals and moral, relational, agentic, competences.  Despite current 
cultural imperatives to be a materially successful self, managing claims of success 
and failure incorporated not only making particular kinds of claims, especially to 
sufficiency, but making them in the right kinds of way, in moderation and with 
modesty.  The alternative was to risk a charge of psychological deficit in needing 
material possessions.   Talk of ‘happiness’ was shown to be discursive capital 
which can be employed to outrank other forms of success.  Moreover, 
contemporary success as it is constructed here appears to require claims to 
happiness as a crucial kind of psychological accomplishment for the successful 
subject. 
Choice was also marked out as a particular element of the successful or 
failing self, and of the individualisation of the self.  Simultaneously participants 
marked out ‘choice’ as one of the distinguishing characteristics separating their 
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own and previous generations of women.  Yet, at the same time, participants 
construct an ‘I’ who is both compelled to make choice; and judged according to 
the quality of choices made.  In the process, successful identities are also 
configured as responsible, moral, identities.  
 In chapter 7 the thesis moved focus to constructions of others as successful 
or failing subjects and explored in particular the way speakers generated 
imaginary versions of others.  I presented this as the mobilisation of socially 
shared cultural resources where ‘imagining’ is embedded in the resources for 
making sense of the world.  But, I also argued the discursive imaginings recruited 
by participants could be shown to be rooted in personal concerns.  In doing so, I 
suggested that this contributes to theorising the ‘subject’ as one variably 
constituted in moment-to-moment discursive interactions, whilst simultaneously 
allowing the discourse analyst to take life history and continuities seriously.  In 
addition, I argued that the notions of fantasy and projection are not dependent on 
psychoanalytic readings of the subject, but operate as discursive practices in that 
when people make sense of their worlds they project onto objects and events 
historically situated and habituated concerns. 
 In my final empirical chapter I extended the notion of situated personal 
order to situated interpersonal orders; the habits of discursive engagements that 
sediment within relationships.   I developed an empirical analysis drawn from one 
interview with two sisters, and illustrated a repeating pattern in the interview talk 
where the younger sister takes up the subject positions and narrative capitals 
previously occupied by her elder sister, claiming those subject spaces for her own.  
I argued that while this relationship is a psychosocial one, there is no requirement 
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to understand this notion of the psychosocial in psychoanalytic terms.  The 
meaning making on show here is achieved discursively through the take up of 
subject positions and mobilisations of narrative capitals.  
A second contribution this thesis makes is a demonstration of an analytic 
style for a multilayered and productive discursive psychosocial psychology.  This 
helps move forward the debate around the synthesis of a fine-grained analytic lens 
for order in talk with a wider lens for broader orders of grand narratives, 
ideological dilemmas and argumentative threads (Wetherell, 1998).  The 
principles for this analytic focus were laid out by Wetherell, Billig and Edley, but 
with only a few exceptions (see Reynolds, 2004, for example) little empirical 
work has subsequently been worked up in a style that would be of this synthetic 
kind.  My thesis works up an analytic approach which throughout is focused on 
the social action of talk, but which understands that social action to be operating 
at local levels and wider organisations of discursive order; often discourses of 
individualisation, neoliberalism and the psy complex; but other differently 
organised discourses too, such as discourses of the family and enduring 
relationships.  This analytic contribution is delivered throughout the thesis, but 
chapters 5 and 6 provide the clearest illustrations upon which other chapters draw.   
In 5 and 6 I show how talk is embedded in multiple contexts, indexing multiple 
meanings, and how these may be held steady temporarily, but then shift in a 
dialogic tapestry of alternative readings.  
A further contribution of the thesis is to debates on psychologisation and 
individualisation.  Social psychology has joined little with these broad 
sociological debates and the sociological literatures here tend to be expressed in 
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monolithic terms, and not alive to the ideological dilemmas and conflicts lived out 
in practices in these discursive territories.  Discursive and technological 
encouragements to being the neoliberal subject are deeply at odds with other 
profoundly powerful normative strictures, such as expectations of modesty and 
self-deprecation.  Chapters 5 and 6 illustrated the way these grand discourses play 
out through contradictions, nuance, irony, unfixable argumentations, and not the 
simple rehearsing of neoliberal entrepreneurial discourse often presumed.   
In chapter 6 for example I illustrated the way in which local practices of 
calling up discourses of particular psychologies, such as happiness, both draw on 
and re-enact grand narratives of psy complex discourses and the individual, 
experiencing, self.  I showed how local orders of doing talk of choice are 
enmeshed in grand narratives of the neoliberal subject, one simultaneously 
produced in talk as both free and constrained; to have choice, but be impelled to 
make particular choice; to constantly risk dilemmas of good choice and bad 
choice. 
The final main achievement of the thesis is the contribution to current 
theoretical debates on understanding the ‘psychosocial subject’.  The analytic 
method I have demonstrated has also allowed me to say something in response to 
one of the central critiques from psychoanalytic psychosocial study, that discourse 
studies, with a focus on shared resources, fragmentation, and momentary 
productions, are unable to explain investments or commitments or take biography 
seriously.  Because discursive work in psychology often concentrates on fine-
grained analysis with attention on sequencing and interaction and practices, and 
sets aside the concept of an individual subject, it can create an impression that 
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there is a crucial gap left unattended and unexplained: this is the notion of the 
individual subject, with an analytic attention to life history and unconscious 
dynamics.    
Psychoanalytically inflected psychosocial arguments have argued that the 
way to address this notion of personal biography and interiority lies with the 
notion of the dynamic unconscious as a private, inner world, organising 
understandings and behaviours. 
 However, in this thesis I have drawn on concepts from discursive 
approaches in psychology to show that discursively led psychosocial study does 
have rich analytic and theoretical resources for attending to life history, to 
personal investments, to personal and interpersonal orders.  Again, this is hinted 
to throughout, for example in my analysis of the long extract from Paula in 
chapter 5 where I examine the making of biographical continuities through 
organising narratives joining pasts, presents and futures.  The notion of personal 
order is worked up more explicitly in chapter 7 where I illustrated the way in 
which particular discourses have resonance for speakers across a range of 
interactional sites and become regular discursive tools for addressing interactional 
business.  My example there considered Bridget, living out practices and 
technologies of the beauty industry, combining these with discourses of family, 
and work, and using them as resources to make sense of other women  too.   
Patterns of usage work out over time as particular discursive resources and the 
argumentative dilemmas they index are reproduced for fresh sites and tasks.  I 
also argued in chapter 7 that notions of imagining and fantasising about others 
could be seen to be a process embedded in discursive meaning making practices 
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and not require a theory of private, internal organisation to explain its appearance.   
 My method of pairing interviewees allowed me to go further though and in 
chapter 8 I explored relation dynamics in interpersonal relationships.  Again, I 
have argued that we can use a discursive lens to understand something of the way 
these relationships are taken up in practices, without needing to delegate this 
territory of the personal and interpersonal to the psychoanalytic.  I find quite 
plausible the argument Lucey (2009, in press) has made saying: ‘concepts such as 
identification, projection and projective identification … allow for the possibility 
that what happens between people goes beyond conscious levels of awareness and 
conscious interest’.  What I am not persuaded by is the argument that the location 
for these moments of identification and projection lies within the individual.  I am 
adopting Billig’s (1999a; 2006) argument in this.  These processes take place 
within external practices, within language, within the uptake of particular 
ideologies, within the playing out of ideological dilemmas, within the subject 
positions that get taken up and get contested, within the argumentative threads and 
discursive capitals speakers have access to.  This is not because there is an 
internal unconscious, dynamic ego-executive which makes it so, but because there 
are habits of engagement in language use: a habit of calling up particular 
resources, repressing others, calling up more, repressing yet others.  These are 
habits in negotiating routes through possibilities.  Sometimes resources are 
received as well-matched to the interactional task, and sometimes received as ill-
fitting and inadequate.  
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9.2. Reflections on the research and future directions 
I decided early in the study to focus on women as a direct response to the relative 
neglect of women, and in particular, women in mid-life, in much social 
psychology.  On balance I still think that was a good decision which kept the 
focus on women’s discourses of self and other women rather than any 
perpetuation of women as ‘other’ to men.  However, the absence of interviews 
with men does mean that my claims here cannot legitimately be claims to 
gendered patterns of behaviour and therefore this would be a valuable 
development in future study.   Similarly, given my argument that much of what is 
on display here is intrinsically connected to contemporary individualisation and 
neoliberal policy, valuable additional research would come from a cross cultural, 
cross national approach.   
 The broad scope of the research was motivated by a desire to see what 
participants would construct as successful and failing given space to mobilise 
their own discursive selections, and to see what would pass as uncomplicatedly 
untroubled and what would require more careful management.  This has been a 
particularly fruitful strategy for illustrating what gets marked out by speakers as 
passing and where dilemmas and tensions are made apparent. 
 I was aware during analysis that my first impressions of the interviews 
would be colouring the analyses I was working up.  Consequently, I have been 
careful to point clearly to those moments in the talk that have helped form my 
conclusions, pointing not just to the immediate local interaction but to the broader 
discursive resources recruited across individual interviews and across the corpus 
as a whole.  I have cited frequently and at length from the interviews, to allow 
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readers opportunity to think about the legitimacy of my arguments. 
As the interviewer I found the emotional labour required of me in several 
of the interviews highly demanding as participants occasionally dealt with 
accounts which appeared to cause them distress.  It seemed to me that despite my 
intention to allow participants to lead on topics, and to exercise care when 
working up co-constructions with them, my research agenda had placed them 
sometimes in discursively difficult positions.  Notably, all participants expressed 
enjoyment of the interview process on its termination – usually in terms of 
opportunities to reflect.  Indeed, my interviews sometimes appeared to offer an 
opportunity to celebrate achievements.  Nevertheless, the ‘trouble’ I interpreted in 
some accounts did cause me to rethink my sampling strategy as I discussed in 
chapter 4.  I elected not to seek out potential participants to fulfil demographic 
quotas on unemployment and poor housing because of concerns that these a priori 
criteria could also be targeting potential participants precisely because they might 
be expected to have more difficulty telling stories of successes and failures.  Of 
course, they might not have struggled at all, but this was something I decided not 
to pursue.  This points to potentially valuable future work sensitive to the 
discursive practices of speakers positioned in particular difficulty with discourses 
of ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘meritocracy’ and ‘entrepreneurship’.   
One interview was particularly difficult:  the paired interview between two 
sisters which I discussed in chapter 8.  This interview was particularly charged for 
several reasons, I think. Early in the interview I began to interpret Olivia’s 
account as one which had to be worked up with much more effort if it was to 
generate a story of success in the face of her sister’s account, and indeed in the 
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presence of her sister.  Both sisters actively contested much in each other’s 
accounts.  And, of course, there was the apparent disclosure of a suicide attempt.  
There was a discursive ‘rough and tumble’ about their interaction as the two 
sisters argued versions of events.   This was something I found difficult to tolerate 
and it provoked some anxiety for me about my responsibility in bringing about 
this particular interview event.  At several points in this interview I asked both 
women if they were happy to continue and they confirmed they were.  
At the end of the interview both sisters accompanied me as I walked back 
to where I had left my car and, to my relief, there was much laughter in their 
conversation.  Since then, examining their transcripts, I have noted occasions 
where both sisters would break off their ‘argument’ to check some apparently 
unrelated details with each other.  For example, during one particularly heated 
debate Olivia interrupted her own flow to check whether her sister had 
remembered to cancel an appointment with her hairdresser.  It is possible, perhaps 
likely, that their discursive rough and tumble may be a familiar, sisterly, habit of 
relating for them, and strange only for me.  Possibly my anxiety reflects my own 
constructions of the way such talk with my siblings would, I think, have 
degenerated into highly charged and more lasting argument.   
My analysis of my interview with the two sisters does suggest some 
potential for moving into therapeutic theories of the discursive constitutions of 
sibling relationships.  
Also, I am aware that my notion of the discursive habits of engagement 
suggests potential for a fruitful dialogue with insights from Bourdieu’s notion of 
the logic of practice and habitus. I suspect that debate may point to greater 
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flexibility and mobility in these discursive ‘habits’ than Bourdieu’s arguments 
might suggest, but this is another potentially productive debate for another time.    
9.3. Closing remarks 
I have argued that the understandings of success and failure are much more 
interactionally and contingently accomplished than previous study in psychology 
has allowed; that they are more varied, and more flexible.  More importantly, I 
have argued that talk of success and failure is not talk of accomplishments or 
losses, but is an identity project in action.  This is a morally organised and 
contested project, with orientations to evaluative consequence and troubled 
positions.  In addition, I have taken up the notion of the neoliberal subject and 
explored empirically how this is activated in moment to moment interaction to 
constitute the individualised psychologised subject it presumes.  I also note 
though, that speakers do not take on that habit of individualisation without 
contest; it is orientated to in some tension.  
 More than that; this thesis has developed and added to the debate between 
two versions of the psychosocial; a discursively led psychology, which focuses on 
the macro and micro fields of analysis; concerned with the social 
accomplishments of language in action; and a psychoanalytically inflected 
psychosocial psychology, calling on unconscious dynamics, inner worlds, and 
systematic hidden defences.   
Discourse study in psychology is still a young project and the multilayered 
analytic approach demonstrated here is in relative infancy: but the resources upon 
which it draws make it a prodigious prospect.  I have drawn on vital developments 
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in psychology from post-structuralist influences and the turn to language.  The 
influence of conversation analysis has been enormously fruitful for understanding 
the moment to moment interactional business accomplishments in talk; but the 
drive to a discursive psychology which turns away from the broader ideological 
tapestries within which and by which these interactions are shaped misses much 
that is most productive for social psychology.  The synthetic approach here, 
attentive to the rhetorical, the argumentative, to cultural technologies and grand 
narratives taken up in mundane practices, to shared social orders and personal and 
interpersonal orders,  makes this a rewarding and entirely psychosocial prospect. 
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Appendix A. Recruitment Poster 
 
Being Women 
 
Would you be willing to take part in this research project which aims to learn more about how 
women think about success and failure in the context of everyday life? 
These are the sorts of questions I will be asking: 
What does it take for women to think of themselves as successful? 
Do we worry about failing? 
How do we work out what counts as successful, what matters most?   
What are the failures that matter most? 
 Which ones don’t matter at all? 
   What are the things that concern you? 
* 
  I’d like to talk to women between 30 and 65 years old.  Would you be interested in taking part? 
 
Would you be willing to talk to me, Jean, about these questions, either or on your own, or with one 
or two other women you know, such as friends or family or work colleagues, etc.  Talks will be 
confidential and you will not be identified by name in any of the work that comes out of this study.  
If you think you might like to take part please let me know and I will send you more information.  
If you have any questions, please do ask.  
You can contact me in any of these ways: 
 
Telephone: xxxxx xxxxxx 
e-mail: J.M.McAvoy@open.ac.uk 
or in writing at The Open University (address below) 
All our talks will take place somewhere convenient for you so please don’t let that stop you getting 
involved.  Your participation in the project would be very much appreciated.  Thanks for reading 
this. 
 
This study is being conducted as part of PhD research by Jean McAvoy, Faculty of Social Sciences,  
The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA. Tel: 01908 274066.  Website:  www.open.ac.uk  
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Appendix B. Information and consent letter 
 
Dear 
 
A study of women’s personal stories of successes and failures 
 
I am delighted you have expressed interest in taking part in this study.  If you 
decide to go ahead, your involvement will make an important contribution to this 
project.   
 
You will be asked to take part in one or two informal interviews discussing what 
you think about success and failure and what these things mean to you.  You may 
be interviewed on your own, or with a friend or colleague of your choice if you 
prefer.  The discussion is expected to last about one hour.  The information you 
give will be used to explore how women talk about success and failure and the 
way we use these ideas to make judgements about ourselves and other people and 
the way we live our lives.  Everything you say will be treated in confidence.   
 
The discussion will be audio recorded and later transcribed for analysis.  All 
names will be changed to protect the anonymity of all participants.  Excerpts from 
the transcript will form part of the final research report as well as any academic 
papers which are published as a result of this project.  The data will not be used 
for any purpose other than academic research and teaching.  Your privacy will be 
protected and you will not be identified by name in any published work relating to 
this project.  A transcript of your discussion group will be available for you if you 
would like your own copy.   
 
This study is the basis for my PhD research being carried out at the Open 
University.  My research is supervised by Prof. Margaret Wetherell and Prof. Ann 
Phoenix of the Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University (address 
above).  The project is funded by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Open 
University.   
 
If you decide to go ahead, please sign the form below to show that you have read 
the information in this consent letter.  Participation in this study is voluntary and 
you should not feel under any pressure to join in. You are free to withdraw at any 
time and discontinue participation.   
 
If you have any questions or concerns please do contact me either by telephone, or 
by e-mail, or in writing at the address above.  If you have any concerns which you 
feel I cannot address you are very welcome to contact my supervisors for 
clarification.   
 
I have provided two copies of this letter which I have already signed.  If you 
would like to join in the project please sign and return one copy in the envelope 
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provided and I will contact you to arrange a convenient time for us to meet.  The 
second copy of this letter is for you to keep to remind you what the study is about 
and to make sure you have all the necessary contact details if you have any 
questions.  
 
Many thanks for considering participating in this study.  Your time is much 
appreciated. 
 
Best wishes 
 
 
Jean McAvoy, MSc (PRM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant:  Name (Please print)______________________________________ 
          Signature______________________________________________ 
 
Researcher:  Name ________________________________________________ 
          Signature _____________________________________________ 
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Appendix C. Demographic summaries 
 
Pseudo-
nym 
Age Marital 
status 
Child- 
ren 
Employment  Inter- 
view 
no.  
Inter-
view 
location 
Inter-
view 
length 
in 
minutes 
 
Interviewed 
alone unless 
stated 
 
Amy 34 Second 
marriage 
1 Part-time 
financial advisor 
 
7 home 82:39  
Andrea 35 Single 0 Charity worker 
 
17 home 62:03  
Barbara 44 First 
marriage 
2 IT trainer 
 
6 work 64:32 with Cheryl 
(work 
colleague)  
 
Bridget 41 First 
marriage 
3 Joint owner of a 
beauty salon 
 
4 work 34:57  
Cathy 50 First 
marriage 
3 Health services 
training manager  
 
3 work 90:29  
Cheryl 52 First 
marriage 
1 Administration 
clerk 
 
6 work 64:32 with Barbara 
(work 
colleague) 
 
Dot 49 First 
marriage 
3 NHS clerk, 
previously 
employed in 
family business 
 
10 home 64:3216  
Gail 46 First 
marriage 
3 University 
lecturer 
 
16 work 113:11  
Hannah 51 Divorced 2 Voluntary sector 
worker 
 
13 home 106:19  
Jackie 55 First 
marriage 
2 Methodist 
minister 
 
19 home 116:01  
Linda 39 Second 
marriage 
2 Care home 
manager 
 
8 home 112:36  
Louisa 49 Single 0 Social worker 
 
2 work 62:41  
                                               
16
 Remarkably, the same length as with Barbara and Cheryl 
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Maria 50 Second 
marriage 
 
2 Teacher 12 home 62:34  
Mel 46 First 
marriage 
2 Voluntary sector 
care services 
manager in. 
 
18 home 67:37  
Nora 58 Widow 
(second 
marriage) 
2 Voluntary sector 
worker, 
previously self-
employed 
 
20 work 48:02  
Olivia 37 Divorced 0 Credit manager, 
banking 
 
11 sister’s 
home 
150:53 with Yvonne 
(sister) 
Paula 45 First 
marriage 
2 Housewife 
 
 
9 home 124:46  
Rachel 52 Divorced 2 University 
lecturer 
 
5 friend’s 
home 
73:34 with Tess 
(friend and 
work 
colleague) 
 
Ruth 59 First 
marriage 
1 Retired nurse  
 
 
1 home 104:40 with Sue 
(friend) 
Sally 34 First 
marriage 
2 Shop worker 
 
 
14 home 124:45  
Sheila 59 First 
marriage 
3 Social care 
trainer  
 
15 home 78:03  
Sue 55 First 
marriage 
2 Retired further 
education 
teacher and 
nurse 
 
1 friend’s 
home 
104:40 with Ruth 
(friend) 
Tess 45 Divorced 2 University 
lecturer 
 
5 home 73:34 with Rachel 
(friend and 
work 
colleague) 
 
Yvonne 33 First 
marriage 
3 Bank manager 11 home 150:53 with Olivia 
(sister) 
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Appendix D. Question schedule 
GENERAL 
1 What do the concepts success and 
failure mean to you? 
 
If you think of women our age, either 
you personally or public figures, what 
do you think of as success or failing?   
 
 
 
• What  is it that makes that seem 
successful?  
 
• Does that relate to your own life? 
Have you experienced that sort 
of thing?  
 
• We talked about success; what 
about failure. 
 
• What is it that makes that stand 
out as failure? 
 
• Is that something that you have 
had to deal with in your own 
life? 
 
 
TOPICS AND SITES 
2 Work/career 
 
Is (paid) work important to you as an 
achievement, as a way of measuring 
your own success? 
 
 
 
• What would you say has been 
particularly successful or even 
particularly unsuccessful for you 
in regard to work 
 
3 Money 
 
Do money and material possessions 
count for you as a form of success? 
 
 
 
• What level of money or 
possessions counts as successful; 
is that a level you have achieved?  
 
4 Relationships 
 
Are relationships important as a 
measure of  your personal success for 
you?  Things like having a partner, or a 
husband, having children, being a 
particular sort of mother, or wife, or 
daughter, and so on. 
 
 
 
 
• Can you give me an example of 
what you mean? 
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5 Appearance 
 
I’m interested in how we judge 
ourselves, and indeed others, in terms 
of our appearance.  Some people say 
that there is pressure to look good, to 
fight signs of ageing, etc. What’s your 
experience.  
 
 
 
• Do you feel a pressure 
yourselves to look a certain way. 
 
• Is that affected by ageing? 
6 Being good enough... Some women… 
 
Taking all of these things into account, 
work, relationships, ageing, some 
women say there are environments 
where they never quite feel good 
enough.  Is that something you ever 
find yourself thinking?  
 
 
7 Class 
 
Do you think social class affects 
whether people are judged to be 
successful or not? 
 
What class would you say you were in? 
 
Are you in the same class now as when 
you were younger or has that changed 
in any way? 
 
 
 
• Is it straightforward for you to 
say what class you are in? 
 
• Do you think class affects the 
sorts of things you can do?   
 
• Is that something you have 
experienced 
 
 
PHOTOGRAPHS 
8  
Can you look at these pictures of 
different women.  Some are well 
known, some are ordinary everyday 
sort of people. It is just a diverse 
collection of all sorts of different 
people.  I’m interested in what you 
think about them in terms of success 
and failure and the way women live? 
 
 
• Are there any images here that 
you relate to personally? 
 
• Are there any images here that 
you aspire to? 
 
• Who are the successful ones 
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ACROSS TIME 
9 Life span 
 
Have your ideas about success and 
failure changed over the years? 
 
 
• Do you think you have changed, 
or 
• Do you think times have changed 
and it’s different for everyone? 
 
10 Changes you might make 
 
Are there things you wish you had done 
differently; 
 
And are there things you hope to do 
differently in the future? 
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Appendix E(1). Photographic images used during the interviews  
Photographic images were presented on laminated card.  Some cards contained 
single images, some multiple images.  That format is reproduced in the pages that 
follow.  The front of the card showed the images only, without any text.  The 
reverse of the card held a short caption to identify or describe the picture, 
followed by the photo credit.  On the following pages, the captions are included 
below each sheet of images for ease of reference.   
 
Note: no figure numbers were used on the original presentation cards.  Cards were 
presented in no particular order, and the order differed for each participant.  
Participants were encouraged to spread the cards out, look through them, and 
select the ones they found interesting and ones where they felt they had something 
to say.  Most participants worked fairly systematically through the whole 
collection, often gathering images into temporary groupings on shifting themes. 
 
Full photo credits follow at the end (see page 385). 
 
_____________________ 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright owner 
to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Chris Jackson/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 1. Joanna Lumley, actress, 2005 
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Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Maeers/Fox Photos/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: George Freston/Fox Photos/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
 
(Photo: Mike Lawn/Evening Standard/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
 
(Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2a. Planting potatoes, 1957 Plate 2b. Textile factory 
Plate 2c. Emptying the washing machine in 
a laundrette 
Plate 2d. A Soho prostitute waits for 
custom 
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Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Photo: Photodisc Collection/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Plate 3a. A woman pours tea for  
her family 
 
Plate 3b. A woman looks at a 
website on a kitchen laptop, 2002 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  
360 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Hugo Burnand/Pool/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Plate 4a. Charles, Prince of Wales and 
Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall 
 
 
 
Plate 4b. Charles, Prince of Wales, 
and  
Diana, Princess of Wales 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 5. JK Rowling, the creator of Harry Potter, receiving an honorary  
Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Aberdeen, 
6 July, 2006 
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(Photo: Werner Kissling. ©University of Edinburgh – Dept of  
Celtic and Scottish Studies. Licensor www.scran.ac.uk ) 
 
 
 
Plate 6. Miss Kate Maclean of Garrynamonie, South Uist, 1947. 
Miss Maclean  was renowned for her expertise in dyeing wool. 
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Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Gary M Prior/Allsport/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
(Photo: Clive Rose/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from 
the copyright owner to make available 
online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Kirsty Wigglesworth/ROTA/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 7a. Denise Lewis prepares to 
toss the shot during the heptathlon at 
the 1996 Olympic Games 
 
 
Plate 7b. Rhona Martin and the Great 
Britain curling team, Winter Olympic 
Games, 2006 
 
 
 
Plate 7c. Double Olympic gold 
medallist, Dame Kelly Holmes,  
Dame Commander of the Order  
of the British Empire 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Tim Boyle/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 8. Suzette D’Hooghe, 1977, learning computing 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Ross Kinnaird/Allsport/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(© UPI/Image Collection) 
 
 
 
Plate 9a. The Arsenal ladies, winners of the FA 
Women’s Premier League Final, 1999 
 
 
Plate 9b. Laila Ali (daughter of Muhommad Ali) 
against Valerie Mahfood, Las Vegas, 2002 
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Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(© Motion Picture & Television Photo Archive/ 
Image Collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(© Bob Willoughby/Motion Picture & Television  
Photo Archive/Image Collection) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (© 1978 Bob Willoughby/Motion Picture & 
Television Photo Archive/Image Collection/ ) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(© 1990 Gunther/Motion Picture & Television Photo 
Archive/Image Collection) 
 
 
 
Plate 10a. Elizabeth Taylor, Nicky 
Hilton, Rosalind Russell, Frederick 
Brisson at Elizabeth Taylor and Nicky  
Hilton’s wedding, 1951 
 
Plate 10b. Liza (daughter), 
ElizabethTaylor, Michael Wilding 
Jr., Richard Burton, Chris Wilding, 
and Kate Burton. C. 1965 
 
Plate 10c. Elizabeth Taylor with 
Eddie Fisher at their private wedding 
reception in Las Vegas,1959. 
Plate 10d. Elizabeth Taylor and 
Larry Fortensky, 1990 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Fox Photos/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 11. ‘Fruit Face’, 1939 
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Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Dave Hogan/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Paula Bronstein/Newsmakers/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 12a. Cherie Booth, wife of 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2005 
 
 
 
Plate 12b. First Lady Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, wife of President Bill Clinton,  
and daughter Chelsea, visiting  
Yen Tang, Hanoi 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  
369 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Robert Golden/Robert Golden Collection/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 13. Hospital Auxiliary, c. 1975 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: John Li/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 14. Nigella Lawson, cookery author 
and presenter, 2003 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Fox Photos/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 15. The ‘best ankle’ competition, June 1936 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Photodisc Collection/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 16. Cucumbers and mask 
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Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Dave Hogan/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Laura Cavanaugh ©UPI/Image Collection)  
 
 
 
Plate 17a. Duchess of York (left) and 
Victoria Beckham, 1999 
 
 
 
Plate 17b. Naomi Campbell (left)  
and Victoria Beckham 2003 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Express/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 18. Mother and Baby 
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Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: UPI/David Silpa ©UPI /Image Collection) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Frank Barratt David Ashdown/ 
Keystone/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Kenneth Denyer/Daily Express/ 
Hulton Archive/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Tim Boyle/Newsmakers/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 19a. Madonna at the Live 8 Concert, 
2005, performing with Birham Woldu who 
survived the Ethopian famine of 1984.  
 
Plate 19b. Margaret Thatcher, 
1977 
Plate 19c. Diana Dors, English film star. 
1958 
Plate 19d. Irish author Maeve 
Binchy, 2001 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: China Photos/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 20. Miss World, Unnur Birna Vilhjalmsdottir of Iceland,  
2005 
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Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Pictorial Parade/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission 
from the copyright owner to make 
available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Crown Copyright 2006)   
 
 
 
Plate 21a. Audrey Hepburn, actress 
(1929-1993) 
 
 
 
Plate 21b. Baroness Amos, the first 
black woman cabinet minister, joint 
first black woman peer and the third 
female leader of the House of Lords 
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Image removed pending permission from the 
copyright owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo:  Peter Keegan/Keystone/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from the 
copyright owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from the 
copyright owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from the 
copyright owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Keystone/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
Plate 22a. Pro-Choice March, 1977: Safe 
legal abortions for all women. 
Plate 22b. Women protesting against the 
lack of safe facilities for ‘battered wives’, 
1975 
Plate 22c. Wives of striking Derbyshire 
miners, 1972 
Plate 22d. 1982: Protesting against the 
distinction made by the judge and the media 
between prostitutes and ‘respectable 
women’ during the Yorkshire Ripper case 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Scott Barbour/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 23. Marble sculpture of Alison Lapper, 
by Marc Quinn, 2005 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Amos Morgan/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 24 [No caption] 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Monica Lau/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 25. Make-up and tattoos 
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Image removed pending permission from the copyright 
 owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: SW Productions/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 26. Mother and daughter 
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Image removed pending 
permission from the copyright 
owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Nancy R. Cohen/Getty Images) 
 
 
 
 
 
Image removed pending permission from the 
copyright owner to make available online 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Photo: Oleg Nikishin/Newsmakers/Getty Images) 
 
 
Plate 27a. Gardens… 
 
 
 
Plate 27b.… and markets 
Selling flowers for International  
Women’s day, Russia, 2001 
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http://www.paloaltolions.org/Tails/TailsText.html 
 
 
Plate 28. The cat or the lion 
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Appendix E(2). Photo credits 
 
Plate 1. Joanna Lumley, actress, 2005.  Original Title: Sea Princess. Photo by 
Chris Jackson/Getty Images. 
Plate 2a. Planting potatoes, 1957. Original Title: Planting Potatoes. Photo: 
Maeers/ Fox Photos/Getty Images. 
Plate 2b. Textile factory. Original Title: Textile Factory. 1968. Photo: George 
Freston/Fox Photos/Getty Images. 
Plate 2c. Emptying the washing machine in a laundrette. Original Title: Barbican 
Laundrette. 1979. Photo: Mike Lawn/Evening Standard /Getty Images. 
Plate 2d. A Soho prostitute waits for custom. Original Title: Lady Of The Night. 
1978.  Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images. 
Plate 3a. A woman pours tea for her family. Original Title: A Cup Of Tea. 1969.  
Photo: Evening Standard /Getty Images. 
Plate 3b. A woman looks at a website on a kitchen laptop, 2002. Original Title: 
Woman Looking at Website on Laptop in Kitchen. 2002. Photo: Photodisc 
Collection/Getty Images. 
Plate 4a. Charles, Prince of Wales and Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall. [No title.] 
2005. Photo: Hugo Burnand/Pool/Getty Images. 
Plate 4b. Charles, Prince of Wales, and Diana, Princess of Wales. Original Title: 
Regal Newlyweds. 1981. Getty Images. 
Plate 5. JK Rowling, the creator of Harry Potter, receiving an honorary Doctor of 
Laws degree from the University of Aberdeen, 6 July, 2006.  Original Title: JK 
Rowling - Honorary Degree Presentation. 2006. Photo: Jeff J Mitchell/Getty 
Images. 
Plate 6. Miss Kate Maclean of Garrynamonie, South Uist, 1947. Miss Maclean  
was renowned for her expertise in dyeing wool. Original Title: Miss Kate 
Maclean of Garrynamonie, South Uist. Photo: Werner Kissling © University of 
Edinburgh - Dept of Celtic and Scottish Studies. Licensor www.scran.ac.uk.  
Reference: 000-000-616-880-R 
Plate 7a. Denise Lewis prepares to toss the shot during the heptathlon at the 1996 
Olympic Games. Original Title: Denise Lewis of Great Britain prepares for her 
toss of the shot-put. 1996. Photo: Gary M. Prior/Allsport/Getty Images. 
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Plate 7b. Rhona Martin and the Great Britain curling team, Winter Olympic 
Games, 2006. Original Title: Curling - Switzerland v Great Britain. 2006. Photo 
by Clive Rose/Getty Images. 
Plate 7c. Double Olympic golf medallist Dame Kelly Holmes, Dame Commander 
of the Order of the British Empire. [No original title] 2005. Photo: Kirsty 
Wigglesworth/ROTA/Getty Images.  
Plate 8. Suzette D’Hooghe, 1977, learning computing.  Original Title: Senior 
Citizens Learn Computer Skills. 2003. Photo: Tim Boyle/Getty Images. 
Plate 9a. The Arsenal ladies, winners of the FA Women’s Premier League Final, 
1999. Original Title: Arsenal ladies. 1999.  Photo: Ross Kinnaird/Allsport/Getty 
Images. 
Plate 9b. Laila Ali (daughter of Muhommad Ali) against Valerie Mahfood, Las 
Vegas, 2002. © UPI/Image Collection (EBSCO). LVP2002110804 
Plate 10a. Elizabeth Taylor, Nicky Hilton, Rosalind Russell, Frederick Brisson at 
Elizabeth Taylor and Nicky Hilton’s wedding, 1951. ©  Motion Picture & 
Television Photo Archive/Image Collection (EBSCO). 
Plate 10b. Liza (daughter), ElizabethTaylor, Michael Wilding Jr., Richard 
Burton, Chris Wilding, and Kate Burton. C. 1965. © Bob Willoughby/Motion 
Picture & Television Photo Archive/Image Collection (EBSCO). 
Plate 10c. Elizabeth Taylor with Eddie Fisher at their private wedding reception 
in Las Vegas, 1959. © 1978 Bob Willoughby/Motion Picture & Television Photo 
Archive/Image Collection (EBSCO). 
Plate 10d. Elizabeth Taylor and Larry Fortensky, 1990. © 1990 Gunther/Motion 
Picture & Television Photo Archive/Image Collection. (EBSCO).  
Plate 11. ‘Fruit Face’, 1939. Original Title: Fruit Face. 1939. Photo: Fox Photos/ 
Getty Images. 
Plate 12a. Cherie Booth, wife of Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2005. Original Title: 
Cherie Booth - Documentary Filming. 2005.  Photo: Dave Hogan/Getty Images.  
Plate 12b. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, wife of President Bill Clinton, and 
daughter Chelsea, visiting Yen Tang, Hanoi. Original Title: Clinton Family 
Historic Visit to Vietnam. 2000. Photo: Paula Bronstein/Newsmakers/Getty 
Images. 
Plate 13. Hospital Auxiliary, c. 1975. Original Title: Hospital Auxiliary. circa 
1975. Photo: Robert Golden/Robert Golden Collection/Getty Images. 
Plate 14. Nigella Lawson, cookery author and presenter, 2003. Original Title: The 
Saatchi Gallery Opening Party. 2003.  Photo by John Li/Getty Images. 
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Plate 15. The ‘best ankle’ competition, June 1936. Original Title: Ankle 
Competition. 1936. Photo: Fox Photos /Getty Images. 
Plate 16. Cucumbers and mask. Original Title: Woman with mask and cucumbers 
on eyes. 2000. Photo: Photodisc Collection/Getty Images.. 
Plate 17a. Duchess of York (left) and Victoria Beckham, 1999. Original Title: 
The Duchess of York and Victoria Beckham backstage at Earls Court . 1999. 
Photo by Dave Hogan/Getty Images.  
Plate 17b. Naomi Campbell (left) and Victoria Beckham 2003. Naomi Campbell 
(left) and Victoria Beckham pose for pictures at the Costume Institute’s Spring 
2003 ‘Goddess’ exhibition and Gala at the Metropolitan Museum New York, 
2003.  Photo: Laura Cavanaugh ©UPI. Image Collection (EBSCO). 
NYP2003042853 
Plate 18. Mother and Baby. Original Title: Mother And Baby. circa 1968. Photo: 
Express/Getty Images. 
Plate 19a. Madonna at the Live 8 Concert, 2005, performing with Birham Woldu 
who survived the Ethopian famine of 1984. ©UPI. Photo: UPI/David Silpa/Image 
Collection (EBSCO). 
Plate 19b. Margaret Thatcher, 1977. Original Title: Margaret Thatcher. 1977. 
Photo: Frank Barratt David Ashdown/Keystone /Getty Images. 
Plate 19c. Diana Dors, English film star, 1958. Original Title: Diana Dors. 1958. 
Photo: Kenneth Denyer/Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images.  
Plate 19d. Irish author Maeve Binchy, 2001. Original Title: Irish author Maeve 
Binchy in Chicago.  2001. Photo: Tim Boyle/Newsmakers/Getty Images. 
Plate 20. Miss World, Unnur Birna Vilhjalmsdottir of Iceland, 2005.  Original 
Title: Miss World 2005 Finals. 2005. Photo by China Photos/Getty Images. 
Plate 21a. Audrey Hepburn, actress (1929-1993). Original Title: Portrait Of 
Audrey Hepburn. 1960. Photo by Pictorial Parade/Getty Images.  
Plate 21b. Baroness Amos, the first black woman cabinet minister, joint first 
black woman peer and the third female leader of the House of Lords.  Crown 
Copyright 200617   
Plate 22a. Pro-Choice March, 1977: Safe legal abortions for all women. Original 
Title: Pro-Choice March. 1977. Photo: Peter Keegan/Keystone /Getty Images. 
                                               
17
 Crown Copyright 2006. Website statement said free use for research, education, and internally 
for other purposes.  2007 says:  The material may be downloaded to file or printer without 
requiring specific prior permission. Any other proposed use of the material is subject to the 
approval of Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO).   
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Plate 22b. Women protesting against the lack of safe facilities for ‘battered 
wives’, 1975. Original Title: Refuge Needed.  1975  Photo: Evening 
Standard/Getty Images. 
Plate 22c. Wives of striking Derbyshire miners, 1972. Original Title: Miners 
Wives.  1972. Photo: Evening Standard/Getty Images. 
Plate 22d. 1982: Protesting against the distinction made by the judge and the 
media between prostitutes and ‘respectable women’ during the Yorkshire Ripper 
case. Original Title: Prostitutes' dignity.  1982. Photo: Keystone/Getty Images. 
Plate 23. Marble sculpture of Alison Lapper, by Marc Quinn, 2005. Original 
Title: Controversial Statue Unveiled In Trafalgar Square.  2005. Photo by Scott 
Barbour/ Getty Images. 
Plate 24 [No caption]. Original Title: Mature woman wearing glasses, portrait. 
2001. Photo: Amos Morgan /Getty Images. 
Plate 25. Make-up and tattoos. Original Title: Tattooed Woman Applying 
Makeup.  2000.  Photo: Monica Lau /Getty Images. 
Plate 26. Mother and daughter. Original Title: Mother and daughter (3-5) using 
computer, smiling. 2005.  Photo: SW Productions/Getty Images. 
Plate 27a. Gardens… Original Title: Woman Gardening.  1999.  Photo: Nancy R. 
Cohen/Getty Images. 
Plate 27b.… and markets. Selling flowers for International Women’s day, Russia, 
2001. Original Title: Russians Celebrate International Women's Day.  2001.  
Photo: Oleg Nikishin/Newsmakers/Getty Images. 
Plate 28. The cat or the lion. http://www.paloaltolions.org/Tails/TailsText.html    
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Appendix F. Transcription notation 
Transcription notation used throughout this thesis is an adaptation of Jeffersonian notation 
(see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984, cited in Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).  Notation devices 
were selected in place of conventional punctuation in order to direct the reader and analyst 
away from a conventional reading and towards a more deliberate analysis, but without 
obscuring readability.  Conventional spelling is used on the assumption that for this study 
regional accents had no particular interpretative meaning and orthographic representation aids 
readability. 
 
[02:33/67:37] each extract begins with a time indicator in square brackets.  The 
numbers before the dividing line / indicate the point in the recording 
where the extract starts; the numbers after the diagonal line indicate the 
total length of the recording.  In this example, the extract begins 2 
minutes and 33 seconds into a recording which lasts for 67 minutes and 
37 seconds. 
   
word words or part words underlined indicates speaker’s emphasis 
 
(word) words in single brackets indicates the researcher’s guess when the sound 
is unclear   
 
((note)) italic text inside double brackets is a researcher’s note, for example, non-
verbal activity, such as  ((laughter)) 
or directing the reader to figure numbers for the photo images referred to 
in talk 
 
(.) a full stop inside brackets indicates a pause 
 
[ 
[ 
opening square brackets aligned over two rows indicates overlapping 
talk     
 
wor::d a double colon indicates the preceding sound is drawn out 
 
↑ an upwards arrow indicates a rising intonation 
  
ºwordº degree symbols around a word or section of talk indicates noticeably 
quieter speech 
 
word- a dash at the end of a word or part word indicates a sharp cut off   
 
.hh a full stop before two letter aitches indicates an audible in-breath 
 
hh two letter aitches indicate an audible out-breath 
 
[…] ellipsis in square brackets indicates a section of the discussion has been 
omitted, with accompanying text indicates the duration of the talk 
omitted, for example, [2 minutes 20 seconds omitted] 
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